Transcript: EU-China at 50: The State of the Bilateral Relationship in a Changing World

EU-backed "EU-China Think Tank Exchanges" by CCG and European Policy Centre in Beijing on May 23.

This is the transcript of the policy dialogue roundtable themed “EU-China at 50: The State of the Bilateral Relationship in a Changing World,” organized by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the European Policy Centre (EPC), in Beijing on May 23. The roundtable was part of the EU-China Think Tank Exchanges funded by the European Union.

The policy dialogue roundtable was chaired by:

• Henry Huiyao WANG, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalisation (CCG)

• Declan Kelleher, Chair, Governing Board, European Policy Centre (EPC); Former Irish Ambassador to China

and featured special remarks from:

• Jorge Toledo Albiñana, Ambassador of the European Union to China

• PENG Gang, Former Minister of the Chinese Mission to the European Union

Contributors included:

• SUN Yongfu, Senior Fellow, CCG; Former Director General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce of China

• Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive and Chief Economist, European Policy Centre (EPC)

• CUI Hongjian, Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG; Professor, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University

• Daniela Schwarzer, Member of the Executive Board, Bertelsmann Stiftung; Former Director and CEO, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

• SUN Yanhong, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

• Franco Bruni, President, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

• ZHU Feng, Managing Director, CICC Global Institute

• Loukas Tsoukalis, President of the Board, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

with intervention from:

• WANG Yiwei, Nonresdient Senior Fellow, CCG; Jean Monnet Chair Professor and Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Director of the Center for EU Studies, Renmin University of China

The following transcript is based on a video recording and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Policy Dialogue Roundtable | EU-China at 50: The State of the Bilateral Relationship in a Changing World

Henry Huiyao WANG, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalisation (CCG)

Your Excellency Ambassador Toledo, Excellencies, distinguished guests and participants, colleagues and friends, good morning.

It’s really a great honour to welcome all of you to this “Policy Dialogue Roundtable: EU–China at 50: The State of the Bilateral Relationship in a Changing World.” This is really a very important, significant roundtable that we’re having at this annual event.

This year marks a significant milestone—50 years of relations between China and the European Union. It’s a moment both to reflect on the achievements of the past 50 years and to explore how we can strengthen cooperation amid a rapidly evolving global landscape.

I’m especially honoured to co-chair this dialogue with Ambassador Declan Kelleher, Chair of the Governing Board of the European Policy Centre, former Irish Ambassador to China—one of the longest-serving Irish ambassadors to China—and also leading this EU think tank delegation. This event is held in partnership with the European Policy Centre (EPC), where I think Fabian is also the President, with which CCG has worked closely as the Chinese counterpart in this EU-China Think Tank Exchanges.

We also have many of our think tank colleagues from different Chinese think tanks participating in this roundtable today. This initiative, founded by the European Union, has now been ongoing for several years, and it aims to build a long-term effective mechanism for exchange and cooperation between European and Chinese think tanks.

Over the past several years, under this project, CCG and EPC have held multiple exchanges in Beijing and Europe, producing research papers and analysis that deepen understanding of EU–China relations. Most recently, from April 22nd to 23rd, 2025, just last month, CCG participated in a seminar in Madrid co-hosted by EPC and Elcano Royal Institute. This seminar also brought a number of experts from China to talk with European counterparts and share insights on how the two sides can find common ground and work together. This was especially important given the renewed trade tensions under the second Trump administration and current global economic uncertainties.

50 years of EU–China relations have a remarkable history built on mutual respect, shared interests, and cultural exchange. This relationship benefits from unique geography linking Europe and Asia, and from both sides’ economic strength and innovation.

Of course, we have seen recently a great improvement. President Xi has talked with European leaders on the telephone, and we see a number of senior officials visiting China. Just two days ago, President Xi also phoned President Macron. And of course, we have many visits—Mr. Wang Yi was talking to many counterparts in European countries, including Germany’s new foreign minister. Recently, China also decided to lift the sanctions on members of the European Parliament, and the EU did the same, signalling a positive step towards improved relations.

Additionally, China and the European Union have vowed to jointly uphold the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core, and China’s potential accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also sees interest from the European Union. This would open new avenues for expanding the free trade area and strengthening global economic governance.

So, today, as we engage in dialogue, the shared goal is clear: to promote pragmatic cooperation, overcome geopolitical uncertainties, and jointly uphold and develop a rule-based international order that benefits both China and Europe—and, of course, indeed, a wider world. So, thank you very much for your participation, and I’d hand it over to our co-chair, Ambassador Declan Kelleher, to say a few words.

Declan Kelleher, Chair, Governing Board, European Policy Centre (EPC); Former Irish Ambassador to China

Thank you very much, Henry. It’s a great honour for me to be asked to be co-chair of this very important session. Henry has spoken very eloquently, and I very much agree with what he said.

Let me just thank the CCG for organising this session under the EU-China think tank exchange project. Let me also thank the European Union for supporting the project, and let me also recognise and thank think tank colleagues who travelled here and who’ve made the trip from many places, including Europe, and all the other participants who are taking part in these dialogues.

I particularly want to recognise our two distinguished speakers: Ambassador Jorge Toledo, who’s an old friend, and also Minister Peng Gang. And I think we look forward very much to what they will have to say.

I would also just, on a housekeeping point, note that there will be a closed-door roundtable this afternoon as part of the EU–China 50 project. And finally, if I may, I’d like to thank the members of the EPC team here—Fabian Zuleeg, Almut Möller, and also, in particular, Ivano di Carlo, who has performed extremely valuable preparatory work.

So, with that, I look forward very much to this session. I’m delighted to see so many old friends here, and I hand back to you.

Henry Huiyao WANG

So, now we’ll be extremely happy and honoured to invite a great friend of China, Ambassador Toledo, who has been here for several years and has often been a keynote at the CCG annual forums and also one of the most active diplomats in Beijing. We’d like to hear from you about this really improved Sino–EU relation, so your speech will be very helpful. Thank you.

Jorge Toledo Albiñana, Ambassador of the European Union to China

Thank you, Henry and Mabel. Thank you very much for inviting me. Thank you, Declan and Fabian. Thank you very much for inviting me for the third time to this forum. It’s the second time I’m addressing this forum because last year, I think something happened, and it was somebody from the delegation who addressed the forum. Always delighted to see you all here.

To see frank and free discussion happening in Beijing is always good. We support, we finance this exercise. I think it’s an increasingly important exercise, and one of the best examples of people-to-people exchanges that are increasingly needed in our relations between the European Union and China.

What I will try to transmit is my impression—our impression, I would say—the impression we have in the European Union, in Brussels, in the EU institutions about their relations between the European Union and China in this very particular year. It’s very particular because we are commemorating—I have spent about two weeks celebrating—our 50th anniversary of our relations. And this is an opportunity to take stock of what has happened in the last 50 years, to see what challenges we have now, and to lay the ground for a prosperous future relationship between the EU and China.

As you know, I’m quite frank. So, I will again try to be objective and try to be frank, but also try to be optimistic. This is a particular moment not only because we are celebrating or commemorating our 50th anniversary, [but also] because of the obvious geopolitical situation.

We in the European Union, China here, and the world need that we stabilise our relations, rebalance our relations, and improve our relations. The world doesn’t need another trade war. The world doesn’t need more geopolitical conflicts. So, we have a special responsibility in the European Union and in China to stabilise, rebalance, and improve our relationship, and not to add more problems to the already very troubled waters that we are witnessing in the world.

So, what has happened over the last 50 years? One thing is that the world has witnessed the most rapid, fastest, and impressive growth in the history of humankind: China’s growth. I remember when I came here for the first time in my life in 1989, China’s per capita income was 300 U.S. dollars. Now it’s 13,000. China was an underdeveloped country at that time. Now it’s a developed, industrial, very developed country.

Sometimes I’m told when I say China is no longer a developing country that “you must go to the provinces” and all. Yesterday I was in Heilongjiang, very far from everywhere. I was so impressed by the infrastructure there, and everywhere I go. I will dwell on that later.

So, we have witnessed that. And in the European Union, we have witnessed enlargement. In 1975, when we started our relations, there were nine member states. Now there are 27. We lost one on the way, unfortunately. But we’re getting closer again to the UK. And we have deepened our integration. By far, the European Union is the regional organisation with the deepest integration, where member states have to abide by rules that they have opposed. This is unprecedented in the world, and it’s affecting more and more areas of competence. And we hope that in the future, it will affect the very core of sovereignty, which is the political and security policy.

So, lots of things have happened in the European Union and in China. At the same time, we have increased our relations—our economic, trade, people-to-people relations—a lot. In 1975, the trade between what is now the European Union and China was maybe the equivalent of 2 billion euros a year. Now it’s more than 2 billion euros a day. Last time I checked, it was 365 times more.

So, the incredible growth of exchanges has also brought imbalances. So it is extremely important that now both the European Union—we are convinced in the European Union—but it is very important now that in China, they realise, they admit, that this has created imbalances and that some of these imbalances, as we will see, are no longer sustainable. So we need to address these imbalances.

As I said, we need to find common ground because it is very important for China, for the European Union, and for the world that we stabilise and that we rebalance our relationship. So, I know the Chinese government does not like the description of our relationship as three-faceted. You know, we say we are partners, we are competitors, but we are also systemic rivals.

Well, let’s start with the partnership. Yesterday I was in Yichun, in Heilongjiang, for the Biodiversity Day. That was the third time I went to a Biodiversity Day, this only invited by the Minister of Environment and Ecology, who finally couldn’t make it. But anyway, I went there for the third time in three years. First time in Kunming, second time in Hainan, yesterday in Yichun, Heilongjiang. I was so impressed by the massive forest and the biodiversity there.

But this is to say that we have a very good partnership when it comes to the fight against climate change, protection of biodiversity. We were key—China and the European Union were key—to the success of Kunming-Montreal and then Cali-Rome biodiversity action. And we were also key to the “success” of climate negotiations in Azerbaijan and in Abu Dhabi.

And what is more important, without our common action, more than ever, there is nothing useful we can do. I mean, now with the United States withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, it is even more important that we increase our ambition. We hope that the United States, even if they withdraw from the Paris Agreement, will help via the states. But in any case, it is more important than ever that we increase our ambition.

So, we have a very good relation. We are going to hold the high-level dialogue on climate and environment on the 14th of July here in Beijing, and Vice-President Ribera plus two Commissioners will come. So, this will be a very good opportunity for us to continue cooperating, and we will again be crucial for the success of the next COP on climate.

But let me say, what we are asking from China is very clear. We are asking China to increase its ambition. We know—I read the other day, everybody knows—that China has already peaked from a very high level, by the way. It has peaked in carbon. But we are asking China to put that in the new national objective because they have already peaked much before they were supposed to—they were supposed to peak in 2030. Well, they have already peaked, but we see a reluctance from China to announce a higher ambition and a shorter peak.

It is very important, especially now, we are also asking China to stop adding coal capacity. It’s not time to do that. Still, 60% of the production of electricity in China is produced by coal. China is adding more coal capacity than the rest of the world put together. And finally, China, although it’s improving, is the highest contributor to greenhouse emissions in the world, 30%. It’s true that per capita of the United States is higher, but it’s also true—I mean, it’s no longer true what China was saying a few years ago that historical emissions of China are lower than the EU and the United States. No. Historical emissions of China since 1850 till last year are already higher than the European Union.

So there is no reason why China will not have an ambitious target to reduce its greenhouse emissions. And there is no reason why China continues hiding behind a classification of 1990, which exempts China from contributing to global funds against climate change. There is absolutely no reason. China will very soon, next year or the following, be a high-income country. It’s already an upper high-income country. As I said, you cannot say—at least in order not to pay into multilateral funds—that you are a developing country anymore when you are, when China is the highest emitter of greenhouse gases.

And we have to tell our friends from the Global South, we know that China does South-South cooperation. Last time I checked, China was not in the South, but anyway, bilateral cooperation is not the same as multilateral. We are being criticised by China and others because we don’t put enough money in multilateral [funds]. We are, by far in the European Union the first contributor to these multilateral funds. We need China, especially now that the U.S. has withdrawn, to contribute and join us in contributing to these multilateral funds. So, again, we can find common ground and improve our partnership there, and we hope that this high-level dialogue will be instrumental for that.

Let’s go to our systemic rivalry, the other extreme of our relations. We have many differences. We have political systems that are different. We have a different concept of human rights. We have a different narrative of human rights, and we have a different narrative on rule of law or democracy. Fine. We are not going to change the Chinese political system. We know.

But let’s go to what has tainted our relationship for the last three years, which is the Chinese position on the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Yes, it has tainted our relationship. It has darkened our relationship. Why? Because no matter how many times we have said—myself and my European Union Ambassador colleagues—that this is actually existential for Europe, and that we cannot understand the Chinese political and diplomatic support to Russia in this case. We have been told about historical reasons for that and all, but well, for us it is existential. And when we see that China has been supporting in the Security Council and many multilateral fora the Russian position, well, this is a big problem for us.

We must admit that lately, we have seen some movement, like for instance, we recognise that China for the first time voted with us to amend a resolution in the Security Council, trying to add the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty to a draft resolution which—and this is what’s happening now—very sadly, was vetoed, well, of course, by Russia, but by the United States.

And we praise and we commend China for putting more than ever, I would say, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in the first place. We were told the other day there are four principles, and the first one is the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. That’s good.

But then the second and third principles, when we talk about root causes or legitimate security concerns as if they were justification for what has happened, as if they were principles that had to be redressed in any peace agreement, we cannot understand that. Because there is no legitimate security concern. There can be no root cause to what happened on the 24th of February 2022—that is what is happening every day. So, we don’t understand that in Europe, and this is a bad factor for our relations.

So, let’s see what happens now. Again, we have the opportunity to find common ground, and there have been positive movements, I think, by China. We are always told that China’s position on the Ukraine conflict is consistent a nd clear, but at least territorial integrity is put in the first place. I know that it is very important for China: territorial integrity, sovereignty, and also—may I remind you—non-interference in internal affairs, because never forget that one of the main objectives of Putin’s aggression on Ukraine was to topple the Ukrainian government. So these are principles that are very dear to China and also very dear to the European Union.

We have common ground—let’s work on it. And now it’s time for us—we are doing that—and for China to press Russia to start immediately a ceasefire for 30 days, immediately and unconditionally of course, because you see Putin is putting conditions that go directly against these principles that are very dear to China and to the European Union—principles like giving up Crimea or giving up Donbas, etc. This cannot be supported by China.

So, let’s find, again, common ground. We will have an opportunity to discuss this, by the way, on the 2nd of July, when Director Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Brussels to meet High Representative Kallas, who, as everybody knows, is very concerned about the Russian aggression on Ukraine. So let’s try to find some better and improved common ground.

And finally, let us see what has happened in what we call the competition part of our relationship. Competition, which we don’t mean it in the same way as our friends, the Americans. When we say competition, it’s competition. But what we want is fair competition. And forgive me if I say that we are not finding fair competition, and that it is not only not improving—it is getting worse and worse. Lately, it’s getting seriously worse.

I’m talking, and we are having meetings here in Brussels about the new export controls on rare earth and materials by China. We all read that in the famous Geneva agreement between China and the U.S., China was cancelling the retaliatory measures against the United States, which included export controls on eight rare earths and materials which are vital for many industries in Europe, in the United States, and everywhere. Well, it’s not happening. It’s not happening.

So, China is adding an extremely bad measure to what the EUCCC has listed as 1,580 market access barriers. Well, we have a new and extremely serious problem. I’m saying this because this is extremely bad for our companies who are finding that vital materials are not being exported from China to Europe. Well, after all, they were measures against the U.S., first of all. So not against us—it’s not that we agreed with that at all—but they were not against us. Then they were supposedly lifted, but not only have they not been lifted, but they are affecting our industries very seriously.

But let me talk in general terms to give you the larger picture of what’s happening. From 2017 to 2024, the Chinese economy grew 40%. The GDP in China grew by 40%, by far the largest, the fastest growth in the world. So, when a country grows so much, you can expect that the market gets larger for its partners. Well, the European Union exports went down by 30% in the same period. From 2017 to 2024, our exports went down by 30%. In 2022, the European Union–China trade reached a Guinness Book of Records—historical Guinness Book of Records—of a trade deficit. Never in history had anybody had a trade deficit as large as that. So in 2023 and 2024, in terms of value, it went down a little bit. In terms of volume, because of the Chinese industrial deflation, it went up. And the first three, four months, it’s going up very rapidly again.

This is not sustainable, and it’s not that we are looking for a perfectly balanced trade. We are not doing reciprocal tariffs or something like this. We want a level playing field, fairness, and we are faced with discrimination in public procurement—public procurement for European companies who are manufacturing in China. Some of these measures are making the business case for our companies in China impossible. I must say.

Now with the trade war with the United States, there is a trade diversion risk, which is very, very high, which is already happening. You can see it in the numbers of trade between the European Union and China in the month of April. And we are saying that we are not going to allow that.

President von der Leyen said when she came here in the last summit on the 7th of December 2023, basically, China has to really open up, has to stop putting barriers to our companies. Otherwise, we will start putting barriers.

But what we are going to do—what we are doing already, and we will do—is just reciprocate. Not with reciprocal tariffs, but for instance, in public procurement, if we see, as we have seen—it’s already proved in the European Union—that our medical device companies are being discriminated in public procurement by the Chinese provinces, well, we will do the same with Chinese companies in Europe. It’s only fair.

So, these kinds of things we need to address. And let me tell you one thing. We are discussing—we are having technical negotiations in Brussels and here—about market access barriers, about EV tariffs, about Chinese investments in Europe, possibly. That’s at a very, very preliminary stage. And now we have to start discussions on export controls and all. So we’re finding more and more issues.

And let me tell you something: they are not making progress. So this is very concerning. They are not making progress, so much so that we were supposed to hold a high-level economic and trade dialogue, and I’m afraid we are not going to hold it. Because I mean, in order to hold it, we need progress; we need deliverables.

You know, this famous brandy Cognac tariff/anti-dumping investigation, which was, and is being, recognised by MOFCOM, retaliation because of our EV very targeted tariffs. So we see that for the first time in history, Cognac, which is a very expensive product, is the target of an anti-dumping investigation, which is unprecedented. Fine. It is hit with provisional tariffs which make Cognac and brandy so much more expensive that it is, again, destroying the business case for Cognac here in China, which, by the way, our EV tariffs are not destroying in Europe.

But, well, we take China to the WTO—fine. It will take some time, and we will win, I’m sure, because it doesn’t make sense to [have] an anti-dumping investigation on Cognac, which is much more expensive here than in Paris. But on top of that, and against a clear WTO regulation which bans anti-dumping duties to be collected when the product is destined to duty-free shops, all Cognac and brandy that was destined to duty-free shops in China is blocked. And we are told by MOFCOM that they know this is banned by WTO, but they have a national regulation that allows it, which is applied for the first time since 2009 and is blatantly against WTO, because you cannot oppose a national regulation to the WTO, which is an international commitment. But anyway, the brandy is still there. Vice Premier He Lifeng was in Paris last week. They discussed this, and no progress at all.

Again, there is a lot of room for improvement. I’m afraid there is more and more room every day because the situation is getting worse and worse. So, we need progress. We need deliverables. And we are not getting it.

And let me also be very clear, because I know our Chinese interlocutors always say that the situation would improve if we ratified CAI, if we allowed ASML machines to be exported to China, or if we fixed the EV tariffs. I don’t see. There is absolutely nothing. EV tariffs affect less than 2% of Chinese exports to the European Union. ASML machines are being exported to China, and last year they hit a record export to China. And CAI has nothing to do with all this. So, let me be very clear: CAI, ASML, or EV tariffs have nothing to do with it. We have to talk about what we feel is an unlevel playing field. Let’s talk about that.

And let me finish with people-to-people. We think that China’s measures on exempting from visas [in] most of our member states, not all. I take this opportunity to ask China: Why haven’t all member states been included in this wave of visas? That’s good. We have to go back to our tourist exchanges, especially when it comes to European tourists coming to China, and I hope that will improve.

Another good news is this: we are discussing, and think tanks are discussing. Let me take this opportunity to say two things about our sanctions. I mean, as Henry said, China has lifted sanctions against the European Parliament. Let me be very clear: we have not lifted our sanctions. The Chinese sanctions were taken in 2021, I think, in retaliation for our sanctions, which affected, I think, four individuals and one entity. We were hit by completely disproportionate sanctions against the European Parliamentarians and entities.

And that’s where I want to go: sanctions have been lifted against the European Parliament and the Parliamentarians, but not against entities. Two of them should have been here today: MERICS and the Alliance for Democracies [Foundation] in Denmark. I don’t know why they were hit with sanctions. It would have been a very good opportunity to lift the sanctions against them, because, last time I checked, they are two of the best think tanks about China that we have in Europe. So I hope that next year we will enjoy their presence in this. And by the way, they participate when this happens in Brussels.

And also, they would have taken the opportunity to lift the sanction on the Political and Security Committee of the European Union because it doesn’t make sense. It’s like hitting the 27 member states. All member states have an ambassador in this committee, and they are all under sanctions. We don’t understand if it’s personal or not.

So, what we did—not we, the European Parliament, because the European Parliament cannot lift sanctions, it is the Council. So what the European Parliament did, and I think it was a good decision, is to lift restrictions of official contacts between the European Parliament and China. And this is also good news.

So, this is the state of affairs. But I want to be optimistic that once we realise and we admit the state of affairs, we know where we have to go to improve our relationship. And I think I have given a fair, realistic description which leaves a large room for improvement. And I hope that we will hold this opportunity, we will use this opportunity of the 50th anniversary and the forthcoming summit, probably at the end of July, to make progress, because as I said, it is very important for us, for China, for the European Union, and for the world. We have to provide stability, predictability, fairness, and balance to a very troubled world. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Ambassador Toledo, for your frank and straightforward speech at this China-EU Policy Roundtable. I think this is really a platform for exchange and dialogue. So, thank you for all the points.

But just briefly, I would like to respond a little bit because you talked about energy consumption. I think China is actually making huge progress on green energy. Actually, President Xi, when he mentioned China going to achieve a carbon peak, it is not by 2030—it is before, you need to see the word with a magnifying glass. He was saying “before,” so China could put that ahead of schedule.

And I’m very glad to report that now renewable energy is already over 50% of China’s power generation. So we are in the right direction there. Also, China is doing great things on EVs, solar panels, and wind power. China already accounts for about 60% of global EV consumption. Most cities in China have over half of their vehicles as EVs now. So I think China is doing things in the right direction.

Also, you mentioned China’s contribution to multilateral institutions. Just a few days ago, the Chinese Vice Premier announced that China is going to donate 500 million U.S. dollars to the WHO. So China is still working very hard with the EU and many others on those multilateral institutions, and I’m sure also on the WTO and the Russia-Ukraine war there. I just noticed China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi was at the Meeting of BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and he actually made a statement that China and BRICS countries can be a very good mediator and peacemaker for the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Also, I was at the Munich Security Conference, and we heard the Defence Secretary say, you know, for peacekeeping, the U.S. will not send any troops. It has to be European troops and non-European troops. So, non-European troops could mean India, South Africa, Brazil, and China. China is the largest peacekeeping force-sending country among the P5 member countries of the UN. So there’s a possibility that China could be more actively involved with other BRICS countries to guarantee peace in the Ukraine-Russia war.

Finally, on tariffs on EVs, I’m very glad to see that we are having a new discussion on how to have a price limit now, rather than focus on a 40 or 30 per cent tariff on EV cars. Absolutely, I would think reviving the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between China and the EU would be absolutely so important. Director Sun Yongfu, former Director-General of European Affairs at MOFCOM, was involved for many years—seven years, actually, negotiating this CAI. So much achievement.

The former European Ambassador also came to my office. He said this is China’s second opening up, and the EU has achieved many more things before the U.S. The EU used to be just following the U.S.; now the EU is taking the lead. So I hope this CAI can be resolved. Also, one of the good things I would report is that since China lifted visas for so many EU countries, we have seen a big surge of bilateral tourism and discussion.

So, really, it’s all great news. But I hope that perhaps our former Minister of the Chinese Delegation to the European Union from MOFCOM, Mr. Peng Gang, can say a few words as openly as well. And I’m sure Ambassador Declan will moderate that as well.

PENG Gang, Former Minister of the Chinese Mission to the European Union

Thank you, Mr. Wang, Founder and President of CCG. Thank you so much, Ambassador, Co-chair, Ambassador Declan. I am very much honoured and very glad to enjoy the remarks just now by Ambassador Jorge Toledo. So, dear ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends, very good morning. It gives me really great pleasure and honour to be invited to today’s seminar and speak on the theme of 50 years of China-EU relations.

As I just returned to Beijing from the beautiful city of Brussels not long ago—two months before—it makes me feel very much cordial to join Excellency Ambassadors and all the experts and scholars today to discuss on the theme of China-EU relations, especially focused on the 50th anniversary celebration of this year. So, let me just focus on the theme.

The 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations is an important moment that bridges the past to the future of China-EU ties. Over the past 50 years, China-EU relations have transcended the Cold War and withstood numerous tests, and have always maintained an overall forward and positive development trend, with strategic mutual trust deepening, economic and trade exchanges expanding, people-to-people exchanges becoming increasingly extensive, and multilateral coordination being very much fruitful. China-EU relations have become one of the most influential bilateral relations in the world. And I think just now His Excellency Ambassador Toledo just mentioned the importance of our bilateral relations.

Over the past 50 years, we have respected each other and moved forward hand in hand. China-EU relations have evolved from the establishment of diplomatic relations to the comprehensive partnership, and then to the comprehensive strategic partnership. The China-EU Summit has gone through 24 meetings, and the two sides have also established high-level dialogues in strategy, economy and trade, digital affairs, environment and climate, and people-to-people exchanges, as well as more than 70 consultation and dialogue mechanisms.

So over the past 50 years, we have achieved mutual benefits and common growth. As mentioned just now by His Excellency Ambassador, the annual trade volume between China and the EU has grown from 2.4 billion U.S. dollars at the beginning of the establishment of diplomatic relations to more than 780 billion U.S. dollars last year. The stock of mutual investment has increased from almost zero to more than 260 billion U.S. dollars.

So we have achieved fruitful results in cooperation in finance, environmental protection, culture, education, tourism, customs, and so on and so forth. Our cooperation in emerging fields such as the digital economy, new energy, and artificial intelligence is making robust progress. We have become one of each other’s most important trade and investment cooperation partners.

And also, over the past 50 years, we have jointly upheld multilateralism and promoted world peace and development. Both China and the EU uphold the international system and international order with the United Nations at its core and the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. The two sides have carried out fruitful multilateral coordination and cooperation in a wide range of areas, playing an important role in improving global governance and promoting the international order in a more just and reasonable direction.

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

With the size and depth of our cooperation, I think it’s natural that we sometimes face differences and frictions. In recent years, some in Europe have expressed an anxiety about competitiveness between the EU and China, and also some politicians calling for reducing dependence or de-risking on China. At the same time, certain countries like the United States—the biggest country and the most powerful country in the world—continue to act recklessly, adopting unilateralism, protectionism, and hegemonism practices indiscriminately, which seriously undermines global trade rules and international fairness.

But as President Xi Jinping pointed out in his congratulatory message marking our 50th anniversary, China and the EU are not only competitive strategic partners but also two major forces for building a multipolar world, two major markets supporting globalisation, and two major civilisations championing diversity.

A sound and stable China-EU relationship not only works to the advantage of both sides but also brings benefits to the whole world. China and the EU have neither conflicting fundamental interests nor geopolitical contradictions. Our consensus far exceeds our differences, and our cooperation far outweighs competition. So, we are partners, not rivals. Personally, I cannot accept this kind of three conceptions.

China has always believed that those who share the same ideals are partners. Those who seek common ground despite differences are also very important partners. So, I fully agree with His Excellency’s remarks just now: the world needs no more conflict, needs no more trade war. That’s very correct.

After 50 years of development, our relationship has become more mature and resilient. We have mechanisms and experience in place to manage differences between China and the EU, and also European countries.

In today’s complex and uncertain world, as long as we respect each other, engage in equal dialogue, and work together while accommodating each other’s concerns, we can overcome challenges, manage disagreements, and face global issues together.

China is ready to work with the EU side to further strengthen our high-level exchanges and deepen practical cooperation in various fields. We look forward to holding the new round of the China-EU summit this year, as well as high-level strategic, economic and trade, green, and digital dialogues.

We can align our development strategies by exploring synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway. And we can support each other’s modernisation and integration efforts. We can also enhance our communications, expand mutual openness, and work together to jointly safeguard free and open trade and investment, and maintain the stability and smooth flow of the global industrial and supply chains.

I also understand His Excellency just now mentioned a lot more issues, like addressing trade imbalances and also some other trade and political issues, but let’s leave some room for further discussion today.

We can further strengthen exchanges and cooperation on major issues concerning the future of mankind, such as global environment protection, climate change, and artificial intelligence. China also welcomes deeper cooperation with the EU under the UN, WTO, G20, and other frameworks to jointly address global challenges, including some other regional issues. Together, we can promote a more balanced and inclusive global order and inject more certainty and positive energy into an uncertain world.

So, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

A 50th anniversary is not only a milestone, but it’s also a new starting point. With joint efforts, I believe China-EU relations can forge ahead into another promising 50 years. All of you here are supporters, participants, and contributors to this kind of very sound relationship. So I hope you will continue to use your expertise and wisdom to generate new ideas, draw lessons from the past, and help steer China-EU relations towards greater stability and lasting progress for the benefit of peace, development, and prosperity worldwide. Thank you.

Declan Kelleher

Thank you very much, Minister Peng. And could I now invite—and it gives me great pleasure to invite—former Director General of the Ministry of Commerce, Sun Yongfu, who’s Senior Fellow of the CCG, to speak. We know each other of old, so I’m looking forward to what you have to say. Thank you.

SUN Yongfu, Senior Fellow, CCG; Former Director General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce of China

Thank you very much, Ambassador Declan. Yeah, we know each other for many years, and we both accompanied President Xi Jinping to visit your beautiful country at that time. So, I could recall when I was the Director General of the European Department of MOFCOM—well, that was about a little bit more than 12 years. I could recall that was more or less the golden years of China-EU economic relations.

If we review our 50th anniversary, we can see in 1975, the trade between us was only 2.4 billion U.S. dollars and less than 1% of the EU total. So it’s nothing. But last year, it was about 785.8 billion U.S. dollars, 330 times that of 1975. So we can see the progress that has been made by joint efforts of both China and EU member states. So, China and the EU, we are both the second-largest trading partners right now.

But as Ambassador Toledo mentioned, time is changing, and the situation and structure of the economic cooperation, trade structure, is also changing. At the very beginning, China invited a lot of investment and technology from the EU, and the EU also enjoyed the huge market of China. For example, [for] the leading three German car companies, China is the most important market for those companies. And for the luxury goods from France, Italy, Spain, for those very famous luxury goods, China is a very important market, even now, I think, and also for the agricultural products.

But with the development of the Chinese economy, China is moving ahead. So as you mentioned, competition is getting more and more serious. We need fair competition. I think what is common for China and the EU is that we still believe the WTO is a very important UN agency and to be supported. So, we have a kind of group—I still remember—at the vice minister level in order to discuss the reforms of the WTO, in order to adapt itself to the new situation, including AI. So we have a lot in common.

China is really moving ahead. We have a surplus, as you mentioned, but China is not aiming to have a surplus with the European partners. We have an import fair in Shanghai to try to invite European goods coming to China, and we need to work both ways. China is open and is opening wider and wider, as mentioned by President Xi Jinping. But some of those goods, especially the high-tech goods, are not allowed to be exported to China. That’s also the concern of China. So we need to work both ways. Otherwise, the trade deficit of the EU cannot be easily solved.

And we welcome the agricultural products from Spain, from Italy, and from other countries. But trade negotiations should be from both sides, and we need to move in order to have a mutual understanding.

We have new areas of cooperation because we believe—the EU and China—we all believe in free trade, and we all support the WTO and other UN agencies. Climate change, for example, is an area of cooperation—green economy, new and renewable energy. Solar panels, for example, China provides; something like 75% of those are produced here in China. Wind power, China is also taking the lead. The EU, as I understand it, is aiming to have 45% of renewable energy in the near future. So, we have the area of cooperation not only in the trade itself but in technology as well. And EV cars, and batteries, I think Chinese companies are now actively trying to invest in different EU member states, including Germany, including your country, Spain.

So, we think we can work very hard. I don’t know whether it’s the right time to reopen the negotiation of the so-called Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. That was a little bit quiet for many years, starting in 2020, when President Xi Jinping and other European leaders said that we had finished our technical discussion and were moving to the approval level. But because of the sanctions of both sides, now it’s almost dead. But I think it’s quite important for us to work on that. And I hope both parties, including our Minister of Commerce and those trade negotiators in Brussels, can think about how, in what way, we can restart this very important negotiation. I think it’s good for both.

China treats the EU always as a partner. As I mentioned, I was 12 years as the DG of the European department. We never think the EU is our rival. And I hope the EU will treat China the same, as a partner, economic partner, trading partner, but not necessarily a systemic rival. If we can think the same line, I think the cooperation between China and the EU will be on the right track very soon. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Okay, we’ll start our roundtable discussions. Fabian, you have travelled back and forth many times. We’ll start from you.

Fabian Zuleeg, Chief Executive and Chief Economist, European Policy Centre (EPC)

Thank you very much. Thank you also to CCG, Henry and Mabel for the cooperation, and to the EU for the support for this project. I want to also thank very much the participants of these important discussions, including our European and Chinese think tank partners.

This session has been under the label of “uncertain times.” I would say it’s more than uncertain—we live in turbulent times. And that also means we live in times where there’s a high downside risk for all.

Why is that the case? We live in a world where geopolitics drives geoeconomics, where the balance between security and openness has shifted, where the mercantilistic impulses are strengthened. We live in a world of multipolarity, but this is not an ordering principle. It is a challenge for multilateralism at this moment in time, and multilateralism is weakening, which also means that achieving global commons becomes harder—climate change, sustainable economic development, the prevention of conflict.

This uncertainty, this instability, will inevitably impose a cost in human terms, politically, socially, economically, and I think we are going to see that it will weaken economic globalisation. Companies, for example, will be more reluctant to make cross-border investments given the uncertainty they’re facing.

I think it’s important in that context to look at the bilateral relationship. But to do that, it’s very important that we understand both sides of that relationship. And for Europe, the world has been changing over the last years. It has changed with two watershed moments. One is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its aggression against Europe, and the other has been the election of Donald Trump for the second time. These are fundamental shifts. They end the post–World War II era, and they have led to a change in the relationship between Europe and the United States.

But I want to emphasise, in that context, that does not mean a decoupling from the United States. The United States will continue to be closely linked to Europe. And it is also important to recall that the United States is not Trump. There is a difference.

But Europe has been changing as a result. We are discovering our own agency. We are growing up, acting in common. Europe is not divided. On the contrary, there is no real difference on these fundamental issues. I would not take some of those isolated voices of dissent as a sign of fundamental division.

We are doing more together in areas we have not fully explored before, such as defence and security, involving partners even outside the European Union. For example, the relationship with the UK has become very much closer.

What will continue to dominate the European debate is our defence against Russian aggression. That is the prism by which we will see our interactions with the rest of the world, especially if—not even if, especially if—there is some form of peace deal. Because in Europe, we know that a peace deal has to be lasting, has to be sustainable, and cannot be built on violence. It cannot be built on war-shifting borders. In Europe, we are well aware what happens in the long run if war is allowed to alter the borders of Europe. It is a path which leads to more conflict, which will mean that Europe will have to build its defences in the coming years.

So what does all that mean for our relationship with the rest of the world? Of course, we will work together with those who share our values, who share our interests, but we will also do it alone if we must. Because our economies and our competitiveness are important, they are crucial, but our security is paramount. We have to be able to live in security, and that means we have to continue to defend ourselves and to help Ukraine to defend itself against Russia.

Of course, there are many areas, and many have been mentioned, where the EU and China share common interests, share the wish to work together, to cooperate. But we have also heard about some of the question marks, economically, politically, and they are linked to the issues I’ve mentioned just now.

So I hope it is clear where Europe stands on these issues—what will be the filter [through] which Europe will look at the world for the coming years. And we are watching with interest where China will position itself. And we will certainly have interesting—unfortunately, also uncertain—times in the years to come. Thank you very much.

Declan Kelleher

Thank you, Fabian. I now would like to invite Cui Hongjian, a Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG, Professor at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University, to take the floor. Cui Hongjian, please.

CUI Hongjian, Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG; Professor, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University

Thank you, Chair.

[Speaking in Chinese]

It is a great pleasure to be here at this big forum. I would like to express my appreciation to CCG for providing such a valuable opportunity for dialogue across various sectors of China and Europe.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EU. In Chinese culture, we often say that “at forty I had no more doubts; at fifty I knew the mandate of heaven.” But Chinese philosophy is profound and nuanced, and we also have another saying: “Things often turn out contrary to one’s wishes.”

I still remember that ten years ago, at the 40th anniversary of China-EU relations, there was a strong sense of optimism. We believed that China and Europe could seize a window of opportunity and lay a stronger foundation for the next decade of cooperation. Unfortunately, in the years that followed, Europe experienced the refugee crisis, the rise of Mr. Trump, and Brexit, among others. It seems that we may have missed some critical opportunities, and, more importantly, we failed to fully grasp the unique value of the China-EU relationship.

There is another issue that, in my view, reflects a shift in perceptions between China and Europe. Fifty years ago, the vast majority of Chinese people believed that once China had developed—once we had become an advanced economy—many of our domestic challenges would disappear. We thought development would naturally bring smoother progress and a more comfortable life. However, fifty years later, the prevailing sentiment among many Chinese is that, despite the progress we have made, we are now facing even more complex problems and greater pressures than before.

I believe it is a similar case with China–EU relations. Compared with fifty years ago, China and the EU have become much closer. We are now major trading partners, and we have established numerous channels for dialogue. Yet, somewhat unexpectedly, we have only come to realise now that the relationship has become significantly more complex and more difficult to define than it was five decades ago.

There is a prevailing discussion about whether we are entering a new window of opportunity in China–EU relations. This is not just because of the return of Mr. Trump, but because over the past fifty years, the China–EU relationship has gone through a full developmental cycle. We began with mutual unfamiliarity, progressed towards greater understanding and acceptance, and then, in recent years, encountered new challenges in mutual perception. In particular, there has been a tendency in Europe to maintain a certain distance from China. However, in the past couple of years, we’ve seen a growing recognition in Europe that the relationship with China should return to a more balanced footing.

Ambassador Toledo just spoke extensively about balance and rebalance, and I believe this reflects a new awareness on the European side. In the short term, we will face a lack of confidence and momentum in China–EU relations. To address this, I think we need to fundamentally resolve two conceptual issues.

The first is: how do we perceive the differences between China and the EU? Fifty years ago, the differences between us were much greater than they are today. Yet at that time, China and the EU were able to move toward each other and engage in mutual acceptance. Now, fifty years on, we share many similarities—common experiences and even common values. So why is it that, at this moment, differences have suddenly become an obstacle? I believe this is a question that both sides need to reflect on.

To resolve current issues in the China-EU relations, we should also address another distorted, reinterpreted concept, that is, “interdependence.” Fifty years ago, neither China nor the EU doubted the need for deeper interdependence, for only through greater interdependence could we do better business, engage more meaningfully in exchanges and cooperation. But today, why has “interdependence” suddenly become a concerning state and trend? Whenever our European friends talk about dependence now, there is an evident sense of caution toward China. I can fully understand this. As we say in China, “once bitten by a snake, one fears even the well rope for ten years.” And our European friends, unfortunately, have been bitten twice in just a few short years—first by Russia, and more recently by the United States. So, it may seem natural to worry about being bitten a third time, this time by China. But I believe our European friends are wise enough not to make such simplistic analogies.

Finally, I would like to say that over the past 50 years, the China-EU relationship has always been a process of mutual learning and mutual inspiration. In recent years, in particular, our European counterparts have recognised a key element of China’s development success—the use of five-year plans. Today, Europe also has its own industrial policies and many long-term strategies. Looking ahead to the next 50 years—because the China-EU relationship is still very young—can we envision the possibility of jointly formulating a shared China-EU plan for the future?

At the very least, we need to work toward achieving four “re-”s from four different perspectives. First, we must reconfirm our original intention. What were the principles that brought us together 50 years ago? China and Europe came together because of our differences and need for each other. Now, we must not allow those differences to lead to mutual exclusion. We should reflect seriously on what these differences actually bring to the relationship.

Second, we need to reshape our mutual perceptions. If our European friends remain interested in differences, perhaps it would be more constructive to focus attention on understanding the differences between China and the United States. I am aware that many European discussions regard both China and the U.S. as hegemonies. Similarly, more attention should be paid to the differences between China and Russia, as some narratives in Europe portray China and Russia as two authoritarian powers seeking to challenge the so-called existing order. Of course, on the Chinese side, we must also deepen our understanding of the differences between Europe and the United States when we talk about the so-called West as a whole.

Third, I believe we indeed need to achieve a form of rebalancing. This rebalancing must begin with interests. Given the stage of development China’s economy has reached today, it would be unrealistic for China to expect our European partners to continue engaging with us on the same terms as they did 50 years ago. This rebalancing encompasses more than interests; it is about establishing a new, sustainable, and creative model of relations. For instance, as China encounters more trade barriers from the European side, it is essential that it work with Europe to develop new profit-generating models for industrial cooperation. China should innovate in sectors such as electric vehicles, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence. In this regard, I fully agree with Ambassador Toledo’s remarks that we need greater courage, greater ambition, and that we need to create more balanced, mutually beneficial forms of cooperation.

Finally, I believe that China-EU relations need a process of reconstruction. What does this reconstruction entail? In my view, it means that China and Europe must move beyond merely expanding our shared interests to also shouldering greater shared responsibilities. Many European friends have just raised the issue of Ukraine. Clearly, there are differences between China and Europe on this matter. However, if we examine the issue calmly, I believe the areas of consensus between us far outweigh our differences. Therefore, it is time for us to build a sense of common responsibility. For instance, when it comes to navigating economic cooperation and competition, we should commit to reform, not turn our backs on globalisation. We must work together to create greater space and opportunities for institutions like CCG.

Furthermore, we must aim to shape rather than simply reject multipolarity. Multipolarity is a situation that exists whether we like it or not. What we now need is for China and Europe to share our respective understandings of multipolarity, exchange experiences, jointly identify a consensus on how to manage it, and help shape a common set of global rules. I believe that only through these transformations can we restrain disorder and turmoil, and ultimately, help create a development environment that is not only more favourable for both China and Europe, but also more sustainable. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Professor Cui. Very comprehensive remarks—very stimulating and constructive. Thank you. You are also a renowned European-China affairs expert, so we’re very happy to have you.

Next, I would like to invite Daniela Schwarzer. She’s a Member of the Executive Board of Bertelsmann Foundation and former Director and CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations—also a well-known expert. Daniela, please.

Daniela Schwarzer, Member of the Executive Board, Bertelsmann Stiftung; Former Director and CEO, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Thank you very much, Henry. And thank you to CCG and EPC for hosting this dialogue, which I think is of utmost importance. Having listened to the distinguished speakers who took the floor before me, I decided to limit my three minutes to three remarks and to share observations on three questions.

The first one is: after 50 years of relations, how do we look at each other?

Now, I think the debate over the past hour and also this morning gives a lot of food for thought, because we are mutually dependent in many ways. So there is, I believe, a truthful interest to improve the relationship. And yet, we have fundamental differences, which we cannot negate, and which make this dialogue so important.

It is also because both partners, over the 50 years lying behind us, have evolved so much. We heard about the impressive development of China over the past 50 years—its growth in terms of economic weight, its global outreach, its new partnerships which it has built around the world. But Europe has also changed, and Professor Cui just mentioned the crises that Europe lived through. I would like to add that through all of these crises, the European Union managed to improve itself and to become a stronger player.

This is true for the financial and sovereign debt crisis, which I think also was of interest to China, that it was well managed in the end, where Europe managed to actually manage the crisis and change its architecture at the same time. It is true also for, I would say, the way other internal crises have been managed. And I can’t go into detail for time reasons, but it is a learning system, and it is a system that has changed over time. And that, in particular, now is reflecting within itself the new challenges the international order poses.

And that is my second point: how do China and Europe look at the world?

I think there is a strong overlap in the analyses of the challenge of instability, of the risk of conflict that is increasing around the world, and, of course, also the big challenge that the United States posed to the multilateral order. We heard that in many contributions.

Now, Europe clearly has a keen interest in a rules-based international order. But here again, the conversation with China, in my view, is so important on what those shared principles can be, what they have to be going forward, what kind of cooperation we can have in bilateral and interregional, but also in multilateral fora.

And for Europe, of course, in this context, certain principles are non-negotiable. I would say the UN Charter, of course, has to be the base. But it is also the acute reaction to the breach of a fundamental principle of international law: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which, from a European perspective, is something that needs to be dealt with. And I believe that Europeans need, if they build trust and closer partnerships, the recognition of our partners to what extent this violation poses a threat to the global community.

And my third point is really: then how do we think about, given those differences—which we have between each other, between the way we look at the world, and that mutual interest—to actually move ahead?

I do believe, and we heard that in the first panel this morning very impressively, that first of all, mutual respect and the formulation of the need for cooperation is the base. But I also believe that trust-building measures are needed. As in every relationship, when there is reason for distrust, it needs open conversations. And I appreciate the openness of the conversation in this session.

And then it requires, I do believe, confidential conversations—how this trust can be rebuilt. It also requires both partners to recognise how they have been changing.

From a perspective as a European and a German, I will just end on saying that I believe that the European Union, although it has its difficulties—which are non-negotiable, of course, they are there—we are at the moment in a phase of transformation. Transformation of our economic system, adapting to a new world, a new challenge; adapting of our security system, as our security order is under threat. But no fundamental transformation of our political system, because we are a rules-based community of democracies. And I believe it is with that vision that Europe will continue to engage in the world for a stronger multilateral order. Thank you very much.

Declan Kelleher

Thank you, Daniela. And now I invite Sun Yanhong, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of European Studies, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, to take the floor.

SUN Yanhong, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Thank you, Chairman. It’s my great honour to be here to exchange views with so many prestigious European and Chinese colleagues. Based on my research interest, my speech will mainly [focus] on the economic relations between China and the EU. I will share three points of view.

The first one is: the experience of the past several decades shows that the trend of the global economy and global trade are highly synchronised. The global economy underwent unprecedentedly rapid growth since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, especially from 2001, [when] China entered the WTO, until the 2008 international financial crisis. After the 2008 crisis, the global economy and global trade entered an unstable period almost at the same pace.

Another important and interesting phenomenon is the changes in the global trade structure in recent years since 2008. We can see the international trade in goods has begun to decline because, after the crisis, international reliability has declined, and therefore, the global value chains have more difficulties to guarantee the production flows.

However, the international trade in services is undergoing growth, especially the digital services trade has increased very rapidly. From 2005 to 2024, digitally delivered services trade increased from 1.5 trillion to 3.9 trillion U.S. dollars.

So we can get at least three implications from these changes. The first one is: defining the rules-based multilateral trading system, especially the WTO, is very important for the whole world, especially important for the U.S., because the U.S. is the largest beneficiary of the trade in services. The second implication is that for international trade in goods, since the whole cake is shrinking, the competition between China and the EU is becoming more fierce. So, it should be managed better. The third implication is: we are living in the age of the digital economy; China and the EU should collaborate to forge a new model to better accommodate competition and cooperation. This is my first point.

My second point is that at this critical moment of the 50th anniversary, China and the EU should think beyond our bilateral relations, and we can and should collaborate to take more global responsibilities. I can think of at least a global responsibility. The first one is to collaborate to define the WTO system. The WTO system showed a lot of resilience in the past several months. We can see that. So abandoning it is not a good solution. We can collaborate to push forward its reform.

The second responsibility is to collaborate to push forward the global green transition. Both China and the EU made commitments and set up concrete goals. And even though we have many competitions in several specific areas—for example, EVs—we still have many complementarities in these areas. So we can do something together. I think China is already ready to take more responsibilities in this area, especially together with the EU.

My third point is that at this critical moment, China and the EU—yes, we should sit down and seriously talk about our bilateral issues. Just like the ambassador and other experts mentioned: how to view and deal with the trade imbalance, how to deal with the frozen CAI, how to establish a new strategic partnership in the green transition, and how to make a breakthrough in cooperation in the digital transition. Addressing all these issues, I think we need more understanding, more trust, and more joint efforts.

And lastly, I’d like to add some sentences to respond to the trade imbalance. I highly agree with Mr. Sun Yongfu. Yes, as for the trade imbalance, on China’s side, we have our concern about importing high-tech devices from the EU. We need to import high-tech devices, for example, the lithography machines from ASML. Because of the pressure of the U.S., ASML has been restricting exports to China. So this is our concern.

And the other area we should look at more is the service sectors. When we look at the bilateral trade, we can’t only look at the trade in goods but also the trade in services. The European Union has always had trade surpluses in service sectors with China. Of course, the scale is much less than the trade surpluses of China in goods. But yes, the EU has trade surpluses in services.

And now I think, European friends, your chance is coming, because the Chinese government is announcing to expand the openness in the service sectors. You must have noticed that. In medical care, in elderly care services, in all these areas, the European companies have your own advantages. I think given the current situation between China and the U.S., this is a good opportunity for European service companies to invest in China, to find market, to find profits in the Chinese market. I think this market is especially for the EU companies because only the developed markets have your own advantage in the service sectors. So, this is my point. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Mrs. Sun. And next, I’d like to invite Franco Bruni, President of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), a well-known Italian think tank.

Franco Bruni, President, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, my first point is, as a European citizen, I feel fully represented by the words of Ambassador Jorge Toledo. I think I subscribe to everything he said, particularly his words when he went beyond the bilateral relationship with China and he invested issues towards global values.

My second point is more philosophical. Okay, we have bilateral relations, and that’s fine. They are useful to build multilateral relations, but even multilateral relations are insufficient. Strictly speaking, they can be interpreted in two different ways: as an exchange of favours, where everybody calculates its moves in terms of “do this,” “okay, you need this.” But you have to go beyond this.

Multilateral relations become important when they look at the common goods—those goods that are not pursuable. I mean, individual members of the multilateral situation do not pursue them spontaneously because they don’t derive immediate utility from the efforts they do.

The secret of successful multilateralism is that common goods are pursued in the long term for the benefit of everybody, and this benefit cannot be discounted at the individual level so that when we sit around the multilateral table, we have to sit as members of the whole, not as parts that have to trade benefits with other countries.

This mentality has to be stressed a lot—also in Europe, by the way. But in Europe, we do this continuously. We have this duty in our mind. We don’t apply it sufficiently, but we have this duty in our mind. We have to do the same at the global level, especially now that this spirit is vanishing completely. It was in the world after the Second World War, but it has now vanished completely. We have to look at this as the target of multilateralism.

My third point, if I may, is as an economist and has to do with the balance of trade of China with the other countries, including Europe. There are many, many issues, obviously, to rebalance world trade, but as far as China is concerned, let me say that the major effort should be done in macroeconomic policies, trying to push consumption. I mean, there are automaticities. When you start pushing consumption in a serious way, also through welfare—China needs welfare, more welfare—if you start pushing consumption, then things adjust. You will consume things that now you export. Fine. This is not a solution, for instance, of what Ambassador Toledo was stressing—that you should accept more of our goods, and it will come. Start pushing consumption seriously.

This is not simple, obviously, because it has a lot of political implications, social implications, delicate implications. You have to change the way many things work in your country. But this should be your major macroeconomic target. And you will see that if you make progress in this field, the balance of—I mean, we have to do a similar task in Europe. We have to push investment, particularly on research, and many of our international problems will be solved. The United States should do its job in terms of cutting the deficit, and this will do a lot. They are doing the opposite, obviously. So, please do concentrate on consumption in your country. Thank you.

Declan Kelleher

Thank you, Franco. And now I would invite Dr. Zhu Feng to take the floor. Dr. Zhu.

ZHU Feng, Managing Director, CICC Global Institute

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the CCG for providing this wonderful platform with so many distinguished speakers.

Let me start by saying that we are living in testing times, but still not turbulent times. And this time, I draw some parallels, is kind of déjà vu, right, that we saw 100 years ago. Why that? We had the 1909 and the 1930 tariffs from the U.S., and also in between, we had the Great Depression. We had the Spanish flu, which took a lot of lives in the world. And we also had the First World War, and after that, we had the Second World War. So it was a very, very bad time.

But still, in between, we had the Roaring 1920s. And now remember that we had the Roaring 1990s, and we still had the first five years of the 2000s, which were pretty good. But we had the pandemic, COVID-19. We had the tariff wars, starting with the first administration of Trump. And also, we had the global financial crisis. A lot of things happened in between.

But we don’t want to go back. We don’t want to go back to what happened 100 years ago. What can we do now to make it better? So, lasting peace and prosperity—that’s something that we’re trying to seek, right? But after the global financial crisis, we are already seeing a lot of things changing—slow globalisation, “slowbalisation,” or deglobalisation. In some way, we are seeing that things are going to segmentation.

So, talking about globalisation, I think there were a lot of big changes that happened in the past, particularly after the Second World War. I think it was a golden time for globalisation. But that was really globalisation on a regional scale, in a sense, mainly in the Western Hemisphere—the U.S. and Europe. It became a real case for globalisation on a global scale with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and of course, the Chinese reforms and eventual accession to the WTO. And we can say that during this period, actually, trade and investment were the driving forces of global growth and prosperity. Everything was going wonderfully well, in a sense.

But still, you know, remember the rise of Japan and Europe in the 1960s and 70s. It caused a lot of trouble to the international economic and financial system, a lot of challenges, and it eventually provoked, say, the collapse of part of the Bretton Woods system at that time, in the 1970s. We remember that.

So now we’re facing a different challenge. Somebody would say the rise of China, Brazil, and India—the new emerging powers. And I know that Ambassador Toledo was talking about your visit to Heilongjiang. I’m sure that you know pretty much about China. China is a big country. You would see the developing part, and you would see the developed part. That’s why it’s very complicated for the world to perceive. It has a very competitive part, but it also has a less competitive or still somewhere that needs a lot of progress. So it’s a different force.

But then, if you look at what, say, Elon Musk. He recently posted on X—he said, using his AI Grok chatbot, that by PPP, purchasing power parity, actually, China’s GDP is a little bit over 35 trillion U.S. dollars. The U.S.: a little bit less than 29 trillion dollars. And the EU is about 22 trillion dollars. So China is becoming quite competitive, in a sense. I know that probably poses an image that makes a lot of people think about the geopolitical and geoeconomic realignments. We are living in this period, in a sense. And I know that the EU has defined the relationship as partner, competitor, and systemic rival.

The last part, I know less, but I will talk a little bit about partnership and competition. I remember there is a report by the EU talking about de-risking and decoupling. And I think decoupling will lead eventually to greater geopolitical risk. That’s not something we want from the European experience. Actually, in the post-war experience, integration led to fewer risks. So we need to talk with each other and integrate in some way.

About the partnership, I think it’s very important to realise that the whole relationship is dynamic. The EU has a big deficit with China in terms of goods—not as big as that between the U.S. and China, but it has a surplus, a small surplus in services with China.

And I actually quite much agree with what Mr. Bruni was talking about the potential for consumption. I think there is still some way to go. It takes time to go from being a great industrial country to becoming a great consumption power. It took a lot of time for Britain to do that, and it took a lot of time for the U.S. to do that. It will be the same thing for China. I think it takes time.

And then, of course, I think within this, we would see in a past relationship whether the international economic system would be sustainable or not. It’s hard to sustain. We’ve already seen what happened in the last discussions we had with EPC—the [inaudible], a lot of things collapsed. And I think this time we will see big changes too.

In the past, the relationship might be more, in a way—even like the Marshall Plan—they would be happy to do that because, in a way, that would find some grounds for the so-called excess capacity that the U.S. had at that time. And there was a way, after the Bretton Woods, the U.S. found a way to negotiate the overcapacity of Japan and Germany.

Now it’s the case—I agree with the competition part—I think a lot of things need to be done. But then, talking about overcapacity, sometimes we ignore the lasting imbalances, and we look more at the incoming imbalances—the emerging imbalances.

Talking about that, for example, the aviation industry, Boeing and Airbus. They were, still in a way, heavily subsidised, and they basically supply to the whole world. Then you think about agriculture; it is heavily subsidised in the U.S. and in Europe. So, how do you define overcapacity? Does it mean in terms of global supply and global demand? That’s something we need to think about and discuss, but it’s an important issue, absolutely very important.

Going forward, I think we still need to focus on a few things. One of the things that I think we should pick up is the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. One big part is actually about levelling the playing field, like you were saying. That was a big section in the agreement. I think it is still a big part. That’s something we need to look at. We might not necessarily go back to the original one—I think that was a good point—but we need to look at this again because trade and investment are essential for integration, for understanding each other, and for prosperity on both sides.

The other thing is trade agreements. I know we’re in difficult times, and probably the WTO does not work as it has worked before. We’re in a world that has become more segmented, but that doesn’t mean we need to stop, particularly when we face a lot of Trump uncertainties. So, in a way, I think the EU and China, among the biggest economies in this world, can actually lead these kinds of negotiations.

It can be first bilateral, but it can become more of a kind of network of agreements. Maybe we can drive this. It’s not exclusive, of course. If the U.S. joins, that would be great, but it can be a network of agreements that drive tariffs down, particularly the trade barriers that you were talking about.

So let me say quickly about the common grounds that we have. I think it’s easier to tackle the common grounds than tackle the hard problems. That doesn’t mean that we don’t need to think about the hard problems. I think there are a lot of common grounds between China and the European Union.

I think the first thing is probably on environment and climate. There are a lot of things that these two countries can push ahead, not only after the Paris Agreement. I think we made a lot of progress. There are a lot more things that need to get done, and I actually see a lot of things have been done. The joint leadership and joint initiatives are very important in this aspect.

The other thing is the digital economy. I think this is important. These are the two largest economies, and digital innovations are very important. These two economies can discuss, along with the U.S., actually—that would be a good thing—to talk about common standards for different aspects, including the regulatory framework and how we do cross-border data transfer.

Last but not least, I think it’s important to keep talking, and communication is the key. I think that’s probably what we are doing here. If we don’t talk, then things go bad. Coordination among policymakers on how we deal with these issues. I think to continue the framework that we have and probably enhance the framework, and particularly enhance cooperation, is extremely important.

Just to sum up, I think the relationship is about the talk between the EU and China, and it’s about take and give. It’s not something that just, you know, you have to do this, you have to do that. It is negotiating who can do what and who can get what. Going back to peace and prosperity, I think I’m cautiously hopeful about this relationship and cautiously hopeful about lasting peace and prosperity.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Dr. Zhu. So our last contributor, but not the least, is Mr. Loukas Tsoukalis, President of the Board of the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). Please.

Loukas Tsoukalis, President of the Board, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Thank you very much. Now, in the short time I have available, I shall attempt to look at the bigger picture through European eyes. I mean, for many years, most Europeans, especially those living in Brussels, thought of a world with multilateral institutions and common rules, a world of growing economic interdependence, in which Europe’s open economies would benefit a great deal, and a world in which Europe would be able to exert its so-called soft power, for lack of hard power.

Now, this is the stuff, if I may put it bluntly, that Brussels’s dreams were made of. And these dreams are now gradually turning into a nightmare. Because at the same time, Europeans thought not only that they lived in a world of growing economic interdependence, but they also thought they would be able to continue enjoying the peace dividend that followed the end of the Cold War in Europe.

Now the nightmare consists of war being back. We have two wars, in fact, in our immediate neighbourhood: one in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s invasion, and the other in Gaza in the Middle East. And both wars affect us directly. We also have a gradual breakdown of rules, a weakening of international institutions, and a radical and pretty major change in our relationship with our biggest ally, namely the United States.

Now, in a changing world, you need to constantly rethink, and when necessary, redefine your own goals and the terms of engagement you have with the rest of the world. This is precisely what the European Union is being called upon to do.

You know, of course, the European Union is a strange political animal. It is neither a nation-state nor an international organisation. And with the change in the world we’re faced with, the EU is being called upon to essentially transform its DNA. And this is easier said than done. Let me give you two examples of what I mean by transforming our collective DNA.

The first is that European integration—the European Union—was essentially a peace project. It was peace between European countries, and it was largely inward-looking. Now we are being called upon to add defence and security to a peace project. We are being called upon to add hard power to soft power, and are being called upon to think more and more in geopolitical terms. Now, this will mean nothing less than Europe becoming a political adult, if it succeeds in doing so.

Now, the second example I would give you is that most Europeans, especially again those living in Brussels, thought that the main task was economic liberalisation and regulation in a world of growing economic interdependence. And now they realise that, in addition to economic regulation and economic liberalisation, they need to adopt active industrial policies in a world where other partners also think and behave strategically. And this requires a large transformation—huge transformation—in the way Europeans think about it, think about the world.

So, to conclude, in order not to take too much of your time, if you add security and geopolitics to economics, you change the relationship. But also, economic exchange is being changed in the process. So, for Europeans, this is not an easy task because we are also not an individual member country. We need to adjust to a changing world, and we need to preserve our internal unity, and last but not least, to become more and more a political adult—and that is difficult.

But I would hope that in the months and years to come, both sides—the European Union and China—recognise each other’s interests and sensitivities, recognise the needs that each side has. For Europeans, it will be essential to preserve our internal unity. And I think it would also be important that China respects European unity as well. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Loukas. Unfortunately, we’re running out of time for the discussants to make some comments. But maybe we just pick one, just two minutes. I’d like to have Wang Yiwei. He’s the Jean Monnet Chair Professor and Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Director of the Centre for EU Studies at Renmin University of China, and also Nonresident Senior Fellow at CCG. Just two minutes. Thank you.

WANG Yiwei, Nonresdient Senior Fellow, CCG; Jean Monnet Chair Professor and Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Director of the Center for EU Studies, Renmin University of China

Thank you. I have two questions for Ambassador Toledo.

First question: What major lessons can we draw from the past 50 years? As Confucius says, “At 50 years old, you know the mandate of heaven,” right? So what do we know from that?

And then, future-looking, I think China has drafted the 15th Five-Year Plan. We learned a lot from Europe, actually, in the past Five-Year Plan. So, what can we learn more from the European Union in the future Five-Year Plan? And what’s your expectation from the future Five-Year Plan?

So that’s basically two questions to you. And then back to my comments to you. I think President Xi identified the China-EU relations as a “three twos”: two major markets for economic globalisation, two major forces for a multipolar world, two major civilisations for cultural diversity.

I think China may be a unique country that recognises the European Union as a civilisation, not the European civilisation, but the European Union as a new civilisation. It is a human civilisation, a great innovation, I think.

And then, reciprocally, we ask you to view China as a civilisation as well. Like the famous American sinologist Lucian Pye argued, China is “a civilisation pretending to be a state.” If you complain so much about China’s overcapacity, consumption, rebalance, systematic rival, whatever, you are not viewing China as a civilisation. Think about that consumption. We are students of Confucius. Confucius always asked us: save more, consume less. So it’s our culture. It’s not just so-called rebalance and overcapacity. We should produce more EV cars for the world. So it’s not just for the European market.

So, my conclusion is: how to understand us as two civilisations, China and the EU? My suggestion is: turn the systemic rival into a systemic partner as civilisations, both for European civilisation and human civilisation, for AI innovation, climate change, all of this. So, view us as a civilisation, and think globally, not just bilaterally. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Professor Wang. But we are really running out of time. I know Ambassador also has a tight schedule. Perhaps you can briefly answer that, and then we’ll conclude with Ambassador Declan.

Jorge Toledo Albiñana, Ambassador of the European Union to China

Very difficult to answer in a short time, but I will try. Very complex.

I think I had a long speech about lessons learned, but if I had to choose one lesson that China has given to the world, it’s that market, free market—actually, capitalism works. Because in these 50 years, compared to the 40 years before, China has applied, especially in the last 40 years, market and free market and capitalism to its economy. It has worked very well. In the last few years, it has worked so well that—and I’m going to this overcapacity—it is threatening the overall economic balance in the world. So it has to rebalance.

I mean, we are not telling China what to do. It’s clear, every economist knows that there is a clear imbalance in the Chinese economy. As Professor Franco Bruni has said very well, there is an imbalance in the Chinese economy, which is basically a lack of demand or consumption. There is an imbalance in the American economy, which is a huge fiscal deficit. And there is an imbalance in the European economy, which is a lack of investment. So that’s a fact. But overcapacity, which is not even denied now by the Chinese government—they call it something else. They call it “involution,” they call it “rat race.” But it’s clear.

I was the other day in Chengdu, in one of the largest new productive forces. They are losing money. Everybody is losing money because there is deflation. There is overcapacity. So, that’s a problem for China. But if it is a problem for China, we have nothing to say. But if it is a problem for us because of unfair market conditions—and this is the other lesson—then you have to restore fair trade.

And it’s not there on the 15th Five-Year Plan. I wouldn’t, I mean, I don’t feel legitimate to give lessons or to tell the Chinese government what to do, because they’re doing very well. But if I had to, I would say: restore a fair level playing field, and you will attract more investment, if you are interested in European investment. Because I know that European companies, many of them are seriously thinking of leaving because their level playing field is no longer there; because they face difficult conditions; because there are measures that are breaking their business model. So there is a need there for rebalancing, and that’s all.

And about civilisation, make no mistake. Everybody knows that China is one of the most important civilisations in the history of humankind. And we respect that. We admire many traits of this civilisation. And it has nothing to do with consumption or non-consumption. That’s a macroeconomic problem, and that’s a problem for China. But it has effects on us, and we cannot afford to let all this overcapacity, rat race, involution, whatever you call it, destroy our industries in Europe. We are not going to do that. So that’s very clear. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Ambassador. Ambassador Declan, please.

Declan Kelleher, Chair, Governing Board, European Policy Centre; Former Irish Ambassador to China

Thank you, Henry. Let me very briefly thank Ambassador Toledo, Minister Peng, former Director-General and Senior CCG Fellow Sun Yongfu for their comprehensive, excellent statements at the start of this session, which I think provided a substantial and varied vista for the discussion which we’ve just had, which was rich and enlightening. I want to thank my co-chair, Henry, and I’d like to thank all speakers and participants.

Obviously, I hesitate to make specific conclusions from such a rich and varied discussion. We are in a very challenging geopolitical period, and it is clear from the discussion that the EU-China relationship has not just bilateral but also global import. It’s also, I think, the case that one criterion for a successful relationship is that it should be able to resolve differences as well as mark successes.

And insofar as the discussion in this room is concerned, just thinking of a kind of a motto for what we have done and what we have still to do, I’m reminded of a classical Chinese idiom, which is 百尺竿头更进一步, which I would put in English as meaning we’ve had a very good discussion, but we have a lot more to discuss. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao WANG

Thank you, Ambassador Declan. You have basically literally translated “100 metres crossed, but let’s have more metres ahead” in the Chinese saying. That’s exactly, I think, the spirit of this roundtable.

We are celebrating the 50th anniversary of China-EU relations, but we still have a lot of differences. But we identify more and more common ground and more and more common consensus. So this is really the right spirit, I think. With more high-level meetings and also a summit coming up, we hope that we will have more fruitful discussions in the years ahead. So, thank you all very much, and I appreciate Ambassador Toledo’s coming. Thank you all.

The video recording has been broadcast and remains available on the Chinese internet, as well as CCG’s official YouTube channel.