Transcript: Maintaining International Regulatory Cooperation in A Multipolar World

Partnering with the Centre on Regulation in Europe, CCG hosted roundtable within the 11th China and Globalisation Forum running from May 22-24, 2025.

This is the transcript of the roundtable themed “Maintaining International Regulatory Cooperation in A Multipolar World,” hosted by Center for China and Globalization (CCG) in partnership with the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE) from the 11th China and Globalisation Forum.

The forum, jointly convened by the CCG and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC), and co-organised by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS) and the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), ran a three-day agenda from May 22 to 24.

The video recordings of the forum have been broadcast and remain available on the Chinese internet, as well as CCG’s official YouTube channel.

We have so far published transcripts of the opening ceremony, opening roundtable, the roundtable on U.S.-China trade war narratives, and the roundtable on the role of China and the Global South. This session, focusing on international regulatory cooperation, was chaired by Zach Meyers, Director of Research, CERRE and features contributions from:

• Thomas Becker, Head of Government Affairs, BMW Group

• Timo Blenk, Partner and CEO, Agora Strategy Group

• Franck Bruni, President, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

• Christian Kastrop, Partner and CEO, Global Solutions Initiative; Former German State Secretary for Digital Society and Consumer Policy

• Berthold Kuhn, Professor at Freie Universitat Berlin

• David Morris, CEO, Australia China Business Council (Tasmania); Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG

• Erik Solheim, Co-Chair, Europe-Asia Centre; Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

• Gerhard Stahl, Former Secretary General, EU Committee of the Regions; Visiting Professor, PHBS

• Grace Sun, Strategic Marketing Head of LONGi North America, LONGi Green Energy

The transcript is based on the video recording and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Roundtable | Maintaining International Regulatory Cooperation in A Multipolar World

Zach Meyers, Director of Research, Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE)

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen,

We’ve already discussed today the need for new efforts to protect and reinvigorate global governance, and in this panel, we’ll be turning specifically to cooperation in the area of regulation.

I’m very pleased and grateful that we can partner with CCG. I am Director of Research at the Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE), and this really continues our past collaboration with CCG, including in an event in January this year, which was about how to ensure AI development can be inclusive, both within countries and between countries. That was a perfect example of how different parts of the world, even if they have different values, still share many of the same regulatory problems and have much to learn from each other.

The need for close regulatory cooperation in areas like responsive and inclusive development of new technologies and climate change is very clear. But whether it is the U.S. with its deregulatory drive or the European Union with its current concerns about the impact of regulation on innovation and economic competitiveness, it’s clear that many parts of the world are rethinking what good regulation looks like, and whether that helps or hinders the process of international cooperation remains to be seen.

This is not a panel specifically on cooperation with Europe, but as this is our area of expertise at CERRE, it would be very useful for me to maybe explain some of the current thinking about regulation in Europe. And of course, Europe has been famed for its regulatory approaches in areas like technology and the environment, which have been internationally influential, creating a so-called Brussels effect.

But Europe is very much rethinking its approach in recent years. First, the EU is joining China and the U.S. in taking security, supply chain resilience, and tech sovereignty much more seriously than it has in the past.

On the one hand, that may mean that the EU is more inward-looking than it has been in the past, and might be focused on things like tilting the playing field in favour of European firms. But on the other hand, Europe also needs to rebalance its international relationships and remain open, because autarky is not a realistic approach.

And so that raises some questions for Europe, and I think for other countries that’ll be represented on this panel, about how do you put boundaries around the areas where issues need to be securitised, and issues where we really do need international cooperation to be deepened.

I think that’s particularly true when many of the targets for new regulations, like AI and the environment, have consequences that cannot be kept within national boundaries.

Secondly, the EU is increasingly concerned that its approach to regulation is impacting innovation and the bloc’s competitiveness. But there is debate about exactly what this problem is. So, some would argue that it is what EU regulation is trying to do—for example, taking a precautionary approach to risk, which stifles innovation. Others argue that the problem is not the goals, but poor regulatory design.

Wherever we are likely to end, what we have been advocating at the Centre on Regulation in Europe is a return to a simpler, principles-based, and more flexible type of regulation. And this could make it much easier for us to identify where the EU shares common values with its partners and can open the door to better enabling international coordination.

In the long run, it might also lead to a change in the EU’s lawmaking approach, which often focuses on being the first mover, with thoughts about how to be compatible with other regulatory approaches around the world being an afterthought.

So that in mind, I’ve got four broad questions I’d like to ask our esteemed panellists to tackle.

The first is: given the growing shift towards protectionism and the emphasis on economic security and defence, in what policy areas is international cooperation likely to be able to achieve concrete results and help us demonstrate the benefits of dialogue and negotiation? I’ve put on the table environmental standards and technology as two possible options.

Secondly, how can China and its partners both compete in areas like clean energy and emerging digital technologies like AI and quantum computing without undermining the case for regulatory dialogue and cooperation in other areas? So, can we compartmentalise?

Thirdly, what mechanisms, such as bilateral dialogues and multilateral platforms, can help China and its partners mitigate regulatory divergence while respecting their economic, social, and political differences? In particular, as the EU moves ahead with implementing its environmental and its digital initiatives, what support can it provide to Chinese firms, for example, to help them understand and comply with European requirements?

And finally, linking in with the last panel, intensifying geopolitical competition amongst the world’s great powers means that we should also be thinking about whether there’s meaningful scope to secure partnerships and cooperation with third countries. For example, joint initiatives to help developing nations digitise and strengthen their low-carbon transition technologies.

So, to simplify those four questions:

• What can we agree on?

• How do we do it while we also compete?

• What’s the best format for dialogue?

• And how can we extend this cooperation to involve third countries?

So, very pleased to open this up to the panel now. And I’d like maybe to provide the first contribution: Thomas Becker, who’s Head of Government Affairs at the BMW Group. Thank you very much, Thomas.

Thomas Becker, Head of Government Affairs, BMW Group

Thank you very much.

Let me maybe try to explain the topics that have been also discussed in the previous panels at a, let’s say, somewhat lower flight altitude—looking at the automotive supply chain.

My company has started producing electric vehicles in 2013, and we did that in Europe and almost at the same time here in China. So we have a long-standing history of working with Chinese partners, component suppliers, battery cell suppliers since then. And we are seeing a considerable growth in this business.

But one thing is clear: what we are talking about is a supply chain which is not what we have been used to, like the usual European, American, Chinese suppliers we had to do with before— the electric supply chain extends into Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Morocco, and other places, if you look at where the stuff comes from that actually drives an electric car.

So very clearly, in a world where you try to limit access to markets, where you erect higher and higher barriers to trade—be it openly, or be it in the guise of, let’s say, a green paint on what actually is a protectionist policy—you are not going to see a more sustainable mobility.

Electric mobility depends on the availability of stuff from many places and on collaboration. The centre of competence for the battery technology is, let’s face it, in Asia. And decoupling and independence have turned out to be an illusion.

So I’m today, ever more since maybe four or five years ago, certain that the idea of “do everything everywhere in each market” is not a realistic one.

Another phenomenon is important. If you look at the carbon footprint of our products, with each additional vehicle that we sell, it shifts from the road to the supply chain. So if we were to have a fully electric fleet, the biggest piece of CO₂ is emitted before you drive the first kilometre, because the carbon is in the material.

So that means, in order to make our business more sustainable, more and more, we need to look into how to decarbonise our supply chains. And doing that means to negotiate with first- and second- and third-tier suppliers, setting criteria like the use of renewable energies, agreeing on the use of secondary instead of primary material, closing loops wherever you can, using new processes, for example, in steelmaking, in order to decarbonise the vehicle’s footprint.

Can you do this if you have different standards in each and every region? Most likely not.

So, having different test cycles for on-the-road emission testing or vehicle consumption is one thing. But measuring a global supply chain with different criteria is a completely different—and even more threatening—scenario.

So, this is why we think that there’s a strong case for establishing internationally accepted rules, for example, under the framework of the UNECE, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, where standardisation of automotive life cycle assessments is undertaken at the moment with the participation of China and many other countries. We are very supportive of that.

We also think that an internationally accepted carbon accounting logic, which would integrate the CO₂ footprint, so to speak, on the bill of materials, starting maybe with an iron ore mine in Australia or a nickel producer in Canada or Indonesia, will make things much simpler and more transparent, so that in the future, you can actually measure and allocate and count what you buy when you purchase a car, instead of the many, let’s say, controversial discussions we have at the moment.

So, harmonisation, standardisation, collaboration becomes even more essential from an automotive point of view than it has been in the past, when we had the combustion engine technology only.

So, maybe that as a small glimpse on what keeps us busy at the moment. Thank you.

Zach Meyers

Thank you very much, Thomas, and thank you for keeping to time. And let me just ask if the other panellists could too, because we have started late, and I know that some of the other panellists will have to leave right on the dot of six. So let me turn now to Timo Blenk, who’s Partner and CEO at the Agora Strategy Group, to provide us with his perspective. Thanks, Timo.

Timo Blenk, Partner and CEO, Agora Strategy Group

Zach, thank you so much for this kind introduction. And Henry, thank you so much for welcoming me and inviting me to speak here.

So first, let me start by geopolitical competition. I think it’s a well-chosen phrase, and we often talk about it. And let me say very clearly: the fundamental political change in Europe at the moment is absolutely real—going more towards stronger European autonomy thinking, building up European defences, and shifting European supply chains, which comes along with it.

And I remember—and Henry, you were there—the speech of J.D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference when he basically shredded the global international order after the Second World War, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking shortly after him, actually showing how China intends to keep the international order, and also reflecting China’s ambition in that field. So we certainly see a shift in that regard.

Agora Strategy is a company founded out of the Munich Security Conference, and we advise industries, also very much the automotive sector and others, on global challenges, but also governmental institutions, the European Parliament. So I’m going to share a few views from the industrial perspective on what does it mean for a company actually being placed in this international world.

First, companies certainly not only look on growth and market access, but increasingly also at building up resilience and navigating this fragmentation. And diverse, different regulatory frameworks, of course, make that extremely difficult.

Which brings me to the question—and that was the question that you asked—where can we cooperate, actually? I think there are different dimensions.

The first one is a very value-driven one: it’s the question of how to establish and increase trust. And I think it’s really not easy to do that, but standardisation, cooperation—as Thomas has just mentioned—are certainly, from an industry perspective, a few ones which are important.

But it also means recognising different interests, mutual interests, and then trying to find a framework how to build around that. And I think the panel just before, on the Global South and China, reflected also on that.

Further, one: green tech regulation has been mentioned. It’s certainly one of the first. Also, I would also like to mention the field of critical minerals and raw materials, especially all [inaudible] brings me to third countries, where China and European countries could cooperate also in terms of mining and processing.

Critical minerals supply chains are very much diversified, but as you know, many critical minerals, like germanium, palladium, graphite, even cobalt, are processed in China. They come often from China, and European industry is heavily dependent on that. So collaborating there, at least from a European perspective, is highly welcomed.

The next one is managing uncertainty, which I would welcome, also a stronger economic European Union–Chinese business dialogue. I think it would be helpful on issues like crisis prevention, also food security, and, of course, tax and tariffs—moderate tax and tariffs—because nobody is winning from tax and tariffs.

I think one field more to the future is space and space mining. It’s extremely expensive, but it can be very rewarding. And China has, of course, a footprint there. I think even developing a joint framework where Europe or China could at least pursue different interests, but under a joint framework, would be a great success.

I think digitisation/AI tech is also a field of cooperation, and this is extremely based on open-source software and less on hardware. So with hardware, I think there are views and issues, but open-source like DeepSeek as a role model, best practice, can be very successful.

And the last two ones are, from my perspective: infrastructure. Large infrastructure projects—I know China is also intending to build a new railway system towards Europe—are certainly a lasting, strong link. Totally welcomed. And I think these projects are so expensive and big, there is space for different players.

And the last one is also to avoid overreach, which brings me to the first sentence. As I said, it means we can only be successful while respecting independence and building ties, while managing the strategic competition which is certainly there between companies, but also between markets.

Thank you, Zach, over to you.

Zach Meyers

Thank you, Timo. I think your point around EU tech sovereignty being such a real, live issue really can’t be understated. We know that Europe has had some concerns about the role that China might play in tech supply chains in Europe. But really, the concern about U.S. tech firms at the moment is really quite significant.

For a long time, Europe has thought that we could have U.S. firms and regulate them under EU rules, and that would be fine. But, you know, you look at the retaliation that President Trump has threatened against the European Union for fining U.S. companies for not complying with EU law, and suddenly, there is a concern that we have to have our own European companies because regulation without having players in the game might not be enough.

And I think in terms of building trust, certainly from a tech perspective, open source—which is fully auditable—seems like a really good way in which areas like AI, that might otherwise seem like it’s quite difficult because the level of rivalry is so high, might actually be a good place to start.

Another area that I think is quite interesting is financial services and financial regulation. And our next speaker is Franco Bruni, the President of ISPI, the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. And if I recall correctly from earlier today, I think Franco said that he might talk a little bit about financial regulation as a potential topic.

So, over to you, Franco.

Franck Bruni, President, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

Thank you. Thank you very much, and I apologise if I will concentrate my five minutes on global financial regulation, which is clearly in danger of becoming inadequate to cope with the dangers of financial instability that we are running.

Think to the current pressures to lower capital ratios in America, precisely when the American financial system is shocked by several risks and credibility shocks. Think to the deregulation that Trump has in mind in the field of digital currencies. I mean, it’s really a moment of extremely delicate dangers in these fields.

And I think the attention of the world is inadequate on this field. The attention of newspapers, etc., is inadequate. Everybody talks about tariffs, but here you have probably a bigger risk. And also tariffs, by creating uncertainty, have a high probability to cause financial instability. And this is an aspect of the tariff issues which is inadequately dealt with, even by media.

What can I say in general on global financial regulation? Well, we need more cooperation, clearly. In this case, the Global South and Europe could well join forces to influence the general atmosphere of financial regulators in the world.

There are many fronts in which action is required. Let me mention a few of them, mainly thinking to the IMF as an institution that has to be reformed, together with many other institutions.

But think to the IMF: there’s a quota redistribution which has been tried and retried but never solved. Europe has too many votes, and they don’t use the votes because we vote separately. We should give up a large part of these votes in favour of China, India, etc., and exercise the rest of the votes united. In this way, we will reform the IMF.

Also, from a managerial point of view, the IMF doesn’t work well. The top managers are resident, mediocre guys. They should become non-resident, less numerous, and extremely, extremely high-level. So, the whole machine has to be changed.

Let me mention the fact that we have to resuscitate some kind of a decentralised restructuring mechanism. At the beginning of the century, Anne Krueger launched a nice plan to make the IMF the centre of restructuring according to agreed and solid rules. This was refused, after a lot of research and nice publications by Anne Krueger personally and the IMF. This has to be resuscitated.

Anne Krueger herself, a couple of months ago—she’s now old enough, but she said the world’s poorest countries, grappling with an escalating solvency crisis—and here we go back to obviously financial instability—are paying the price for disagreement among major creditors. We have to overcome this issue with a big collective action.

There are other fronts, and I have no time to go into them. But think to the regulation of the new means of payments—for instance, digital payments. We need a very urgent and large global effort to agree on basic rules that will, by the way, avoid that the world gets divided in terms of payment systems.

And here, China is crucial. China has to avoid using the digital currencies topic to fight against the United States. I mean, the United States must avoid fighting against China, but China must be conscious of the fact that we need a common and well-established system of circulating these new currencies. Otherwise, it’s going to be a loss for everybody.

I could go on—a very long list—but I’ve exhausted my minutes.

Thank you. Thank you very much.

Zach Meyers

Thank you very much, Franco. And I think that you’re quite right that there is a lot of goodwill that the EU and other Western countries could develop with the developing world by helping contribute to solving the problems of global financial instability, both from tariffs and from the potential for kind of less well-regulated digital finance solutions like cryptocurrencies.

We’ve talked a little bit about tech, but maybe not tackled it head-on, so I’m really pleased that we have one of the former German State Secretaries for Digital Society and Consumer Policy, Christian Kastrop, who’s also Partner and CEO of the Global Solutions Initiative, who I’d now like to contribute to this discussion. Thank you, Christian.

Christian Kastrop, Partner and CEO, Global Solutions Initiative; Former German State Secretary for Digital Society and Consumer Policy

Thank you very much. So ja, indeed, I would like to start with a little bit of a broader brush, but we can for sure come back in the later discussion.

Really, I’m a bit tempted to look a little bit back, if we talk about, say, the global situation. I remember the very first moonshots, when the astronauts were in space and they looked back to the globe and said, “Hey, that looks really unsafe, tiny, the blue planet in the middle of the black environment.”

And then I think, ja, some people start to think, then it’s all in line with the Club of Rome and all these incentives, which are also around cooperation, orientation, and regulatory rules. But it took a while.

And then, of course, I would also like to mention another astronaut event, which started with a famous communication to the Earth station: “Houston, we have a problem.” And I think this is probably also a nice starter to look into—yes, Houston, we really have a problem. Or should we say, yes, Washington, we have a problem?

So that we face this issue of this new mercantilism, protectionism, and also a lot of things now focused on individual defence and economic security, but not so much seen in a global situation, which is entirely necessary. But it’s more about, “How can I safeguard my backyard? How can I safeguard my resources? How can I safeguard my trade?”—and not so interesting for the other ones.

And of course, this is a bilateral issue, and it’s also a multilateral issue. And I think, how can we keep it up, and how can we really come back to a new cooperation—and really in the best of all parts of the world—and create, then, also the necessary resilience against, say, ecological problems we anyway face?

So what would I do? Also with respect to consumers, maybe, which of course are also important. If you do not take care of consumers, of people, of businesses, and also take care of some political issues, I think we will go into the wrong direction.

So, I think we should, nevertheless, if we want to maintain international regulatory cooperation, let’s start not with the worst things or with the biggest blocks. Let’s maybe start with less sensitive issues. But nevertheless, of course, they should also be pressing issues—otherwise there is no interest on the other side.

Of course, some of these issues are related to the climate issue. And I think the support for climate issues—and again, that’s also an issue for consumers to support—are a kind of a true global common good, and we can really maybe draw on that and try. And this is my organisation, the Global Solutions Initiative.

So, of course, we could, for instance, start with preserving biodiversity. Maybe there is a good analogue on—I may remind you of the so-called Montreal Protocol. This was about 1987, where we had this very successful management of the ozone layer of the atmosphere. I think this is also something maybe we can draw on. It’s a very practical example.

Then, of course, there are also some results we can draw on. We do not yet have an agreement on an aircraft pollution tax, but we have something lately for shipping. And I think this is also maybe a possible issue, which we could really enlarge.

Then moving over to green tech industries, I think green tech industries are important, but they also need a lot of energy. Also related, of course, to my favourite subject some years ago, or three years ago: the digital evolution. And what does it mean, also again, for the people and for the consumers?

And I think there could really be progress, also on global cooperation of regulatory issues. I think this is really not so difficult. I hope—maybe it’s also hope. In a lot of these topics, it’s just hope. But let’s start with some hope.

So, why not look at certain minimal standards also on tech developments? Also minimal standards and social safeguards for the use of digital technologies, which have so many advantages for the people. But we always have to be aware, besides the energy issue, there is also an issue of social safeguards: that consumers also are sheltered, and they are in the driver’s seat, together, of course, with industry, with politics. But we should not forget about them.

So, looking to Brussels quickly: of course, there is an exchange about different regulatory approaches. I was part of that—regulatory approaches—and it was a lot of stuff we had to swallow. But in the end, at least in some big digital reform issues from the Commission, I think we could get an agreement.

And so I also think there is an issue to relate the Brussels’ way of doing it. It could also be an issue for a more global approach. Not everything went well, but still, I think it was not a bad project.

So, most of all—this is my last remark—if we want to have global solutions in that area, I think—and it’s very urgent, it’s really urgent—it’s time to do something, but it also takes time to really understand the position of other regions, of other global players who might think differently—we should have full respect for these views too.

So, it’s creating mutual trust. It’s not necessary, I guess, to get a full understanding in a minute. But if we could create trust—global trust—between players.

And again, a big thank you to Henry and to the whole team organising this conference here. I think this, really, for me, after these two days, is quite a step forward, and let’s discuss it further.

Zach Meyers

Thank you. It’s, I think, nice to get some consensus around the panel so far: that really starting modest, starting on technical issues like measurements and standardisation can be a way to build trust and to, I guess, develop some cooperation and progress without jumping straight to where there might be value clashes.

I’d like to turn now to Professor Berthold Kuhn at the Freie University out of Berlin, who I know has done quite a lot of work in the area of environmental regulation, and very interested to get your thoughts.

Berthold Kuhn, Professor at Freie Universitat Berlin

Thank you for the invitation. It’s an honour to again participate in the China and Globalisation Forum. We want to broaden, but also deepen, dialogue, cooperation, and standard setting. I will say a few words on where and how we can do that, with a focus on EU–China relations.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang said to European Commission President von der Leyen that green is the distinctive colour of cooperation between the EU and China. Of course, we have these flagship topics: climate action, the forthcoming COP30 conference in Brazil. Then we also have the Global Biodiversity Summit in New York in September. And we have already a couple of projects and dialogue formats related to climate action and biodiversity.

But beyond that, there are a series of other green topics of interest and importance for EU–China cooperation. It’s deforestation and greening supply chains—air, water, and soil pollution, plastic waste, for example, green finance, other areas.

I will draw attention to an area which has not received so much attention: it’s sound management of chemicals. And we, from the EU–China Cooperation on Environment and Green Economy project, we’ve done a workshop this week, and there was serious interest and commitment from both sides: from the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and also from the DG Environment in Brussels. Some experts from the OECD were also there.

The EU and China are the biggest chemical producers and consumers. The EU has ambitious regulations—REACH—and China is about to tighten regulations on chemical substances, especially new entrants in the market.

So, in this workshop, we discussed about legislations and regulations with a focus on hazardous materials, different classifications of chemical materials. Then also, we’ve talked about risk assessment and testing innovations, including, for example, non-animal testing and innovations in testing methods, and about product compliance and traceability.

Of course, in the context of the green transition, there are a couple of challenges. For instance, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism. From the EU perspective, of course, this is designed not to punish but to encourage global convergence on emission standards. Rather than fragmenting the global economy, these tools, from the perspective of the EU, could foster mutual transparency and predictability. Dialogue on methodologies for carbon footprinting or sustainable sourcing of critical materials, as was already mentioned—lithium or rare earths—could create a level playing field for green tech producers.

And I want to say that these collaborations do not only generate economic value, but they also build trust. They illustrate that rules-based engagement leads to win–win outcomes: jobs created in the green sector, improved environmental outcomes, and enhanced global stability.

I think the EU believes in strategic openness and supports the resilience of systems, but also wants to preserve the multilateral spirit, whether in trade, environment, or technology. The EU should insulate certain domains from purely geopolitical logics.

I think the over-politicisation, the over-securitisation of cooperation and standard setting in many sectors also affects the green sectors in some areas, and the global race in clean energy and digital technologies has been intensifying.

The EU and China are major players in areas such as electric vehicles, batteries, and also in artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Competition is inevitable; it’s even welcome. But strategic competition does not preclude strategic cooperation.

Thank you.

Zach Meyers

Thank you very much, Berthold. You know, I think that is a real dilemma for the EU, because we’ve seen in the U.S., having started with this kind of "small yard with a high fence" approach— that’s very difficult to sustain in practice.

And for the EU in particular, starting from behind in a lot of technological industries, this autarky-type approach, where we feel like we can do it all, you know, it’s not one that the EU is going to be able to do realistically.

And so, if security is going to become a more and more important issue to the EU, keeping its scope limited and not infecting the whole of the sectors of economic cooperation with China—and indeed with other partners—is going to be really key.

I’d now like to turn to Australia, and I’m very pleased we’ve got David Morris, who’s the CEO of the Australian China Business Council in Tasmania, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the CCG, to provide kind of a non-European perspective.

So, please welcome your thoughts, David.

David Morris, CEO, Australia China Business Council (Tasmania); Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG

Thank you, Zach, and thanks to Henry and Mabel for, once again, putting on a very important dialogue. And thanks for including another Aussie on the panel. It’s always a risk, because Aussies can be frank, right? But hopefully, frank and friendly.

I’m going to slightly disagree with this idea that we should look for small wins, that we should look for regulatory cooperation and then build trust. I think we’ve got to tackle this trust issue head-on. I think we’ve got to tackle the big issues head-on.

Trust has collapsed. Trust has collapsed in the last eight years, and this is a serious problem that we have to address. The trust that we need to repair—the damage that has been done to the world trading system—needs to be addressed head-on. The trust that is restricting our ability to cooperate in the green transition has to be tackled head-on. And in technology, where it may seem to be so difficult to unpick national security from other concerns, but I think we’ve got to tackle it.

These are for businesses, for societies, and for governments around the world. This is not just about, as we heard earlier today, this is not actually just about the U.S. and China. This is about people all around the world. We’ve got to tackle and resolve these big challenges. And so we’ve got to step back from the lack of trust and find a way to tackle these issues.

Now, how do we do it? Well, the populism and the fear and blame that has been causing so much of this problem is deeply now set in the United States—and I’m sorry to say, in parts of Europe as well.

I’m here to deliver some good news: that this is not consistent across the so-called West. We’ve just seen, in elections in Australia and Canada in recent weeks, a complete rejection of Trumpism—a complete and, I think, very convincing rejection of populism and the politics of fear and blame.

And we might actually be able to learn something from those two countries—often left out of these discussions, but significant economies and significant countries, where actually there’s a good understanding of the rule of law, of having rules and norms and standards that are trusted by the people and that can therefore be built upon in the international community.

In trade, for example, in countries like Australia and Canada, they understand the critical importance of interdependence, the economic benefits of interdependence. I worry about other parts of the West. And I say this being frank but friendly here. I’m a visiting professor at several universities in Europe. I’ve just returned from teaching in France, but I’ve also been teaching in Germany, Austria, and Hungary.

And in each course I teach, I ask my students: “Put up your hand who supports free trade.” And I also ask them, “Put up your hand who does not support free trade.” I have not yet had a single student who has put up their hand in support of free trade in Europe.

This is a serious problem. So it’s okay for us, as members of the elite, people who are working in think tanks or in businesses who absolutely understand the value of free trade—we can agree on this around the table, I’m sure. I’m sure if I asked you all to put up your hands, you would.

But the populations of these countries that are so critical to finding the solutions are not convinced. People are not convinced. And so we’ve got to find a way for the opinion leaders—such as people here today—and businesses and others, to explain better the benefits of regulatory cooperation, of standards, of norms—of the rule of law, basically, in the way that we trade and work together.

We here, in this part of the world, with RCEP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, have the biggest free trade area in the world. We heard today about the CPTPP, perhaps Europe joining that, which is a great idea, because Asian regionalism is all about open regionalism.

So if we could build beyond those areas where there’s opposition to free trade, if we could build more and more support and understanding, that’s critical, I think, to addressing head-on.

Now, I’ll be quick, because I’m running out of time.

On green, the same applies. We heard some very useful comments, I think, about supply chain transparency and carbon tracking. I think we can help to articulate the values of green cooperation. We ought to be using the COP process for that, as well as everything else that we’re doing.

Finally, I want to just wrap up very briefly on technology. Technology—we’ve got to address this head-on. We’ve got a crisis here. We’ve got innovation running well ahead of our capacity to govern it. And Europe is a norm leader and a standard setter. And so there are great lessons to learn from what Europe is doing. There are also some lessons to learn in Australia about social media and other regulations as well. But we’ve got to actually think about this with the big picture.

I think this is a serious and existential question for us. These new technologies as, for example, nuclear proliferation and nuclear energy once were in the post-war period.

And what did the leaders of the world do then? There was absolute distrust between the U.S. and the Soviet Union—absolute and total distrust. But they built an international organisation: the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was able to regulate. It accepted that there were national security areas in which they were not going to be able to stop countries from doing [things]—the established nuclear powers. But they built standards and norms and rules for the rest of us, and they rigidly enforced those. And with very small areas of breakout, that system worked.

I think we’ve got to do the same thing in technology today. We’ve got to think big. We need institution-building. We need rules that are supplier-blind. All the cyber experts tell us that tech risks are supplier-blind.

Australia just had a huge cyberattack recently. It was from India. Who would have thought? Why is India attacking Australia? Cyberattacks can come from anywhere. They can come from any country. They can come from a teenage boy in his bedroom. We need to be building national cyber defences, of course, but we also need rules and standards around this.

If the United States doesn’t want to come to the party on this, and they’re not convinced by the need for international regulation, perhaps the rest of us ought to do it anyway. Why don’t we actually build international capabilities to separate the national security elements—which are real—separate those off from where, actually, technology can and must be regulated?

I’ll leave it there. Thank you.

Zach Meyers

Thank you, David. I think, you know, we’re very much singing from the same hymn book here, because at CERRE, the Centre on Regulation in Europe, we produced a report last year on global governance of digital ecosystems, which recommended a global board to manage digital stability risks, especially when it comes to AI, modelled on what we’ve seen achieved internationally in areas like financial stability. And it was very pleasing to see the UN panel of experts on AI recommend a similar sort of model. Getting it implemented is obviously a different question.

Turning back to international institutions, I’m very pleased now to invite Eric Solheim, who’s the Co-Chair of the Europe-Asia Centre, and was also the former Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme. Very interested in your thoughts on the role of international institutions in solving some of these problems.

Erik Solheim, Co-Chair, Europe-Asia Centre; Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP)

Thank you so much. We sometimes speak as if we are now entering a period of geopolitics, because geopolitics was all over the place in the time when European colonial powers dominated the world, as well as the time when the United States dominated the world.

We are just entering a new sort of geopolitics, which is the multipolar order. One nation cannot dominate the world, nor can two, meaning the United States and China. We are embarking upon the multipolar world. That’s a much fairer world. Many more people will be rich. But it’s also a world which can potentially bring anarchy.

So, I very strongly suggest that our calling line be we need a rules-based global order.

Sometimes the Global South doesn’t like that term, because “rules-based global order” for so long meant some rules for the West and some very different rules for the rest. For example, sovereignty of some nations was very important; sovereignty of other nations was not so important. Or: “We should not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations—except, of course, when the United States of America did exactly that,” embarking upon 80 regime change operations in other nations.

What we need in the 21st century is a rules-based order, but with the same rules for everyone. Sovereignty of all nations matters. That means sovereignty of Ukraine matters. But sovereignty of Palestine matters also. No one, including the United States and Russia, should interfere in the internal affairs of other nations.

We need global rules for trade, for investment, and for control of technology. And for sure, we need to attack terrorism with the same determination, whether those suffering from terrorism are white, black, brown, or of whatever nationality. That’s a true rules-based global order. That should be our calling cry.

And as I see it, Europe and China are the two centres for driving this in the world. It will get support from nearly all of the Global South, for sure, from nations like Australia, many others. But unless Europe and China drive a rules-based global order, we will struggle.

There will be someone in the United States who still believes they can dominate the world. There may be someone in Russia who believes they can disrupt the world. But both China and Europe fundamentally believe in that rules-based global order, and let’s try to achieve that.

Then, on the green transformation, which is what I normally work on. Look: China is now so far ahead of the rest of us. We don’t really understand it in Europe, and I’m travelling a lot and seeing all the factories in modern China.

China is now 60% of all green: solar, wind, hydropower, electric batteries, electric cars, metros, high-speed rail. One nation—60%. The rest of the world is 40%. China is the biggest tree planter, and they’ve just cleaned up air and water at a speed no one else is even close to.

So, China is the indispensable nation for the green transformation. That’s one part of it. The other part of it: it’s not so easy for the rest of us to compete.

So, how do we organise this—where we need China for everything green, no one can go fast on solar or electric cars without China, but China is so far ahead that the rest of the world struggles to compete? I suggest two main mechanisms.

We need more Chinese investments in the rest of the world, because everyone wants jobs. I mean, the European Commission, of course; President Macron wants jobs in France; Chancellor Merz wants jobs in Germany. We need jobs in Europe. India—Prime Minister Modi—has launched “Make in India” as his main slogan. Everyone needs jobs. And Chinese companies can help by investing, spreading technology, and more. Just yesterday, Shanghai Automobile launched a new factory in Thailand as an example of this.

But China should also help European and other companies to be successful in the domestic Chinese market. Sometimes, European companies feel that they are not treated in an equal way in the Chinese market. If that happens, these companies will not be the driver of the fair free trade which we all want.

Let me end with a great story, which includes BMW. Quite recently, I visited CATL—that’s now the largest and dominant electric battery maker in the world—in Ningde, Fujian Province. They, over and over again, told me how grateful they were to BMW, saying that BMW had been their very critical partner, very critical customer, shared technology, shared best business practices at a time where that was absolutely essential for the growth of CATL.

Well, now CATL is ahead of any other company in the world when it comes to batteries. Well, time has come for CATL to share that technology and their business practices with the rest of the world. Then Europe needs to roll out the red carpet for that to happen. But the companies also need to get into this move. They cannot just export from China. They need to invest in other parts of the world.

Finally, China now has a huge trade surplus with basically every nation in the world—it’s not just the United States. Nearly every nation has a trade deficit with China. Most nations are not likely for that to continue over a long period of time. Everyone wants jobs and technology to their own nation.

So China cannot just export. China needs to invest more, be in more markets—but of course, also open its own market to foreign competition. Then we will be able to handle this green competition and the indispensable character of China in a better way.

Zach Meyers

Thank you very much, Erik. It’s certainly true that EU–China trust-building is going to be absolutely essential now, and it’s been pleasing that there have been some signs of an improvement in their relations over the last couple of weeks and months.

As I mentioned at the start, one of the issues that we’ve been thinking about at the Centre on Regulation in Europe is the importance of inclusive growth, particularly when it comes to technology. And so I’m very pleased our next speaker, Gerhard Stahl, as well as being a visiting professor at PHBS, was also the former Secretary-General of the EU Committee of the Regions, and so has been thinking quite a lot in the past on the importance of inclusive growth. And I’d very much like for him now to contribute to the conversation.

Gerhard Stahl, Former Secretary General, EU Committee of the Regions; Visiting Professor, PHBS

Thank you very much for inviting me to this very interesting conference and to have a chance to make some remarks in this discussion.

First, I would like maybe to make some general remarks, taking up contributions which relate to the need of trust, because I think this is the basis for any cooperation, and later on, for any more detailed regulatory discussions.

There are some elements which are needed to have trust. There’s the element of stability. There’s the element also of a society which is able to be trusted by its own citizens. And I think one of the interesting parts of our discussion which we had in the time before was to discover that when a government is not able to assure that the losers of globalisation somehow are supported by the winners of globalisation, the internal cohesion of a society might be undermined, and we will get this as a problem for international relations.

And in this sense, allow me to make maybe one positive comment about Europe, and then I will also add some obviously critical remarks about Europe.

But when we compare the different systems, Europe is a market economy, but it is a social market economy. And in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon type of economy, I think, with all its difficulties—and I will come back also on the difficulties—Europe has better succeeded in keeping an internal cohesion. This is an element even of our constitutions, where, based on the rule of our constitution, we are obliged even to have policies which contribute to cohesion. And then you have the different national traditions about social policy. So I think in this sense, for trust, also to assure that the globalisation benefits are shared, is an essential element.

But now I want to come back to our topic here, and this is regulation. Obviously, it is very difficult to address complicated regulatory issues in such a short time, so I can only touch on a bit of the problems.

We have heard that the EU is a frontrunner in climate policy. We have heard climate policy is our common destiny for mankind—we want to solve this. Now, the question is how to implement a climate policy.

And there, the EU, which has developed an ambitious climate policy, obviously is now developing instruments. It was already mentioned that one of the key instruments for the EU to be able to reach its climate objectives will be the Cross Border Adjustment Mechanism.

And now we come into the nitty-gritty of the reality of trade, climate policy, and development ambitions, because what does the Cross Border Adjustment Mechanism mean at the end? It means that imports going to Europe will be burdened by a carbon price if it is perceived that this product has not fulfilled the conditions for an environmentally acceptable production.

That means the idea of the Cross Border Adjustment Mechanism is to stop carbon leakage. This seems to be logical, because if a company is obliged, because of high standards, to have a more cost-intensive production in Europe, obviously, it should not be confronted with competition based on environmental dumping.

But then it has to be calculated. And there, now we will find negotiations for the years to come. The system will start to become operational in 2026, and surely, this Cross Border Adjustment Mechanism will create a lot of problems with trading partners. And trading partners can be concerned and say, “Will this become a new protectionist instrument, which hides behind a climate objective the interest to shelter their own economy against competition from outside?”

Therefore, we, as a foundation—and I’m also a member of a European foundation—have made a study, together with Indian partners, where we looked specifically at the situation of developing countries, also making sure that in the implementation of this mechanism, the interests of developing countries are not overlooked, and that at the end, the system, which also creates revenue for the EU, is not misused as a financial instrument to finance the EU with environmental taxes, but only to compensate the difference in production structures.

It is very complicated, so I can’t go into the details. But for our discussion, I think you might be a bit reassured that inside Europe, partners are looking that a new necessary instrument is not misused as a new form of protectionism.

And then maybe one creative idea—very short at the end. Europe and China are big trading partners. And specifically for Africa, I think these are the two actors of reference. And it might be very interesting also between the EU and China to look more into the different trading agreements.

The EU has a lot of trade agreements with partners. China is more and more an international actor, has more and more agreements. In part of these agreements, you have elements of good governance. Whether this is named the fight against corruption, whether it is named rule of law, it might be useful to have a dialogue between the EU and China on how also these trade agreements could be used to promote a certain good governance.

We have all agreed to the Sustainable Development Goals. This is also in part good governance. So in our trade relations, we maybe could cooperate, and with trade, also contribute to good governance in some countries, while knowing that a long debate is needed to be precise what “good governance” means. But there are procedural aspects which you can bring into such agreements, which might be quite helpful.

Thank you.

Zach Meyers

Thank you, Gerhard. In the interest of time, I’m going to jump straight to Grace Sun, who’s the head of strategic marketing at LONGi Green Energy North America, who I guess would have a lot of experience on international supply chains and the impact of European and indeed other green regulations.

Grace Sun, Strategic Marketing Head of LONGi North America, LONGi Green Energy

Thank you so much, Zach. First of all, I want to say thank you, CCG, for having us here today, and thank you so much for coordinating this forum to bring in great ideas, perspectives, and suggestions.

Before I dive into my remark, I wanted to touch on one of the points that, Christian you just mentioned about the energy consumption of green tech and renewable technology in general.

We did a calculation: the direct energy consumption from silicon materials to photovoltaic modules is only about 0.4 kilowatt hours per watt, while the electricity generation of each watt of photovoltaic modules in its entire life cycle, generally about 30 years, is about 45 kilowatt hours. So, from 0.4 to 45, the ultimate energy efficiency produced by photovoltaics is about 100 times that of its production consumption.

So, by applying green and low-carbon technological innovations, the energy consumed in production can be transformed into green energy that contributes to the global energy transition over hundreds of times. And that’s what we usually call a green energy magnifier. So, I hope that gave you some insight.

As an advanced renewable technology and technology company, LONGi operates globally across diverse markets and policy environments. So we truly welcome growing dialogues around how we can better balance regulations with collaborations in today’s multipolar world.

We encourage efforts to ensure that regulatory approaches remain aligned and supportive of the global energy transition. A successful pathway to decarbonisation depends on shared innovation, resilient supply chains, and mutual recognition of standards.

We operate with a strong commitment to compliance and local engagement in the North American market, so we always welcome open dialogues with policymakers, industry peers, and civil societies to continuously improve our standards, from supply chain transparency, which we just mentioned many, many times today, to environmental performance.

We also believe that localisation can serve as a powerful driver of the globalisation process. It opens the door to shared investment, technology exchange, and cross-border value creation—not in opposition to global cooperation, but a complement to it.

We believe that localisation and international collaboration go hand in hand. That’s why we actively engage in joint standard setting, collaborative research, and work in public–private dialogues, working together to build more resilient and sustainable clean energy ecosystems.

Looking ahead, we would welcome efforts to create more trust-based, inclusive approaches to regulatory cooperation—ones that recognise the global nature of climate challenges and support aligned, forward-looking solutions across markets.

And again, thank you so much for the opportunity for us to be here as part of the conversation.

Zach Meyers

Thank you so much, Grace. We’re a little bit over time, so I’m going to wrap up in less than a minute, hopefully. But I think that there have been some common themes that have come out across all the panellists, which have been very interesting.

The first is just the imperative of cooperation. Firstly, to delivering the green transition, but also delivering it in a way that’s most efficient and most effective, which is going to mean things like common standards across different countries; and also, I guess, going to the point of financial instability, to prevent further fragmentation in the world.

In terms of the areas of cooperation, I think there was also a lot of commonality: the financial sector, the green transition, and digital, particularly areas like AI, which many of us might initially think would be perhaps too sensitive for cooperation.

And on the how—maybe we didn’t get complete consensus—but I think there was definitely an understanding that we have to build trust, and that taking issues like standardisation, measurements, increasing transparency are all steps that may be modest, but are also going to be essential to build trust amongst international players, and at the same time, building support from the ground up for free trade and for understanding the importance of international cooperation.

And I think finally, for the EU in particular, making sure that its instruments are being used for the right reasons. You know, we don’t want to see the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism being used to raise revenues or as a protectionist tool. It’s really meant to encourage the rest of the world to join the EU in decarbonising its sectors.

So with that very quick wrap-up, let me thank all of our panellists for their wonderful contributions today, and to CCG for allowing us to partner with them on this panel.

Thank you very much.