Transcript: Two Sessions Recap

CCG reflected on key political gatherings of China in collaboration with Swiss and Benelux Chamber of Commerce

On March 12, 2025, the day after the conclusion of the Two Sessions—the annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), in collaboration with the Swiss Chamber of Commerce and the Benelux Chamber of Commerce in China, held a “Two Sessions Recap” at CCG’s Beijing headquarters.

The event featured a presentation by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President of CCG, followed by his Q&A with the audience. Since the event was held under the Chatham House Rule, neither the identity nor the affiliation of the participants, except for those of Henry Huiyao Wang, will be revealed in this transcript.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President of CCG

Good afternoon to all the friends from the Swiss Chamber and, of course, CCG as well. I am very pleased to be attending this exchange session this afternoon. Yesterday afternoon, I was at CGTN, where I spent the whole afternoon commenting on the closing of the NPC annual session for a global audience.

This afternoon, I plan to give a briefing of about 15 to 20 minutes based on my understanding of what actually happened, or what my takeaways are from the Two Sessions. After that, I hope we can have a roundtable discussion for exchanges and communication.

We are very happy to co-host this with the Swiss Chamber and also our Benelux Chamber, which Ms. Song represents. I would like to briefly introduce the Center for China Globalization.

The Center for China Globalization is one of the leading think tanks in China and has been ranked among the top 100 think tanks by the University of Pennsylvania’s think tank program for many years. We are also the only think tank with special consultative status granted by the UN in the think tank category.

So, we’re very happy to be active and engage with the business community. I understand that this afternoon we have many business representatives from different companies and chambers, and we are pleased to welcome all of you to this CCG roundtable.

I’d also like to mention that the Two Sessions were completed yesterday, but I believe now is the time to truly understand what the key takeaways are. In fact, CCG is organizing another event, which we normally do. We will be holding a CCG VIP luncheon at the International Club this Friday, with 30 to 40 ambassadors already registered. We will have a brief session there, with some experts, as well as CPPCC National Committee and NPC members in attendance.

What I’d like to emphasise about this year’s sessions of the NPC and CPPCC National Committee is that they are quite significant. The reason for this is that, first, it is likely one of the best NPC and CPPCC National Committee sessions held after COVID.

Although it was relatively short, lasting only eight days, it was very well-prepared. I believe that about a week or 10 days before the sessions, President Xi met with private sector leaders and business tycoons, such as Jack Ma and Lei Jun, as well as representatives from BYD and DeepSeek, who all met with President Xi and other top Chinese leaders. I think this sends a very strong signal. As a result, the mood at this year’s conference was very positive and encouraging.

Furthermore, one thing I found to be quite different is that the world has been changing rapidly. Many countries had elections last year. Then, about 40 days after President Trump took power—just over a month—so many changes occurred. I was just at the Munich Security Conference last month, where I was in the audience when J.D. Vance criticised Europeans, saying that China is not a threat, Russia is not a threat, but that Europeans are losing their values, the freedom of speech, and many traditional Western values. He stated that those are the threats. It’s interesting to see how fast the world is changing.

There’s also uncertainty with Trump launching his trade war—not just against China. He raised tariffs by only 20% on China this term—of course, there’s another 25% from his first term. But he’s also imposed another 25% on Canada, Mexico, and on steel and aluminium imports across the board, with even higher tariffs on EU countries. This creates a whole world of uncertainty, and we saw the financial markets reflect that. For a few days, the New York Stock Exchange was tumbling. However, what I see now is that China has become a stabiliser.

That’s why this year’s conference was so notable. As a matter of fact, I noticed that over 3,000 journalists from China and abroad participated in the Two Sessions, including international journalists from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and more than 1,000 international journalists in total. This is probably a record. This year’s conference has really attracted a lot of attention. Amidst the uncertainty, people were eager to see what China would say, what actions China would take, and what progress would be made.

I think this time, there is a lot of assurance people have gained from the Two Sessions. Moreover, China announced that it achieved 5% growth last year, and for this year, the growth target continues to be 5% in 2025. We can also see that, for example, in 2024, the ten largest provinces contributed over 60% of China’s GDP. Many major provinces, like Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Sichuan, and Zhejiang, continued to maintain this 5% growth rate.

I was at the CGTN studio yesterday for live coverage, and anchors were asking me why the Two Sessions are so important. I explained that the Two Sessions are a regular exercise that China needs.

After a month of Lunar New Year celebrations, people start fresh in the spring, signalling that China is fully back in business. The Two Sessions serve as an announcement to the world that China has resumed operations after the holiday slowdown. We can expect economic activity to pick up in March, April, and May, and even throughout the year. This is the time to set the tone, establish targets, and build consensus.

Consensus-building is especially important because people are looking for answers: What about domestic consumption? What about stimulus packages? What are the government’s policies at the central, local, and grassroots levels? What is the way to go? The Two Sessions play a crucial role in shaping that consensus. And that’s what I mean by regular exercise.

I was calculating—there are 3,000 NPC members and 2,000 CPPCC National Committee members, making up about 5,000 participants gathered in Beijing at the national level. This is likely the largest political meeting in the world.

Beyond that, I was a Beijing CPPCC Municipal Committee member for many years and also served as a Counsellor to the State Council. This kind of exercise is not just conducted at the central level but also at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. In total, there are four layers of Municipal People’s Congress and CPPCC members.

For example, in Beijing alone, there are about 700 to 800 CPPCC Municipal Committee members and roughly 1,000 Municipal People’s Congress members. That means this city alone has around 1,500 to 2,000 representatives. If you multiply that by the 31 provinces and municipalities, the total number becomes quite significant.

Beyond the provincial level, there is also the municipal level. China has 260 cities with populations exceeding 1 million, as well as around 2,500 counties. The total number involved in this system could easily reach a million. This is an enormous consensus-building process.

People often ask about the characteristics of China’s governance system. One key characteristic is its ability to gather elites, experts, and officials at all levels. For example, the 5,000 people attending the NPC and CPPCC National Committee sessions do not even include government officials. When you count them as well—when I was a Counselor to the State Council, I used to participate in each year’s sessions—the total number of attendees could reach 8,000 to 10,000.

This is a massive process of consensus-building, morale-boosting, and action coordination. It also helps clarify debates and deliberate on key issues, such as the Premier’s work report and legislative matters. One notable aspect is that during this year’s NPC session, 269 legal proposals were submitted, and over 8,000 recommendations were received from 3,000 delegates. Meanwhile, CPPCC National Committee members submitted 5,890 proposals.

I understand how this process works. For example, when a CPPCC National Committee member submits a proposal, it must be formally presented during the conference. The proposal must be specific—addressing a particular issue, targeting the relevant government body, outlining the process, and making clear recommendations.

When I was a Beijing CPPCC Municipal Committee member, I submitted several proposals, and I received responses. At the national level, ministries also responded to recommendations. Any CPPCC member who submits a proposal or recommendation—whether on education, tourism, talent development, or other issues—the government must respond. This is quite an interesting process to go through.

It is a valuable exercise, often referred to as a form of “whole-process people’s democracy.” However, I see it as both a consultative democracy and a meritocracy in the making. Every year, 60 million students take the national exam to enter college, with 13 million admitted based on their exam performance. Similarly, 3 million college graduates apply for 200,000 government positions, again selected through a merit-based examination system. Those who enter the system start at the grassroots level and can advance to county, municipal, provincial, or even central government positions based on performance.

This is a unique system that has been practised in China for thousands of years, which, I think, is why China operates in an organic and structured manner—year by year, and through successive five-year plans. This year marks the conclusion of the 14th Five-Year Plan and the setting of targets for the next five years.

This process is quite unique and productive, yet it is not widely discussed. Different countries have their own styles of democracy, and China has developed its own distinctive approach. Rather than prolonged debate without action, the goal is to build consensus.

Yesterday, on CGTN, they highlighted the importance of stability. The Two Sessions also project stability. This stability reassures people, boosts confidence among entrepreneurs and multinational companies, and fosters a clearer understanding of China’s direction. I find this process highly interesting.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also spoke at the press conference, emphasising that China will continue to inject stability into the global economy, maintaining its 5% GDP growth target for 2025.

According to calculations by Bloomberg, based on the latest International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast, China will be the largest contributor to global economic growth over the next five years, accounting for 25% of total GDP growth—exceeding the combined contribution of G7 countries. Yesterday, I also attended a World Bank event where they discussed the IMF, financing, and economic prosperity. It is clear that China will continue to provide stability and contribute significantly to global GDP growth.

Another key area of interest is the concept of “new quality productive forces.” People really didn’t know what this term meant when it was invented last year. DeepSeek is one of these new productive forces. For instance, last week, I read in the Beijing Daily that major hospitals are rushing to implement DeepSeek. When a doctor diagnoses a patient, DeepSeek runs an AI-driven analysis of all relevant medical data, providing a valuable reference for the doctor’s diagnosis. This has huge implications for healthcare. No wonder when I visited Beijing Union Hospital last week, they collected extensive data and asked detailed questions. This is an example of new quality productive forces.

On top of that, if hospitals, the automotive industry, and education are all integrating AI, the transformation will be enormous. Even my children now check with AI before making decisions. This shift will have a massive impact in the years to come.

China, of course, is already the world’s largest producer of AI talent. Each year, out of 30 million college graduates, half specialise in STEM-related fields, generating a vast number of engineers. Even in the U.S., 30–40% of AI talent originates from China.

The Chinese government is emphasising new quality productive forces in AI, the digital economy, quantum computing, electric vehicles (EVs), green energy transitions, battery technology, and many other emerging industries. These innovations will inject new momentum into China’s economy.

Recently, I read about developments in Hangzhou. While China’s real estate market has struggled over the past two to three years, a particular land auction in Hangzhou exceeded government expectations. In many cities, land auctions typically close below the government’s set price, but this one was an exception.

The reason for this is that six major AI companies are based in Hangzhou, and the plot of land in question is located near one of them. Real estate developers recognize that AI-driven growth will fuel future demand.

This reminds me of the internet boom 20 to 30 years ago when there was a wave of returnees—such as Charles Zhang—who came back to China to start businesses. If China currently supplies 30–40% of AI talent for the U.S. and many other countries, it’s likely that more talent will return to seize new opportunities. Take Mr. Liang, for example—he never studied abroad but, as a Zhejiang University graduate, founded DeepSeek AI, a company that has disrupted Wall Street’s high-tech and semiconductor sectors, shaking up markets worth trillions of dollars.

With this evolving economic model and open innovation ecosystem, I expect a second wave of startups—not in internet technology, but in AI. Given China’s solid talent pool, new quality productive forces will continue to make significant progress, especially when combined with the country’s green energy transition and other emerging industries.

Another fascinating topic in this year’s government work report is embodied intelligence, which has become a hot subject. Humanoid robots, as key carriers of embodied intelligence, are evolving from mechanical shells into digital life forms. Many new terms and concepts are emerging, and it is difficult to keep up.

On foreign investment, as you all know, all manufacturing sectors are fully open, with no restrictions on foreign manufacturers. The government work report also emphasises stabilising foreign trade through concrete measures, such as strengthening policies to support foreign trade, fostering new growth areas like green trade and digital trade, and supporting different qualified regions in developing new offshore trade.

“New offshore trade” was mentioned for the first time in the government work report, likely due to ongoing trade tensions, tariff disputes, and policies like the “small yard, high fence” strategy. These challenges have forced many Chinese companies to go global ahead of schedule. Many business leaders I’ve spoken to weren’t originally planning to expand globally, but trade barriers have made it a necessity. Instead of putting all their eggs in one basket, they are now diversifying across multiple regions.

This new offshore trade mainly refers to transactions between Chinese residents and non-residents where the traded goods do not physically enter or exit China’s customs territory and are not included in Chinese customs statistics. So again, if a Chinese company invests in Vietnam, Indonesia, or the Middle East, the order may come to China, but the calculation, delivery, and all related processes that happen outside China may not be counted in China’s trade figures. However, the benefits still go to the Chinese company.

So, in fact, China’s trade with the world is even larger if this new offshore trade continues to expand. This was a particularly interesting point mentioned during the Two Sessions. This category of trade includes but is not limited to, offshore re-exports, global procurement, overseas commissioned processing, and overseas purchases for contracted projects.

You can see that this new offshore trade is growing, whether it is friend-shoring, near-shoring, or other offshore models. So, why is it considered new?

Compared with traditional cross-border import and export trade, new offshore trade separates capital flow, order flow, and goods flow. For example, a domestic enterprise may take an overseas order, but the goods do not pass through Chinese customs. Instead, they are delivered directly from an overseas supplier to an overseas customer.

I think this phenomenon has developed so quickly because of the trade war and tariff war. China’s new offshore trade is still in its early stages of development and exploration, but it is growing rapidly, with significant progress in different regions. Many free trade zones are actively exploring and developing distinctive models, such as offshore exports in Shanghai and overseas commissioned processing in Suzhou. I think the Chinese government has recognised this as another opportunity to expand overseas business.

Regions with favourable conditions for developing offshore trade typically share the following characteristics:

1. Developed economies with high levels of openness.

2. Policy advantages, such as free trade zones and comprehensive bonded zones.

3. A well-developed financial services system and strong technological innovation capabilities.

So, places like Shanghai, Guangdong, Zhejiang, and Beijing are well-suited for developing new offshore businesses. This is just one example of what has emerged from the Two Sessions.

Finally, I would like to return to the global macroeconomic landscape. President Trump is pursuing a more aggressive economic warfare strategy, which is understandable—he is trying to make America great again because American businesses have suffered.

But I think one of the fundamental problems for businesses in the U.S. is that they operate globally but do not do enough to repatriate their profits back to the U.S. This is why the OECD, G20, and about 100 countries have agreed to implement a global minimum corporate tax. However, I don’t think Trump is likely to pursue that.

It is important to level the playing field so that China is not blamed every year. If companies repatriated enough profit, the government would have sufficient resources to compensate workers and those who have lost in the globalisation process. I think this is something that deserves attention.

At the same time, Trump’s trade approach this term appears to have a much broader agenda. In his first term, the focus was mainly on China, but now, in his second term, it seems to be aimed at the whole world.

In his State of the Union speech last week, he stated that the whole world is “ripping the U.S. off.” He is once again trying to rebalance trade with every country he believes has an unfair advantage over the U.S.

In that sense, I think the U.S.-China trade war does not work for China. In my view, China has already adapted to it. If tariffs are raised by 10% or even another 10%, it won’t have a significant impact.

China has been relatively mild, reserved, and restrained in its response. For example, when Trump imposed 10% to 20% tariffs on all categories of Chinese products, China responded with only 10% to 15% tariffs on about 80 product categories in the first round, and then another 10% to 15% tariffs on just a small number of additional products. In total, China imposed tariffs on fewer than 100 product categories—showing a relatively restrained approach.

Despite this, I was totally surprised to see that since Trump’s first trade war (Trump 1.0), China-U.S. trade has actually grown by almost 20% over the past six to seven years. However, the U.S. now accounts for only 10% to 11% of China’s total trade, down from the previous 15% to 20%.

This suggests that China has adapted well and is better prepared for future trade disputes than perhaps any other country. In the end, I believe such policies may hurt the U.S. more than China, as it is American consumers who ultimately pay the price.

Additionally, China has now become the largest trading partner for 150 countries, up from 120 to 140 countries in previous years. At the same time, ASEAN has become China’s largest trading partner, and Vietnam is now China’s fourth-largest trading partner. This highlights the growing trade relationships between China and its neighbouring countries. Given this trend, I can understand why Trump is now focused on consolidating North America. He has even talked about making Canada the 51st state of the U.S. and bringing Greenland under U.S. control.

Last week, I had a dialogue with a former Danish foreign minister in my office. He mentioned that during Trump’s first term, there were already discussions between Pompeo and him, his Danish counterpart, about the U.S. purchasing Greenland. However, he said that the decision would ultimately be left to the Greenlanders themselves, which seems to suggest the door is still open.

Trump has also claimed that if Canada became part of the U.S., Canadians would only pay half the tax. I don’t think if it will ever happen—perhaps it’s just his wishful thinking—but his disruption to global affairs is undeniable, and the world must be prepared.

In this context, I believe China’s Two Sessions have provided some stabilising effect for the world.

China has also significantly improved its relations with European countries, Latin America, the Gulf states, and Africa. While the U.S. is raising tariffs by 25% or more across the board, China is cutting tariffs to zero for 43 least-developed countries exporting to China. One country is raising barriers, while the other is lowering them. I hope China can further expand tariff exemptions for more developing countries.

Moreover, China has unilaterally introduced visa-free policies for 59 countries, allowing transit passengers to stay in China for 240 hours without a visa, without requiring reciprocity. Additionally, China has granted one-month visa-free entry to nearly 40 countries, including most of Europe, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Again, the Two Sessions reinforce China’s commitment to openness. China remains dedicated to welcoming foreign investment and continuing to serve as a stabilising force in the global economy.

These are my thoughts and takeaways from the Two Sessions. I don’t claim to be an expert on the topic, but I’d like to exchange ideas and have a dialogue with all of you.

I’ll stop here. I've been talking for 35 minutes. I think we have enough time for discussion. Thank you very much.

Q

Thank you, Professor Wang, for sharing. I have two questions and would like to hear your views.

The first is about China’s 2025 GDP target. This year, China continues its GDP growth target of around 5%. Last year, exports contributed a lot to the 5% GDP result, while domestic demand remained weak. However, for 2025, exports are expected to weaken, while domestic demand remains a challenge. How realistic do you think this 5% growth target is? Also, we noticed that they used the phrase “around 5%”, which seems to give them some room to say—at the end of the day, they can achieve their target without effectively hitting the 5% target.

The second question is that you mentioned the fast-growing digital economy, which is very important. On the other hand, the Chinese government has been strengthening its data regulation, focusing on personal and important data, which is a challenge for multinational companies operating in China, so I'd like to get your view on the direction of the regulation.

On one hand, China wants to protect the data, which, as I said, affects development. On the other hand, China wants to create a more business-friendly environment for attracting foreign investors. So, what's your view about the future direction?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, good question, thank you.

Regarding the first question about the 2025 GDP target of 5%, I think it is more or less realistic. Even 4.5% growth would still be significant. The good thing about China is its policy continuity—moving from one five-year plan to the next without major disruptions. The chain of command is strong and effective.

China also has 70% of the world’s high-speed rail network. China has 4.5 million 5G base stations, 10 times more than 400,000 in the entire EU. Seven of the world’s ten largest container ports are in China. There is a steady supply of 30 million fresh graduates entering the labour force every year, and the government has just announced plans to create 12 million new jobs in 2025. Additionally, China has 1.1 billion digital smartphone users, meaning everyone essentially has a small ERP system in their hand, driving efficiency and reducing communication costs. These factors contribute to high-quality development in China, rather than just high-speed but environmentally costly expansion like in the past.

There are also low-hanging fruit for growth. AI is becoming a new phenomenon, but beyond exports, there is great potential in the service sector. In developed countries, services contribute around 80% of GDP, while in China, it’s only around 50–55%. That 30% gap represents huge growth potential, especially in healthcare, education, finance, and other service industries.

I think one of the gold mines China hasn’t really done much about is the 300 million migrant workers. They are in the cities, and half of them have already secured regular jobs, but they still have to go back to the rural areas. And then you see 9 billion people travelling during the Chinese New Year, which is sometimes inhuman, sometimes—too much travel which keeps husbands, wives, and children separated.

I found that every 10 years in the past 45 years, China has had a big revolutionary policy. For example, in the 80s, they contracted land to farmers, and China transformed from an economy of shortage to an economy of abundance. In the 90s, the Chinese government said, “Let’s privatise all the apartments for city residents,” which created a 400-million middle class. In the 2000s, China joined the WTO, breaking up a few dozen monopolies, and now 6 million companies can engage in foreign trade, making China the largest trading nation.

So I think, in the next 10 to 15 years, we need another revolutionary policy like that. One major area is the 300 million migrant workers, particularly their household land in rural areas.

If that land can be commercialised, if they gain ownership rights, and if they can transact that, it would help these 300 million migrant workers to buy secondhand apartments in cities, which could support China’s real estate market for another 10 to 20 years.

So, this is just one proposal, but I think, the government has many tools in the box. If the time comes, I am sure those policies will change. But in general, with this kind of synergy I just talked about—all the efficiency, all the talents, all the government stability, the chain of command, and also the government is much cleaner now than in the old days—I would say, if there is no war, China can still keep that trajectory.

Regarding digital data regulation, I think, absolutely, there’s a constant transition in mindset. People used to say, “Okay, let’s hide the data. It’s a secret. It’s private.” But now, you know, people realise that data is the petroleum of the 21st century—you have to let it flow to create wealth.

So, I think the government is in that changing mindset right now. Actually, I chaired a study when I was at the Beijing CPPCC Municipal Committee, and we conducted research on the Integrated National Demonstration Zone for Opening up the Services Sector and the China (Beijing) Pilot Free Trade Zone, known collectively as the “Two Zones”. We compared them to CPTPP standards and encouraged China to join. We actually wanted to see more data flow and fewer regulations.

So I think the government has already relaxed some policies, but they can be even more relaxed. We actually gathered the 25 biggest companies in China here at CCG, and invited the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Commerce, the NDRC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other agencies to discuss, “Why can’t we change some of those laws and regulations?” Those discussions were well received, so I think there is a possibility for more changes in the future.

Q

Thank you so much, Dr. Wang, for your sharing and for hosting us in this beautiful building.

It seems that much of the policy focus continues to be on manufacturing, and we know the risks and dependencies that come with an export-led economy—as we are seeing now with tariffs, for example.

Yet, when we look at the future, most of the growth will likely not come from manufacturing. More likely, it will come from the exchange of intangible goods—we're talking about data, intelligence, or other forms of non-tangible assets—which are not subject to tariffs or this kind of liability.

So why do you think that, at least from the government’s messaging, there isn’t as much emphasis on strengthening this kind of economy?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Well, I think export is something the government doesn’t have to emphasize because supply naturally exists. For example, I remember during COVID, China’s exports hit a record high because the global market needed China to replenish stock. Actually, in the first two months of this year, China’s exports have hit another historic high. I just watched CCTV news the other day, and this was reported.

Another area that is expanding is tourism. Tourism normally accounts for around 10% of GDP, so it is part of the service sector. I think China can do more to encourage foreign tourism, which is why it relaxed visa policies for many countries.

As I mentioned, China’s service sector still has a gap compared to developed countries, so China can do more about that. Over time, this will lead to a more balanced economy.

At the same time, new industries are developing, such as EVs, solar panels, batteries, and related sectors. And now, with AI, the progress has been rapid.

There is also growth in entertainment, such as the record-breaking box office performance of Ne Zha II in Chinese cinemas. I was told that the movie involved support from several hundred companies, showing how new industries are emerging. And of course, Black Myth: Wukong is another example.

So I think China is upgrading in terms of services, technology, and AI. After one year of government discussions on “new quality productive forces,” I think this time, at least for me, I better understand what it means. It doesn’t mean replacing old manufacturing—that remains strong, but rather new sectors are emerging, including tourism, education, and health care.

Three hundred million people in China are over 60 years old. China is ageing, so there is huge potential in industries related to senior care, health care, and home services.

So, I would say China can remain stable, and as long as there is no unrest or war, this momentum will continue.

Q

You put an emphasis on AI. Can you maybe tell us more? Do you know what domain will be very important for China in AI and in which ways they will execute it?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I would say those are byproducts of U.S. containment policies. China probably didn’t initially focus on AI development, but after being sanctioned by the U.S., China had to take action. The same applies to chips. It’s interesting that when Secretary Raimondo was visiting China, Huawei unveiled its 5G phone, and when President Trump was delivering his inauguration speech, DeepSeek was released.

I don’t think this was a coincidence—I believe China was forced to develop these technologies independently. In that sense, the sanctions were counterproductive because the U.S. chip companies would lose billions, if not trillions, of dollars in business with China. Moreover, these restrictions pushed China to become more self-reliant and innovative.

What I see happening with AI is rapid adoption. For example, just one and a half months after DeepSeek was released, Beijing hospitals began integrating AI into their systems. They realised that AI can improve diagnosis, enhance efficiency and accuracy, and ultimately save lives. Beyond healthcare, AI is also transforming industries such as autonomous driving.

I see the biggest impact in education. The new generation of students is using AI as an educational tool, making them more effective learners. In contrast, students in developing countries without AI access will have a completely different educational experience. This AI gap will create a major generational difference.

China used to emphasise “Internet Plus”—now it is “AI Plus.” If AI is used in every factory, restaurant, shop, retail business, internet platform, and digital system, it will significantly increase efficiency across industries.

And even for our think tank, we found that we don’t need as much preparation anymore. We can simply ask DeepSeek to summarise something, and it will do so instantly. If you ask it to summarise the Two Sessions, it might even provide a better summary than what I’m saying here today.

This transformation is happening very fast. For example, the internet shaped the past 20 years, and now AI may drive the next 20 years. This shift is happening now, and AI has broad applications.

Q

I would also like to thank you for sharing your insights and your firsthand experience with the Chinese legislative process. Of course, you emphasised stability—China has been a beacon of stability in this world of uncertainty. We also see stability in the political system and other areas.

My question is: What is the biggest change you have seen? If you compare this year’s Two Sessions to last year’s, where do you see the most significant policy shift?

A second question is about the property crisis. In this case, stability alone is not a good thing to have—we need active measures to resolve the crisis. What do you see coming out of this parliamentary session that gives you hope that this crisis will soon be resolved?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think your question is a good one.

What I think, what I see that makes this year’s Two Sessions different from the previous one is confidence. Confidence is like a gold mine—you cannot afford to lose it.

During last year’s Two Sessions, we had just come out of COVID, and there were lingering concerns. People were still recovering, and confidence was low. But this year’s Two Sessions feel completely different. For example, domestic travel has fully recovered to pre-2019 levels—even exceeding them. International travel is also rebounding after visa relaxations and has already returned to 2019 levels.

The most positive signal is the meeting between top leaders and private entrepreneurs—who were previously said to lack confidence. That is the strength of China’s system—the chain of command is clear.

President Xi stated at the conference that the private sector’s role in China is not dictated by the government—it is legally established. Private enterprises are an integral part of China’s economy.

This hybrid system is unique. The private sector in China contributes over half of tax revenue, 60% of innovation, 70% of scientific advancements, and 80% of employment. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for about 20% of GDP, mainly in key sectors that stabilise the economy. Multinational corporations employ 40–50 million people in China, contributing 10–15%, even up to 20% of GDP.

So, China has a trilateral economic structure—private sector, SOEs, and multinational corporations—is unique and seen nowhere else in the world. That is why I say confidence is much stronger this year than in the past two or three years after COVID.

Also, China feels somewhat relieved now. China is no longer the sole target of the U.S.—many other countries are now in focus. This will likely keep the U.S. busy for some time before it turns its attention back to China.

I saw a Wall Street report suggesting Trump may return. If that happens, we welcome dialogue. I agree with President Trump on one thing—if the U.S. and China work together, there is nothing in the world that cannot be solved. So, I’m glad he has such a good understanding, and we should work together.

As far as real estate is concerned, I think China is still a big, populous country. As I said, 300 million migrant workers don’t really settle in cities. They rent small, shabby apartments in the suburbs while keeping large vacant houses in rural areas—which is a huge waste on both sides.

So I hope that someday the government will address this issue and allow farmers who have already established their lives in cities to sell their rural household land. This could give them the initial capital to start businesses in urban areas.

This reform could sustain China’s real estate market for another 10 to 15 years. Housing 300 million migrant residents across 260 cities is a long-term process—it could take another 10 to 15 years to fully integrate them because right now, China is only urbanising about 20 million people per year.

Another key factor is confidence. If consumer confidence is weak, business confidence is weak, and the overall outlook is uncertain, then people hesitate to buy real estate. However, if confidence improves, more people will be willing to invest in housing, which will at least stabilise the market.

I don’t expect another real estate boom, but I do expect stabilisation—and I believe that is already happening.

Q

Before the Two Sessions, there was a special seminar for the private sector. You could see Xiaomi’s Lei Jun, the founder of DeepSeek, and many other big, small, medium, and micro private sector leaders there. In the government work report, there was also a special section addressing the private sector.

I wonder whether this signals more government support for this sector—either in terms of business environment or policies. Many of our alumni have expressed that they had trouble with local governments. They want to expand or increase trade, but they face visible or invisible barriers.

So, my question is: Will there be more supportive policies for the private sector in the future?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Absolutely. One of the key discussions at the Two Sessions was about issuing a new law to protect private enterprises—something like a Private Enterprise Law. If this becomes law, it will give the private sector a clear legal position, further ensuring its position in China’s economy.

What I see in China—and this is something that only Chinese people truly understand—is that maintaining the authority of the central government and central leadership is crucial. Why? Because once the central leadership sets a goal of supporting the private sector, you can be assured that all levels of government and state apparatus will follow through.

I’m glad this happened before the Two Sessions because it marks a turning point. Banks are now more willing to issue loans to private enterprises. New policies will also be introduced to further encourage private sector growth. I have already heard from some business leaders that they feel much more optimistic now.

Of course, this change won’t happen overnight. It will still take some time. But at least, those who previously refused to protect the private sector or created difficulties for private businesses now have to adjust their behaviour. This is a positive signal that encourages private entrepreneurs.

For example, I know that recently, many private sector leaders have been gathering, and even Jack Ma’s Hupan University recently held an event. So, I am quite sure that this is helping rebuild confidence in the private sector.

When I travel around the world, people always ask me: “Is China’s private sector coming back?” “When will we see Jack Ma again? If he is seen again, it means China’s private sector has come back.” Well, now is the time. The private sector is really coming back.

Q

I have a sharper question following this discussion.

We all know that in the government’s priorities, the order is: State-owned enterprises (SOEs), private sector, multinational corporations (MNCs). Do you think this order will ever change? And do you think MNCs and private companies will ever be treated equally with SOEs?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Well, I think because of China’s political system and governance model, it makes sense for China to maintain SOEs at around 20% of GDP. During COVID, when the outbreak hit Wuhan, 40,000 SOE hospital staff were immediately parachuted. When the Whenchuan earthquakes occurred, SOEs and provincial governments quickly mobilised resources and responded.

When there's a crisis or trouble, SOEs can follow the orders of the government. This is different from Western countries. In the U.S., for example, the government does not own many enterprises—it’s the opposite. President Trump follows advice from private sector leaders like Elon Musk.

But at the same time, I believe all companies should be treated equally. I always say that MNCs are part of the private sector. They are legally registered in China, hire Chinese employees, and pay Chinese taxes. So, I call for the abolition of the distinction between private enterprises, SOEs, and MNCs—they are all Chinese companies, period.

At CCG, we publish a blue book on Chinese companies’ globalisation every year. If there are policy concerns, we are happy to assist multinational companies in engaging with the government and different ministries. We work to help make policy breakthroughs for both private enterprises and MNCs.

I always say that multinational companies operating in China are Chinese companies and should be respected and treated the same as any other company in China. What the Chinese government is emphasising is the importance of the private sector, but I am sure the government also values input from multinational companies from time to time. So, I think there are many opportunities for cooperation.

Q

President Wang, it's my great honour to talk with you, especially in English, for the first time.

I have maybe a very simple but big question. Do you think Mr. Xi and Trump are likely to meet this year? If so, where will it happen, and what conditions might be required?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think President Trump has always wanted to meet President Xi. First, he invited President Xi to attend his inaugural ceremony, and Vice President Han Zheng went there. I don’t think it would have been a good idea for President Xi to be in that crowded Congress building, but China did send a very senior official.

Then, Trump said he wanted to visit China within his first 100 days. However, with the Chinese New Year and other scheduling factors, it wasn’t that quick. But it is still very possible that he will visit this year. If not this year, he will certainly come to the APEC Summit in China next year.

For Trump, his “golden period” of governance will last about 30 months. After that, the next election cycle will begin, and he will become a lame duck. Even during the midterm elections, the Republicans will likely control one of the houses. So, in reality, he has only 28 to 30 months to push his key policies.

One reason he may visit China is to seek China’s help in the Ukraine war. He needs China to play a role, and China could send peacekeeping forces to Ukraine.

Russia has already stated that it welcomes Chinese peacekeepers, and the U.S. has said it does not want U.S. troops in Ukraine—instead, it prefers European or non-European forces. This means potential non-European contributors could include China, India, Brazil, or other countries, but it would have to be a UN-led peacekeeping mission. China is the largest peacekeeping force contributor among the P5 members, so Trump may seek China’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Middle East crisis, and North Korea.

And, of course, he wants to discuss TikTok. There are many things. Perhaps there will even be a new communiqué on Taiwan because Trump is less ideological.

Taiwan has received so much attention because of the binary discourse—autocracy vs. democracy, or West vs. China. But now, that binary view is breaking down. For example, I was at the AI Summit in Paris last month, where China, India, the EU, and France all signed the AI declaration, while the U.S. and the U.K. refused to sign. So, it is no longer the West as a whole acting in unison. But now, you see the U.S. and Russia voting together at the U.N. Security Council—something unimaginable before.

So, I think Trump is less ideological, and this autocracy-democracy binary view will become less dominant. Taiwan, for example, can no longer use democracy as an excuse to demand protection.

The new paradigm shift is that the world is now being measured by effectiveness—how well a country governs and how it gets things done.

I found it very interesting to watch Trump at a news conference after the Washington Reagan Airport air crash. He had Vice President J.D. Vance and the Transportation Secretary all speaking under what they called “the wise leadership of Trump.” It looked like a Chinese news conference.

Even Zelensky recently posted on Twitter, saying he is coming back, and they should talk again, and also referencing Trump’s wise leadership. So, they are learning quickly.

I think Trump will come back to East Asia, and of course, China would like to talk with the U.S. to work together.

Q

Thank you very much for your words, Mr. Wang. My question is about foreign investment.

You said something about Chinese investment in developed countries such as the Netherlands or Switzerland. Will the Chinese government encourage or foster such investments? What could developed countries like Switzerland or the Netherlands do to facilitate these investments?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Oh, absolutely. There are huge opportunities. I was in Europe in February, visiting Munich, Brussels, and other cities, and I saw strong interest in Chinese investment there.

Last November, Pascal Lamy, the former WTO Director-General, came to my office, and we held a roundtable discussion. We talked about how von der Leyen imposes high tariffs on Chinese companies and EVs entering Europe.

But why can’t we invite European companies like Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz—which have established many successful joint ventures in China—to invest back in Europe?

Right now, Chinese investment is mainly flowing into Hungary and, to some extent, Spain. However, due to the negative investment environment in many European countries, Chinese companies are choosing Hungary instead of expanding into Brussels or other Western European countries.

I think it’s time to revive the China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). This is also relevant to Trump’s policy toward Chinese investment. Trump has said that if a Chinese company invests in Mexico, he will impose a 200% tariff, but if the company invests directly in the U.S., he will lower the tariff to 15%. This is similar to how China used to attract foreign capital investment.

For example, Fuyao Glass invested over $1 billion in the U.S., and it has been extremely successful. So, I am sure that Chinese companies want to invest in both Europe and the U.S. That is what is meant by “new offshore trade” in the CPPCC National Committee Sessions that I mentioned earlier.

So, I think there is huge interest from Chinese companies to invest. It’s just that EU policies classify China as a systemic rival and impose a 40% tariff on Chinese products.

For example, I recently met with a group of UK business leaders, and the UK is doing fine—it has kept tariffs at 10% instead of raising them to 40% on Chinese EVs. If you go to London, you will see that all the Uber cars are made in China—they are clean, efficient, and widely used.

Q

Thank you, Dr. Wang, for sharing. That was very informative. Just now, you mentioned consumption, so my first question is about consumption.

This year, the government work report has put consumption at the top of its agenda, and we know that in recent years, both the central government and local governments have released many initiatives to stimulate it.

So, my question is: What policies or initiatives to stimulate consumption do you think will be introduced this year, especially considering the quite challenging employment situation? So, that is my first question.

My second question is about this year, 2025, which is very important. The government is reviewing the 14th Five-Year Plan, and I think most ministries are starting to formulate the 15th Five-Year Plan. Is there any information you can share with us? For example, is there anything new on that? Thank you so much.

Q

Can I just add one more question?

Because for me, I agree with you—everybody talks about consumption and stability in China. Everybody thinks it’s very important, but after talking with Chinese people, they say: “Look, it’s important for us, but no meaningful policies have really come out to help us.”

Okay, you have consumption subsidies, but they just give you a little money if you consume, right? But not many people use them, and they still don’t want to spend their money. So, is there a long-term reform to restore confidence to the consumers—to make people feel that it’s okay to spend their savings again, rather than save?

Henry Huiyao Wang

You’re right. I really think that, first of all, confidence must be restored. Before doing anything, if people are worried about the future or their retirement, they will hold their wallets tightly and hesitate to spend. But now, I see some confidence returning, which can help. So that’s number one.

Number two, the Chinese government is introducing more stimulus packages. They announced a 300 billion yuan government bond, and there could be more to come. I think the current debt ratio still allows for further stimulus measures.

Number three, I think the international environment could improve under Trump over the next two to three years. If China is no longer the sole target and becomes just one of many targets, then that might actually be better—more tourism, more investment, more business activity, and increased imports and exports could help boost the economy.

Number four, the rise of AI could enhance productivity, create wealth, and generate new income sources.

So, all these factors combined, I would say at the very least, we can stabilize the economy. We may not return to the high-growth era of 10 years ago when the economy was booming every day, but we are not in a situation like Japan either.

We are likely entering a “new normal.” We can’t expect 10%, 8%, or even 7% growth anymore, but if we can maintain 4–5% growth, considering the magnitude of China’s economy, it is still enormous—equivalent to adding the entire economy of Australia every year.

There is also a lot of redundancy that can be optimised. With greater efficiency, effectiveness, confidence, and a better international environment, I would say China will remain relatively stable in the next few years.

What’s the second question? Yes, about the 15th Five-Year Plan. They are not explicitly calling it “new quality productive forces”, but they are focusing on AI, information technology, digital economy, and green energy transition.

I think one of the biggest buzzwords in this year’s Two Sessions is “science and technology.” China is now making a strong push in this area, and this is largely a byproduct of U.S. Sanctions. The restrictions have pushed China to say: “If we are falling behind, we are at the mercy of others. So why can’t we make heavy investments in this field?” So, I think the 15th Five-Year Plan will focus heavily on these areas.

Q

Thank you very much for the discussion and presentation. I have a question about international affairs.

What do you think China’s role will be in BRICS and the SCO, particularly on topics of development, stabilisation, and the international order? Do you see anything from the Two Sessions that gives us an idea of what to anticipate in the next five years?

Henry Huiyao Wang

You can be assured that China is emerging as a leader of BRICS, at least economically. For example, at the Munich Security Conference this year, there was a record number of Global South participants, making up 30% of attendees. And the GDP of BRICS countries is already larger than that of the G7.

At the same time, 70% of China’s trade is with non-G7 countries. The U.S. accounts for only about 10%, with maybe another 20% coming from the EU and other regions. So, China is becoming a major economic magnet for Global South countries.

As a matter of fact, China has granted zero-tariff access to 43 developing countries. China’s trade with Africa has increased, and, of course, China’s trade with Asia, ASEAN, and Vietnam continues to expand.

Just this afternoon, before you arrived, I met with a minister from Latvia and the Latvian ambassador in my office. We discussed the UN and the future global system, and I was thinking, we are probably seeing more of an equilibrium now.

For example, in the G20, we see that 10 members are from developed Western countries, and 10 members are from BRICS and the Global South. So, I see this as a new equilibrium, which was also discussed at the Munich Security Conference. And China is certainly leading this half of the global balance, at least economically.

For the next few years, the key question will be: How can we coexist peacefully with this new MAGA situation, as President Trump pushes for a new geopolitical strategy? I see that he is very concentrated on his own sphere—North America, including the U.S., Greenland, Canada, and Mexico. If he is doing that, then he should not interfere with China’s peaceful unification with Taiwan, right?

So, I think in the future, even with the Ukraine crisis, I am sure President Trump has made a proposal asking Europeans to deploy troops there. He even said that he would like to see Chinese troops involved.

So, in the future, if NATO and BRICS work together to guarantee security in Ukraine, it could be a much safer arrangement than the Minsk Agreement. I see that BRICS will play an increasingly active role in global stability. Even though it is not yet a fully organised structure, eventually, it will become more organised and influential in global affairs. Just like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which now includes 150 countries, China’s trade with BRI countries has already surpassed 50% of its total trade.

So, I certainly see the world moving toward a more balanced new equilibrium, where the G7 and BRICS coexist. Hopefully, they will be big enough and powerful enough that friction will be reduced, and they can coexist peacefully.

That is my prediction for the next few years, and the next decade, probably.

Q

You mentioned offshore trade is increasing, right?

With offshore trade increasing, in your view, do Chinese companies doing business in Vietnam get counted in Chinese statistics? Does China track how much they produce in Vietnam, their total revenue, and their contribution to the country’s GDP? And then, how does the government use these statistics?

Is the goal, for example, to determine how much tax they could impose when these companies bring profits back to China? Would this data be used to reallocate some of that money to contribute to the overall welfare of Chinese society?

Henry Huiyao Wang

What I am saying is that the Chinese government does not track the profits or revenue that Chinese companies generate overseas. What I am saying is that, in addition to the import-export statistics that China announces every year, there is also offshore business activity, which Chinese customs do not account for. This means that Chinese companies’ total trade volume is actually larger than the officially announced figures.

More and more Chinese companies are expanding around the world, forced to go global ahead of schedule and do more business. Eventually, as Chinese companies grow stronger, become more profitable, and expand their investment capabilities, they will invest even more in other countries.

So, this is a new trend and a byproduct of the trade war.

China reports trillions in import-export trade, but there may be a significant portion of trade that is not calculated in these statistics because it happens outside China through offshore operations. This means that this sector of business is doing well and it may represent a new trend in global business.