Transcript: Suisheng Zhao at CCG

Professor at the University of Denver and founding editor of the Journal of Contemporary China explores the "prolonged crisis" in China–U.S. Relations from Trump 1.0 to 2.0.

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Aug 03, 2025

On July 18, Suisheng Zhao, a Professor and Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, University of Denver, visited the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG) to deliver a keynote address and participate in a discussion with Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG.

Following that, Zhao, also the founding editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, answered questions from a live audience.

CCG broadcast the dialogue online, and a full video recording remains available on CCG’s official WeChat blog. The dialogue and Q&A sessions of the recording has been uploaded to CCG’s YouTube channel.

This transcript is based on the video recording and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary General, Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG)

Distinguished guests, Professor Zhao, friends of CCG,

Good afternoon! Welcome to the Centre for China and Globalisation. I’m the Secretary General of CCG. Welcome to our CCG Global Dialogue.

Actually, CCG Global Dialogue is a very prestigious global dialogue. We conducted a lot of dialogues with the distinguished guests, including Pascal Lamy, Joseph Nye, Graham Allison, a lot of those distinguished scholars and political figures.

Today, we are honoured to have with us Professor Suisheng Zhao, Professor and Director of the Centre for China-U.S. Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. Our discussion today is themed "From Trump 1.0 to 2.0: Transitions and Analysis of China-U.S. Relations." I believe this is a subject of great interest to many, as China-U.S. relations are the most consequential bilateral relationship in the world today, shaping global strategic, security, and economic landscapes. Later, we will have the honour of hearing Professor Zhao’s keynote speech, followed by a dialogue with Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG. As I mentioned earlier, this Global Dialogue series is where renowned scholars, policymakers, and thought leaders engage in exchanges with Dr. Wang. Past discussions are available on YouTube and various domestic platforms, so we encourage everyone to subscribe to our channels and get updated.

I am truly honoured to introduce Professor Suisheng Zhao. In addition to his roles at the University of Denver, Professor Zhao is also a Research Associate at Harvard University’s Fairbank Centre for Chinese Studies, a member of the National Committee on China-U.S. Relations, and the editor of the renowned English-language Journal of Contemporary China, a leading international publication on China studies. I believe Professor Zhao will elaborate further, but I am honoured to mention that I, too, have been a contributor to this influential journal, which has shaped many global opinions on China.

Professor Zhao’s distinguished career also includes serving as a Campbell National Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Washington College, Assistant and later Associate Professor of Government and East Asian Politics at Colby College, and member of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP).

Professor Zhao holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, an M.A. in Sociology from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and a Bachelor’s and Master’s in Economics from Peking University.

Beyond founding Journal of Contemporary China, Professor Zhao has authored over ten English-language books, including: Power by Design: Constitution-Making in Nationalist China, A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity, and his latest work, The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy, which was named a 2024 Best Book of the Year by Foreign Affairs.

He has also published over 100 English academic and policy papers in leading journals such as The Washington Quarterly, The Wilson Quarterly, Political Science Quarterly, The China Quarterly, and the Journal of Contemporary China.

Today, Professor Zhao will present on: "From Trump 1.0 to 2.0: Transitions and Analysis of China-U.S. Relations." Following his remarks, Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG, former Counsellor of China’s State Council, and a distinguished professor, will engage him in an in-depth dialogue. Without further ado, let’s welcome Professor Suisheng Zhao to the stage.

Suisheng Zhao, Professor and Director of the Center for China-US Cooperation, Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver

[Speaking in Chinese]

Thank you, Dr. Miao, for the kind introduction, and thank you, Huiyao, for inviting me back to CCG. Two years ago, I spoke here about China-U.S. relations, and in these two years, the relationship has undergone significant changes. Since Trump took office—especially in his second term—many have made predictions. One of the most notable was a bet made by two prominent scholars at the World Economic Forum in Davos this January. The first figure in this bet was Graham Allison, a good friend of Huiyao, who argued that by this time next year—around the one-year mark of Trump’s second term—we would “be surprised on the upside” in the China-U.S. relations.

His reasoning was simple: Trump and the Chinese leader have a strong rapport, Trump respects the Chinese leader, and they share similar personalities as strongmen, which makes negotiations between them smoother. Therefore, China-U.S. relations were expected to improve. However, on the same panel, Ian Bremmer, founder of the Eurasia Group, strongly disagreed. He predicted that by this time next year, relations would not only fail to improve but would “be in materially worse condition.” He argued that China-U.S. rivalry is so deeply entrenched and emphasised that China would not accommodate Trump or Trump’s policies, making any improvement in relations unlikely.

Half a year has passed since that bet, and Trump has now been in his second term for about six months. Looking at the developments so far, who do you think is winning the bet? There’s a few hundred dollars at stake. In my view, neither prediction has come to fruition. We haven’t seen a “surprising improvement” in China-U.S. relations, and I doubt we will in the next six months. At the same time, relations haven’t become “materially worse” either, and I don’t foresee that happening in the remainder of the year. So, what has China-U.S. relations been like under Trump’s second term? I would argue it has largely followed the trajectory set during his first term. And what is that trajectory? I call it a “prolonged crisis.”

Before Trump’s first term, China-U.S. relations followed a cyclical pattern—periods of crisis, followed by stabilisation, improvement, and then another crisis, another improvement. These cycles were typically driven by two factors: sudden incidents and U.S. domestic political cycles. However, the cyclical dynamic of China-U.S. relations came to a definitive end during Trump’s first term. Since then, the relationship has experienced a cliff-style plunge. Many in the U.S., especially, have framed post-Trump 1.0 China-U.S. relations as a “new Cold War.” I don’t like this term. So, instead, I’ve coined the phrase “prolonged crisis” to describe a long-term crisis that is not triggered by sudden events or U.S. domestic political cycles, but rather stems from accumulated contradictions between China and the U.S. over the long run.

The lowest point of this prolonged crisis actually occurred after Trump’s first term began in 2017. The first trade war kicked off in 2018, and over the next five years, until 2023, China-U.S. relations reached their nadir within this prolonged crisis. What was the most significant indicator of this low point? The near-total suspension of all high-level exchanges between the two nations. Before this period, more than a hundred communication mechanisms were functioning at various levels. In 2017, when President Xi visited Trump at his Mar-a-Lago estate, there were attempts to establish or re-establish four dialogue mechanisms. While these frameworks were technically set up, they proved largely ineffective. Meanwhile, nearly all other channels of communication were nearly completely severed.

During these five years, virtually no U.S. cabinet-level officials visited China. Although China’s foreign minister could attend UN General Assembly meetings in New York, not once during this entire period was China’s foreign minister invited to Washington.

During this period, high-level exchanges between the two nations were largely reduced to rhetorical confrontations conducted through media channels. With official diplomatic communications suspended, people-to-people exchanges also experienced significant deterioration. From my perspective as an individual and a university professor, the Trump administration implemented two particularly damaging policies that profoundly impacted my work in education. First, the complete termination of the Fulbright Program, which had enabled many Chinese scholars to conduct research in American institutions while also facilitating American scholars’ work in China. Second, the discontinuation of the Peace Corps’ operations, which had provided young Americans with opportunities to teach English in China’s remote communities and learn about China. This programme has also been dismantled.

From 2020 to 2023, the number of American students studying in China plummeted dramatically. At its peak, following the 2008 and 2009 Olympics, there were as many as 15,000 American students in China. By 2023, that number had dropped to a low of 350, and by the following year, it had only slightly recovered to just over a thousand. Moreover, these students are now concentrated in only two institutions: Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University and Yenching Academy at Peking University. During my visits to numerous other Chinese universities, I’ve noticed many international students, but very few Americans.

This sharp decline in Americans coming to China has been mirrored by a significant reduction in Chinese people going to the United States. During Trump’s first term and continuing into the Biden administration, the number of Chinese students in the U.S. peaked at 370,000. By 2024, that figure had dropped by one-third, to around 250,000–260,000. I anticipate further declines this year due to restrictive U.S. visa policies and Trump’s anti-immigration stance.

As official and people-to-people exchanges dwindled, the media in both countries portrayed the other in an extremely hostile and often demonising light. Having lived in the U.S. for 40 years since 1985, I’ve always seen overwhelmingly negative coverage of China in American media. Any mention of the People’s Republic of China, the PRC, or even the sight of the Chinese flag on television is almost invariably accompanied by narratives of technology theft, job theft, and espionage. Additionally, the portrayal often suggests that China is unsafe, with reports of American young people, faculty members, or scholars being detained or disappearing in China.

Conversely, Chinese media portrayals of the U.S. are equally bleak. When I visit Beijing or return to China, like I recently participated in a seminar in Shanghai, attendees felt I must be living in a very dire and chaotic situation since I live in the United States. They said, “You should come back to China quickly. How can you still live there?” I thought to myself, “I’ve lived in the U.S. for 40 years and I’m doing fine.” They went on to describe the U.S. as a place plagued by shootings, anti-Asian sentiment, and civil unrest. One even asked me, “Can you still buy things in stores? The shelves are empty!” I was stunned, as I had never heard of such issues.

This kind of mutual vilification, the departure of most foreign journalists from Beijing, and the drastic reduction of correspondents from Chinese state media in Washington—such as People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, and China Central Television—from hundreds to just a handful, has led to overwhelmingly negative reporting on both sides.

This negative portrayal not only deepens hostility between the two countries but also leads to irrational responses to each other’s actions. I recall that in 2023, many American scholars were concerned that the two great powers could no longer engage in dialogue and were on the brink of war. In fact, some even suggested that China and the U.S. were “sleepwalking” toward escalation and confrontation.

When Biden took office after Trump’s first term, he was deeply concerned about the potential for inadvertent escalation. He called for responsible management of competition and the establishment of guardrails, with one of the most crucial measures being the restoration of high-level exchanges. However, resuming these exchanges proved difficult. When Biden’s Secretary of State and National Security Advisor suggested meeting with Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi, the meeting could not take place in Washington or Beijing. Where was it held? It was held in a cold, neutral location—Alaska.

That place in March was bitterly cold and dark, but the media remarked that the atmosphere inside felt even frostier than the weather outside, thanks to the chilly standoff in verbal exchanges. However, leaders on both sides—especially during the Biden administration—still hoped to restore communication.

Thus, at the 2022 Bali summit, it was decided that U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken would visit Beijing in late January or early February the following year. However, three days before the trip, the balloon incident occurred, postponing the visit. Fortunately, the well-established dialogue channel between Wang Yi and Sullivan remained open, and it was this that facilitated a swift resumption of communication and allowed the visit to be rescheduled to June.

In June, the U.S. Secretary of State came, followed by four U.S. cabinet secretaries visiting China within three months—the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Climate Envoy. Then, in November 2023, the San Francisco summit took place, aimed at “stopping the decline and stabilising” relations. I believe this goal was achieved, but the stabilisation occurred to a very small degree. In other words, the prolonged crisis that began during Trump’s first term, or what many Americans call the “new Cold War,” was neither terminated nor reversed.

Why is this prolonged crisis or so-called “new Cold War” so difficult to reverse? Many, especially some scholars in the U.S. who pin their hopes on dialogue, believe that China and the U.S. still can’t find common ground because they lack sufficient understanding of each other’s policy red lines, leading to misunderstandings and misjudgments. I disagree with this view. Last year, I wrote an article titled “Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk,” arguing that neither side truly believes the other’s commitments. Why? Because mutual trust is nearly impossible to establish, whatever one side says, the other doesn’t believe. And why can’t trust be built? Because since Trump’s first term, China-U.S. relations have entered a new historical phase: great-power competition.

From the U.S. perspective, its policy focus before this was counterterrorism. But after Trump’s first term, great-power competition became the priority. Although this was formally articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, I believe its roots trace back to the 2008–2009 financial crisis. During that crisis, the U.S. economy suffered a severe downturn, while China’s economy remained robust. In 2010, China even managed to maintain a double-digit GDP growth, its last such milestone.

So, I feel that many people in China—and I don’t say this as criticism—but at the time, many Chinese scholars became somewhat overconfident, believing that America had completely collapsed, was in irreversible decline, while China enjoyed overall stability and sustained economic growth. As we just discussed, notions like “the East is rising while the West is declining” seemed to have fully materialised.

In the past, China looked up to America; now it sees it at eye level. Not just eye level—I think to some extent, it’s even looking down on America. There was a perception that America now needed China, especially during the subprime mortgage crisis. Many Chinese scholars, including some from Renmin University, argued that America’s need for China was greater than China’s need for America. One scholar from Tsinghua University even claimed that China had comprehensively surpassed the U.S., not just in GDP but also in technology, declaring America permanently weakened.

During this period, China’s attitude toward the U.S. underwent a significant shift. In the past, many issues could be resolved through mutual compromise or negotiation. But now, many in China felt that America must respect China’s “core interests”—interests that are non-negotiable and non-compromisable. Previously, such “core interests” referred to a very narrow set of issues. But now, they seemed to expand to cover almost everything, all deemed non-negotiable and non-compromisable. This shift alarmed many Americans.

In my 40 years living in the U.S., I’ve developed a strong sense that this country has a deep-seated crisis mentality—it constantly fears being overtaken, fears its way of life being destroyed, and always looks for scapegoats to mobilise resources. Japan once played that role; now China has become the perfect scapegoat. Thus, a so-called “Sputnik moment” emerged. America began reassessing China, a process that actually started before Trump’s first term, around 2014–2015, during Obama’s second term. During this reassessment, America realised it had discovered a true competitor.

Thus, in Trump’s first National Security Strategy, counterterrorism was notably downgraded from being America’s primary strategic focus to a secondary objective, or even no longer mentioned. Instead, the report emphasised “great power competition.” His National Defence Strategy went even further, explicitly identifying China and Russia as America’s principal strategic competitors in the U.S.’s great power competition. This reorientation has continued under Biden.

During my visit last year to the U.S. Air Force War College, I was struck by how dramatically their curriculum had changed. Among the 400 colonels in attendance, the focus had shifted entirely. Where once their coursework centred on the Middle East and Islamism, these topics have now become marginal. Instead, the curriculum is dominated by studies of China and Russia. The China component alone consists of eight five-hour modules covering Chinese society, economy, culture, politics, and military affairs. I lectured for five hours in one such module, and was impressed by the seriousness with which these officers now approach the study of China.

So, great-power competition has become the central focus of U.S. foreign strategy and the primary framework guiding its China policy. As a result, the entire discourse surrounding China in the U.S. changed. As I just discussed with Huiyao, works like Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon argue that China has a hundred-year strategy to replace and defeat the United States.

And books like The Long Game and others reflect this shift. In the past, the question was “Who lost China?”—but now it’s “Who will lose to China?” There’s this mindset that during my term, I absolutely cannot allow China to surpass the United States. Great-power competition has become almost a bipartisan consensus across the American political spectrum. A new “Washington Consensus” has emerged—one focused on competing with and defeating China.

Since the start of this great-power competition, ideology has been politicised and weaponised. Although ideological differences between China and the United States have always existed, for quite some time, both sides chose to downplay them in pursuit of shared strategic, geopolitical, political, or economic interests.

However, beginning with Trump 1.0, ideology became highly politicised. Vice President Pence’s first major speech outlining the U.S. approach to China was entirely couched in Cold War language, casting China as America’s ideological rival. Then, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s Nixon Library speech was effectively a Cold War manifesto, drawing a sharp distinction between the Chinese people and the Communist Party, and openly calling for regime change—blatant Cold War thinking.

Biden has continued this trend, framing great-power competition between China and the U.S. as a contest between democracy and autocracy. Ideology has been fully weaponised, with all sorts of issues used as tools in this great-power competition. This, in my view, characterises the evolution that began under Trump’s first term and has continued into the Biden era.

Our topic is “From Trump 1.0 to 2.0.” I believe Trump 2.0 represents a significant evolution. The reason why Allison is now so optimistic in his analysis is precisely because of these substantial changes. However, this does not mean that the prolonged crisis or the fundamental nature of China-U.S. great power competition will change. That has not changed at all. What has changed is the main focus of the competition.

During Trump 1.0, the emphasis was on geopolitics and American leadership. Biden continued that approach, highlighting ideological conflict and even making a major issue out of Taiwan. But what is the focus of competition in Trump 2.0? It’s trade and economic issues—maximising America’s trade and economic interests. As for geopolitics, geostrategy, ideology, and even the Taiwan issue, he rarely mentions them. If you look at all of Trump’s speeches since returning to office for his second term, you’ll find very little discussion of the South China Sea or Taiwan. In fact, he almost completely avoids the Taiwan issue—his subordinates might talk about it, but he himself steers clear. As for ideology, it’s even less of a focus; he doesn’t address ideological issues at all.

Not long ago, I was discussing with a colleague who studies international relations theory, and he raised a very interesting point. He said that the current leaders of the three major powers—Trump, the Chinese leader, and the Russian leader—all share a common ideological opposition to traditional liberalism and even to traditional democratic ideas. In other words, their ideologies are remarkably similar.

For Trump, who is his ideological enemy? It’s not countries with different political systems, but what he calls the “enemy within”—his domestic adversaries. Who are these internal enemies? Undocumented immigrants, LGBTQ communities, and even the Democratic Party—he treats his political opponents as ideological adversaries and enemies. This is unprecedented in American politics. In the past, the two parties competed fiercely, but it was always under the premise that both sides were patriotic; they just had different ideas about how to achieve patriotic goals. Now, Trump treats Democrats as his outright ideological enemies.

So, in this context, Trump does not view China as an adversary—neither in terms of ideology nor geopolitics. There’s an article with a title I really like: “Trump Is A Trade Hawk, Not A China Hawk.” That’s right—he’s a hawk on trade, not on China. I later tried to validate this point, and indeed, there’s ample evidence. Not only did he launch trade and tariff wars across the board against all countries, rather than singling out China, but if you compare his first and second terms, none of his original China hawks returned to key roles in his cabinet or among his senior advisers. Mike Pompeo and Matt Pottinger were not brought back; nearly all of his first-term hardline China officials, including his famously tough U.S. Trade Representative, were left out.

Someone I know quite well, David Stilwell—who lived near me, served as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and was an Air Force Brigadier General—was certain he would return. Before Trump came back to office, he confidently told me, “Look, during his first term, I worked tirelessly for him. These China policies, the strategies to contain China—those were all my ideas.” He was sure that once Trump returned, he would be brought back as well. But after Trump’s return, he didn’t get any role at all; he remained an Air Force Foreign Area Officer.

Many Chinese are familiar with Miles Yu. At the time, he was also confident—he believed that his boss, Pompeo, would return to office and that he would go with him. But in the end, nothing happened; there was absolutely no opportunity for him. Matt Pottinger, who published numerous articles to curry favour and signal his loyalty before Trump’s return, was also left out.

So in this sense, I really agree with that article’s title: Trump is a trade hawk, not a China hawk.

There’s another important shift in Trump’s second term regarding great power competition. He now sees that while great powers compete, strongmen can jointly govern the world. Major powers can join hands to carve up the world, turning it into respective spheres of influence—America in the Western Hemisphere, Russia in Eurasia, and China in the Asia-Pacific. In a sense, this represents a rethinking and redefining of America’s hegemonic position. In the past, the U.S. never acknowledged a multipolar world. Yet, as soon as Secretary of State Marco Rubio took office, he said that America has already entered a multipolar world.

The Under Secretary of Defence for Policy, Elbridge Colby, with whom I’ve had some contact, is known in Washington as a representative of the neo-isolationist school, even though he is quite hawkish on China. He believes that the U.S. should not overextend itself or provide support to European countries. When it comes to Indo-Pacific security, he argues that U.S. allies in the region should take primary responsibility for their own defence. Just a couple of weeks ago, his remarks drew significant attention when he told the UK, Why is your aircraft carrier in the Pacific? That’s not your concern. Europe is a mess—take care of your own problems first. This viewpoint closely aligns with Trump’s concept of strongmen jointly managing the world.

In this context, Trump is not a China hawk. In fact, he has always shown admiration for the Chinese leader. If you look at all of Trump’s statements about China’s leader, there has never been a single negative remark. He has always hoped to reach some kind of grand bargain or transactional deal with China. So when the China-U.S. trade war began and he imposed 147% tariffs, it was really an opening bid, hoping for negotiation and a deal. But China refused to play along.

In the end, Trump completely reversed his stance, and throughout this process, he was eager to meet with the Chinese leader. He would post on his own social media platform, Truth Social, in the middle of the night, unable to sleep over making a deal with the Chinese leader. Eventually, he wrote in all caps, the Chinese leader is “VERY TOUGH, AND EXTREMELY HARD TO MAKE A DEAL WITH.” But he also acknowledged that this was only right, that they defend their interests, and I defend America’s interests. Ultimately, this competition is over national interests.

This is a new development for China-U.S. relations. Given this, what are the prospects for the bilateral relationship? Is it possible for the relationship to reverse this prolonged crisis? In my view, that remains unlikely, for four main reasons.

First, U.S.-China relations are now driven completely by personal will, especially on the American side. Trump’s own approach is highly arbitrary, focused on immediate concerns with no long-term strategy, while China engages with the U.S. from the perspective of stability and a broader strategic framework. This makes it difficult for the two sides to find common ground.

Second, when it comes to trade and economic issues, Trump’s demands remain extremely high. Although so-called selective decoupling and other economic measures are meant to prioritise trade and the economy, reaching any agreement with China is still very difficult.

Third, although Trump is able to control the situation for now, the broader U.S. domestic environment remains extremely unfavourable. While he hasn’t brought back the first-term hawks, the overall atmosphere in Congress and across the political landscape is still deeply hostile toward China. For now, Trump maintains his position as a strongman and keeps the Republican Party in line, which retains control over Congress. However, if his policies encounter difficulties—if the effects of the tariff war, which have yet to be fully realised, begin to harm the economy in, say, six months, triggering a recession and he faces setbacks in the midterm elections—these China hawks and hardliners could quickly gain influence over him.

In addition, this idea of joint governance of great powers—what many now trace back to the 18th- and 19th-century Concert of Europe—has fundamentally changed from its original form. Today, the power dynamics among major countries are not balanced, but are shifting rapidly and unpredictably. Trump once thought he could strike deals with Putin, but this has become increasingly difficult and may ultimately end in disappointment; U.S.-Russia relations will also change in the future. The same goes for his hoped-for deals with China—I think these may not materialise either. Under such circumstances, the concept of joint governance is hard to realise. This is why I believe that the “prolonged crisis” or so-called “new Cold War” will be difficult to change in the short term.

Therefore, with regard to Allison’s prediction, I think it’s still too early to see any clear outcome. Looking at the current trajectory of U.S.-China relations, what matters most is the wisdom and foresight of leaders. However, in my view, Trump lacks this kind of foresight. China’s leadership benefits from a relatively stable system, so I’m less concerned on that front. What worries me is irrational decision-making in the U.S. regarding China.

After Trump, and even now, I see two major irrational tendencies in America that concern me deeply. First, there is a serious underestimation of the resilience of China’s economy and political system. Many in the U.S. now believe that China’s economy is finished, that it has already peaked; Trump himself claims that China’s economy is failing and that his pressure is actually helping China. There is a widespread view that China is on the verge of collapse, which simply does not reflect reality. Likewise, the resilience of China’s political system is underestimated.

Second, there is an overestimation of the “China threat.” Not long ago, I attended a conference at Brown University that focused specifically on this issue—the inflation of the China threat. The overestimation of China’s influence on American society is especially alarming in the United States.

Both the underestimation and overestimation of China have led to a common policy result: overreaction to China’s policy moves. Examples of such overreactions toward China abound, and they can have extremely serious consequences. I will briefly touch upon some of them.

First, overreaction can lead to avoidable conflict. The U.S. has made many strategic mistakes by overestimating the threat from an adversary and underestimating its resilience. History offers many such examples. One is in the 1950s, when, because of the “domino theory,” the U.S. became mired in the Vietnam War. Another is the Iraq War, where the U.S. once again overestimated the threat.

Second, these overreactions have created major obstacles to academic exchange between China and the U.S. Right now, in American academia, such exchanges have become nearly impossible. For example, in states like Texas and Florida, laws have been passed prohibiting public university faculty from participating in academic exchanges in China. Not long ago, I visited Florida, where a professor told me that when he tried to join a National Committee on U.S.-China Relations delegation visiting Japan, Korea, and China, his university warned him: If you go to China, you will be fired. This has had a devastating effect on academic exchange.

Third, the economic impact is also significant—it’s a lose-lose scenario, where both sides suffer.

Fourth, such overreactions have fuelled anti-American sentiment in China, which is highly detrimental to the U.S.

So these are the outcomes I am deeply concerned about. I’ve spoken at length, so let me summarise: I don’t see the current situation as a new Cold War, but rather as a prolonged crisis. It is not a new Cold War because the U.S. and China have not formed two distinct geopolitical and ideological blocs. Moreover, neither country is likely to defeat the other. The U.S. underestimates China’s resilience, and many in China also underestimate America’s resilience. Neither will be defeated. The only viable path forward for both countries is peaceful coexistence. I’ll stop here. Thank you all.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG

Thank you very much. Just now, Professor Suisheng gave a very comprehensive and focused analysis, as well as a summary and outlook on the evolution from Trump 1.0 to 2.0 over an eight-year period. I think his analysis was spot-on. Having lived in the U.S. for decades, Professor Suisheng is deeply involved in academia while also staying attuned to developments in China. He has contributed greatly to building bridges and strengthening ties between the two countries. His remarks were truly excellent.

Now, for the next part of our event, we’ll be switching to English, because, as always, CCG Global Dialogue is conducted in English.

[Speaking in English]

So, from this point, I’d like to begin our discussion with Professor Zhao on the topic “From Trump 1.0 to 2.0: Transitions and Analysis of China-U.S. Relations.” We’re hosting this CCG Global Dialogue today at the CCG CBD office. I’d also like to briefly introduce Professor Suisheng Zhao to our English-speaking audience. Professor Zhao is Director of the Centre for China-U.S. Cooperation at the Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs, University of Denver. Another of his notable achievements is founding and serving as editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, which is recognised as one of the world’s top journals in China studies. He founded that journal many years ago and has long been a leading figure in the field of China studies. The journal has become highly influential for research and discussion not only on China, but also on U.S.-China relations and global issues.

Suisheng, I find it interesting that you mentioned Graham (Allison). We’ve invited Graham to CCG many times, and this February at the Munich Security Conference, he made the same prediction that by February 2026, China-U.S. relations would improve—a bet he also made publicly with the chief editor of Foreign Affairs, Daniel, among others, for a $1,000 lunch wager. I have a slightly different view, because I think we’re still waiting for a truly high-level summit between China and the U.S. During the last phone call between President Trump and President Xi, both agreed that a series of visits would take place. Who knows—after those visits, we might see some improvement in the relationship. But I agree with you that, in the long run, the competitive dynamic will persist.

For today’s dialogue, I’d like to focus particularly on Trump 2.0. I have several questions, and then we can also invite questions from colleagues and our audience. The first question I would like to ask you is this: With three and a half years remaining in President Trump’s term, what do you see are the biggest areas for cooperation between China and the U.S.? As you mentioned, since neither side can defeat the other, we might as well try our best to find areas where we can work together. What are the most promising areas where we can work together? That would be my first question. I’d like to hear your thoughts on that, and then I may add some comments as well.

Suisheng Zhao

Thank you again for the invitation and for the conversation. Before I answer this question, let me also pick up when you talked about the leaders’ meeting possibility. In fact, I think if there’s a summit between the Chinese leader and President Trump by the end of the year, there could be some significant change or improvement in the relationship.

So, in that context, I would urge the China side to make as much effort as China could to facilitate this meeting. Trump himself, I think, is very eager to meet the Chinese leader. The New York Times article said he is “obsessed” to have a phone call with the Chinese leader. Even he himself said several times he had already made phone calls but did not happen. That showed he was so eager.

If there is a meeting, I think a lot of issues in person could elaborate much better. And he has a big personal eagerness to show his respect by the global leaders. So, in that case, if a meeting could happen, in that case, Allison could have a point. The opportunities by end of year, I think the two opportunities, their possibility for meeting. One was the September 3 Chinese military parade or celebration of the Anti-Fascist Anniversary. I don’t know if he was invited.

Henry Huiyao Wang

My personal observation is that China is certainly open to welcoming world leaders for the September 3 80th Anniversary of the Anti-Fascist Victory Parade. We’ll have to see. Putin has confirmed to come, and we have other leaders to come. But if President Trump can make it, that would be even greater. It would create the possibility for a “Yalta-style” gathering, with the big heads of Europe, China, and America sitting together in Beijing for a summit on peace.

Suisheng Zhao

That would be a big win for China. In that case, I don’t know if Trump will want to give Beijing such a big win. Also, U.S. domestic politics may not favour his visit.

Another question I’d like to ask is this: Peacemaking seems to be the biggest common denominator between China and the U.S.—not just on Ukraine and Russia, but also in the Middle East, as you mentioned. The second point is that I agree with you about Trump being less ideological. Actually, Graham Allison has documented that since his election, Trump has publicly praised Chinese leaders 40 or 50 times and said many good things about China. He rarely made any bad comments about China.

If Trump is less ideological—no longer holding “democracy versus autocracy” summits, and not interested in geopolitical encirclement of China (for example, even suggesting a U.S. withdrawal from certain alliances)—that marks a significant change. However, he is now building up a trade war alliance: he has struck new deals with Vietnam, specifically aimed at countering China, and has made similar agreements with Japan, all focused on building a tariff coalition against China.

So, if he’s less ideological, if he’s no longer holding democracy summits—“democracy versus autocracy”—if he’s not interested in the geopolitical encirclement of China (for example, he’s talking about getting out of the AUKUS), but he does make a new move now. He’s building up a trade war alliance, right? He’s had a new deal with Vietnam, but he was aiming at China. He’s had another deal with Japan, probably also with China in mind. So he could be building up a tariff encirclement...

Suisheng Zhao

I don’t know that part with Japan. Now he is fighting with Japan. Japan will not compromise...

Henry Huiyao Wang

I understand. But, for example, the deal he made with Vietnam specifies that if goods are made in Vietnam, the tariff is 20%, but if they are just transshipped, the tariff is 40%. Clearly, that policy is aimed at some country.

Suisheng Zhao

Should be peacefully. Of course, as you said, hot war is not possible because nuclear powers cannot fight; that would destroy the world. So, the competition now is primarily, especially at Trump 2.0, on the economic front.

And Trump’s policy is basically learned from China. In fact, learning from state capitalism. Even Joe Biden already started state capitalism using the state subsidies and built industrial policy to protect the domestic market against globalisation. In fact, China benefits tremendously from globalisation in this process developed. In the meantime, China also had its own industrial policy and state capitalism. The U.S. criticised China for a long time. Now, the U.S. is learning from China.

I don’t know how good the U.S. could be learning from China, but could that be successful? China succeeded by using state capitalism and industrial policy. In the 21st century, in the AI age, the new technology age, could this industrial policy and protectionism really help the American economy? I’m not quite sure. That could isolate the United States and eventually delay the progress, even in technological innovation, in the competition, AI and many other fronts. It is really something very uncertain for the U.S..

Henry Huiyao Wang

I agree that the U.S. is stimulated by the Chinese practice now. It is probably putting more state capitalism into practice. But China is actually quite unique. I mean, the system China has in the last 47 years since opening up is supported by three pillars: the private sector 60%, another 20% SOE that does all the dirty jobs, and then another 20% multinational employees, where 40 million people generate one third of China’s export in business. This kind of trilateral hybrid economy is second to none in the world. So, China must have done something right. Of course, embracing globalisation is another thing. It lifted 800 million people out of poverty.

But now I’d like to press the other thing we talked about, because mutual assured destruction is preventing the hot war, but then the issue of Taiwan is a hot spot. How do you see the prospects for peaceful cooperation between China and the U.S. in the Pacific, and is there a way to address the Taiwan issue peacefully as well? What are your thoughts on this issue?

Suisheng Zhao

The Taiwan issue is the most dangerous issue. When I give talks in the U.S., the question from audience ask mostly is Taiwan. Everybody is concerned about if China will use force to cross the Taiwan Strait and what America can do for that.

My sense here is that it’s very dangerous for sure, but could be less dangerous. Here, it became dangerous because the status quo has been changed in the last decade or so. The U.S. Taiwan policy is a so-called “One China Policy,” which talks about there is only one China. But neither side of the Taiwan Strait could unilaterally change the status quo, could use force to change the status quo.

The U.S. supports peaceful resolution, not peaceful unification. So, that’s very two different terms. If you both sides agree unification, be it, but be peaceful. We support resolution, not unification—that’s American policy. And in this process, the U.S. has been very clear that neither side should change the status quo. For many years, China has emphasised the so-called “peaceful unification” and played a long game to achieve peaceful unification with so-called “strategic patience.” That’s how the U.S. has seen China’s policy.

And here is a three-party game. Taiwan, for many years, also agrees that there’s one China, but the so-called pro-independence force has been developed since the 1990s, and Taiwan’s status quo has been changed primarily by the Taiwan pro-independence forces. But the U.S. has never criticised Taiwan’s pro-independence forces for the change in the status quo. And the U.S. itself has also changed its status quo policy because when Taiwan became, in the American mind, a democracy with elections, a lot of American politicians became very sympathetic to Taiwan [because they are like-minded]; and we should support like-minded people. So, more and more American politicians try to show their sympathy to Taiwan. That is reflected in the U.S. policy to Taiwan. They increased official exchanges, increased arms sales to Taiwan. So that is a change in the status quo.

I mentioned that for many years, the U.S. had a strategic ambiguity policy toward Taiwan, meaning that we will involve, but we will not tell what we will involve, how we will involve. That’s a double deterrence. On the one hand, they try to deter China, saying, don’t do anything, and also deterring Taiwan: don’t be proactive. So double deterrence. That’s their policy.

But this policy was changed by Joe Biden. He said in public to the media four times that the U.S. treats Taiwan as a NATO ally. In other words, if there is a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. would get involved. Four times. Also, he not only increased arms sales to Taiwan, but also he included arms aid to Taiwan according to the Foreign Military Financing program, which is the law they used to help Ukraine. So that crossed China’s red line. But the U.S., in the meantime, blamed China for changing the status quo because they said China became less patient. The Chinese leader said we cannot let the Taiwan issue pass on from generation to generation, and China increased military exercises and also activities across the Taiwan Strait, including blockade, all those kinds of exercises. So America blames China for this.

The last point here is that Trump has now changed. Trump 2.0, I think, is different. Trump is very different from traditional American politicians. He did not have any attachment to Taiwan. He treats Taiwan as a pawn. He could trade Taiwan as just a product for anything he wants to get. So he could sacrifice Taiwan for whatever he can get from China. He also thought Taiwan took advantage of American generosity, like chips, all those things took out of U.S. production. So, he had a lot of problems with Taiwan.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think, as you just mentioned, the U.S. attachment to Taiwan is largely because they think Taiwan is a so-called democracy. But now, the narrative of democracy versus autocracy isn’t as effective as it was during the Biden era, when he strongly promoted democracy. If you look at recent UN Security Council votes, Russia and the U.S. sometimes vote together, while China and the EU vote together. I was, in February, at the AI Summit in Paris, where China, the EU, Germany, France, and India voted for the AI declaration, while the UK and the U.S. vetoed it. So, there are no longer “China versus the West” or “the rest versus the West” that kind of scenarios; things have become more blurred.

Also, in Taiwan, as a matter of fact, support for TPP, for independence, seems to be waning. In the last election in January, 60% of voters voted for parties with a more pro-peaceful unification stance. They’re the majority in the parliament. As you said, if Trump is less ideological, and he thinks Taiwan has stolen U.S. chips technology and didn’t pay the insurance fee, then probably, we have a good opportunity for the Chinese mainland to accelerate the peaceful unification process.

I really think the world is becoming more tolerant of different systems. For example, within the BRICS bloc, you have India, the world’s largest democracy, alongside Russia, China, and Middle Eastern kingdoms with royal families. The BRICS bloc is working well despite differences in governance systems. The world is no longer divided into “democracy versus autocracy”; it allows various governance models to flourish at the same time and compete peacefully.

Whether China’s model is good or not, let’s compete peacefully. Whether Taiwan’s model is good or not, let’s compete peacefully. That way works for the next mega trend. I think eventually, we would be recognising each other legitimately. Like Zeng Xiaoping said, it doesn’t matter whether the cat is white or black.

Suisheng Zhao

This could happen under Trump.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, that’s right.

Suisheng Zhao

It’s possible. So, as you said, take advantage of the three and a half years.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Good. We’ll open the floor for one or two questions if anyone has any. Zichen, do you have a question to ask? There’s a microphone here. Zichen is CCG’s editor for Pekingnology.

Zichen Wang, Research Fellow & Director of International Communications, CCG

Good to see you, Professor Zhao. I was wondering, I spent the last year in the U.S., and I was told by some Americans who believe that President Donald Trump could be the only and perhaps the last remaining hope for China to have a very different leader. Because, as you have suggested, for example, he has the power to make a lot of different policy choices regardless of what the national security and foreign policy establishment believes. And against the popular will, he can make foreign policy decisions like the one in Russia, which stands in contrast with what the U.S. traditionally believes. He is apparently not an ideologue. He’s not interested in colour revolutions or regime change abroad. And he is known to be very transactional. It’s really unimaginable that the United States will have a similar leader in the next maybe 4 years, 10 years or 20 years. So, from that perspective, President Trump, as tough as the challenge he presents to China in diplomacy, might really be a rare beast that China has to deal with. So, from that perspective, some say Beijing should jump at the opportunity to really deal with him, but I guess, at a level of risk-taking that’s typically not usual in Beijing, I was wondering if you would agree with that.

Suisheng Zhao

I agree to a great extent because 川建国. They really translate that into English: building China, not building the U.S. Trump is building China.

Zichen Wang

And if you believe that to some extent, what would be your advice to Beijing?

Suisheng Zhao

I don’t think I could give advice to Beijing. I can only tell you what’s going on there. In the U.S. now, the liberal media, those critical of Trump, is flooded with articles talking about whatever Trump has done is good for China. And Stephen Young, those former ambassadors, those former diplomats, who know China so well, all published articles that, whatever Trump policy came out, said this is good for China. This is good for China. Almost everything is good for China. This is a very strong discourse in the U.S. now talking about Trump. He is not only a hawk. I mean, even Allison, his first article during the Davos conference, talks about “Is Trump a China Hawk?” And not only him, a lot of mainstream scholars, commentators all wrote that Trump is good for China. So, how could China deal with that? Could China take advantage of that? That’s China’s business.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Maybe I’ll just add to Professor Zhao’s comments. I think Trump has ushered in a new era. When he started the trade war with China during his first term, nobody would expect he would be the kind of president who would so disrupt bilateral and multilateral relations, quitting the WHO and the Paris Agreement and all those things. The impact is still being felt today. And in his second term, this trend has only intensified.

So, I think, the U.S. is shifting from a more political and geopolitical focus to a greater focus on geoeconomics and trade, gradually diluting the ideological divide. Then, it boils down to “Let’s compete, make America great again, make China great again, make the world great again.” So, let’s compete peacefully. It may not be a bad thing to usher in a new era of economic competition. So, wait and see.

Let’s have a second question. We will take two, maybe.

Yang Huang, Senior Economist, the World Bank

Thank you very much, Professor Zhao. And thank you for the fascinating talk and the fascinating conversation between you and Henry.

I’m an economist by training. I want to ask a question about the driving force behind this bilateral relationship. You talked about we are experiencing a long cycle of this bilateral relationship between China and the U.S. I heard earlier from Justin Lin, as an economist, who said that when the size of China’s GDP doubles the size of the U.S. GDP, then this bilateral relationship will stabilise and then they can cooperate. I wonder, what’s your view on that? What are the key ingredients or driving forces behind this bilateral relationship? Do you think this economic force is the only one, or are there other forces?

Suisheng Zhao

Indeed, if China could double its GDP, over tech, the U.S. economy, the relationship will be changed fundamentally. But if China could do that any time soon, I don’t know if that would happen. Even if that happens, China’s per caped GDP is still far behind the U.S. I travel in China. Although a lot of people in the U.S. say China threat, China is already a developed country, you go to many places in China, toilets are very different from America, far away. If that happens, that could change. But when that would happen, I don’t know.

In the U.S. now, the prevailing view is that China not only peaked, China will slow down dramatically in the long run. China’s demographic situation [will be] even worse, that by 2050—there are a lot of predictions—the Chinese population would be equal [to that of] American population, at 700 million people. If China declines by a hundred million people and the U.S. increases very dramatically, not only by immigration but also by natural birth, it will be in a much better position than China. So, if that’s the case, I don’t think the situation talked about by Justin Lin will happen anytime soon.

Henry Huiyao Wang

That’s why CCG is also promoting for China to welcome global talent coming to China, right?

Suisheng Zhao

Exactly. That’s a good opportunity now because of Trump’s immigration policy. It’s the best time now. Three years from now, we will change.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, we have a final question. The gentleman with the glasses.

Louis Liu, Founder & CEO, DAP Technologies

Thank you very much for the final question opportunities. I’m Louis Liu from DAP Technologies. We do international trade and provide supply chain solutions for aviation.

As we know, the export control from U.S. to the control the CFM engines for the aircraft C919. On the other hand, China exports controls rare earth to the U.S. What do you think is about this trade war? Do you see it coming to a warmer or a cooler situation in the future? Another question is, we talked about the Taiwan issue. As we know, most of the high-level chips are produced by TSMC in Taiwan. If the Taiwan issue becomes too terrible, how can we keep the supply chain solution for high-end chips to make sure the world economy can be safe? Thank you.

Suisheng Zhao

On the specific trade deal, on the engines you talk about, those parts versus rare earth, I think China and the U.S. have already reached some kind of agreement on this. China has already relaxed rare earth exports to the United States, issued more licenses. The U.S. has also already reopened the exports of those parts to China. I think those deals are really good. I think it will continue. If the current negotiation sustains and can move forward, those issues could be resolved.

On the second question about the chips. They have invested in the U.S. and have already built in Arizona and some other places to try to prevent that situation. But I don’t think how successful that could be. For Trump, it’s better if you just move all production to the United States, but I don’t think that will happen. The U.S. does not have that many skilled labourers. And also, the labour cost is so high. So that was still a problem for China, the U.S., and the Taiwan side.

Suisheng Zhao at CCG in November 2023