Transcript: Rethinking an Outdated Rules-based Order at Munich Security Conference

Henry Huiyao Wang joins Bronwen Maddox, Samir Puri, Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, and Jane Kinninmont to rethink global governance.

On February 16, CCG participated in an official side event titled “Rethinking or Renewal? Rethinking an Outdated Rules-based Order” hosted by Chatham House at the Munich Security Conference. The panel, moderated by Chatham House CEO Bronwen Maddox, featured the following speakers:

• Samir Puri, Director of the Centre for Global Governance and Security at Chatham House

• Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

• Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

• Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

The following transcript is based on a video recording of the session which is also available on the official CCG WeChat blog. As the moderator said, this session was not under Chatham House Rule and was a “very public discussion.”

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Very warm welcome. My name is Bronwen Maddox. I'm the Chief Executive of Chatham House, the think tank based in London, more than 100 years old, which gave rise to the Chatham House Rule. And I keep being asked at this conference to explain the rule, but we are not under the rule now. We're having a very public discussion on "Rethinking or Renewal? Rethinking an Outdated Rules-based Order." And this is something that we Chatham House had been giving a lot of thought to even before the intensity of these two days in Munich, which has cast all kinds of questions about the old order and what might replace it.

And what we're talking about today is the fact that the U.S. is stepping back and that the order that has been there for many decades in the world is clearly changing. So what is going to take its place? Is it going to be, for example, China stepping in and saying, we'll shape a lot of these rules? Is there an opportunity for other countries to step in? Whether through regional groupings, their own influence on existing institutions, or creating new institutions, are they going to be able to have a voice? Many of them feel they didn't have a voice the first time the rules were set. Well, that's what we're talking about. And it couldn't be more timely given, as I said, the discussions and the pronouncements in Munich in the past couple of days.

I've got a terrific panel here to discuss this. Dr. Samir Puri, who is the Head of Chatham House's new Center for Global Governance and Security. He's joined us from being an academic writer. He wrote a book called Westlessness on just this theme. And indeed, he's a British civil servant and was in Ukraine in 2014 for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Ottilia Maunganidze, who's the Head of Special Projects at the ISS, the Institute for Security Studies, a think tank that has done so much to put African governments on the front foot in this kind of thinking based in Pretoria, joins us as well. Thanks very much indeed. And Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director of the European Leadership Network, which is a think tank based in London and Berlin. And we may yet have Henry Wang of the Center for China and Globalization that will make itself obvious during the course of this.

Well, three very different perspectives on this. Samir, I wonder if you could help us kick off on this and your thinking on what replaces what has been an order in the world that we have been enjoying for many decades.

Samir Puri, Head of the Center for Global Governance and Security of Chatham House

Thank you, Bronwen. Really delighted to be here running this side event at the MSC. When we suggested the title, one of my suggestions for the title was "80 Years Young: Rethinking or Renewal for the International Rules-Based Order." I think nothing human-constructed for eight decades can really survive without the winds of change actually starting to wash up against it and erode it very dramatically. So I think when we talk about fragmentation, it's not only about the actions and disruptive actions that certain actors are taking. That's a given. It's also the passage of time and how much the world has actually moved on.

We've got a very visceral experience on Friday of the transatlantic parts of the world order to have had a sledgehammer taken to it, some might say. But there's also the fact that exactly 20 years ago in Iraq, there was a transatlantic dispute, as we all remember, but that didn't happen at the time of rising and risen powers in the East.

And to take the MSC's little essay that they wrote about multipolarisation. I'm a multipolar optimist, which means that although the diversity of the international system with many more autonomous, influential actors, not just great powers like China, but also countries that are gonna join those ranks, such as India, potentially Indonesia in the future as well, is really welcome, it makes it extremely challenging to work out what's going to take the place of the order as we've grown used to it since 1945.

Just a couple of quick examples to round off my opening comments. There's clearly the possibility, when we're talking about order, that the global governance that we require is provided by actors and countries that didn't previously step into the breach and present those sorts of services.

I'll give you one example, which is Qatar and mediation. That's something that has emerged in terms of obviously the Hamas mediation, in terms of the Taliban office, in relation to Afghanistan. There are a number of different examples where actually that's a potential very useful global good, not one that's necessarily coming up in the 90s and the 2000s. In the 90s, you had the Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio. That's very different to Doha.

Then one other observation in terms of where global governance will come from rather than independent actions from the structures, for example, through the BRICS. And I'm really interested just to make reference to Wang Yi's keynote comments from a couple of days ago here, the idea that China is willing to provide more public goods to the international community.

So just to round off, there's a huge question mark as to whether there's gonna be multiple overlapping offerings and possibly clashing of offerings of possible competitive multilateralism in which there are different possible structures. But to round all that up into one sort of takeaway: I don't think this new order is going to come from the reform of the UN Security Council, and I think it can be a little misleading if our eyes are only drawn to that theatre where there isn't really much optimism that there's gonna be any quick solutions.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Thanks very much indeed for that. Ottilia, I wonder if you could pick up exactly this. Your institute's work spans many questions. But we have this year South Africa having the presidency of the G20, South Africa taking a very active role in trying to use the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, particularly in the context of Israel and saying, look, if there are parts of the world order there, we want to be able to use them. What is your feeling about this world we're looking at now? Is it one of "might makes right" where big countries can do what they want? Or is there a chance for others to use the order that's there and improve on it?

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

Thank you so much. And I can't thank Chatham House enough for convening this discussion. I'll answer your question in two parts.

The first part is about how we understand the global order. I come from the southernmost tip of the African continent, from the one region now that in 20 years will account for a quarter of the world's population, a region that has largely been part of the discussions of the global order, whether it's on the UN Security Council agenda or elsewhere, but not always being an active participant at the table.

What have we seen over the past 10 years? We've seen an increase in agency in those spaces. And that agency has included using the institutions that exist and using them in ways that allow us to hear the voices, for example, of the Maldives when presenting at the International Court of Justice, talking about how climate change is an existential issue for them, how the right to water is a fundamental aspect that inspires them as a country. But also when we think about where South Africa is, as both a member of the BRICS, but also as you rightly pointed out, chairing the G20 this year, we need spaces where we can find leadership. But we also need spaces where we can look at what institutions exist, how are they working, and are they working for us in ways that we need them to work for us. It's one thing to be on the agenda. It's another thing to be at the table discussing those issues and ensuring that they're informed by the realities within the context of the African continent.

And I think what I'm saying is, there will be multiple leaders on issues, and there'll be multiple leaders at institutions. And I'm not just talking about institutions of accountability because, of course, that's my particular area of interest and focus. But I'm also talking about...

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Institutions of accountability? You mean the International Criminal Court, the ICJ, and indeed the Security Council, even if it's jammed up now, but it was the original...

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

If we go to the letter of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council's primary function is to be able to ensure international order and stability and to do so by ensuring abiding by the rule of law.

So I'll come to the second point and then I'll end, which is the way in which those rules are applied, and whether they are equal. Let me use a real example, whether you are a Sudanese Head of State and have been alleged to commit crimes within your jurisdiction, once your arrest warrant is issued, there is a global consensus that there needs to be accountability for crimes committed within your territory. Or let's say, crimes have been committed in Afghanistan, whether the fear of an International Criminal Court prosecutor will be that sanctions will be imposed on her at the time in the name of Fatou Bensouda or the Head of the Justice, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, which goes to the question: we have rules. At least for a number of countries, we agree on those rules. The question then is how do we ensure that these rules apply equally across the board such that there is accountability, period. But that's not the only set of institutions. I think I'll end there.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

I'm gonna come back on this point. Just a tiny bit more because you're talking with wonderful idealism about rules applied equally. Do you think that that is really realistic? You could say, look, the U.S. tried to, you know, set up the old order. It didn't follow all the rules itself but still was trying to be an inspiration for this. I can't think of a point when these rules have been applied equally, including to very big countries.

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

You've almost answered the question right there, which is around the system that we want to be putting in place rather, and working towards putting it in place. I will say as an African, when counterparts from the European continent were being scolded just a couple of days ago, I sat there going, "We're used to this." We're used to being told what to do. We're used to being told that these are the rules and you're not abiding by them. We're also used to hearing these words being said where those same rules have been broken elsewhere. The challenge, I think, is around how we ensure that actually they do apply. That is the challenge. It's not idealism on my part, if I can put it that way. Let's call it a wake-up call. Let's call it an eye-opening moment for those to whom rules have applied.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

I wouldn't hold idealism against anyone, but we are in a very, very realistic Munich this year. Jane, I want to come to you. And quite a bit we've heard already about bits of the UN system, and this is something you've worked on a lot. Worth saving?

Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

So I think it's vital that there is a body where everyone has a seat at the table. And if we didn't have the UN General Assembly today, we probably would want to invent it, but we might think it would be too idealistic to get everybody sitting next to one another. In a way, the UN captures this tension in the broader world because it has the General Assembly where everyone is at the table on the basis of being a sovereign nation-state. But it also has the Security Council, which codifies the dominance of a few so-called great powers defined as such, as we heard, 80 years ago. So in a way, it is reflecting the struggles that are playing out in the wider world.

But this order has never been static. So we mustn't fall into an illusion that it was all one way for 80 years and suddenly it's changed. And quite often, I think in Europe, what is being talked about when people speak of the rules-based international order in the last 30 years, or slightly more, the period since the end of the Cold War and a period where people wrongly thought that the world was becoming more and more like-minded, it's increasingly clear now that that's not the case and we need to have multilateral institutions that are able to bring together the non-like-minded, those who don't agree and seek places for common ground.

Inclusive organisations that bring together the non-like-minded may also struggle to act. We certainly see that at the UN. And I think that's part of the reason that we are increasingly seeing minilateralism or so-called "coalitions of the willing" because countries find it easier to act when they can get new groupings that don't depend on larger consensus. Those can be important sources of initiatives. But there is a risk then of turning multilateralism into a kind of clubocracy, where the richest countries get together or the democracies get together or the West gets together. And the competition for global governance becomes another source of conflict.

Above all, the UN Security Council was designed to rid future generations of the scourge of war. And that is where it is really not holding up, because increasingly we see that conflicts involve the major powers, including the veto wielders, either directly, whether that be Ukraine or Iraq, or indirectly, where their close allies are involved or where they're sponsoring different proxy groups. And again and again, we see that UN envoys now are being overtaken by mediators from regional organisations or more local groupings, because when the Security Council is divided, its peacemaking functions don't much work either.

But there are also many initiatives that the UN can take that are not held hostage to the veto-wielding powers. And I think something so important and interesting right now is to look at the future of climate agreements. We've already been through a period where the US pulled out of the Paris Agreements and the rest of the world proceeded with it, and I think that's what we're going to see happen again because these targets have been so baked into economic plans and even business research and development. There's a lot that can be done. These institutions aren't static and they're the product of actions and choices. So it also comes down to what governments choose to do and what their voters want to do.

And that's the final thing that is a massive issue for international organisations at the moment because most of them work on the basis of nation-states. Most of them mediate the desire to safeguard humanity from huge existential threats through the lens, often the short-term lens of national governments. And when we are in an age where there seems to be in many countries, a collapse of trust in government, that has a knock-on effect on institutions that try to work through governments and bring governments together. International organisations will need to get better at communicating their fundamental points and principles to the public. And that can be difficult because, with most of them, there is a big gap between the big aspirations that they all have, "Let's stop all war," and what they can do realistically and day to day on the ground. Often you need those lofty ambitions to rally support, but sometimes there may be a need to explain that what's actually being done is small, it's micro, it's local, it can only help up to a point, but we'd be better off having it than not having it.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

I think let's stop there. You've got a lot in there, both from aspirations for the UN itself. I was moderating a panel of small states a few days ago, where they were saying, "Look, we're nothing without the UN and the rule of law because we can't have the rule of might. So the General Assembly, one vote, one country really matters to us." You've touched on that. And you've touched on some of the regional ones, where I think my economics team at Chatham House is very fond of saying—the CPTPP, now led by Japan, is a really good example of a new organisation not at the moment led by the U.S. or China.

Henry, welcome. Where is China in this? With the U.S. stepping back, is that a chance for China to step forward or does China have a different vision?

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

Thank you, Doctor Maddox. I think it's a fascinating discussion. We're talking about outdated rules and how to innovate that. The theme of the Munich Security Conference this year is "Multipolarisation." I mean, last year the report was "Lose-Lose" and the year before that was "Westlessness." So we see the evolution this multipolar world is shaping now, but we don't have a multiple system to sustain that. So how to do that? I think that's quite a challenge now. I mean, Trump has a new agenda of consolidating North America and even the Americas now. But for the rest of the world, what can we do?

So what I'm thinking now is that we have to take two approaches. The first is to maintain the regional system. For example, we have RCEP now, the largest free trade agreement in the world, which is a system that seems to work in the last two years. We have CPTPP. The UK joined in that and that's really great. Let's have an innovative system with those regional experiments. We have Belt and Road. Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned that in Munich. Belt and Road and Global Gateway can work together for the Global South. We can even combine Build Back Better World (B3W), the World Bank, AIIB in China, and all those things. So we can have those new multilateral systems to innovate.

But that's not enough. We have to have a bigger system. We all hear about the UN Security Council and things like that. Personally, I think, G20 is a readily available mechanism that we have there. How about combining the G20 into a Security Council? We have P5 there. The remaining 15 can be given associate members or kind of rotating roles there involving them because G20 is already well represented: 10 developed countries, 10 Global South countries. So if we have a system to redesign the UN Security Council, get G20 into it, and have two-thirds of the veto-for-veto at both the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, we may have a new UN system to work for this multipolar world. Otherwise, we're stuck...

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

So Henry, I just want to push you on this. Do you think the UN system and particularly the Security Council, is worth trying to save? Or is it just jammed and we have to look, as we have all been discussing, for regional deals instead?

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

No, I think we have to sustain that. The UN is the core. It has been there for 80 years. We haven't started the Third World War yet because of the UN system.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

That is a big optimistic point, Third World War.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

That's why we have to strengthen, sustain, and innovate it. For this multipolar world, we need an innovative system to sustain that. But on the other hand, U.S. President Trump keeps quitting the multilateral systems like the WHO, the Paris Agreement, and the Human Rights Council. What about continuing to sustain the systems with China, the EU, and other countries? For example, WTO could be WTO minus 1. The Paris Agreement? Let's minus one. And also WHO minus one. All the rest should sustain that. Maybe a few years later, they will regret it like the UK regrets Brexit. Let's not give up. Let's continue, China, the EU, Japan, and all the rest of the countries like India and Brazil. We should sustain the existing global system, innovate it, and keep it forward rather than just disrupting, stopping, and getting nowhere and chaotic.

That's what China is doing. While Trump is having a lot of tariffs, China announced giving 40 countries zero tariffs coming to China. You know, let's compare high. Let's not compare low. Let's do that.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Let me just ask you, though, because it is so much the theme of this, China's position on Ukraine. Is that compatible with China upholding the UN system and its principles on sovereignty? Every time President Xi Jinping makes a statement, he said, "I very much want international order." And yet, Ukraine has obviously been the focus of this Mnuch and I would like your view on that.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

Thank you. I think China is very clear. China is the major country saying that no nuclear war should be fought in Ukraine. When President Macron went to Beijing, President Xi called Zelensky right away. And then yesterday, Mr Wang Yi met the Ukrainian Foreign Minister saying that China is Ukraine's largest trade partner. What's interesting is what recently the Defence Secretary of the U.S. said, "The U.S. is not gonna send troops to Ukraine." For the peace plan to work, you have to have the European troops there and other country's troops. So let's go back to the UN. Let's get the UN peacekeeping force there. China is the largest peacekeeping force among the Security Council members. So if China and India send peacekeeping forces there, Putin may accept the peace plan. That's what Trump said at the Davos. He needs China's help. China and the Security Council, for that matter, should be involved in the peacekeeping.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Thank you very much. An intriguing idea there. Okay, we've got a lot of thoughts running, both about what works, what doesn't work, and what's broken about the UN, but also about regional groupings, which we're beginning to hear a lot of examples. Thank you, everyone. Let's go to questions now. We've got 18 minutes. I've got lots more questions. But the mistake I made the other day was not to give enough time because there were lots. So let's start there. Over there. If you could say who you are, please.

Ricardo Della Coletta, Reporter at Folha de S.Paulo

Good morning. I'm Ricardo Della Coletta. I'm a journalist for the Brazilian newspaper, Folha de S.Paulo. BRICS was briefly mentioned, and I wanted to ask the vision of the panellists if BRICS has a role to play in this new world order that you were discussing. Usually, there is a lot of scepticism in the West because of the size of BRICS, the new members, and different visions. But at the same time, it's been around for a while now. And considering the current U.S. administration policies, you might find arguments for other countries to feel attracted to this kind of alliance. So I wanted to hear your thoughts on that. Thank you.

Samir Puri, Head of the Center for Global Governance and Security of Chatham House

I mean, we have, of course, representatives from two of the BRICS countries here. But I'll just take the point about Western scepticism. I think in the West, sometimes there's a tendency to mirror image: Well, the BRICS doesn't have an organisation like the EU or NATO; it doesn't have a Secretary General with a gavel; it doesn't have a collective action potential. Therefore, it can't really change international affairs. I think that's quite wrong. And I think one of the strengths of the BRICS alignment, which is why Indonesia has joined just this year, and why it expanded previously last year, is that it has some strength in making sure that diversity is sort of baked-in into how it functions. It's obviously a spur for greater bilateral cooperation within that structure, but I think it's definitely an expression of the global rebalancing we're experiencing, whether it can provide global goods at a regional or even international level. That I think we await to see.

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

At the moment, the BRICS countries, and I'm talking not just about the member states, but their populations, account for just under 50% of the global population. Now we can have a separate conversation around what you're speaking to, Samir, the workings, and how that develops. But this is an institution that over the past decade or so has evolved even as it still doesn't have a solid secretariat and all of those features of a bureaucracy, so to speak. But the fact that we are seeing additional members applying to be in BRICS, it could be that this is the room that has a door that is open to them to access.

Now, how you work within that grouping, how you ensure a more constructive agenda, and how you look to what are the elements of what BRICS is currently covering and what it can offer, including now the increase, particularly from the Gulf states, which makes even the oil revenue of BRICS alone increasingly a significant factor. We're having conversations perhaps that go beyond just the economics. And I think the message here is a similar message to what we've already heard, which is, we're seeing different clubs form. How those form, how they evolve, and how they partner, as Henry proposed, is perhaps the next stage.

I will say one thing and I say again, accountability will always feature in my responses, Bronwen. Previously, BRICS statements have often focused on economics, on development for the most part, until 2023 in November when they had one of the first resolutions, extraordinary resolutions that focused on peace and security. Now it's been a year and a half since then, and I think the evolution of BRICS is something that is worth watching. One that has an agenda that goes beyond what it was initially formed for, recognising a vacuum exists in other international institutions.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

I think that BRICS represents a new alternative in terms of economic development because I think the vast majority of developing countries have been a little bit fed up for the last 40, 50 years. There's no big gigantic plan for development. There's no talking about how to sustain. For example, China, as I said, gives up tariffs for 40 countries coming to China. So that's why the BRICS represents a new economic Globalization still being pushed forward rather than securitisation and all those other ideologically driven agendas. So all those countries find, "If China can lift 800 million people out of property, why can't we? If the Belt and Road Initiative can invest $1 trillion for 3,000 projects, how about we get a piece of that?" So you see 40 countries lined up to join BRICS.

I had the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan come into my office. We had a dialogue. He said Turkey wants to join BRICS. Well, Turkey is a NATO country. It's okay. Let's mix each other. Let's really get a better mix-up for a better world. On the other hand, a lot of countries worry about the weaponizing of the US dollar. So BRICS, Brazil, China, and South Africa, want to try some new experiments, which is allowed. We should be allowed. For example, DeepSeek China has provides a new AI model outside the monopoly of the U.S. It’s open-source and can really apply to all developing and BRICS countries. So I think let's have some healthy competition without rivalry relations.

Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

I would just note that multiple Middle East countries have wanted to join BRICS, even though they have very close relations in most cases with the U.S. because they want to signal that they can't be taken for granted and that they don't want their major relationships to be exclusive. So they don't want to be told, "You're with us or against us." I think most of the potential of BRICS is untested, but there is a desire, among many countries, to say we're not as aligned as we used to be.

Unidentified

Hi, perhaps the EU is joining the BRICS to break after this Munich Security Conference, but this is just kidding. I'm from Finland, a country to which the rules-based order matters the most. Without the rules-based order, without institutions, we don't have a say. But I've listened to you very carefully and some of you talk about "multilateral rules-based order" and some of you talk about "multipolar rules-based order." What's the difference? What do you want to signal with this or is it just semantics?

Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, former President of Iceland and Chairman of the Arctic Circle

I'm Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, former President of Iceland and Chairman of the Arctic Circle. Looking at the title of the session, my first question is, when do you think the rules-based order became outdated?

My second question is, if we go back to the war in Iraq before it started illegally on fabricated evidence, and the bombing of Libya by some of the leading European powers, why do you think these two acts, which clearly were against the rules-based order had no consequence for these countries or these leaders that executed this? Because I think it's important for us in Europe and the Western world to honestly try to draw lessons if we are going to engage with the rest of the world for a new rules-based order.

And my third question is, unfortunately, when we look at the war in Ukraine, it's very little discussed even here in Munich. It's interesting that in all the discussions about the war in Ukraine, there's not a single major involvement from the United Nations. So I think, unfortunately, one of the fallouts of the war in Ukraine is that the UN has demonstratively been shown to be irrelevant. So my third question is, do you think the UN has a chance to become relevant again after the war in Ukraine?

Ambika Vishwanath, Co-Founder and Director of Kubernein Initiative

Thank you. I want to add a foot to your list of three questions, which I think were really great. I think if we expand BRICS, it's going to sound a bit like a G20 lite. So I'm a bit skeptical on that one, but I'm not entirely disagreeing with you.

My question is going to what Ottilia talked about in accountability. If the UN is in fact then going to be defunct and we are going to have this proliferation of systems around the world, what is something that's underpinning all of them? Because they're all incredibly interest-based and transactional in nature. And so they are going to be that friendship for a season, not for a lifetime. So do we need something to underpin all of this? Is accountability that thing? Or if not, then what is it? And if there is nothing, how long are they actually going to last?

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Okay, thanks very much indeed. Let's take those. We had first a technical one on multipolar versus multilateral. What does that mean? And then thank you, a series of questions on the standing of the United Nations and when did the rules-based order become out of date. What about the US not following it? Indeed, I might say out of that, China and the bigger countries are not following at various points. Is it going to survive? And indeed, a wider question about accountability. Ottilia, let me start with you.

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

So on "multipolar" and "multilateral," I'm definitely the one who was using "multilateral" over "multipolar." For me, poles, if you think of a magnet, poles are on opposite ends or even when they are around a circle, they do not necessarily touch. So there are moments when they interact and they need each other almost to exist, whereas a "multilateral" space is a space in which some of these can be clumped together and they can engage, perhaps not on an equal footing—we recognise the vertical nature of the world, unfortunately—but that there can be multiple strategic or otherwise groupings, which ties in perhaps with the question or the issues, Ambika, that you raised: if I hear your question correctly, what is the glue that binds the different clusters?

We are in a moment of definition, which is why perhaps "outdated" might not be the word, but a system that is in the process of evolution, which means the principles or the foundational values may differ across the board. For me, you know my answer, there has to be a clear set of principles and values that undergird what defines an institution. But I'm not the one that's building these institutions. I'm the one that analyses them.

Final comment, if I may, on the UN particularly. I will say that perhaps one of our major failings is that we look at the UN Charter and we only make reference to two chapters or two sections within chapters when the reality is the UN and the UN system is not only the UN Security Council. In the presence of a deadlock at the UN Security Council, we have seen the UN General Assembly step up in terms of some of the engagements that need to be done. We've seen institutions of the UN and agencies of the UN continue to operate. If we reduce the UN to one part of its system, we break it.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Thank you. I don't want to go right down the panel. These are great answers. But what about this particular point former President raised? The question of the U.S. and Iraq. What if the big countries do not follow the rules?

Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

I think they—the U.S., the UK, and Western countries who went for this option—have faced consequences, many of them indirect because it did erode the credibility of the UN and the rules-based international order. And when some countries appear to see themselves as exceptions to the rules, they forget that then other countries will argue they should be exceptions too. My fear is that a multipolar world might involve many countries saying they should be exceptional and then the rules start to collapse.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Okay. But the question is sort of, did they start to collapse or is this really the best you can hope for? I mean, you could say the Chinese example. Look at China, it very much upholds the rules-based order, except the bits it doesn't like, like the United Nations Conventional on the Law of the Sea and bits of the WTO.

Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

But they started to erode and we have seen the Iraq War used as an argument by Russian propaganda that the West doesn't have the moral high ground to stand on. We've seen Gaza used in the same way and that has limited solidarity with Ukraine outside of Europe with real effects.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

I'm gonna try and squeeze in two more questions. I gave a lecture a year ago at Chatham House on double standards. Let me just get people's comments really briefly at the back.

Elizabeth Cousens, President and CEO of the United Nations Foundation

Thank you very much, Elizabeth Cousens, the UN Foundation. First of all, I want to express appreciation that the original title for this panel was "Retirement or Renewal." And somehow, it changed already to "rethinking". So that's a little bit positive trajectory for that.

I very much appreciated the comments from the beginning about the system being more dynamic than we like to give it credit for. And I wanted to look back not just at the last 30 years when we thought history was ending, to the whole sweep of the history, some of the most significant accomplishments of the system actually happened when the world was at its most stuck. Eradication of smallpox would point to the indispensable but often less visible role of the UN and deconflicting the Cuban Missile Crisis, which people don't talk about enough. So there's a lot to look at from the history that's relevant today.

I just wanted to ask each of you, for any example, your greatest tips on what you think have been the most influential achievements in the multilateral arena, a specific solution to a specific problem.

Orysia Lutsevych, Head of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House

Thanks a lot, I'm Orysia Lutsevych with the Ukraine Forum in Chatham House. I appreciate the complexity of the world and we need funding decisions very quickly. But I think we cannot build complex systems without addressing the basics. Right now, we have Russia and the cause of the Russian war is a very revisionist imperialism that wants to limit countries' sovereignty and change borders by force. My question is the following: How do we actually reverse that? How do we hold Russia accountable? Because we cannot just walk over it and pretend this didn't happen.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Okay, thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Okay, you got about 20 seconds each. Your best example of what works or about how to hold Russia accountable.

Jane Kinninmont, Acting Director at The European Leadership Network

I'll keep it super short. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ottilia Anne Maunganidze, Head of Special Projects at the Institute for Security Studies

She was reading my notes.

Samir Puri, Head of the Center for Global Governance and Security of Chatham House

And we're all going to say that or, I think, about the likes of it.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

Okay. I'm gonna say in the WTO. There are still 40 things taken to it every year, and about 20 of them settled, even though the appeal process is jammed up. Henry, sorry.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

I think the multipolar world is just a status. But multilateralism means that we reach some agreement on that. So we have to really drive for that. As far as Iraq and Ukraine, you see, a big power didn't obey the UN rules. So that's why it's time to revive that...

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

So let me ask you then Orysia's point. You get the whole 20 seconds then, Henry: how to hold Russia accountable for that.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization

Let's get the UN Security Council revived through this new plan that Trump is proposing. Let's get the UN peacekeeping force back to Ukraine. And then let's use this occasion to revive the Security Council and the UN. The UN's biggest achievement is that it lifted billions of people out of poverty and the WTO has contributed greatly. They contributed so much to multilateral systems.

Bronwen Maddox, Director and CEO of Chatham House

We're gonna have to stop there. I suspect the answer, if we can't, and it's gonna take a lot of Munichs to get the UN Security Council going again, we may be back simply with coalitions of the willing on sanctions, which is about where we are at the moment.

Everyone, thank you very much indeed for coming. I could see more hands up. Thank you for the richness of this debate and for the particular experience. Thank you for coming. Thanks to the panel.