Transcript of Middle East Panel 3: outside interference, status, regulation, and role of non-state actors

Middle Eastern think tankers, Chinese experts, the Ambassador of Lebanon, the Ambassador of Syria, and Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud

On May 25th and 26th, 2024, the 10th China and Globalization Forum, hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), co-organized by the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), and supported by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies (ACCWS), was held in Beijing.

Below is the full transcript of the special forum "Independence and sovereignty: Outside interference, status, regulation, and role of non-state actors." CCG has published its video recording on Chinese social media, where it remains accessible. The video recording has also been posted on CCG's YouTube channel.

The transcript hasn't been reviewed by the speakers and may contain errors.

Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation moderated the roundtable.

The keynote speakers are, by order of appearance,

Hassan Ahmadian, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, University of Tehran

Milia Jabbour, Ambassador of Lebanon to China

Alaa Talabani, Former Member of Parliament Iraq

Yasmeen Al Eryani, Co-Executive Director, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies

Zichen Wang, Research Fellow, CCG

HE Wenping, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

with intervention from

Mohammed Hasnein Khaddam, Ambassador of Syria to China

Nasser Hadian Jazy, Professor of Political Science, University of Tehran

Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud

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Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, The Amersi Foundation

Thank you very much. This is the last panel for the day. Again, the framing question has been very specifically identified in the papers that you have, so I will not repeat it. I will do what I did for the last panel, which is ask questions of each of the panelists. We would like to kick off here by asking Professor Hassan Ahmadian. My question to him is this: I had the privilege of serving or working with the late Henry Kissinger when he was Emeritus chair of the Eisenhower Fellows of which I am a trustee in the United States.

Kissinger once described Iran as either an ideology or a state. If it is an ideology, then that is consistent with the way it is trying to export that ideology by creating non-state actors and supporting them in various parts of the Middle East. And I here refer to Iraq; I refer to Lebanon; I refer to Yemen; I refer to Syria, and many others. So my question to Mr Ahmadian is, “Why is Iran feeling the need to have these non-state actors in these countries? And to what extent does it exert control over them? Does it finance them? And does it expect that they do something in return for it?

Hassan Ahmadian, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Strategic Research, University of Tehran

Thank you. Let me extend my thanks to the CCG and the Amersi Foundation for having me on this panel and setting up this interesting event. I think the issue of non-state actors is not an Iranian issue in the region. It goes well beyond Iran. It's actually rooted in the weakness of the nation-state itself. The apple doesn't fall far from the tree, and the tree is a weakened nation-state. And that apple that is the non-state actor comes as a result of that weakness.

Now Iran's national interest came in line with some of those non-state actors. It came against other non-state actors. And I think many countries actually used and propped up some of those non-state actors in the regions, not only Iran, but Iran was successful, I guess, in dealing with them, in making use of the fact that its national interest and their national interest came in line.

Now, I think beyond the weakness of the nation-state that couldn't basically face the challenges that were inherent in its inception and also over time by the international interventions and regional competitions, be it ideological or geopolitics, I think the nation-state's weakness in dealing with those challenges brought up those parallel solutions. One of those parallel solutions was malicious. Some other parallel solutions were also brought up.

But since we're focusing on those non-state actors, primarily malicious, let me tell you that there are different reasons. In Lebanon, for instance, Hezbollah came as a result of occupation. It wasn't there before the 80s. Lebanon was occupied, then Hezbollah came as a resistant movement and still is working as a resistant force. In northern Iraq, the Peshmerga forces that then became the KRG army basically came as a result of a brutal dictator who was arming to threaten an entire population who he gassed to death with chemical weapons. In Iraq itself, the rise of ISIS led to the emergence of non-state actors. In Palestine where we are witnessing a genocide, the killing machine is still ongoing, and the resistance and the non-state actors came as a result of this lengthy occupation of the Palestinian territories. I think there are different diverse reasons for the emergence of those actors. You can talk about Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, and Yemen, all with different reasons for them. But I think the result also leads us to the same issue, that is, the weakness of the nation-state.

What to do about this moving forward? I think the strengthening of the nation-state is key. And to strengthen the nation-state, you need a more inclusive government within the countries. And also, you see that not all governments are against non-state actors. Actually, many governments made use of those non-state actors to fulfill what they failed to do in defending their territorial integrity to stop the terrorist organizations from flourishing in their countries. So, a more inclusive internal politics, (would lead to) a more harmonious region.

Here, I also should mention the Beijing agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia helps a lot in bringing down the level of tension in the region, leading the region into a less tension-driven status that feeds into the weakening of the nation-state.

And thirdly, I think (we need) a global, more balanced way of dealing with the region. The Western previous dealing with the region has been imbalanced. Here, I think also China and other rising powers can play a key role in balancing off the Western influence and rule in the region to bring it into a more balanced setting where the regional states can interact without much tension.

Mohamed Amersi

I want to put one more question to you, if I may. The cynic might say, and I say cynics, that it is in Iran's interests to have these non-state actors across these four or five countries because, through that, it is able to very cheaply assert control over these countries and not allow them to flourish as independent sovereign states.

A, what do you answer to that question? And secondly, what will it take Iran, if it's ever going to get there, to say, fine, we are now going to try and push for these non-state actors to become the legal, legitimate political part of the setup of these countries, just like the IRA became part of the government of Ireland. We had a situation in Sri Lanka that we were discussing with our colleague here, Tamil Tigers folded up. So what would it take Iran to say, let us now push for these militias to become part of the regular armed forces and allow these countries to flourish as independent states. Those two questions.

Hassan Ahmadian

I think you see that, basically, each case has its own intricacies and different details in dealing with non-state actors. I think the Iranians have actually pushed their allies, many of their allies, to be merged into the national armies. In Iraq, it worked to some extent; some are still not part of the armed forces. In Syria, the National Defense Forces are now part of the Syrian army. In Lebanon, there is resistance against Israel there. The situation is very complex. It's not Iran's shot to basically call the shot in there and ask Hezbollah to merge into the government. And I think they are on very good terms with the government there.

In Yemen, there is another situation. Iran actually backed the Saudi-Houthi deal that was very close before the 7 October. Had it not been for that conflict, I think the deal would have been signed. And Iran was backing it.

So, there have been different ways of dealing with it and pushing for it, but I think what remains is the three categories that I mentioned. You need an inclusive government within that can embrace those bodies, not alienate them. And you need a region and an international system that can basically deprive the region of the emergence of those kinds of non-state actors. Thank you.

Mohamed Amersi

We will now turn to Her Excellency Milia Jabbour. I think that many would say that Lebanon has brought it upon itself, and it is the people of Lebanon who are to blame for what we have there with Hezbollah. We have Amal. We have many movements there. Some of them are militarized and are working independently of the regular army. It plays to Hassan's point that unless you have a strong state where its people believe that they want to create an independent state, the non-state actors will flourish. What would you say to that?

Milia Jabbour, Ambassador of Lebanon to China

Thank you, Dr. Amersi. First, I would like to thank you because I'm happy to be among a panel where we have more ladies than the first two panels. So I'm happy to be here. I'm happy to be among those ladies. Anyway, thank you very much.

And probably a quick historical overview of the Middle East would help us answer your question. If we want to better understand the contemporary Arab region, it requires stepping back from the present and taking a long view of the evolution of states and sovereignty in the Middle East because you're talking about non-state actors. I'm not going to do that because it requires lots of time, but it is worth noting that the architecture of the region was created by Sykes-Picot, and we should not ever forget that. This is an informal and secret agreement between Britain and France sketched out during World War I to divide up the post-Ottoman region and through which borders were imposed by former colonial powers. With the same importance as Sykes-Picot came then the famous Balfour Declaration issued by the British government in 1917 announcing its support for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. This is a bit of the context of what we are going through today.

One of the key factors that brought the Arab world to the point of turbulence we are in today is the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is the oldest and most serious destabilizing force in the region. It has plagued us all since the 30s. Over the course of the years, with four major Arab-Israeli wars and more than a hundred non-respected international resolutions -- not respected by Israel-- plus the fact that the USA, a major power in the Middle East and other Western societies, seem to pay more attention to the security and rights of Israelis than to those of Palestinians and Arabs. This chronic imbalance generated considerable anger and frustration among the populations of the Middle East. This tension was built over decades and was one of the important factors in the growth of movements in the 80s whose ideology was to fight particularly against Israeli occupation of Arab lands.

Talking about statehood and sovereignty, the general principles, patterns, and conceptions of statehood and sovereignty of the Westphalian system have evolved over time. In more recent times, the idea of a nation's right to exercise its sovereignty is being challenged in different parts of the world by various organizations as well as by proponents of humanitarian intervention.

The system has also been challenged by the presence of a wide array of multiple actors and a myriad of categories of non-state actors. These can be sub-state actors such as labor unions, large companies, professional associations, religious communities, or transnational actors such as non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross or Green Peace. The term also includes criminal networks and politically violent actors like ISIS or Al-Qaeda. It can also include quasi-military organizations, militias, national liberation movements, and guerillas.

Non-state actors differ greatly in nature. So too do their interactions with the states. This is what Dr. Hassan talked about: their interaction with the states. Non-state actors in the Middle East are not merely the expression of a state vacuum, where they take uncertain roles that states traditionally fill. Rather, some states purposefully outsource some of their tasks to non-state actors, co-opt non-state actors to their own advantage, or tolerate them.

The different ways in which states choose to interact with non-state actors stem from the state's raison d'État. Thus, a non-state actor can fold into the state's purposes, be it by providing security, welfare, or charity, or by acting as a representative of a given community within the state.

For example, Lebanon has outsourced a key area of governance to a sub-state actor. Our Personal Status Laws falls into the realm of the religious communities recognized by the state. Hezbollah, as one of the major political parties, has very extensive activities, including construction work to repair war damages caused by Israel. It also provides healthcare and social services. They do it within the context of the state. It also became a large representative of community interest, like the Shia interest, in a similar way to political parties and democracies. Furthermore, Hezbollah continues to operate as the country's legitimate resistance against Israeli occupation, thus maintaining an asymmetric defense posture that protects Lebanon from Israeli retaliations.

Sometimes, those non-state actors can also take a more antagonistic form where the non-state actor challenges the regime or the political system in place, usually legitimizing its own existence by disproving the state's capacity to deliver. Examples are those that seek mainly to destabilize the state, such as Al-Qaeda, or even to replace an existing one, like ISIS.

In an apparently unmanageable overlay of domestic, regional, and global power struggles in the Middle East, major big and regional powers confront each other on battlefields beyond their own territory by proxy wars. Some strong non-state challengers can become very influential in shaping the regional balance of power. And with rival and ally states, each seeking to influence and control rival networks. The result is a turbulent regional system in which state interests are often hard to discern and shift in complex ways. Nevertheless, some lessons can be learned from the case of Lebanon, where in spite of the frequent political instability and regional insecurity, there can be an approach, to some degree, a temporary alternative, where the dynamics of security politics in Lebanon can be understood through the lens of what some intellectuals call hybrid sovereignty. Such an approach suggests how an assemblage of state and non-state actors has been able to navigate between rival understandings of insecurity, producing at times shared but still contested understandings that have sustained a system of plural governance over security that has been able to respond to a shifting geography of state filled with tensions. Security politics in Lebanon requires perpetual adjustments to avoid collapse or to avoid internal war, as occurred between 1975 and 1990. This is a chapter that nobody wants to experience again, even at a great cost. Thank you.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much for that very insightful analysis of Lebanon. Now, I'll turn to Alaa Talabani.

Alaa, first of all, thank you very much for taking the trouble to come all this way. It's a real pleasure to see you here again. Last time, we were in Baghdad together. You have a very amazing vantage point. You are from Kurdistan, and you are a member of the Iraqi Parliament where you saw how all of these Shia-backed paramilitary units were, in a way, running riot and trying to stop the state from being able to behave as a state. How do you see the future of that? Is that a problem for the internal Iraqi people and the Shia people of Iraq? Or do you feel that, on balance, this is Iran trying to extend its influence in Iraqi affairs?

Alaa Talabani, Former Member of Parliament Iraq

Thank you so much for this great opportunity, Mr. Amersi. It's honored to be here. This is my first visit to China and to attend such an important forum. Thank you so much for your invitation. I'm so happy to meet so many good friends as we met earlier in Baghdad at my place and then here in Beijing.

Well, this is a good question. You mentioned at the beginning that you like this part of the whole conversation and panel so much; I like it as well because it's kind of a daily-basis concern for us as Iraqis. When I was in parliament for 16 years, I worked as an advisor to our new prime minister for a while, and I'm working in civil society now.

I like the title here about sovereignty. I think, and I can say that Iraq is one of the Muslim countries that are suffering from the violence of sovereignty. For many different reasons. Some of them are local and internal, and some of them are external because of the interests of other countries in Iraq.

Sometimes we say Iraq is an arena for other parties and countries' conflict. And there are many examples. For example, Turkey, between time and time, they are bombing some areas in Iraq, in northern Iraq. They are assassinating some individuals under the name of protecting their national security and defending (against) terrorism. Of course, they pay Kaka'i. And so far, there is no official action towards this. There are some rules, and some in the government are trying to make a security agreement with Turkey.

But why we cannot stop this? Because we have Iran on the other side. They are bombing places inside Iraq through their partners, of course, through some militias, which I will explain because we are dividing them into legal militias or, let's say, legal armed forces, which are under the umbrella of al-Hashd al-Shaabi. But some of them are not because the whole country and the government are suffering in dealing with these forces. So when they are bombing, and Iran is not denying that they are bombing places in Erbil, in Kurdistan region, and there is, between time and time, bombing the American forces, the American embassy in Baghdad.

Of course, Americans, in return, are also attacking some militias' places inside Iraq. They assassinated two important figures inside Iraq on the road to the airport and in the capital city. This is a big violation of the sovereignty of Iraq. They assassinated someone like Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. For the Iraqi people, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis is a hero. He liberated the country from ISIS.

Imagine all this happening in Iraq with diversity between Iraqi political parties. I was in the parliament. First of all, before talking about what happened in the parliament and the legal action towards the al-Hashd al-Shaabi and militias, nobody can deny the important fatwa of our Marja'iyah Najaf, the fatwa of Jihad. And here, when the al-Hashd al-Shaabi was created, there was this discussion and argument in the parliament. At that time, I was the head of my political party block in the parliament on turning al-Hashd al-Shaabi into organized legal armed forces. We were very much divided. Of course, the Shia party were with; the Sunni party were against. The Kurdish were very concerned. But in the end, with the majority, it was past. I was with putting al-Hashd al-Shaabi in the legal frame.

But here is the question. After we did that, it's an official organization and an official institution. The question here is, has the Shaabi subordinate to the order of the commander-in-chief of armed forces, which is the prime minister, let's say, Sudani? The answer: not always.

Let's not forget Mr. Ahmadian talked about Peshmerga. I'm Kurdish. I was a freedom fighter for a long time. And we are proud of the Peshmerga. But at the same time, Peshmerga, again, are not taking their orders from the prime minister, from the commander in chief of the armed forces. They are taking their orders from the Kurdistan presidency or, let's say, parties. Even peshmergas are divided between PK and KDP, the two main Kurdish parties. So this all causes very big concerns for us. Unfortunately, so far, we have been unable to organize this.

Between time and time, the relation between Iraq and Kuwait, then the rights of Kuwait over Khor Abdullah (affirmed) by the Security Council agreement in 1993 after the invasion. Later on, a kind of understanding happened between Iraq and Kuwait, and it was rejected by Parliament and by the Supreme Court. Still, this is a continuing argument.

Thank God, the relationship with Saudi is very good now. After 40 years, we have signed a security agreement. And our prime minister, well, let's be honest, the previous prime minister Al-Kadhimi, he started the relations and opened good relations with Saudi Arabia going towards the economy. So besides opening the Arar ports, which were also closed for decades. This all sounds to be good relations or good agreements between Iraq and Saudi after a long time of not having even political or diplomatic missions in both countries. Now, we have a good diplomatic mission there. Saudi has an amazing ambassador in Baghdad who's close to everyone.

Now, back to your question, Mr. Amersi, within Iraqi society, people are concerned about all these armed industries in the hands of different groups. Some of these groups have members in the parliament; they have offices open legally under the law of the parties. They have economic offices, which they are playing a big role in the economy of Iraq. But their armies are not under the control of Iraqi formal forces. Some of them are not, and they are outside these big orders. So that's a concern. For example, today, all Iraqi people wake up with the news of an assassination or a big explosion that happened in a KFC shop in Baghdad. These are the wrong messages. it has different meanings and messages, but this is a very bad message for Iraq and the Iraqi people.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much for your very touching remarks as to what you have been through the past 20 years now, and hopefully, Insha'Allah, very soon, the country will find peace and stability. Thank you.

I now turn to Yasmeen Al Eryani. She's from Yemen and she has a very good understanding of the dynamics that played out in Yemen. And the question is more or less the same for her as well. Are the Houthis a force for good, or are they a force for division and to stop the country from becoming united and a sovereign state? How do you see it going forward?

Yasmeen Al Eryani, Co-Executive Director, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies

Thank you first for inviting me and for arranging for these Middle Eastern-China panels. I think they're very important and timely. Your Royal Highness, Excellencies, and everyone, and of course, the organizers, Amersi Foundation and CCG.

Before I answer your question, which is very direct about the Houthis, I will answer it. But before I do that, I want to kind of zoom out a little bit because, in the last two days, we have heard of multiple global crises, from the weakening of world rule-based order, weak multilateralism, and geopolitical competition that is negatively impacting the Global South, and so on. And I believe that Yemen is a microcosm of all these crises, quite condensed. And I think it's an example of what happens when you leave these crises unaddressed.

So, the Houthis are a symptom of a long period of crisis in Yemen, which, in one way or another, has something to do with all these more global crises. They are not only specific to Yemen. The Houthis captured the state in 2014. They took control from a legitimate government. We were in a transitional period that was struggling, but it was moving forward. We were trying to escape a fall into a full-blown conflict, but we were drawn into it. I think Yemen now is in a very critical situation as a state. It risks fragmentation. It risks long-term conflict. And I believe the Houthis have a very big role to play here.

The Houthis as a group is also not one that would be willing to share power with other Yemeni parties. And Yemen has been enjoying political pluralism for the past several decades. So, this is not new to Yemen. And there is very little tolerance to a government that governs alone, that, you know, one party or one group that governs without the others.

I believe that this will not pass in Yemen. But how will it unfold? I think that's the critical question. In terms of what the title of the panel is, sovereignty and non-state actors. I mean, there's an array of non-state actors in Yemen. Of course, the Houthis are the strongest. They are strong militarily. They have also used the last 10+ years to really consolidate power while their opponents continue to be very weak and fragmented and divided between them. But there are other non-state actors in Yemen, armed, and with different political projects. Some of them are in the government of Yemen or the internationally recognized government, and they are backed by regional states, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and to some extent also Oman. And they're competing with each other, which means that there is no chance to stand in the face of quite a coherent organization like the Houthis.

The Houthis seem to have a long-term strategy. They are calculating their next moves, and they have a worldview that is anchoring them in broader regional and world politics. And they believe that they have a position within that worldview. Their opponents do not seem to have a strategy. This makes a very complex situation in Yemen because, at the same time, I find it very difficult to conceive of broad acceptance of the Houthis across Yemen, although we know that they do have expansionist ambitions, maybe even beyond Yemen, according to their political discourse. So, I think we have been underestimating their ambitions in Yemen. And this is a failure of judgments that we will have to deal with.

And we see now this escalation in the Red Sea that I think has global repercussions. We also have other armed groups besides those that are within the nominally government of Yemen and the Houthis; we have Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Al-Qaeda is a bit stronger in Yemen compared to the Islamic State. They have some footing; although they have been retreating since 2015, they are now gaining strength. New leadership, new source of revenue, and collaboration with what was seen before as an antithesis to Al-Qaida, which is the Houthis. They are collaborating with the Houthis. They are receiving drone technology, for example, from the Houthis. We know that the Houthis are also collaborating with Al-Shabaab across the Red Sea and the Somalia coast, which means we are moving in a very quick path towards a complete militarization of a very important water choke point, which is the Red Sea. It is also a threat to the Mediterranean, which is another water choke point. I think the world is sleepwalking into this. And I don't see at the moment a clear strategy to address these risks. Thank you.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much for your remarks. Again, very helpful. I will now turn to our Chinese colleagues here. Let me start with Zichen Wang. He was in Baghdad at the Baghdad Dialogue. He met a lot of the Iraqi participants there. I think he's got a good understanding of what works in Iraq and what doesn't work in Iraq. What is China's attitude in terms of tolerating or even accepting that non-state actors should be allowed to, as it were, play a part, whatever part it is, in some of these Middle Eastern countries in which China has become by far their biggest trading partner and in some cases political partner? Does it tolerate this, or, is it trying to find ways to mitigate this by disarming them, requiring them to become part of the political structures in the country where they operate?

Zichen Wang, Research Fellow, CCG

Thank you, Mr. Amersi. It's a great privilege to be on this panel. Your foundation made it possible. I work with CCG, so I will not thank my boss here. It's great to be in front of His Royal Highness and also some friends that, as you correctly mentioned, that I came across in Baghdad.

So that is actually a very interesting question. And some of the panel members have talked about, you know, non-state actors. I think the situation in China is actually quite unique. I think the People's Republic of China, with the Communist Party of China in leadership, is known to be and is very proud of being a very strong and centralized state. Throughout Chinese history, the tradition here has always been that a strong central government is what the people are used to. When the country is fragmented, when the country is in chaos, the natural tendency of the Chinese people across many generations and its leading intellectuals is that people want a centralized and strong state.

So I think that's something very crucial, a difference between the reality in the Middle East and the People's Republic of China today. You all talked about a lot of very specific cases in the Middle East. As we all know, at this particular moment and for many years before that, the United States remains the number one, let's say, as the theme of the panel says, outside interference for the region. The Chinese approach and its collaboration with countries in the Middle East have largely been economic. China, I think, for the past 10 years, has been trying to enhance its involvement in the Middle East. But still, the emphasis is largely economic. China set up a military logistical base in Djibouti but officially maintains that it is not a military base, whereas the United States maintains many military bases across the region.

I think for the Chinese, (China's involvement) is still not at the level of "outside interference" in the region as the United States or, before that, Great Britain was. As Professor Ahmadian alluded to in the initial remarks, there is speculation, or maybe to some extent, hope for emerging powers like China to get more involved in the region. I'm not exactly sure that's Beijing's interest at this particular moment because I think one thing that lingers in the background is the rivalry between China and the United States. It has grown increasingly global in that all regions of the world have been drawn into the strategic competition between the two countries. Nevertheless, the degree and the pattern of involvement of these regions differ. Comparatively speaking, I think the Middle East is among the least affected regions in terms of China and U.S. competition. From the perspective of functions, the Middle East, I think, excluding Israel, does not belong to the US..-led alliances. Obviously, among the various types of alliances formed by the United States to counter China, the Middle East falls into the category of, "loosely organized alliances throughout the world that are intended to weaken China's influence." It's vastly different from the NATO or from the U.S. alliances with certain countries in terms of science and technology, which imposes technology export control against China.

So, in contrast to the increasingly intense global strategic environment, I think the atmosphere in the Middle East vis-à-vis China and the United States relations are actually relatively favorable. The two countries do not have obvious conflicts there on regional affairs. With the United States implementing a strategic contraction, China has maintained a relatively neutral Middle Eastern policy. As a result, I think countries of the region barely face any pressure to choose sides. To be sure, disagreements frequently arise, but until now, I think the differences between the two powers have been limited to mutual criticism and noncooperation, which is still a long way from direct confrontation.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much for your comments. For the last panelist now, I would ask, HE Wenping, do I pronounce it right? Thank you. So my question to you is going to be the definition of non-state actors must be very odd to China because such an "animal" does not exist in Chinese political as well as social structures. Now you are involved with social sciences. So how does China actually see non-state actors, i.e., a state within a state? Is this something that people understand how this phenomenon works here?

HE Wenping, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

Yes. You can see that this organization is called the Institute of Western-Asian and African Studies; this institute is affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the Middle East and Western Asia, in this large area, there are actually a lot of these non-state actors; for example, in Somalia, there are a lot of warlords. After the end of the Cold War and now even in the Western African country, there's Sahel, and in those places, there are a lot of terrorist activities and other non-states playing a lot of roles. Even in the Middle Eastern area, we just heard the situation has been introduced from Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. So now everybody knows Hezbollah, Houthis, you see a lot of ministers in that area.

Being the outside observer on the Middle East situation today, the major thing that is being talked about is the Palestine and Israel conflict. There are also a lot of negotiation talks in Cairo. And then there are Houthis actions in the Red Sea, which have even damaged China's interests since we have lots of business going on. The commodities and the global supply chain now has been damaged. This is also a damage to the global economic recovery. So, nobody can say that they can stay outside of the picture.

I agree with the previous panelists who just mentioned how to understand these non-state actors and their role in the Middle East. I think it's a double-edged sword. When the country is really out of control and even the state actor is seen nowhere, it creates soil for these non-state actors so they can survive. Non-state actors could even build on their power and get stronger.

I have students ask me, "What is Hezbollah?" "What is its relationship with the state? Are they military troops controlled by the Lebanon government?" It is a very difficult question. Similarly, the Houthis are under whose control? When the state is becoming weak, of course, non-state actors will become stronger.

I think this final panel's questions are really well-chosen because we also need to talk about independence and sovereignty and also outside interference. As my friends just mentioned, assassinations from outside of the Middle East ignored the sovereignty of the Iraqis, ignored sovereignty of Lebanon, and all the countries. When your sovereignty and independence are getting weaker and weaker, that's why we see lots of other players. They are showing their head now; they are playing around and even made into those mainstream talks, like those talking in Cairo. It seems like one step forward and then two steps back.

Then who is the player? Maybe some non-state actors don't want to see those things move in that direction. So lots of attacks and even assassinations happen. Also, because I've been doing research in international relations for decades, when you're looking at world history, even state actors are playing around together with these non-state actors. When there is something that the state actors cannot do on the surface, those non-state actors will do for them under the table. So those things we don't know the secrets. Many things are confidential. So maybe years later, then we get to know something that happened during the Second World War, even the First World War, about why those wars immediately broke out. And then you find it's not for those reasons that we have been taught by the media. Actually, it's other reasons, very deep. So this is the issue. They're all intertwined with each other. Thank you.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much. I will now invite a couple of interventionists from the floor. Let's start with His Excellency Mohammed Hasnein Khaddam, Ambassador of Syria. These phenomena of non-state actors, you also see in Syria in quite a way, some are for the government of President Assad, and some are against the government of President Assad. So, how does this play out in Syria? Again, it would be helpful if you could confine your remarks to three or four minutes so we can give some people time to speak as well. Thank you.

Mohammed Hasnein Khaddam, Ambassador of Syria to China

I have three pages only. Thank you very much. I must thank you, Mr. Amersi, Mr Wang, for hosting this very important forum. I am honored with the presence of Prince Turki. In fact, I will elaborate, I prepared some quotations and I build my case that the players in the region are reactionary players for the main players which are, in fact, the US and Israel. As Her Excellency, the ambassador of Lebanon, mentioned, the Sykes-Picot divided the region irrespective of territorial integrity and sovereignty, creating sub-sovereignties.

I wish to state in the beginning that the term "non-state actor" is a euphemistic misnomer that sits on the border of terrorism and just struggles. Obfuscated for a long time due to the lack of a clear international definition of terrorism. An effort my country called for in the 80s last century but was hampered by many Western countries, but mainly the USA; of course, the lack of a clear definition of terrorism gives great space for foul play.

And let me here quote Senator Hillary Clinton: "We created Al-Qaeda 30 years after the creation of Taliban." The liberation movements for the Palestinian issue are a continuation of the liberation movements that spread throughout the 40s and 50s of the last century. They were self-created. The Palestinian cause remains the oldest unresolved question in spite of tens, if not hundreds, of UN resolutions that clarify the solution. In full support of the occupational force and for internal or geopolitical reasons, the U.S. did its best to avoid all routes that led to a just solution, and instead, it reverted to destabilizing the region or restructuring the region.

I will give a few examples. You know, you feel that maybe Henry Kissinger was a Tiresias when he founded the State Department terrorist list. Just to compare the situations, the first four countries enlisted in 1979 were Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Libya. So, the vision from those days was clear for what was to come. I don't need to elaborate here.

The second issue. In 2001, after the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Bush administration adopted the prescription provided six years earlier by the so-called neocons or another misnomer in the Middle East referring to the pro-Israel lobby. It's a clean break, a new strategy for securing the realm. It's not that much known, but this is the policy adopted by the Bush administration and is still ongoing. The lead figure in that strategy was Netanyahu and other neocons. The plan is still in play and is based on the principle -- but please check it on the internet. It's there available -- Peace is dangerous for Israel. So, we have to provide a new approach to solving Israel's security problem, which included toppling Saddam Hussein, containment of Syria by engaging in proxy warfare, and highlighting its possession of weapons of mass destruction. It is very pertinent till now. This is 1996, by the way.

About Syria, I wish to quote a certain official in one administration who was related to constructive instabiliy, you know, after the invasion of Iraq and the domino effect, the democratizing of the region, etc. In fact, the main reason was security, securing Israel. Of course, there were three priorities for the U.S. administration towards Syria. First, it should gather as much intelligence on the critical social, economic, and ethnic forces at work in Syria. It should conduct a campaign around democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. And it should offer the Syrian regime no lifelines unless President Bashar -- this is very important-- is prepared to go to Israel as a part of a peace initiative or to expel all anti-peace terrorist organizations and their members from Syria. Of course, this is no better explanation about the connection of what's going on in Syria and the Palestinian issue, the core issue of the Middle East. This is why wish to mention that there iasre no non-state actors. In fact, all terrorist groups in Syria are financed and formed from outside the border. Of course, this is amongst hundreds of such quotations.

The question I want to finalize by is raised in Washington now by non-state thinkers is whether Israel is an asset to a liability for the U.S. and the Middle East and internationally, especially after the recent episode of genocide in Palestine. The whole Middle East question was built on invalidated presumptions for decades. I will state a few: Palestine has been inhabited by its own people for millennia. They are now thrown in the sea. Judaism, like Islam and Christianity, is a heritage of our region. People lived in harmony throughout the centuries. The region is paying the price of certain Western crimes (that) may be committed against certain groups and they are repainting with our blood. Of course, the Palestinian issue will never die without a solution. This is all I would say. Thank you very much.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much for your remarks, highly appreciated. I would now ask Professor Hadian, and let me put to him an alternate model in place of the non-state actors for Iran to think. So many people would say that after the Iraq-Iran war, after the imposition of sanctions on Iran, that even after signing the JCPOA, Iran was subjected to the most brutal sanctions regime that the world has ever seen. And Iran, some would say, legitimately exercised its rights of self-defense to ensure that it can never, ever face a situation where its neighbors can attack it again. And this it does by having non-state actors or supporting non-state actors in its neighbors.

But would an alternate model where Iran would say to these non-state actors, why don't you become part of the main political process? Why don't you get yourselves into political parties and then ask your state to sign security guarantees with Iran in the way that perhaps the GCC, in the way that NATO, in the way that European Union frameworks work? So it can get the security and protection it needs, but at the same time, it would allow these countries to exercise their independence, to develop, and to become sovereign. Is this something Iran might consider one day?

Nasser Hadian Jazy, Professor of Political Science, University of Tehran

Thank you very much. Thank you and CCG for inviting me. Let me for a couple of minutes lay out of framework for my discussion and my response. Number one is, you know, we can address this issue at three levels, at the international order level, at the regional level, and at the national level. I guess so far, many of our colleagues have addressed the issue from within the national level. I don't like to engage at an international level. I just say that, you know, international order is extremely important for the generation of non-state actors, provided, of course, I assume we understand what non-state actors (are). I was thinking whether Brookings and Carnegie are non-state actors or only they are non-state thinkers. But anyway, that's a very complicated concept to be conceptualized. But for the sake of our discussion, I assume we understand we have a general understanding of what that is.

So rather than going to the international level or national level, I would like to concentrate for a couple of minutes on the regional level.

You know, to me, two important events of changes happened in our region in the Middle East, there was a balance and imbalance. There was a balance of power in the sub-regional Persian Gulf between Iran and Iraq. Thanks to the American invasion, that changed to an imbalance. And the whole discussion for a couple of decades now is to reconstituting that previous balance. But there was an imbalance in the region of the Middle East.

And the imbalance was Israel was acting like a superpower to the rest, and there was supposed to a military edge that keeps the Israelis to be in that position. That imbalance, to a large extent, at least in our perception in the region, has changed to a balance. And it has a couple of important elements in it. Number one is Iran's missile program. Number two is Iran's nuclear program. And number three is these so-called non-state actors.

Non-state actors are a part of Iran's basic deterrence. We have tried to build a comprehensive deterrence belt around Israel. Thus, in order to keep that balance in the region, in order to create that deterrence belt, Iran has relied on important allies like non-state actors. These are the reasons. Unless the root causes at the three levels, it's the international level, regional level, and the national level, unless we address them, we cannot resolve this issue of non-state actors. Thank you.

Mohamed Amersi

I think His Royal Highness would like to address a few words from the floor, please.

Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud

Thank you. I was reminded of my time as director of intelligence in Saudi Arabia, that we had a terrorist attack at that time in the City of Dhahran. And this is going back to the mid-1990s, which was traced at that time to a party that called itself the Hezbollah al-Hejaz. And I remember at that time, the Kingdom had a security agreement with Iran. And the Ministry of Interior was coordinating with their Iranian counterparts. Anyway, the perpetrators fled from Saudi Arabia and went to Iran, eventually ending up in Lebanon, where finally one of them was captured actually in Lebanon and was brought back to face trial in the Kingdom.

My point is that because of China's intercession between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the security agreement between the two countries has been revived. And now hopefully, that events like that will not occur anymore as an understanding of their rapprochement that happened between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This is just a non-state actor that is happening there.