Henry Huiyao Wang’s Call for China-Europe Investment Cooperation

After speaking with Henry Huiyao Wang at CCG’s 2026 China Outbound Investment Forum, Limen China founder René Ruschmeier examines how Chinese investment could support European industry.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), recently spoke with René Ruschmeier, founder of Limen China, a consultancy specialising in China, geoeconomics and corporate strategy, on the sidelines of the 2026 China Outbound Investment Forum in Beijing on 17 October 2026.

Ruschmeier, who has lived and worked in China since 2017, subsequently published a commentary in Table.Briefings on 20 October, drawing on ideas discussed at the forum. In the article, he argues that Chinese investment and technological expertise could support Europe’s industrial renewal, and that Europe’s China Policy should be assessed in terms of its contribution to European competitiveness and prosperity.

The article is republished here with the author’s permission.

EU: Too much politics in the debate on China

Chinese capital and technological expertise could support Europe’s industrial renewal. Europe’s policy toward China should evaluate such opportunities based on their contribution to Europe’s own competitiveness and social prosperity.

On Oct. 17, I spoke at the China Outbound Investment Forum in Beijing with Henry Huiyao Wang, the founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization. He suggested that German industrial companies invest jointly in Germany with their Chinese partners. Former Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming advocated at the conference for an investment agreement with the EU that could provide a reliable framework for such projects.

At European locations, it would be worth examining whether established corporate partnerships can accelerate industrial renewal. The benchmark for this should be the sustainable development of in-house technological capabilities.

In his 1986 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, US economist James Buchanan made a remarkable statement: “There is no political counterpart to Adam Smith’s invisible hand.” Buchanan drew attention to the rules governing political decision-making and to the interests of the parties involved – which the Scottish economist Adam Smith had already identified in the 18th century as key components on the path to the wealth of nations.

Even with good intentions, a politically desired outcome by no means arises automatically.

In my view, this implies a practical requirement for policy toward China. Its instruments need verifiable goals and procedures that allow for course corrections if the results fall short of expectations. This applies to trade restrictions as well as to the promotion of investment. The prospect of political acclaim offers no guarantee of their economic success.

China is not going anywhere. Its technological development is putting increased pressure on Europe to renew its own competitiveness. The credibility of tougher trade instruments also depends on what economic costs Europe is willing to bear in the event of a conflict. A policy toward China that proposes further restrictions should provide a clear justification for its expected security gains and economic costs.

To the extent that trade restrictions aim to buy Europe’s industrial players additional time, it must be clear what capabilities are to be developed during that period. What will Europe do with the time it gains? What investments will this trigger, who will finance them, and when are competitive offerings expected to emerge from them? The political decision on a policy instrument should answer these questions.

Experience in the US already provides evidence of sectoral gains in production and higher costs resulting from tariffs. The US International Trade Commission has examined such effects and explicitly distinguished its analysis from an assessment of the overall net economic benefit. Long-term competitiveness, in particular, requires its own set of criteria. Additional production resulting from a tariff barrier alone does not yet answer this question.

In the case of temporary protective measures, progress should be reviewed regularly. Their continuation requires an economic justification that also takes into account the costs to buyers and consumers.

Let’s take China at its word. Wang’s proposal for joint investments and Chen’s call for a reliable framework open up a concrete negotiating agenda. If Chinese companies want to bring capital and technology to Europe, governments and companies should develop projects based on this and that make a verifiable contribution to European competitiveness.

For Germany as an industrial hub, it would be necessary to clarify what development work takes place locally. How are employees trained, and which skills do European partners develop independently? Contract drafting and investment reviews must clarify access to critical technologies as well as control over sensitive data. It is also crucial to determine which capabilities European companies retain in the event of the partner’s subsequent withdrawal.

Such an approach acknowledges that each side pursues its own interests. For European companies, this includes ensuring that collaboration leads to the long-term development of their own capabilities. Chinese partners need reliable conditions for their investments. European companies’ access to the Chinese market must also be on this negotiating agenda.

The appeal from Beijing deserves a response from Germany in the form of verifiable proposals. Europe’s competitiveness could benefit if Chinese investment leads to greater industrial learning capacity at European locations. The success of European policy toward China should be measured by this criterion.