Henry Huiyao Wang in dialogue with Trita Parsi on global governance and the Middle East

CCG President and Quincy Institute Executive Vice President discuss the transition towards multipolarity, the Iran conflict, major-power mediation, and the future of the international order.

On August 20, Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), recorded an episode of the CCG Global Dialogue series with Trita Parsi, Co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

The following transcript is based on a video recording and has not been reviewed by either of the speakers

Henry Huiyao Wang

At CCG, the Center for China and Globalization, we have a Global Dialogue series, so we would love to have you on this Global Dialogue. I know you are an expert on global governance, but you are also a great expert on the Middle East, particularly Iran–U.S. relations. To start, what is your take on global governance?

Trita Pars

The situation of global governance, of course, is in crisis mode. I do think one of the things that really came through here at the Paraty Dialogues is that there is a tremendous amount of energy and a realisation of the need to defend international law, and to defend the UN Charter, and the UN order, because their absence would be absolutely disastrous.

My own takeaway is that we do not necessarily need a perfect vision or a perfect definition of the problem. I think what is more important at this moment is to put forward a large number of practical, detailed proposals that take advantage of the energy that exists right now in defence of international law, push them forward, and use them as vehicles to be able to get to that larger picture.

The larger picture, of course, is that, as we transition away from unipolarity, it is going to become even more important for us to ensure that there is a global governance structure that is fit for this era — not just for the problems of this era, but for the fundamental change in the structure of the world that has occurred as a result of this transition away from unipolarity.

I think a search for a perfect vision is going to be a waste of energy. We have good enough a vision; we need to push really good proposals at this point.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Quincy is doing something very unique and interesting: really pushing for a new narrative and new thinking on global governance. We are entering a multipolar world, so how do we reflect that in the UN system and the global governance system?

Not many people are talking about multilateralism, and not many think tanks are really working on it. So that, I think, is what has drawn attention to this Better Order Project. What is the current focus of Quincy?

Trita Parsi

What we are doing right now is looking at the 20 proposals we have on seven different areas and identifying where the political opportunities are to push them forward.

There is a political opportunity on the UN Security Council reform, and a lot of progress has been made there. There is definitely an opportunity on our proposals on the Middle East order and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Because what you have now, as a result of this war of choice that Trump and Israel started with Iran, is that the old order has completely collapsed. As a result, there is, by definition, now a search for a new order.

When we first put forward a proposal, an obstacle we faced then was that there was already an existing order — not a functioning order and, in my view, not a good order — but there was some resistance from governments to thinking that long-term or what would happen after that order. Well, it turns out that it was not that long-term, because it has just happened. So we have an opening there.

One area where we have not made a huge amount of impact, unfortunately, and where we are trying to figure out exactly how we can be helpful, is around the norms around the use of force.

Over the last couple of years, we have seen a massive deterioration of these norms and the manner in which forces have been used which is in clear violation of international law, and almost normalisation of that. What the Israelis are doing in Lebanon is building on what they did in Gaza, and we believe there is a strong need for pushback.

But it is challenging because, at this point, it is not entirely clear to us where the best pressure points are. But we are constantly looking to see: we have solutions, when are the problems ready for these solutions?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, I agree with you, particularly on what you said about the use of force. It is really rampant and uncontrolled. China has long advocated no first use of nuclear weapons, and China still adheres to that.

I think that now, with AI and all these new technologies coming into play, perhaps we could also think about the “no first use” of AI in future wars. This is the kind of consensus we really need to build.

I know you are a top expert on Iranian issues. What do you think about what is going on there, what are the solutions, and what can other countries do?

Trita Parsi

A lot of countries have already played a critical role in mediation, both from the region, Pakistan, with China in the background as well.

But I fear that we are looking at a very bad situation. I think that there is a likelihood that the third round of this war will start relatively soon.

I also think that the mediators that have been involved so far are ultimately very good and creative. They bring legitimacy to the process because they are from the region, but they do not necessarily have much leverage with the U.S. and Iran.

At some point, there may be a need for a larger power to engage in that mediation precisely because of the need for such leverage.

China made a key contribution to the Saudi–Iranian deal, which had been negotiated by regional states. China came in at the end and was crucial in moving it across the finishing line.

The critical element that China contributed was that both Iran and Saudi Arabia deeply value their relationships with China. As a result, China ended up becoming the guarantor of this deal.

The Saudis had enough confidence that the Iranians would be careful not to violate the agreement because, if they did, they would end up embarrassing China and hurting their relationship with China.

And vice versa: the Iranians knew that the Saudis would be very careful about doing anything against the agreement because of the consequences in their relationship with China.

We do not have that element in the current negotiations — a mediator who has that type of leverage over the two parties. It is not entirely clear whether China would have it with the U.S. and Iran.

There is obviously the United States’ own rivalry and tension with China, which come into play here and were the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China.

But I do think that, at the end of the day, there is a likelihood that this conflict cannot really cross the finishing line in terms of reaching a deal unless there is that type of involvement.

Just take a look at the MOU. Yes, they did manage to negotiate and agree to it, but as soon as there was a conflict, there was not a third party that could act as the arbiter of that conflict. There was no mechanism in the deal making clear whom they should go to if there was a difference of interpretation.

So even if China does not play that role in the mediation itself, I think there may end up being a need, if there is another MOU or another agreement, to have some guarantor coming from other major powers.

It may not be China alone, but it seems to me that the deep mistrust and some of these other structural factors make it very difficult for the Iranians and the U.S. to actually resolve this on their own.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Just imagine two people or two parties fighting, and then they reach a temporary truce among themselves. It can easily be disrupted by either side, and there is absolutely no guarantor.

I think China is actually very actively involved. Pakistan, in particular, is involved in the mediation and has a good relationship with China too.

So I think you are absolutely right that, when the deal is being made, we need some bigger players to come forward and perhaps play a guarantor or mediating role.

China is the largest trading partner of both the Gulf states and Iran, and it has good credibility. I also think the U.S. and China are having quite a few summits this year. So, as you suggested, China could be a good mediator in this situation.

I also remember that, for the JCPOA many years ago, China was one of the signing parties.

Trita Parsi

Yes, China was an important player there, particularly in the implementation of the JCPOA. The Chinese played an important role.

One of the benefits of this negotiation vis-à-vis the JCPOA is the regional value — that you have the Qataris, the Saudis, the Pakistanis, and the Omanis deeply involved in the negotiations themselves.

That is important for the longevity of it, but it may not be sufficient to cross the finishing line. That is where it may be necessary to involve some other great powers.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. So I think this could probably offer new hope: if China became involved with other countries — the European Union, other actors, and BRICS countries — we could not only serve as mediators and help with the Iranian crisis, but perhaps also with the Ukraine–Russia conflict.

That model, I think, instead of having only two-party talks and only two parties signing—

Trita Parsi

I mean, there will, of course, be a lot of resistance from other players — the Europeans and others — who probably would not want to see China, or certainly not BRICS, involved.

But at the same time, this war is now more than four years old. There is no clear end in sight, and this is starting to become an endless war for Europe. That is going to be devastating, and it is certainly devastating for the Ukrainians themselves.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Maybe finally, since you are from a major and very influential U.S. think tank, I could ask a final question about U.S. internal politics.

What do you see happening in 2026? And how can the U.S. get out of this situation, particularly with the midterm elections coming up? What is your general assessment of the U.S. situation in terms of international relations?

Trita Parsi

The internal situation in the United States is that the U.S. is still, I would say, experiencing a legitimacy crisis of the two parties.

I think it is going to be very interesting to see what happens on the Democratic side on foreign policy, because there is a huge rift between the grassroots and progressives on one side and the Democratic Party establishment on the other.

We saw that already in 2024 with the elections, in which the largest number of people who voted for Joe Biden in 2020 would not vote at all in 2024. The plurality of them — 29 per cent — said they stayed home because of Gaza and Joe Biden’s policy on Gaza.

I think that is going to become a litmus test in a lot of different races on the Democratic side, and it may amount to a very significant shift in the Democratic Party’s approach to this issue.

The current establishment approach not only lacks support among the grassroots; it has active opposition and animosity towards it.

So I think that is going to be very interesting to watch, and it may end up being decisive for the direction of the United States vis-à-vis Israel in the broader scheme of things.

Because you also have a situation — not a similar one, but a situation on the Republican side in which, again, support for Israel and Gaza is becoming a litmus test on a lot of Republican congressional races as well.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. I think we have had a great discussion. We have all enjoyed it very much, and we have all enjoyed this Paraty conference in Brazil. We hope to see you again, either in the U.S. or in China.

Trita Parsi

Fantastic. Thank you so much. Appreciate it.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you.