The luncheon, themed “Ukraine, Iran and the Future of Global Order: Perspectives from China and Europe,” was hosted by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, and moderated by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG and former Counsellor of the State Council of China.

Keynote speakers were:

• Jens Spahn MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag; former Federal Minister of Health of Germany

• Norbert Röttgen MdB, Vice Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag

• Huang Rengang, Vice President and Secretary-General of the China Society for WTO Studies, Ministry of Commerce of China

Below is a transcript with slight editing. This transcript is based on the audio recording of the luncheon and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-Founder and Secretary-General, CCG

Mr Jens Spahn, Dr. Norbert Röttgen, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon. Thank you all for joining us today at the CCG-KAS VIP Luncheon.

Today’s luncheon is a very timely and very themed event. It is our great honour to welcome Jens Spahn, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, together with a six-member high-ranking parliamentary delegation from the CDU. Mr Spahn paid a visit to CCG a couple of years ago, and we are delighted to have him back with us today. We also extend a warm welcome to Mr Norbert Röttgen, whom we have met on many occasions at the Munich Security Conference and other important events over the years around the world.

Nowadays, escalating conflicts and major power competition have disrupted the global economy and security landscapes. Amid growing geopolitical uncertainties, perspectives from senior policymakers are more valuable than ever. In such a turbulent context, strategic dialogue between major powers has taken on unprecedented significance. Only through frank communication and consensus building can we work out practical solutions to current crises and safeguard global peace and stability? Before we start, let’s take a moment to acknowledge some of our special guests and VIPs who are here.

We have invited representatives from host organisations, distinguished diplomats, government authorities, academic institutions, international organisations, corporate leaders, and media representatives. They are:

• Catarina dos Santos-Wintz MdB, Parliamentary Director, CDU-/CSU Parliamentary Group

• Nicolas Zippelius MdB, Spokesperson for Development Policy, CDU-/CSU Parliamentary Group

• Mark Helfrich MdB, Spokesperson for Environmental Policy, CDU-/CSU Parliamentary Group

• Dr Ingeborg Gräßle MdB, Member of the Budget Committee, CDU-/CSU Parliamentary Group

And ambassadors to China:

• H.E. Koula Sophianou, Ambassador of Cyprus

• H.E. Mikko Kinnunen, Ambassador of Finland

• H.E. Thorir Ibsen, Ambassador of Iceland

And the diplomats from different embassies to China, including Embassy of Australia, Embassy of Canada, Embassy of Croatia, Embassy of Denmark, Delegation of the European Union, Embassy of Germany, Embassy of Hungary, Embassy of Norway.

Also from the Chinese Policy Circle, including:

• Li Shen, Deputy Director, Germany and Austria Division, Bureau VIII, International Department of the CPC Central Committee (IDCPC)

• Huang Rengang, Vice President & Secretary-General of the China Society for WTO Studies, MOFCOM

• Han Bing, Former Deputy Director General, Department of European Affairs, MOFCOM

• Huo Jianguo, Vice President, China Society for World Trade Organization Studies (CSWTOS), MOFCOM

• Zhou Xiaoming, Former Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN Office at Geneva

Also, we have invited academics, experts, and scholars. We have experts from Beijing Foreign Studies University, Peking University, Beijing International Study University, Tsinghua University, Beijing Foreign Study University. Welcome, all of you.

We also have representatives from German institutions, including GIZ, Hanns Seidel Foundation Beijing Representative Office, Heinrich Böll Foundation Beijing Representative Office, German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), and corporate representatives from Merck China, Volkswagen China, and other companies.

Please allow me to introduce Dr Henry Hui Yao Wang, founder and president of Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and former councillor of the State Council of China. He previously worked at China’s Ministry of Commerce. He was also a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School and currently holds the position of Distinguished Professor at China Foreign Affairs University. Please join me in welcoming Dr Henry Huiyao Wang to deliver an opening remark and introduce our speakers. Welcome.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President, CCG; Former Counsellor of the State Council of China

Thank you, Dr Mabel. And so, distinguished Mr Jens Spahn, Minister Jens Spahn, and Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, distinguished Dr Norbert Röttgen, member of the German Bundestag, and Vice Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, distinguished Excellencies, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen,

It’s really a great honour for us, together with our KAS, to have this very important VIP luncheon, and also on behalf of CCG, I would like to extend our warmest welcome to our German delegation and to all the guests attending the luncheon today.

As we discuss today’s theme, “Ukraine, Iran and the Future of Global Order: Perspectives from China and Europe,” it is highly relevant to the world we face today, which is marked by profound turbulence and uncertainty. The prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to reshape Europe’s security architecture and disrupt global energy, food, finance, and supply chains.

As a Chinese think tank, CCG has been closely following these geopolitical developments. At the same time, tensions in the Middle East, especially around Iran, nuclear issues, and the Strait of Hormuz, are also affecting energy security and international stability. As Chinese scholars, we need to watch all these developments carefully. At such a moment, the world needs not more confrontation, bloc politics, or escalation, but more dialogue, mediation, multilateral cooperation, and public goods for peace. This is very important. Our German friends, the German parliamentary delegation led by Minister Spahn, have come to China at a very timely moment.

Recently, China-U.S. relations have shown some signs of moving from intense strategic competition towards strategic stability, as both President Trump and President Xi indicated at their summit in Beijing. This is important not only for China and the United States, but also for the world. Hopefully, we can see a more stable China-U.S. relationship, with several important trips already scheduled. I think President Xi is going to visit the U.S. by September, followed by another APEC summit and G20 summit. We hope this will become a positive factor for global stability.

On today’s theme, from the perspective of a Chinese think tank, I would simply say that China has consistently supported the promotion of peace. In February 2023, China released its 12-point position paper on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis. It emphasised respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, abandoning the Cold War mentality, a ceasefire, the protection of civilians, nuclear safety, grain exports, and the stability of global supply chains. In May 2024, China and Brazil jointly put forward a six-point consensus. Later, China and Brazil, together with other Global South countries, launched the Friends of Peace group at the UN.

This shows that the Global South is actively trying to participate in addressing this crisis. Developing countries are also paying a price for this war, through higher food prices, energy insecurity, inflation, and disrupted development. So this is also in their vital interest.

Personally, I have previously argued that peace in Ukraine probably cannot rely only on U.S.-Russia negotiations. Any lasting peace must involve Ukraine, Europe, the United States, the United Nations, Russia, and, of course, Global South countries and other stakeholders. One possible proposal I put forward at the time was that we should perhaps have a UN summit bringing together the P5 countries, as well as Ukraine and the European Union, to discuss a ceasefire, security guarantees, reconstruction, and a long-term peace settlement.

After a ceasefire, one of the things I think is important is to explore how a UN-backed peacekeeping force could monitor the arrangement, with participation from European countries and possibly Global South countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, or Pakistan. That is just my personal opinion. I published an op-ed in Foreign Policy before the Alaska Summit, but I think reconstruction will be equally important. Peace is not only about stopping the guns. It is also about rebuilding homes and roads, ports, power systems, schools, hospitals, and other related infrastructure.

Institutions such as the AIIB, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the World Bank, and European development institutions could all play a role in this reconstruction. I was in Berlin just about a week ago, and we had dinner with the State Secretary of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Germany provides a huge amount of development assistance around the world, and it is very important to work together.

The Middle East is also not far from Europe, and as we can see, it is not far from China either. Any major conflict in that region will affect global energy markets, shipping routes, inflation, and supply chains. It will certainly affect China, Europe, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, and many other countries in different parts of the world.

China’s position on Iran is also clear. We respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional countries. We oppose the use of force. We support the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe the Iran nuclear issue should be resolved through diplomacy and negotiations, not military confrontation.

In this respect, China has also actively worked with Pakistan and other mediating parties. At the recent summit between President Xi and President Trump, both sides said that the Strait of Hormuz should not be closed, that no tolls should be charged, and that dialogue should be promoted. This is really good, and I am sure European countries would also like to see the war stopped, and the strait kept open.

Just today, I think we have seen reports since yesterday that progress has been made on an agreement between Iran and the U.S., and that they are going to sign it on Friday in Geneva. This is a good sign. I think both Europe and China would like to see that. I am sure that in the future, Europe and China, including Germany and China, can continue to play an active role in promoting this peace arrangement.

China’s efforts to promote peace in the Middle East are highly consistent with Europe’s core interests. Europe needs energy security, open shipping routes, and stability in its wider neighbourhood. Preventing a wider war in the Middle East is also essential for averting humanitarian disasters and refugee pressures. So I think this is in all our interests.

Looking ahead, China and Europe, including China and Germany, can work together in supporting future regional peace and reconstruction frameworks, not only for Ukraine, but also for Iran. On reconstruction, we can all work together. Germany has a lot of experience in international development and many good examples of supporting different projects. I think China and Germany can really work together on post-conflict reconstruction and future peacebuilding.

In my final words, China and Europe are both major economies, major trading partners, and important supporters of multilateralism. China and Germany, in particular, have built deep economic ties over many decades, and Germany has been a leading partner in China-EU relations in terms of economic and trade development. These ties not only serve trade and investment, but also provide a foundation for broader cooperation on peace, reconstruction, global governance, and multilateralism.

The world today does not lack weapons; it lacks trust. It does not lack sanctions; it lacks dialogue. It does not lack blocs; it lacks bridges. I really think China and Germany can play important roles. China and Europe can also strengthen strategic communication, reduce misunderstanding, and explore practical cooperation in conflict mediation, humanitarian relief, post-war reconstruction, energy security, and global governance reform.

Once again, I would like to thank Mr. Jens Spahn and Dr. Norbert Röttgen, as well as the parliamentary delegation, for coming to Beijing this time. You have really come at the right time. I hope our luncheon will provide a good platform for dialogue and communication. I look forward to hearing more keynote remarks from our German friends and Chinese friends.

Let me now turn to our next important speaker. I would like to introduce Minister Jens Spahn.

Minister Jens Spahn is Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag. He is also a former Federal Minister of Health. Jens Spahn is a German politician from the Christian Democratic Union, the CDU, and has been a member of the German Bundestag since 2002. Since May 2025, he has served as Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag.

We had the honour of hosting Minister Spahn at CCG about two years ago, so it is a great honour to see you again. Minister Spahn is from North Rhine-Westphalia and holds a bachelor’s degree in political science. In 2002, at the age of only 22, he was directly elected to the Bundestag and has since been re-elected in his constituency. From 2015 to 2018, he served as Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Finance. From March 2018 to December 2021, he was Federal Minister of Health in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s fourth cabinet. His tenure included the COVID-19 pandemic, during which he played a central role in Germany’s health policy response.

After leaving government, Minister Spahn remained an influential figure in the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group and served as Deputy Chairman during the opposition years before being elected Chairman in May 2025. He is considered one of the key decision-makers and strategists within the CDU, and currently one of the chief negotiators of the German government’s reform agenda.

Without further ado, let us warmly welcome Minister Spahn to give his keynote. Welcome.

Jens Spahn MdB, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group, Germany

Thank you, dear Henry, ladies and gentlemen, Excellencies, colleagues of the German parliament.

We are here for two days in Beijing for discussions like this. Thank you very much for hosting us again. You’re right, it’s the second time. In the home region of Norbert Röttgen in the Rhineland, after two times, you would say it’s a tradition, but we are building up on one.

The most important difference to two years ago is you have a continuity of government here, but we had a change of government since then, and we are back in government.

Besides this luncheon, the most important part of our journey is tomorrow, the party dialogue that we have with the Communist Party. And actually, you would wonder why conservatives from Germany have a party dialogue with the Communist Party of China. It might not be the most obvious at first glance. But then we actually made the experience over many, many of these meetings — meanwhile, every year we meet in Berlin or Beijing — that it makes really sense to have this open and frank dialogue between the two parties, because it is a good chance in an annual meeting to really discuss what needs to be discussed in a very, very friendly and at the same time very frank manner. So, we are looking forward to it tomorrow with Minister Liu.

Thank you very much to the Center for China and Globalization and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for hosting this event once again. Henry Wang, we last spoke on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. It was a very stimulating exchange, and I remember it with great appreciation.

The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation began its engagement in China already in the 1980s, at a time when the world was facing major transformations. A few years later, the global order was reshaped. And today, once again, we are speaking about the future of the global order. This sounds ambitious, and it is serious, but that does not mean our influence on these developments is small. On the contrary, the fact that we are discussing European and Chinese perspectives today shows how important our relationship is. China is the second biggest, Germany is the third biggest economy in the world. China has the second biggest military budget in the world. Germany, meanwhile, has the fourth biggest military budget in the world.

So, for many, many reasons, it makes sense to have a frank and proper discussion on what’s going on. We know, of course, as Germany, we are not such a superpower as the U.S. or China are, but I’m very, very happy that there are many representatives of our European friends, together with the European Member States — as a European Union member, Germany aligned with the partners in the European Union — we can make a difference.

By the way, that is not our main topic today. One of the main topics today and tomorrow, in all the talks, will be the economic relationship between the European Union and China. There are more mutual dependencies than one might see at first glance.

Of course, we discuss rare earths, subsidies, overcapacity, technology, and all of this. But I dare to say that we might need each other, on both sides, more than some may realise these days. Because obviously, the European market is also quite important for a country that has overcapacity and needs to sell somewhere. So, we should properly and frankly discuss what needs to be discussed in that area.

But today and here, we have another focus. Europe and China both want stability. Our relationship must be based on reciprocity. This reciprocity can create stability. We should preserve this understanding and act accordingly. Wars, unrest, and hegemonic behaviour lead to instability.

This is especially true for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It severely threatens our security, it violates our understanding of freedom and sovereignty, and it harms our economies. It also harms the People’s Republic of China. China’s growing support for this war is the greatest challenge in its relationship with Europe and Germany.

And what needs to be understood is that this war, and meanwhile, two wars in our neighbourhood, of course, are changing our the European perspective and perception of sovereignty and security. The discussion on de-risking the question that we should be more cautious when it comes to foreign technology in our grids, or our telecommunication grid, or energy grid. Many other discussions, of course, are catalysed by this war and the changing perspective. The longer this war goes, the more this perspective will change, and that needs to be understood outside of Europe as well.

And, of course, there’s a question: when actually is this war a bigger burden on our relationship between China and the European Union than it is benefiting those who are engaged in different ways? China claims neutrality, but not all of its actions reflect it. I hope that the People’s Republic will condemn this war. I hope for stronger trust between Germany and China. This trust would grow if China ended its political, economic, and technological support for the aggressor. Russia has no interest in stability. It misjudges reality. By the way, Russia has the GDP of Italy, it is losing ground, and eventually it will fail. China, on the other hand, can play a much stronger, stabilising, and constructive role in this conflict, a role that corresponds to its historical importance. Europe and China could be key pillars of more stable global order.

This also applies to the situation in the Middle East. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil. It has a fundamental interest in safe shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The current conflict increases costs in Chinese and European supply chains.

Global economic slowdowns, although threaten China’s and Europe’s domestic economies that are already under stress. To end this, decisive steps are needed to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. I’m very much sure this is an interest of Europe and China, both of us, and there must be no arms exports to Iran. You can argue a lot if this war should ever have started, but after it has started, there should be no result that leads to stronger Iranian regime than it was before the war. We can achieve this only together. We should therefore strive to better understand each other’s perspectives.

By the way, yes, discussions are important, declarations are important, but since this is not our first discussion, and many, many declarations have been made after all these discussions, we need some decisions as well that actually start to make a difference. But to be honest, some of the objects from the economic relationship to the Ukrainian war we have been discussing for many, many years now, but there is no real difference. It’s even getting worse. So I would say discussion is important, but we should, I would prefer to come to common decisions as well.

It is my great pleasure to now invite Norbert Röttgen to give a keynote input. He has shaped foreign and security policy debates in Germany for many, many years with clarity, strategic vision, and analytical sharpness.

As one of the leading thinkers of our parliamentary group, he brings exactly the perspective we need at this moment. Dear Norbert, we are very much looking forward to your remarks. Thank you very much,

Norbert Röttgen MdB, Vice Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group

Dear Henry, dear Jens, thank you very much for raising the bar and level of expectation regarding my speech. This is always good to have pressure which makes us deliver better. Dear colleagues, Excellencies, and ladies and gentlemen.

China and Germany are very different countries, but both of us carry considerable international weight. As Jens Spahn earlier outlined, China is a global power. China is the second-largest economy in the world, Germany is the third-largest economy globally, and we are Europe’s largest economy and a central actor within the European Union, whose internal market of 450 million citizens produces roughly the same GDP, slightly more than China does.

What follows from this is very simple. It matters that we, the Chinese people, politicians, scholars, thinkers, and the German counterparts, remain in dialogue. It matters that we understand each other’s interests, perceptions, priorities, problems. It matters that we are candid about where we converge and where our views diverge. It matters for our bilateral relationship, but we share the view and we share the awareness that it’s not only about us. We have an awareness that we are part of a global international community, and this responsibility enlightens our interest and how we define our interests. We have a clear view that our responsibility goes beyond our relationship. We carry and bear responsibility for the international order.

This is why I would like to address three issues that are shaping the international landscape as we are supposed to discuss at this luncheon. It’s Russia’s war against Ukraine; it’s the conflict surrounding Iran and the growing importance of economic international competition, economic statecraft and geoeconomic resilience.

We are very grateful to CCG and to the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation for having created this opportunity for dialogue. As I mentioned, it’s important to stay in a dialogue to exchange our views in order to get a better understanding inside of the problems and challenges we as countries and as the international community are facing. So thank you again for that.

I would like to start with Ukraine, and Jens already outlined the importance of this war that this war has for Germany and for Europe as a whole. Russia’s war against Ukraine is and remains the defining security challenge of our time, and this is really important to see. It’s not one issue, one important issue beside others, but it’s really the defining challenge, whether the return of war that has surprised everybody not only in Europe but across because we thought that war in Europe is a matter of the past and Putin forced us to learn that war again has become a matter in Europe and the 21st century, a matter of the present and possibly of the future. So, to make war a failure is fateful, crucial for the European destiny, and for our future.

It’s a direct challenge; this war is a direct challenge to the principles on which international stability depends: sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition of changing borders through force. So it’s at the same time a very fundamental defining European war that decides upon the perspectives of our future, and at the same time it’s a challenge to the founding principles of international stability.

So you cannot confine this and define it as a European conflict. It is by nature an illegal war of attrition, a challenge to the international order, as it is to the European peace order. Because Ukraine did not threaten Russia, Ukraine did not provoke it, did not attack it, did not provide any justification for a war of conquest, not to mention the attrition that is happening now for more than four years.

What is at stake, therefore, extends far beyond Ukraine itself. The outcome of this war will shape the security architecture of Europe and beyond for decades to come. And this is why the positions taken by major powers matter so profoundly. China has consistently emphasised the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity in international affairs. Time and again, it has confirmed how important, how foundational these principles are. And Europe and Germany welcome this commitment, because these principles are also fundamental to our own understanding of international order.

So, there is a very important fundamental convergence in our principal views on how the international order has to be understood. And this is why, for many Europeans, it is so difficult to reconcile these principles with China’s approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, because China is not just a commentator or a bystander in international affairs. China is one of the few countries with significant political, economic, and diplomatic influence over Russia.

No one expects China to adopt Europe’s position, but we do expect major powers to uphold the principles they themselves have repeatedly affirmed. So the talk about international order is not just academic abstract talk; it is one of the most relevant discussions that are crucial to resolve ongoing conflicts and even wars.

So there is one question I propose to be discussed, and we might want to discuss it at this event. And the question is whether a world in which a powerful state, whoever not only Russia — others also are in question — can alter borders by force if we consider this compatible with the principles that China itself regards so essential for international stability. I am convinced, and we are convinced that neither of us does envisage such a world in which borders can be changed by brute force. It’s not our interest, neither Germany’s nor China’s interest.

Let me proceed to the Middle East again. For Europe, the Middle East is not a distant region. The Middle East is our immediate southern neighbour. Instability there quickly affects our security, our economies, our migration systems, our societies. And the Middle East has played a major role in our cultural development, so our past, particularly cultural roots, are closely aligned. In fact, we share common cultural roots. Therefore, we have a profound interest in regional stability and in preventing further escalation in the southern neighbourhood of Europe.

And yet the question of Iran confronts us with a difficult dilemma we have to appreciate and have to discuss. On the one hand, respect for international law and state sovereignty remains an indispensable principle, and this principle, of course, also applies to Iran. On the other hand, we cannot ignore Iran’s own conduct over many years, the mass slaughtering of its own people only a few months ago. Supposedly, at least 30 people were killed because they went to the streets and demonstrated against the regime, the regime’s open support for the illegal war of attrition Russia is waging against Ukraine, Iran’s support for armed proxies across the region, its destabilising activities, threats against Israel, and its persistent pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

So we also have to integrate in our discussion that sometimes there are conflicts of interests and principles can come into conflict, the conflict of sovereignty and the massive abuse and suppression of the people of a regime, of a government, and the support and provision of war and conflict across a region and even beyond. But there are some simpler aspects in this conflict. Certainly, there has been no justification of Iran to attack its neighbours when America attacked Iran, so this is a clear case. And I would say we should agree in our demand and call that Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon. A nuclear-armed Iran would certainly trigger a wider nuclear proliferation throughout the Middle East and would increase the tension and the probability of war. So, this is something where we can easily converge, and we are where we should work together.

The freedom of navigation and the freedom of the seas is also a founding principle of international law itself, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which is an international waterway, has been illegal from day one. As countries that are exposed and massively and successfully engaged in international trade, the international waterways are fundamental for our own interest and for the stability and the freedom of the international order. So also here China occupies a uniquely influential position, the largest purchase of Iranian oil, and one of Tehran’s most important economic partners.

And so there is leverage in the hands of China, and we should come together in order to exercise leverage for the betterment of the international society, the validity of principles, and for our economic interests.

This brings me to my last point I want to raise as a suggestion for discussion and dialogue, and this is the new economic situation we are in. The new trade situation we are facing, both of us, China and Germany, are industrial heavyweights. We are very successful trading countries, and we are very exposed and engaged in this area. At the same time, we are seeing the international order eroding, while economic interconnectiveness and interdependencies remain. And this has, as a consequence, that eroding international order, which brings about more conflicts and even wars.

While economic relations remain interconnected, economic statecraft, the weaponisation of trade and economic interdependencies have emerged as a new phenomenon. What, particularly, we in Germany have seen over a long time, as a contribution to stability, to trade with each other, to engage economically, we were forced to learn when Russia went to war against Ukraine and cut off the energy transportation lines to Germany. So what we considered a contribution to stability turned out to be a vulnerability of Germany because we had agreed to be too dependent on Russian gas and energy supplies.

China has made a decision for the so-called concept of dual circulation, so to try to get less dependent from others and increase its dependency from others. Germany, as an industrial nation, very successful in trade and industry, with a high competence in these areas, also has clear goals. We have to increase our competitiveness. We have to achieve growth again. We have to decrease dependencies. We have to diversify supply chains. So, we also, as China does, are working for stable growth, competitiveness, and the reduction of dependencies.

And if we were to take decisions in that direction to diversify supply chains and to reduce dependencies, this could not be interpreted as an anti-China policy. It has to be understood as a policy that works for our growth, our competitiveness, our sovereignty in the way China does for itself. China does not accept a unilateral dependency from others; China wants to reduce dependencies; China wants to mitigate vulnerabilities, and this is what is happening.

I think we have to uphold our relationship in the economic realm on the basis of rules, on the basis of what the international order provides as suggestions for fairness. Reciprocity is one of these elements. State subsidies have to be under control, and there has to be a fair valuation of their respective currencies. So this is a major point of discussion we have to face.

I think we are not directed against each other, and this is perhaps one of the fundamental assumptions we should make. And we certainly propose we are not seeing our relations, neither our bilateral relations nor the international order, as a zero-sum game. We are determined to increase growth. We are determined to increase win-win situations by cooperating with each other on the basis of rules, of principles, and of fairness.

And if we were to adopt such a perspective that there is huge potential in our relationship that we bear responsibility for the international stability and order, I think we can really do more and contribute more for our bilateral relationship and for the international order. And one precondition for that making happen is that we engage in dialogue. And this is why I want to again thank the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and you, Henry, for providing this opportunity for exchange dialogue. Thank you very much for your hospitality. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you. Thank you very much, both Jens and Norbert Röttgen, for your really great, very stimulating, and also very encouraging discussion and keynotes.

I think absolutely, you know, this war between Ukraine and Russia has already lasted longer than the First World War. Now it is getting into its fifth year, and so it is high time that we got this resolved.

I am also hearing from you that China is the second largest economy, and Germany is the third largest economy. We really have to work together, not only for stability in Europe, but also for the Middle East. It is in our common interest, vital to both our economies and the livelihoods of our people, that we all work together. So this is absolutely very important.

I also appreciate that Norbert mentioned the economic side. We are so much intertwined, and German-Chinese cooperation goes a long way back. I remember many years ago, when I drove my first Santana, German industry actually revolutionised China’s auto industry and really stimulated the development of China’s auto industry. Now it is time for China to come back and do more investment and technology transfer. So I think it is highly possible that we can do more together in the future.

Now I would like to invite our final speaker from China. He is also a former colleague of mine, and he has worked at the Ministry of Commerce: Mr. Huang Rengang.

He now serves as Vice Chairman and Secretary-General of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, which is a key organisation under the Ministry of Commerce. He brings over 30 years of extensive experience in foreign trade administration, multilateral trade diplomacy, and international economic cooperation.

He is a distinguished senior expert with specialised expertise in WTO affairs. He previously served as Minister Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs at the Chinese Embassy in Australia, in Canberra, and was also Deputy Director-General of the WTO Department at MOFCOM.

So he has a lot of knowledge about trade. I think China and Germany, as two of the largest trading nations in the world, have many things in common. We should find a way to collaborate and cooperate, and of course to help the world safeguard the WTO and the multilateral trading system.

Without further ado, let us welcome Vice Chairman Huang to give his keynote. Welcome.

Huang Rengang, Vice President & Secretary-General of the China Society for WTO Studies, MOFCOM

Thank you, Henry Huiyao Wang, for the introductory remarks. It is my great honour to be invited to this CCG-KAS luncheon. I am so honoured to have this lunch with senior politicians, members of parliament from Germany, senior diplomats, ambassadors, and other friends from the business community and academia. It is a good opportunity for me to learn here.

I am very interested in the speeches the previous speakers have just delivered, and I would like to say that, as a trade observer and economic analyst, I am also a peace lover. I hate wars. If you look at what has happened in Ukraine and Iran, both have had a very negative impact on global trade and economic activities. We have seen rising energy costs, higher logistics and shipping costs, disrupted supply chains, and rising prices, to the detriment of consumers and businesses all over the world.

That is my personal feeling. In the past few months, when the United States started military strikes against Iran, you could look at any market in China and see that fuel and gas prices rose obviously, perhaps by nearly 20%, or at least 15%. So this has had a negative impact on almost all Chinese consumers and drivers, as well as people around the world.

From a trade perspective, I would like to see peace realised as soon as possible, both in Ukraine and in Iran, or the Middle East. Maybe I should also echo the perspective of Dr Henry Huiyao Wang a little, because he illustrated China’s perspective on the Ukraine war and the Iran war in greater detail. But from a trade perspective, I think the earlier we bring an end to these wars, the better it is for the world economy.

Different economists have given different analyses of how these wars will impact the global economy and international trade, but it is all bad news. So I would say that now we should make collective efforts to see that peace is realised, that the fundamental concerns of each country can be properly addressed, and that permanent peace can be achieved.

Of course, China is an upholder of the Charter of the United Nations. We would like to see respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each and every nation. We would like to see that no illegal wars are waged against neighbours or each other. We would like to see a normal global order for business and trade maintained, so that factories and businesses can run normally without paying much higher costs.

On the other hand, I would also like to take this opportunity to talk a little bit about Chinese perspectives on how global efforts can reshape the international trade order.

As you may know, I have been engaged in the study of the WTO, the World Trade Organisation system, and its rules for some years. Now you may say that many trading partners are complaining to China: you are producing too much, you are exporting too much. In the previous speeches, you heard words such as “overcapacity” and “subsidies.” So I will tell you what has made China what it is now.

If you look back 30 or 40 years, when China was negotiating its accession to the WTO, our trading partners, including Germany, the EU, the UK, France, the United States, Japan, and Korea, were all telling us that you should open up its market, embrace capitalism, and the market economy was absolutely good for China; you should not follow the old doctrine of a self-sufficient and protected local market.

Forty years ago, a slogan popular among some Chinese economists was that China had no domestic or international debt. The government had no debt; it did not borrow abroad or at home. Then economists from the West told us that this was not a good model. If China wanted to develop its economy, it had to open up its market, lower tariffs, allow investment, and embrace the concept of the market economy.

After years of negotiations, we have done what you told us. I remember that during the 1980s, I was working in gthe foreign investment administration in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. We had to review applications for foreign investment, including major German investment projects such as Volkswagen in Shanghai and other German investments. At that time, we were given lectures by our trading partners on why China should open its market.

Now, after years of effort, China has been able to welcome and embrace foreign investment. If you look at the number of foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned businesses in China, the numbers are very impressive, including a lot of German investment. We welcome them, and we thank you for your participation in China’s economic development process.

In this process, we changed our laws and regulations to meet WTO standards. We also changed the way we administer and regulate the economy through deregulation, by giving more incentives to businesses and entrepreneurs, and by providing greater protection for intellectual property rights.

As a result, China’s manufacturing capacity has been growing, and Chinese products have become quite cheap and competitive in the world market. So my point is that I would like to say thank you for your participation, your advice, and your lectures on what China could do to do a better job of reform and opening up in the Chinese economy.

Now we have reached today’s stage, where we are talking about overcapacity. Actually, if you look at WTO rules, there is no clear definition of what constitutes overcapacity. For instance, in the WTO, there was a famous dispute settlement case between the U.S. and the EU about aeroplanes, between Boeing and Airbus. The WTO panel of trade judges decided that both Boeing and Airbus had received large amounts of subsidies from various sources, some from governments and some from others. Both were guilty. You can look at the documents and the rulings.

If you look at history, for instance, in the automobile sector, Germany has been a global superpower for many years. If you look at Chinese statistics, Volkswagen accounted for 60%, 70%, or around two-thirds of China’s car market for many years. Volkswagen was the number one car producer in the Chinese market for many years. At that time, perhaps some smaller Chinese car producers complained about Volkswagen’s overcapacity in the Chinese market, but the government seemed to turn a deaf ear to those complaints.

Of course, if you look globally, over 80% of Volkswagen cars are sold overseas, not in the German market. But if you follow the theory of overcapacity, Volkswagen perhaps should only produce 20% of what it produces now to satisfy the German market. For global transnational corporations, you have a vision for the world market, for the international market. This overcapacity issue has been there for decades. It was not China that created this problem. Maybe China copied the practices of some major Western multinationals.

If you look at the case of Airbus, around 85% of Airbus planes are exported outside the European market. China is probably one of its major markets. But you hear few Western economies talk about Airbus overcapacity. When China exports, then people talk about overcapacity.

For instance, last year China exported around 3 million electric vehicles, but the total vehicle production in China was 30 million. Out of 30 million vehicles, China exported 3 million electric vehicles. That is only about 10%. And then you talk about overcapacity. But when you export more than 80% of a product overseas, you do not talk about overcapacity.

So China wants fair treatment in the global market. China is ready to negotiate and talk about such issues. China is also ready to talk about subsidies. That is very interesting.

If you look at WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing duties, there is an agreement and a committee on subsidies and countervailing duties, which defines the situations in which products are judged to be dumped or subsidised, and subject to punishment under WTO rules. Of course, there have been some cases where the United States lost, and the U.S. was unhappy. So the U.S. started telling us that the WTO dispute settlement system was not good and not fair, and that it deviated from the vision of U.S. trade policymakers or experts. So, the United States is now moving away from the appellate system and the multilateral trade system.

The interesting thing now is what has happened. The major shock to the global trade order is what has been done by the United States government: the tariff war. Some people talk about two wars, but actually, now there are three wars: Ukraine, Iran, and a trade war.

The trade war is that the U.S. has put tariffs on almost every trading partner. The EU is no exception, although the rate imposed on the EU may be lower, perhaps 10% or 15%, lower than that imposed on China. But this is an obvious violation of WTO rules, a violation of the United States’ own obligations and trade commitments in the WTO. It is a violation of the MFN, or most-favoured-nation, principle. It is a violation of the principle of non-discrimination. It is a violation of many WTO rules. So this act of protectionism and unilateral trade action should become a serious concern for all trading partners, including China.

I know that at WTO meetings in Geneva, some European representatives of the EU delegation have raised concerns time and time again about this kind of behaviour. I believe that, with collective effort, we will be able to work together to uphold the multilateral trading system represented by the WTO. I hope we can work together to see that global trade and investment can flow in a smooth manner rather than in a more difficult manner.

But if you look at recent moves by the EU, by the bureaucrats in Brussels, some are really concerning, because it seems that they are tightening regulations on trade and investment to the detriment of some Chinese businesses. That is not good news for Chinese businesses. I think it is not good news for European consumers either. Whether it is good news for European businesses, I am not sure. We have to wait and see the impact of these policies and how they come into effect.

Finally, I would like to say that China is ready to work with Germany and other European countries, EU member states, to ensure the smooth flow of goods, capital, and people, to the benefit of all countries. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you, Mr Huang, for sharing the Chinese perspective.

Now, because I think our time is getting tight, we will go directly into the Q&A section. Let’s put some chairs here. We will invite Mr Spahn, Mr Röttgen, and Mr Huang to come to the stage, and we will have a short Q&A. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.

Okay, let’s invite Professor Cui, one of China’s European affairs experts.

Cui Hongjian, Director, Center for EU and Regional Development, Beijing Foreign Studies University

Yes, it is my great pleasure to be here. I am from Beijing Foreign Studies University. It is my great pleasure to meet Chairman Mr Spahn once again after two years. I still remember that we had a very good discussion two years ago. We shared some complaints about the three-party coalition in the German government.

So now, of course, it is your time. I mean, it is time for the CDU and CSU to run Germany, especially amid very, very great uncertainty so far.

First, it is a little bit of a pity for us to say that, over the past years, the Ukraine issue has occupied so much of our bilateral relations. I still understand the position taken by our German friends and European friends about responsibility and the moral issues related to this war. But as we understand it, making a judgment through black-and-white logic is not so realistic in the current situation, just as for the German government to make some clear stance on Iran, Israel, and the Middle East issue.

So I think it could be understandable that China tries to take the complexity of the situation into mind and to find out how to stop the war or invasion. This is different from defeating a country. So now, of course, I think it is time for us to go beyond this kind of controversial issue of morality or other questions.

Recently, I participated in some discussions with our European colleagues on how we could find an opportunity now to finalise this war or conflict. From the European side, now you are talking about a proper way to have direct talks with Russia, in the format of the E3, E5, or some other format.

So, Chairman, could you please give us some ideas? How could China and Germany, or China and Europe, do something together now to stop the war, especially as we know China has been suffering for a long time from the spillover effects of this war?

Another question is for Mr Röttgen. We also had some discussions several years ago in your parliament. You mentioned the economic issues between China and Germany, especially in the name of competitiveness. I also know that you are concerned about issues involving the Chinese government on rare earths and some other materials, just as China is also keeping a very close eye on what the European Union and ASML are doing, I mean, in the Netherlands.

So how could we find a way out of this retaliatory situation? How could we find a way to manage competition in a more cooperative way? Thank you so much.

Mikko Kinnunen, Ambassador of Finland

Thank you very much. Thank you, Henry. Thank you for inviting for this luncheon. Obviously, coming from Finland, my favourite topic might have to do with Russia’s war of aggression. Are we in any changing point right now, and perhaps the question being here, when one is here in China, how can we?

I guess one of the big goals is to make sure that Russia will no longer attack any of its neighbouring countries in the future. I mean, if you look at the map all the way from Finland to China, perhaps also including Norway, there are 14 countries that share a land border with Russia. I think all of us, within the last 200 years, have experienced this type of aggression, including annexations of territories and things like that. So I think it would be a great goal to be able to prevent this kind of behaviour from our common neighbour in the future.

Thank you for being here. I think it is valuable that parliamentarians from Europe visit China. I am also trying to encourage your Finnish colleagues to be here as often as possible. Thanks.

Han Bing, Former Deputy Director General, Department of European Affairs, MOFCOM

Thank you for sharing these opinions. Your perspectives on these three topics are very clear and very compelling.

I just wanted to ask about the last one, on trade and self-dependence. We understand how European countries see the trade deficit and the huge competitiveness of Chinese products in the EU market. So we quite understand your worries. From the Chinese side, I think we want to seek ways to cooperate in the future on this issue.

I would also like to ask: could you understand why China is pursuing self-sufficiency? We think we are forced to do that. When we intend to import products from, for example, ASML, or when we intend to import high-tech products from the EU or the U.S., there are restrictions, so we cannot get them.

When we produced our aircraft, the C919, our original design was to buy more than 80% of the parts, including the engine, from the international market. That was our plan. But we cannot get the engine. The process of granting permission to export engines to China for the C919 aircraft is very slow. I think fewer than 20 engines are approved each year. So how can we wait for these products?

I would like to ask: could you understand China? We understand your worries. Could you understand why China is doing this? We think we are forced to do this. Could you give us some ideas on how we can get out of this situation?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay. Thank you. I think we will turn to our guests, because I do think China and Germany have a lot of common perspectives. I remember four years ago, when Chancellor Olaf Scholz came to Beijing during COVID, when Germany was a G7 leader. China’s top leaders said that no nuclear war should be fought in Ukraine, right? That was a really good outcome.

So I would like to invite Mr Spahn, Mr Röttgen, and Mr Huang to respond.

Jens Spahn

Thank you very much indeed. I start with Ukraine, and then I go to trade. First of all, the question of Ukraine, of course, is not very complex. There’s one country invading its neighbour with brutality and brute force for more than four years now: murder, death, rape, taking children away every day.

Secondly, if we just put all morality away, let’s just put it the other way, or imagine the other way. What would you say if there was a country in your neighbourhood destabilising the region aggressively, fighting actually against the way your society works? In this case, in our case, a liberal, free, democratic society, and we would call this country in your neighbourhood, causing all this trouble, our best friend. How would you think about it?

So, of course, if Putin is called the best friend, of course, that is doing something with us, seeing what he’s doing, just one and a half hour of flight away from Berlin. And you’re right. Actually, I say it every time I have a discussion with our Chinese partners. Imagine how much time we could spend discussing other topics if this war would end, how much we could engage in other activities if this would end, but then the question is, how?

And of course, it will end through negotiations, like every war. The question is how: is it just one country dictating peace, or is it really negotiating? That is what this is about. As soon as we have at least a bit of faith, or trust, or however you want to call it in Europe, that there is a serious willingness from Putin to negotiate, then it makes sense.

You asked what you can do. If you would help bring him seriously to the table, then we could play our part. But as long as he does not take it seriously, (it is difficult.)

The last time a German Chancellor talked to Putin, the next day there was one of the big bombardments of Kyiv. That was his sign of being serious about talks. So if you could convince him to take it seriously and come to the table, then we can take over. But for that, you have leverage, perhaps more than you every now and then want to admit, if I can put it this way.

And because our Finnish ambassador mentioned the border, Putin, besides this war with Ukraine, plans to rearm already for after the war. Then you ask yourself in Europe: what is he actually rearming for? What is he planning for? Is it because he wants to go east? I don’t think so. South? I don’t think so. West — that is what it is about, and that is why our Finnish friends are worried.

So one thing is the war. The other thing is what he is actually doing with all the planning for after the war, and where he is looking. And he’s looking west, not with a friendly face. And that is actually the second part of what is worrying. And in all of this, of course, we could cooperate, but then we all need to mean it seriously.

Trade. First of all, as Norbert has already described, our industrial base, the core of our economy, is under real stress. It is melting away. 10,000 industrial jobs gone every month for the last two or three years.

That has several reasons, but one reason is the influx of — and one has to admit this — good products from China. So now the question is, of course, I see your argument: you are saying this is market competitiveness, and we have to accept it. Yes, of course, if it was a fair competition, we would have to accept it.

But overcapacity. The question is, as you said, what is the definition of overcapacity? I will give you an example. The world needs around 600 gigawatts of solar panels per year. You are producing 1,000 gigawatts per year.

In a normal situation, the market would adapt. That means supply would just go away, with companies going bankrupt or leaving the market, until it is adapting to the demand. But that is not happening. Capacity is not adapting to demand in several areas, not just in solar panels, because of subsidies — more of the provinces than of the central state. Because all the provinces are in competition with each other and are supporting industries, and often the same industries, in all provinces.

So when you ask what is meant by overcapacity, I would say that when supply is not adapting to demand because of state interference, that is overcapacity.

If you say Airbus is exporting 85%, yes, but there is demand for it. We are not supporting Airbus to build more planes than are ordered. No one is telling Airbus to build them, whether someone needs them or not. They are just building as many as are demanded in the market. That is actually the discussion we have right now.

And of course, if you see your industrial core melting away, what would you do? Of course, we are reacting because our people are reacting. If you take the political situation in Germany, it is very much driven by this development: in the automotive, machinery, energy, and chemical industries, we are losing jobs. And I would say this is not just because we are not competitive enough.

We have to do our part, that is true. But there is more to it, and it is not only Germany; it is the whole of Europe. That needs to be discussed.

Then I end with what we could do. As I said earlier, we have been describing this to each other for years now. I do not know how often I have discussed it in the last years. The question we all have is: what can we do?

Perhaps start negotiating again. Of course, we can’t just implement the investment agreement from five years ago. It needs to be adapted or renegotiated. But let’s concretely start to negotiate again about a framework for our trade. That would be something to start with, at least, besides all the talking.

Norbert Röttgen

Yeah, I think most of the questions have been answered already. Perhaps I would focus on one aspect you mentioned. I was really struck by the way you mentioned it and raised your question, and that was the question: can you understand?

You asked whether we have an idea for how to cooperate. I would say this is really the crucial question: can we understand each other? I think this is the essential question for achieving results that are in the interest of both of us. And I think we can understand each other.

It does not take so much, because we can understand our mutual strengths. Both of us are economies with strong industries, and industry is at the core — and shall remain at the core — of our economic success and prosperity.

Both of us have more and more export-oriented economies, both in China and, traditionally, in Germany. Exports have been a pillar of prosperity and economic success. We want this to be maintained and to endure.

We share challenges and problems. Both of our societies are ageing, so we have a demographic problem, and we are under pressure. China has to do some serious economic homework, and so does Germany.

So we are under pressure. We have different political systems, and pressure appears in different forms. But at the end of the day, our governments, political systems, and leaders have to resolve the problems, and we feel the pressure we are under.

And as a result, we share the necessity, or the desire, to have a combination of protection and openness. Openness is a precondition for prosperity; protection is a precondition for the safety of our people. So this has to be managed.

I would say that currently, and for a while, we have chosen the path of a kind of economic struggle that might become, to the world, a bit more than only a struggle, in order to get more protection for our respective economies and demand openness from the other side. There is a danger in that, because we have this unravelling of the international order; we are seeing domestic pressure. We might be tempted to think that if we go against each other, we might achieve more results. And I think this would be a major, major mistake.

So if we start by trying to understand each other — and it’s not so difficult, because we share so many opportunities, challenges, and dangers — I think if we were to manage the balance of openness and protection, we would achieve for both sides a lot more than we have today.

In a way, it is a reverse situation, and I can fully understand the history you mentioned. You mentioned that China has come all the way from a very low level, and we know the history of one hundred years of humiliation. Now you have a big, big goal to come back, to see the comeback again, and now you are becoming very successful. And now the traditional players, like Germany, come: “Oh, you have to be restricted in your success.” So I can fully understand that.

On the other side, you have become so strong and so competitive at the global level that now you are in a role that Germany has occupied for decades. And we now see the erosion of our industrial base. So this means homework for us in terms of innovation, productivity, and competitiveness. But it also requires that we do something about the systematic destruction of more and more industrial areas. We can’t sustain that. We cannot sustain that politically or economically.

So I think we can find points very easily where we share the challenges and see the opportunities. Then we should simply design how to manage the balance. There might also be conflicts of interest, but if we were to start a dialogue and a discourse in this spirit, I am really convinced that it would be for the betterment of the global economy, as well as for our two economies.

So thank you very much for this question: “Can you understand us?” I can understand that. I would also ask: can you understand us? And starting with this is a good start.

Thank you.

Huang Rengang

I only want to add, finally, that for China, I think my organisation, the China Society for WTO Studies, gives advice to government trade policymakers. Our advice is that it is good to engage, to negotiate, and to talk, rather than waging trade wars, sanctions, or retaliation. This is always our basic position.

I think this also applies to any conflict, including military conflicts. It is very important to encourage the parties concerned, as stakeholders, to engage in talks.

…

My observation is that China is ready to engage with all our trading partners and talk about these issues, including, as you mentioned, subsidies, overcapacity, state-owned enterprises, industrial policy, and the structure of the economy.

But there is an interesting phenomenon. My observation is that nowadays, every day, a lot of U.S. government agencies are translating Chinese government documents issued by different ministries, as well as speeches by Chinese leaders. Every day, they are trying to see why China has been successful in manufacturing, what our industrial policy is, and why Chinese manufacturing has grown in this way. As a result, they are not only translating, following, and studying these documents, but also turning some of those ideas into practice.

So now you see the U.S. government taking measures to encourage foreign investment by promising government subsidies in semiconductors and chips, promising government equity participation, and planning for future industrial policy or remanufacturing with U.S. government involvement, support, and subsidies.

As a phenomenon, I think this is worth studying by academics and experts. I don’t think a long-term trade or merchandise surplus or deficit will last forever. As you mentioned, for decades Germany was very competitive in many sectors, and many of its products are still competitive. That is the reason why my colleague Han Bing mentioned that we want to buy aircraft engines from you, but you do not sell them.

So if you check the list of products that you don’t sell to China, you had better have a sense of urgency. Sell them now to China. It is like some chips, such as H200. Two years ago, the United States banned sales to China, but now they have reopened sales. But China may not want them, because China is now able to produce similar products.

So my advice is: have a sense of urgency, and try to readjust your trade policy and export restrictions towards China. Sell what you have now to China, and trade can maybe be balanced more quickly.

Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you. I think we are running out of time. Just to conclude, my brief remark would be that I think we have had a very productive and stimulating discussion.

On geopolitical wars and conflicts, I think Europe and China, being the second and third largest economies, should get involved. We should not be set aside. Personally, I would encourage Europe to get involved in direct talks on the Russia-Ukraine war and also on the future of the Middle East and on re-establishing a peaceful situation there.

China should also be involved. As I proposed, we should have a UN-based multilateral approach. I think Germany, Europe, and China should be involved in future geopolitical guarantees, peacemaking, and stabilising the situation. That is one lesson I have learned: we should not sit on the sidelines, but should get involved in peace negotiations.

Finally, on trade, I think this is really great. Germany has been one of the largest and longest-standing investors and manufacturers in China. You have so many German industries doing very well in China — probably over 10,000 of them. But we should probably also work together, because you have so much experience working with China.

Now we can have joint ventures back in Germany, in the Global South, and in other European countries. We could have more technology sharing. China has now become a fitness room for German companies.

So now let us all train well and go back to Germany and other countries. Let us work together and have a joint-venture approach. I am sure that 40 years ago, we had joint ventures in China, and 40 years later, we can have joint ventures back in Germany and many other places. In this way, we can address the trade deficit and trade surplus, and we can perhaps build closer cooperation between our two great nations.

Once again, I want to thank Mr Spahn, Mr Röttgen, and Mr Huang very much, as well as the ambassadors and all the distinguished guests.

Finally, I would like to give the floor to Mr Johann Fuhrmann, Chief Representative of KAS, for his concluding remarks.

Johann Fuhrmann, Chief Representative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) China / Beijing

Thank you so much, Henry, and of course, Mabel and CCG, for making this very open discussion possible. I assigned the easiest job to myself today, because I only have to say thank you. Thanks to all of you for your time. Thanks to all of our speakers. And of course, thanks to our staff and to all of those who made this event possible.

This was our second luncheon organised by CCG and KAS. And I hope to invite all of you again, in a very timely manner, to such an event. Thank you so much

Our members of parliament still have a little bit of time, so please mingle and talk with them. Thanks and see you soon.

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On May 31, Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG, attended the “CWD-CIGI-CCG-GSI Dialogue Discussion” at The Hertie School in Berlin. Co-hosted by CCG, the Council for World Dialogue (CWD), the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), and the Global Solutions Initiative (GSI), the dialogue was held under the theme “Brainstorming the Future: New Narratives for the Common Good.” More than 20 experts and policymakers from think tanks, international organisations, academic institutions, and policy communities joined the discussion.

On June 1, Wang was invited to a C-level dinner discussion jointly hosted by Global Bridge and the Global Solutions Initiative at the Allianz Forum in Berlin.

From June 1 to 2, Wang attended the Global Solutions Summit 2026 at the AXICA Convention Centre in Berlin, where he joined the panel discussion “Reordering Ties: Navigating the Emerging International Trade Landscape.”

On June 2, CCG and GSI co-hosted a roundtable in Berlin titled “The China-EU Economic Relations: Ensuring Continuity in a Challenging Landscape.” Held on the sidelines of the Global Solutions Summit 2026, the closed-door discussion focused on how China and Europe can maintain continuity, stability, and resilience in their economic relations amid a complex international environment.

As a Knowledge Partner of the summit, CCG contributed to agenda-setting and the organisation of thematic discussions. Wang attended the roundtable and delivered opening remarks.

Also on June 2, on the sidelines of the Global Solutions Summit 2026 in Berlin, T20 U.S. in 2026, an official G20 engagement group, held a meeting with members of its task forces and advisory council under the theme “Leveraging Knowledge and Ensuring Policy Continuity in Uncertain Times.” Participants discussed annual priorities, policy research directions, and follow-up work.

Wang was invited to join the meeting and has also been named to the Advisory Council of T20 U.S. in 2026. Wang is the only expert from China on the 2026 T20 Advisory Council.

On June 3, Wang and Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, visited the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) in Berlin and met with MERICS Director Mikko Huotari.

On June 4, Wang and Miao visited the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) in Berlin and met with KAS Secretary General Mark Speich and Christian Echle, Head of the Department Asia and Pacific.

That same day, Wang visited Wolfgang Ischinger, President of the Munich Security Conference Foundation and a veteran German diplomat.

Also on June 4, Wang and Miao visited the Körber Foundation in Berlin and met with Sarah Pagung, Executive Director International Affairs and Director Berlin Office, and Clara Bredenbrock, Programme Manager Bergedorf Round Table, Political Breakfasts.

On June 5, Wang and Miao visited the headquarters of Springer Nature in Heidelberg, one of the world’s largest academic publishing groups. They were received by Executive Editors Brigitte Reschke and Prashanth Mahagaonkar.

On June 8, Wang and Miao attended the final meeting of the EU & China Think Tank Exchanges programme at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels. To keep the line of dialogue open, the EPC, in cooperation with EGMONT – The Royal Institute for International Relations, the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) and CCG, set up the EU-China think tank exchanges.

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According to the Global Solutions Initiative, T20 is one of the official engagement groups of the G20, bringing together think tanks, research centres, and policy experts from around the world to provide evidence‑based insights and policy recommendations to G20 leaders and officials. T20 U.S. in 2026 is being convened as a policy research network under the theme “Harnessing Knowledge and Ensuring Continuity for Better Policymaking in Uncertain Times.”

According to a Stimson Center post, the T20 Advisory Council brings together policy researchers, think tank leaders, former senior diplomats, and practitioners from major economies, international organisations, academic institutions, and policy research organisations. Its members come from countries including the United States, China, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, Mexico, Argentina, the Netherlands, Portugal, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Bangladesh, reflecting broad participation from G20 members, European economies, and countries from the Global South.

As part of the 2026 T20 process, the Advisory Council is expected to contribute policy solutions to the broader T20 U.S. policy process ahead of the 2026 G20 Leaders’ Summit in Miami, helping support policy continuity as the United Kingdom prepares to host the G20 in 2027.

CCG has remained engaged with the T20 process and wider G20-related policy discussions. On April 17, 2026, Wang participated in a T20 seminar in Washington, D.C., co-hosted by the Brookings Institution, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, and the Stimson Center.

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The global geopolitical landscape is undergoing its most profound transformation since the end of the Cold War. The protracted war in Ukraine and escalating tensions across the Middle East have compounded mounting risks to regional security and global stability. Against such a volatile backdrop, strategic dialogue among major powers carries unprecedented importance. Only through candid communication and consensus-building can viable solutions to ongoing crises be explored to anchor global peace.

Jens Spahn, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, will pay a visit to China in the near future leading a delegation of six high-ranking Members of Parliament from the CDU party. Taking this opportunity, a luncheon roundtable will be hosted on June 15, 2026 for exchanges themed Ukraine, Iran and the Future of Global Order: Perspectives from China and Europe. The Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung will facilitate an open discussion platform for all participating attendees.

As the major force within Germany’s ruling coalition, the policy stances of Mr. Spahn and the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group directly shape Germany’s and the European Union’s diplomatic trajectories. Attending this luncheon enables you to access exclusive value as below:

1. First-hand policymaker intelligence: Distinct from fragmented media coverage and academic theoretical analysis, the lawmakers will share firsthand experience and insider observations from Europe’s top decision-making circle. Mr. Spahn led an official delegation to Kyiv in September this year for closed-door meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian cabinet officials, granting him authoritative insights into battlefield dynamics, Western aid frameworks for Ukraine, and tangible obstacles to viable peace negotiations.

2. Targeted high-end networking: Participants comprise senior diplomats, business leaders, academia fellows and think tank specialists from China, Germany and the European Union, spanning diplomacy, energy, finance and international trade sectors. The event serves as both an intellectual summit and an elite platform for viewpoint exchange and high-value connection building.

3. Intimate interactive closed-door format: Strictly capped attendance ensures premium communication efficiency. Moving past conventional one-way keynote delivery, ample Q&A time is reserved for open discussion and direct intellectual debates with the MPs.

4. Forward-looking trend projections: Drawing on latest global developments, the CDU decision-makers will unpack the far-reaching implications of Donald Trump’s second presidential term on transatlantic ties, the Ukraine war and broader global geopolitics, delivering actionable reference for corporate strategy and personal decision-making.

Welcome Remarks: Jens Spahn

Jens Spahn ranks among Germany’s most influential contemporary statesmen with over two decades of parliamentary service and an extensive cabinet governance track record. He is renowned for pragmatic policymaking and strategic foresight. Elected to the German Bundestag for the first time in 2002, he has held pivotal portfolios across Germany’s core federal ministries:

· Parliamentary State Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Finance (2015–2018): Central contributor to European economic governance architecture and EU fiscal policymaking;

· Federal Minister of Health under Angela Merkel’s cabinet (2018–2021): Oversaw Germany’s nationwide pandemic response amid the global COVID-19 outbreak and demonstrated outstanding crisis governance capabilities.

In May 2025, Mr. Spahn was elected by an overwhelming majority as Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group – the largest parliamentary faction by the party of Chancellor Friedrich Merz - cementing Mr. Spahn’s role as a linchpin of Germany’s ruling coalition with decisive input on major German and EU foreign policy formulation and implementation as well as domestic reforms.

On international affairs, Mr. Spahn advocates a pragmatic foreign policy. He affirms any viable peace settlement for Ukraine must respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while repeatedly acknowledging China’s irreplaceable leverage as a UN Security Council Permanent Member in facilitating Russia–Ukraine peace talks. Concerning Iran’s nuclear dossier, he consistently backs diplomatic de-escalation, opposes nuclear proliferation, and calls for coordinated global efforts to sustain long-term peace and stability across the Middle East.

Keynote Speech: Dr. Norbert Röttgen

Dr. Norbert Röttgen is member of German Bundestag and Vice Chairman of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group responsible for foreign policy. He is former Federal Minister for Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety of Germany; former Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and Co-Chair of the Council, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

Core Discussion Agenda

From a top European policymaker’s on-the-ground perspective rooted in practical governance experience, Mr. Spahn will address key questions including:

· What is the latest evolution of the Ukraine war, and where lie realistic breakthroughs for peace negotiations?

· Substantive shifts in Washington’s policies toward Europe and Ukraine under Trump’s second administration?

· Points of divergence and common ground between China and Europe over Ukraine and Iran-related agendas?

· Prospects for the Iran nuclear issue and feasible containment of cascading regional security risks?

· Emerging China–Europe cooperation opportunities in non-proliferation, crisis management and global governance?

· Future orientation of the China–EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership amid shifting global realities?

Event Information

Date: Monday, June 15, 2026

Venue: Beijing, China

Registration: Please scan the QR code

or use this registration link

Dialogue bridges divergences; cooperation underpins lasting peace. In an increasingly volatile international environment, direct exchanges with core national decision-makers carry irreplaceable value.

We sincerely invite you to grace this exclusive luncheon alongside Mr. Jens Spahn and industry peers to jointly explore China–Europe collaborative pathways and advance global peace and prosperity.

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Trump has buried liberal world order but what comes next could be better

The US and China have an opportunity to move beyond ideological confrontation towards coexistence, strategic stability and managed competition

The two terms of US President Donald Trump have shaken the old style of US liberal internationalist leadership. Yet, as some doors close, others open. The summit between President Xi Jinping and Trump in Beijing last month suggests that the United States and China might now have an opportunity to move beyond ideological confrontation and towards a more realistic framework of coexistence, strategic stability and managed competition.

For decades, Washington has held global primacy and pursued a liberal internationalist foreign policy of promoting democracy, open markets and stewardship of global institutions. Trump’s more realist foreign policy has been more transactional, sovereignty-centred and more openly sceptical of the post-war order.

Its focus on tariffs, alliance burden-sharing and resistance to Western progressive social values has changed the narrative that American power serves a universal project larger than itself. Further, even if Trump left office tomorrow, his tenure has made any future attempt to re-embrace old-style liberal internationalism less credible.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the transatlantic partnership. The Trump administration’s criticism of Europe’s reliability, defence posture and direct interference in European politics has weakened the idea that the Atlantic alliance can remain the unquestioned core of global order. Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is now part of a wider reassessment of a world no longer disciplined by US-led blocs.

Multipolarity has also arrived. Middle powers are hedging, alliances are looser, regional institutions matter more and countries across the Global South increasingly resist fixed ideological camps. That creates an opening: with strategic stability newly recognised, the US and China can work to avoid the Thucydides Trap and the Kindleberger Trap.

Avoiding the Thucydides Trap – describing the potential danger when a rising and an established power come into conflict – requires both changing the narrative and de-securitising the relationship. Yet, this trap is by no means an ironclad law that cannot be crossed but, rather, is a subjective construct.

And, while national security concerns are real, they cannot justify cutting every commercial, technological, educational and diplomatic link. Thankfully, the recent Xi-Trump summit has started to move things in the right direction, with three more in-person high-level meetings planned for this year. If the two nations can keep the momentum going, a mutually destructive and pointless war can be avoided.

One priority is establishing a dialogue between these leading powers on the global governance of artificial intelligence (AI). This is vital to reduce the risks of AI weaponisation and misuse, and to get to grips with the upheavals in daily life that AI could bring.

There is also space for selective security cooperation. China and the US have overlapping interests in preventing an escalation of the Iran war, advancing a political settlement to Russia’s war with Ukraine, denuclearising the Korean peninsula and preserving stability across the Taiwan Strait.

China’s relations with Iran and Pakistan give it channels Washington lacks, as demonstrated by the high-level exchanges involving Islamabad and Tehran last month. The US should also avoid using Taiwan as a bargaining chip, support peaceful cross-strait dialogue and reaffirm that it does not support secessionism.

The second danger is the Kindleberger Trap. Named after Charles Kindleberger’s account of the disastrous 1930s, it describes the breakdown of the global order when the established power no longer provides public goods, while the rising power is not yet ready, accepted or empowered to do so. If the US retreats from global governance and China’s contributions are treated as threats, the result will be a governance vacuum.

Beijing has made it clear it is willing to do more. Its five major initiatives – which span the Belt and Road Initiative, development, security, civilisation and global governance – form part of a broader effort to supply development finance, security dialogue, cultural exchanges, infrastructure connectivity and institutional reform.

Last year, China pledged an additional US$500 million over five years for the World Health Organization as global health financing comes under strain. At the World Trade Organization, it has supported the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement, helping to preserve rules-based dispute settlement while the body’s appellate mechanism remains paralysed.

Beijing has also moved to institutionalise mediation as a tool of global governance. In May last year, China and more than 30 other countries signed the Convention on the Establishment of the International Organisation for Mediation in Hong Kong.

Tariff-free treatment for exports from 53 African nations and regional summits with nations from Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf states and Southeast Asia all point in the same direction: China is offering the world new development opportunities, market access and a fresh institutional voice.

Instead of engaging in competition, a better direction would be to embrace the narrative of human security and the concerns of human development to transcend the overextension of national security concerns. All countries can benefit in a world where global public goods are supplied by more than one power and through more than one institutional pathway. A system that excludes either will be unstable; a system that allows both to contribute will be more resilient and more prosperous.

The US and China must continue to move away from disordered competition and towards more managed competition and the Olympic ideal of competition that drives us towards self-improvement, to go “faster, higher, stronger – together”. In this way, the world can avoid the Thucydides Trap and the Kindleberger Trap and instead embrace the alternative of a more prosperous and secure world.

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Pekingnology

Henry Huiyao Wang: From Strategic Rivalry to Strategic Stability

Below is the latest comment by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), on the outcome of U.S. President Donald Trump’s meeting with President Xi Jinping…

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a month ago · 14 likes · 1 comment

Pekingnology

Henry Huiyao Wang on building mechanisms for managed interdependence

Below is the latest comment by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), on U.S. President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China…

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a month ago · 21 likes · 3 comments

Pekingnology

Henry Huiyao Wang on How China’s patient diplomacy can help secure peace in Iran

Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), wrote on Wednesday, April 22 in his opinion column in the South China Morning Post…

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2 months ago · 24 likes

Pekingnology

Henry Huiyao Wang: Middle powers are taking up the mantle of multilateral leadership

Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), wrote in his opinion column in the South China Morning Post on Wednesday, March 25…

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3 months ago · 18 likes · 3 comments

The 2026 Forum will facilitate business connections and investment matchmaking for enterprises seeking to enter or expand across more than 80 of the world’s most dynamic markets.

Participants will receive first-hand guidance from leading business leaders with front-line global experience, benefit from extensive international networking and service connections, and access customized advisory solutions from top-tier think tanks. The event will also feature the official release of the Top 100 Inbound-Outbound Going Global list and mark the formal launch of a CCG Committee on Outbound Chinese Enterprises.

Business Representatives with Chinese government officials and investment promotion officials from 80+ Nations

Bringing businesses and their leaders together with economic and commercial counselors from over 80 embassies in China, the conference offers comprehensive coverage of the world’s major markets and key regions. Businesses will ask counselors to provide direct interpretations of their respective countries’ latest investment policies, market access conditions, and compliance requirements, delivering authoritative, first-hand country intelligence to participants.

Targeted Matchmaking across 80+ Countries

Dedicated regional tracks — covering Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Pacific Islands countries — will align supply-side and demand-side participants with precision. Sessions are designed to facilitate concrete outcomes in trade, channel partnerships, and investment matchmaking.

Case Studies and Practical Insights from Leading Business Leaders

Senior executives from major multinationals will share operational expertise and authentic case studies on market selection, risk management, and organizational localization. All discussions will be conducted under results-driven conditions.

Ambassadors’ Exclusive Gala Dinner (VIP Only)

A high-level, closed-door dinner will bring together ambassadors, senior corporate leaders, and heads of professional service institutions, providing an exclusive setting for substantive exchange and the cultivation of high-level networks.

Event Information

Event: 13th China Inbound-Outbound Forum

Organizer: Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Participants: Chinese businesses, embassies, chambers of commerce, investment promotion agencies, business leaders, professional service providers, think-tank experts, etc.

Registration: Early-bird registration is now open, with a 20% discount available for a limited period.

To register, please scan the QR code below.

For further enquiries, please contact:

Tel: +86-10-65611038-8009

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The event will bring together representatives from the policy, business, and academic communities in Beijing, including foreign ambassadors and representatives of international organizations in China. It will be a unique opportunity to listen to the insight from a towering U.S. figure, as well as exchanges from other high-profile guests in Beijing

Henry Paulson served as the 74th U.S. Secretary of the Treasury from 2006 to 2009 and played a key role in the U.S. response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Before entering public service, he spent more than three decades at Goldman Sachs, including as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. He is also the author of On the Brink and Dealing with China.

Event Information

• Guest Speaker: Henry Paulson

• Time: Wednesday, June 10, 2026, 11:30 – 14:00

• Venue: Beijing

• Format: Luncheon dialogue & live Q&A

Registration

Please fill in the application form or scan the QR code:

Confirmation letters with detailed venue information will be sent to confirmed participants.

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The Carter Center delegation included

• Christopher Hobbs, Deputy Director, Strategy & Operations for Peace Programs, Office of the Vice President, The Carter Center;

• Elizabeth Knup, Special Advisor to China Focus at The Carter Center and Senior Advisor to the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China Relations, University of Pennsylvania;

• Carla Freeman, Senior Lecturer for International Affairs and Director of the Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS);

• James Lee, Chairman and CEO, Lee World Group; Kate Logan, Director, China Climate Hub and Climate Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), and Fellow, ASPI Center for China Analysis;

• Neysun A. Mahboubi, Director of the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China Relations, University of Pennsylvania, and Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, Foreign Policy Research Institute;

• Daniel Murphy, Executive Director, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School;

• Kate Logan, Director, China Climate Hub and Climate Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI); Fellow, ASPI Center for China Analysis

• and Ralph E. Winnie, Jr., Director of the Eurasia Center’s China Program, Director of the Eurasian Business Coalition’s China Program, and Vice President of Global Business Development.

Founded by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center is a leading non-profit organization dedicated to peace, democracy, public health, and international exchange. President Carter played a historic role in establishing diplomatic relations between China and the United States in 1979 and, after leaving office, continued to support people-to-people exchanges and mutual understanding between the two countries.

Chinese participants included

• Hu Xijin, public opinion leader and former Editor in Chief of Global Times

• Jin Xu, President, China Association for International Trade;

• Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG and Former Counselor to the State Council of China;

• Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG;

• Tang Min, Vice President and Senior Research Fellow of CCG and Former Counselor to the State Council of China;

• Lu Xiang, Distinguished Senior Research Fellow at CCG and Emeritus Research Fellow, Institute on American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;

• Tim Gao, Founder and President of SMS Tourism Think-tank and former Vice President, China Hospitality Association;

• Veronica Hong Liu, Deputy Director of Public Relations and Exchanges at CCG;

• Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG

• Serena Xue DONG, Non-Resident Fellow of CCG and CGTN reporter

• Yingshi “Fred” Gao, Non-Resident Fellow of CCG, CGTN Radio reporter, and founder of Inside China Substack

• Lei Gao, Staff Editor and Columnist, Global Times

The Carter Center delegation had been on an exchange visit in China for nearly a week. During the two-hour English-language discussion, several members of the delegation noted the constructive assessments and positive expectations voiced by Chinese stakeholders regarding China-U.S. relations after President Trump’s visit to China, stressing that uncertainties in the bilateral relationship should not be underestimated.

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As part of the seminar, CCG held the launch event for the new English-language book Witnessing China’s Modernization in a hybrid format. The video recording of the book launch has been uploaded to CCG’s official YouTube channel.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG and editor of the book, joined representatives of the contributing authors and more than 30 experts, scholars, educators, young professionals, and media representatives from China, the United States, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Brazil, Singapore, Zimbabwe, and other countries at the event.

Witnessing China’s Modernization:

Understanding People-Centered Philosophy, Quality of Life and Overall Well-Being Improvement

from Global Perspectives

ISBN: 978-1-80606-037-5

Edited by Mabel Lu Miao

Published in January 2026

Publisher: Cam Rivers Publishing (United Kingdom)

Published by Cam Rivers Publishing, Witnessing China’s Modernization brings together the first-hand observations and lived experiences of 18 international authors from 14 countries and different generations who have lived, worked, studied, or travelled in China. The contributors include economists, anthropologists, senior professionals, and young researchers. Through cross-cultural perspectives, personal observation, and vivid storytelling, the book explores the social transformation and improvements in people’s livelihoods that have accompanied China’s modernisation. It also offers international readers a more varied and multidimensional perspective on contemporary China and its people-centred approach to development.

During the launch session, Mabel Lu Miao introduced the book in her capacity as editor. She said Witnessing China’s Modernization is a collective work rooted in the real experiences of international authors and seeks to record China’s development and transformation over recent decades through individual stories. The book, she noted, looks at areas including poverty reduction, infrastructure, public services, education, youth development, and quality-of-life improvements. It also considers, from a global perspective, what China’s experience may mean for human development, Global South cooperation, and the Sustainable Development Goals. Miao emphasised that the book is not only about telling the story of China’s modernisation, but also about contributing to a wider global conversation on human modernisation, internationalism, and common development.

During the roundtable discussion, several international contributors shared the changes they had observed in Chinese society and in people’s everyday lives, drawing both on their own experiences and on their interactions with Chinese friends and communities. They also highlighted the value of cross-cultural exchange in deepening understanding and friendship.

Benjamin Z. Freking, Associate Research Fellow at CCG, said the key to understanding China lies in building deep connections with Chinese people. Drawing on his experience of living in China on and off for around 15 years, he noted that the country has seen remarkable changes in rural development, urban renewal, and digitally enabled lifestyles. The transformation of payment methods, including the widespread use of WeChat Pay and Alipay, he added, reflects China’s digital integration and rapid capacity for innovation.

Tungamirai Eric Mupona, Vice Chairman of the China-Zimbabwe Exchange Center and Deputy Secretary-General of the Harare Africa Forum, shared his experience of conducting research and living in rural Zhejiang. He said he was deeply impressed by China’s approach to coordinated development, noting that many rural areas have not been left behind by urban growth, and that some remote counties have even attracted international medical companies. He said the continued flow of public resources to the grassroots and rural areas had given him a personal sense of China’s progress in inclusive development and rural revitalisation.

Mars Pouyan, international investor and founder of Quantum Vision Capital and Quamix.io, described China as his “second home.” He said what he feels most strongly in China is the close connection between family, community, and the country. Chinese people, he said, have their own “secret recipe” and “formula,” showing extraordinary execution capacity in whatever they set out to achieve. He also expressed the hope that China’s development experience could bring prosperity and inspiration to more countries.

Carli Beeli, President of China Switzerland Connection (CSC), said China is like a “magnet,” attracting interesting people and ideas from around the world. He summed up China in three words: “ancient,” “futuristic,” and “hardworking.” He particularly highlighted developments in public transport, high-speed rail, and robotics, and said Chinese society has a strong capacity to adapt to change and progress.

Harvey Dzodin, former Vice President of ABC TV Network, used the words “peace,” “prosperity,” and “progress” to describe China. He said that over several decades he had witnessed China’s dramatic transformation from a country with relatively limited infrastructure into a highly modernised society. In his view, although China’s high-speed rail, robotics, and infrastructure have changed rapidly, the Chinese people’s aspiration for happiness and a better life has remained constant.

Michael Hermann, Chief Representative of the Yunnan and Chongqing Representative Offices of Humana People to People China, reflected on his experience in poverty alleviation and social work in Yunnan. He said China’s development is reflected not only in hard infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and airports, but also in the continued improvement of rural public services, social security, and grassroots governance. He noted that China’s ranking on the Human Development Index has continued to rise, and said that if Global South countries wish to truly understand China’s development experience, they need to look more deeply at China’s historical and cultural background, governance system, and forms of social organisation.

Davide Poloni, Sales Operations Manager at Porsche China, said that during his time living and working in Shanghai, he had been deeply impressed by the safety, creativity, and vitality of Chinese cities. He particularly highlighted the rapid rise of China’s automobile industry and new energy vehicles, arguing that Chinese manufacturing has moved beyond its former low-cost image into a new stage defined by advanced technology, improved quality, and stronger global competitiveness.

Bruce Connolly, a Scottish photographer and freelance writer, recalled his long-term observations of China’s development since first entering the country by train in 1987. He said China’s transformation from steam trains and bicycle-filled cities to high-speed rail networks, a cashless society, and modern metropolises has been astonishing. At the same time, he said, the greeting “Welcome to China” remains one of his most enduring memories of the country.

J. Renato Peneluppi Jr., member of the board of the Brazilian Bar Association of Rio de Janeiro for the coordination of Brazil-China relations, said the words that had drawn him to stay in China over the long term were “resilience,” “warmth,” and “welcome.” He said that while China has addressed its own development challenges, it has also continued to respond to global challenges. Renewable energy, electric vehicles, poverty reduction, and infrastructure cooperation, he noted, all reflect the dynamic relationship between China and the wider world.

Neli Akhobadze, Research Fellow at the Caucasian Association of China Studies, shared her experience of studying Chinese, living in China, and travelling across the country. She said it was her Chinese friends who helped her truly understand Chinese society and inspired her to pursue Chinese studies. Through the rapid expansion of Hangzhou’s metro network, she said, she had witnessed first-hand the profound changes that can take place in China within just a few years.

The roundtable was moderated by Zoon Ahmed Khan, Research Fellow at CCG. She said China’s development is visible not only at the macro level, through economic growth, technological progress, green energy, and infrastructure development, but also through the personal experiences and genuine understanding formed by people from different countries and backgrounds. The book, she noted, brings together the personal stories of 18 international authors and reflects CCG’s long-standing efforts to encourage diverse voices to take part in the international conversation on China’s development.

During the audience exchange, Joshua Dominick, founder of Krankin’ Thru China, said China is like a constantly flowing river, with new ideas, new communities, and new changes continually emerging. This, he said, is one reason many international friends are willing to stay in China over the long term, observe its development, and take part in it.

Audience members and guests also discussed the question of “where China will go next.” Participants noted that China still faces challenges including demographic change, green transition, industrial internationalisation, Global South cooperation, domestic consumption upgrading, and deeper engagement with the world. At the same time, they said, China’s accumulated strengths in industrial capacity, infrastructure, technological innovation, and development experience will continue to offer important reference points for the international community, especially developing countries.

The launch event opened with remarks by John Zhanjie Zhao, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG and Director of the Cooperation and Innovative Network Department. Other guests included diplomats from the embassies of India, Kazakhstan, and other countries in China; experts and scholars from universities and research institutions including Peking University, Tsinghua University, Beihang University, the University of International Business and Economics, and the University of Auckland; representatives from organisations including the Beijing NGO Association for International Exchanges, Postal Savings Bank of China Tongzhou Branch, Sunshine Insurance Group, and EURAXESS China; international young professionals; and media representatives from outlets including Huanqiu.com and Beijing Daily’s Beijing Municipal Administrative Center Edition.

After the book launch, guests from different countries and fields, contributing authors, and young representatives continued their conversations over dinner in a relaxed setting, further deepening mutual understanding and connections during the networking reception.

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Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning did not directly answer the question.

“Since the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, China has maintained close communication with all relevant parties, including Iran, and has been making active efforts to promote ceasefire and peace. Guided by the spirit of President Xi Jinping’s four propositions, we will continue playing an active role in restoring peace and tranquility to the Middle East and Gulf region at an early date.” she said.

“On the Iranian nuclear issue, China always supports a peaceful resolution through dialogue and negotiation. We hope relevant parties will seize the opportunity and find a solution that accommodates the legitimate concerns of all sides through negotiation. China will continue playing a constructive role in the political and diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and promote peace and stability in the Middle East and beyond.”

About a month earlier, on April 26, Mohamed Amersi, a British businessman and founder of the Amersi Foundation, raised the same issue at a dinner during the 12th China and Globalization Forum in Beijing.

Amersi, who said he knew Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi as a friend and had been in contact with Iranian negotiators, argued that China could take custody of Iran’s remaining highly enriched uranium and down-blend it for civilian use.

“The proposal to take and down-blend Iran’s 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is the single most concrete step China can and must take right now,” he said, speaking to dozens of Chinese and foreign guests, “It removes the most dangerous element from the equation. It builds Chinese credibility with Washington. And it gives Iran a face-saving mechanism that does not involve surrendering its nuclear material to the United States.”

We hereby present the full transcript of the dinner:

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG

Good evening to all of you. Welcome to the CCG annual conference, the China and Globalization Forum dinner that we are having tonight.

Today, we have had very good discussions. I think we had a very productive day. I just participated in the closed-door session on Ukrainian engagement with China, which was also very constructive. I really think that today we had a great gathering of all of you, and this is well documented. We are going to summarise it and send it to the relevant authorities for internal reference. So this is really productive.

Tonight, we are going to have a dinner focused on the Middle East, which we already talked about today. We talked about global governance. We talked about China-U.S. relations. We talked about China-global youth cooperation. We talked about China-EU relations and China-Global South relations. Of course, we also had a closed-door session on China-European cooperation on Ukraine. There are many subjects, but one of the most urgent things happening around the world now is what is happening in Iran. That really affects all of us.

I heard that flights were cancelled because airlines were affected by the high cost of oil. Lufthansa is cutting 2,000 flights, and Air Canada is cutting hundreds of flights. I am sure this is affecting all of us. In this turmoil, China is really making every effort and making itself readily available to support the peace-making process. I have never seen a Chinese foreign minister in history like Foreign Minister Wang Yi. He has reached out to more than 30 counterparts around the world in just a short period of time, since last Wednesday, when the war broke out. He talked to all the Gulf countries and Arab countries. He talked to all the foreign ministers of the Security Council member states. He talked to the EU foreign minister. Of course, he also invited the Pakistani foreign minister to Beijing to talk about this issue and to support Pakistan in playing a more active mediating role in this conflict.

So we are hoping that by the time President Trump comes, more progress can be made. Tonight, before our dinner, we will have a half-hour to 40-minute discussion on the topic. First, we will invite Mr Mohamed Amersi to give a keynote speech on his perspective on the situation in Iran and the Middle East. Mr Amersi is a well-known businessman, philanthropist, and thought leader. He is based in London, but he is originally from Iran, so this is a good time to hear from someone of Iranian origin who knows Iran very well.

He will give us perhaps a 12-minute talk, and then we will hear some comments from Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Researcher, Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Then we will invite top Chinese experts on the Middle East, including Vice President Niu Xinchun, to join a panel with Daniel Levy and the president of the European Policy Centre. The three of you can have a panel discussion for about half an hour on the issues related to the Middle East and the crisis we are facing there right now. After that, we will have a free discussion if there is more that needs to be discussed.

I will stop here. I hope you can enjoy some of the food. We can probably supply a bit more food. We would also like to hear all your thoughts about the situation we have, what is happening in Iran, and how we can get out of this crisis. I will stop here. I hope you enjoy the dinner tonight. Thank you very much.

Zoon Ahmed Khan, Research Fellow, CCG

Thank you, Dr. Wang. Now let us warmly welcome Mr. Mohamed Amersi, founder and chairman of the Amersi Foundation, for his remarks. Welcome.

Mohamed Amersi, Founder and Chairman, Amersi Foundation

Good evening, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Let me start by thanking Henry and Mabel and all of CCG for hosting me here one more time. It’s always a pleasure to come to Beijing and to come to CCG’s events.

My talk tonight, my speech tonight, is entitled “What China Can, and Some Might Say Must, Do to Engage More Meaningfully in the Middle East Crisis.”

For those that may not know me, I am of Iranian origin, and I am in active contact with the Iranian team that is in discussions with Pakistan and other partners in how best to resolve this current crisis. The views that I am expressing are largely my views, but they have been informed by diplomacy and dialogue discussions that span now nearly 12 months.

As we all know, that on February 28 of 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, a sustained aerial campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, its regime leadership infrastructure, and, of course, it ended up killing the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Tehran retaliated in a way that was largely unexpected. Missiles and drones struck Israel and also Iran’s Gulf neighbours. A diplomatic framework two decades in the making collapsed in a matter of hours.

Since that moment, every actor in the crisis has been asked what they will do. Washington has answered with force. Europe has answered with statements. Tehran has answered with defiance. But there is one power and permanent member of the Security Council, one country with a $400 billion stake in Iranian stability, one nation that buys more than 80 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, that has not yet given its full answer. And this is China.

China, and the answer to this question, will determine whether this crisis ends in a negotiated settlement or in the most consequential regional war of the 21st century.

Let me elucidate my thinking. I will break this up into four or five parts.

Part one: the Iran file is, in my view, China’s file.

Let us be precise about what this actually means, and what’s at stake, and why. Above all, this is a Chinese strategic problem. China imports, as I said, approximately 1.4 million barrels of Iranian oil per day. That represents more than 80 per cent of all Iranian oil exports, and roughly 15 per cent of China’s total oil imports. The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow choke point through which that oil must flow, is also the route for an additional 40 per cent of China’s seaborne energy supplies from the Gulf states. Every day this crisis deepens, that lifeline is at risk.

Then there is the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership signed between China and Iran in 2021, a framework worth up to $400 billion, covering oil, gas, petrochemicals, transportation, telecommunications, and security cooperation. This is not an abstraction. It is the single largest bilateral investment commitment that China has made in the Middle East. If Iran descends into prolonged conflict, that investment framework collapses with it.

At the centre of this crisis sits the nuclear file. Iran has enriched uranium to 60 per cent purity before the June 2025 air strikes. It is now operating from a degraded, but not destroyed, nuclear infrastructure. The question on every diplomat’s desk in Washington, in Tel Aviv, in Riyadh, and, most urgently, in Beijing, is what happens next with Iran’s nuclear programme. Who holds the uranium? Who verifies the limits? And who underwrites any new deal?

China is not a bystander to these questions. It is structurally the only power that, in my view, can answer these questions.

Part two: what does China bring to this moment?

China’s position in this crisis is, in my view, unlike any other actor’s. It was an original signatory to the 2015 JCPOA. It has remained in contact with Tehran throughout the period of maximum pressure, throughout the collapse of the deal, through the air strikes, and through the current fragile back-channel diplomacy.

It is, as Iranian Foreign Minister and my friend Abbas Araghchi has publicly acknowledged, the country Iran consults before any major round of nuclear talks. Iran has briefed Beijing before the Muscat talks. It has briefed Beijing before the Islamabad round that collapsed in April. And Tehran treats China as its most essential strategic partner.

That gives Beijing something no other country possesses: genuine trust from Iran. Not easy. Not agreement on every point, not influence without limits, but the kind of institutional trust that is built over decades of energy, trade, sanctions, defiance, and strategic solidarity. When Iran needs to send a signal to the world, it goes through Beijing. That is Beijing’s leverage.

And, simultaneously, China shares with the United States, its greatest rival, one critical overlapping interest: neither Washington nor Beijing wants a nuclear-armed Iran.

The two powers are aligned on ends, but are divided on means. Beijing fears a nuclear Iran would trigger a regional arms race that would threaten the NPT framework, destabilise the Gulf energy corridor, and draw the United States more deeply into the Indo-Pacific neighbourhood. A nuclear Iran, until recently, was not in China’s interests, full stop. Has that calibration changed? Time will tell.

And to the proposal now on the table, reported by Newsweek on April 17, that China is open to taking custody of Iran’s remaining 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, down-blending it for civilian use as a mechanism to unlock the stalled nuclear negotiations: this is not symbolic. This is China offering to become the custodian of the most sensitive element of any Iran deal. That is not the act of a bystander.

China has the access. China has the trust. China has the shared interest. What remains is the political commitment by China to use all three of these simultaneously.

Part three, and this is important: I call it the failure of managed ambiguity.

And yet, here is the problem. Beijing has so far pursued what we might call managed ambiguity. It speaks the language of de-escalation while quietly deepening its strategic relationship with Tehran. It calls for dialogue while reportedly preparing to supply Iran with MANPADS, according to U.S. intelligence assessments. It presents itself as a neutral mediator, while its energy dependency on Iran gives it every incentive to keep Tehran viable, and none to press Tehran hard.

U.S. President Trump has warned Beijing explicitly: if China sends weapons to Iran, there will be serious consequences. The Chinese Embassy has denied these reports in the United States. But the strategic logic is clear: a China that arms while simultaneously positioning itself as a peace broker will not be seen as a credible mediator. It will be seen as an interested party wearing a neutral’s mask.

And the longer it is perceived that Beijing plays that role, the more it will squander the genuine diplomatic capital that it holds.

The collapse of the talks this month is instructive. The U.S. sought a narrow agreement on maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran demanded full sanctions relief and international guarantees. There was no bridge.

Beijing rightly criticised the U.S. maximum pressure approach, correctly, but it offered, as of now, no alternative framework. It backed Pakistanis’ mediation efforts to diplomatically find a resolution, but it did not do what only it can do: sit with Iran’s leadership and deliver a credible, private message that the current trajectory may not be in Iran’s and global interest.

Managed ambiguity worked for a China that was rising quietly. But in a regional war, with a nuclear file unresolved and a Trump-Xi summit on the horizon, ambiguity is no longer a strategy. It will be viewed as an abdication.

Part four: what must China do?

So, let me be direct about what China must now try and think of doing, concretely, sequentially, and urgently.

China must communicate directly and clearly to the Iranian leadership that Beijing’s continued political sponsorship, economic investment, and diplomatic cover is conditional on Iran engaging seriously with a negotiated nuclear settlement. Not a public statement; a private, strongly delivered message, delivered at the highest levels, that Iran cannot afford to ignore. Tehran knows that without China, it has no economy. Beijing must be willing to say that.

Secondly, take custody of the enriched uranium. The proposal to take and down-blend Iran’s 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium is the single most concrete step China can and must take right now. It removes the most dangerous element from the equation. It builds Chinese credibility with Washington. And it gives Iran a face-saving mechanism that does not involve surrendering its nuclear material to the United States.

An alternative that China has proposed in Islamabad is joint custody of this material with Pakistan. I think Iran would be willing to look at this, but will certainly not be willing to transfer this material to Pakistan. Trump has still insisted on U.S. custody, but I am not sure that this will be accepted by Iran.

At a Trump-Xi summit, this point, and the deal on this point, with verification by the IAEA, is, in my view, easily achievable if Beijing makes it a priority at the summit.

Then, moving forward, it is important that China looks at how it can help underwrite a new multilateral nuclear framework. China was a signatory to the JCPOA. It must now take the lead in constructing its successor, not as a junior participant deferring to Washington, but as the lead guarantor of Iranian compliance.

Beijing should convene a working group with the P5 and the EU to draft a revised enrichment ceiling, verification protocol, and sanctions relief pathway. China’s credibility as a guarantor is precisely what Tehran would accept and which Washington cannot provide alone.

Fourth, use the May summit as a strategic pivot. The Trump-Xi meeting expected in mid-May is the most important diplomatic movement of this Iran crisis. Beijing must arrive with a concrete proposal, not platitudes. A joint U.S.-China statement recommitting to nuclear non-proliferation, with a specific reference to the Iran file and a joint call for resumed negotiations, would be a historic deliverable. It would give Trump a win he can sell domestically, and it would give Xi the responsible stakeholder status that he covets globally. And it would give Iran a pathway out of its strategic isolation.

Fifth, condition future economic investment on de-escalation. The 25-year partnership that China has with Iran must be structured as economic leverage, which can and should be truly exercised. Beijing should make it clear again, privately, that the full activation of BRI investment commitments in Iran, including the $280 billion mark for oil and gas infrastructure, is contingent on Iran’s cooperation with a diplomatic settlement. This is not punishment. It is conditionality. Every serious mediator uses it. China has, thus far, not.

Sixth, let’s redefine non-interference. The doctrine of non-interference made sense for a China that was rising quietly. It makes no sense now for the world’s second-largest economy, the largest trading partner of the Middle East, and a permanent member of the Security Council. Non-interference cannot mean indifference. It must be replaced by a principled engagement: involvement that respects sovereignty, does not impose solutions, but does not stand aside while civilians die and regional order collapses.

In closing, ladies and gentlemen, the Iran crisis is not a problem that exists at the periphery of Chinese interests. It sits at the heart of them. Every barrel of Iranian oil, every dollar of the $400 billion partnership, every ship that transits the Strait of Hormuz—all of it depends on a resolution that does not currently exist.

China has something that no other power brings to this table: Iran’s trust, America’s attention, and structural leverage over both. It has a nuclear custody proposal already on the table. It has a summit with the U.S. president weeks away. It has a five-point initiative that calls for exactly the kind of political solution that this movement demands.

What China lacks is not capacity. What China lacks is not opportunity. What China has lacked until now is the political courage to use its leverage on the country it calls its closest strategic partner in service of a settlement that would benefit the entire region, and, most of all, China itself.

The test of a great power is not whether it can project force. It is whether it can project wisdom. China has the capacity to project both force and wisdom. The Middle East does not need another empire. It does not need another lecture. It does not need more weapons delivered with speeches about peace. It needs guarantors of restraint. It needs builders of opportunity. It needs brokers of realism.

China can be one of these actors, if it chooses. The path is clear: use leverage with partners, speak honestly to rivals, invest in reconstruction, support consistent law and order, coordinate with others, choose diplomacy over spectacle.

History will not ask whether China issued statements. History will ask whether China used its power wisely when the region needed it most.

The world is watching. Tehran is watching. Washington is watching. And, for the first time in a long time, all of them are watching Beijing and asking the same question: will China lead?

The answer is due, and I would say it is overdue.

Thank you very much.

I will now ask a dear friend of mine, Danny Citrinowicz, who is an expert on Iran, to speak for two or three minutes and answer the question: in the Israel-Iran relationship, people say there is a dog wagging a tail. Is Israel the dog or is Israel the tail? Conversely, is the U.S. the dog or the tail? Please help us with that.

Danny Citrinowicz, Senior Researcher, Iran and the Shi’ite Axis Program, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

Thank you, Mr Amersi, and thank you for the opportunity to speak a little bit about a country that I am trying to understand in my professional life: Iran.

I think the question is important, and I would say that the answer is actually both, meaning that Israel had an interest, from the beginning of the days, to see the U.S. and Israel acting together against Iran. In order to do so, it was willing to do the utmost. It does not matter whether Israel believed in the fact that there can be regime change or not, or whether they believed that you can put back the son of the Shah, Reza Pahlavi, to control Iran. It was all fair in the game of convincing President Trump to get into the war.

From the American study, it was not that hard. President Trump, after the change of guards in Venezuela, when he managed actually to pull Maduro out and put Delcy Rodriguez in, he thought that he really could make a change. And adding to the fact that he does not want to be seen as Obama or Biden in terms of how he can support the Iranian demonstrators—and remember, the demonstrations started, or intensified, immediately after the Venezuela event. Then when Prime Minister Netanyahu entered the White House on 11 February and offered him the idea of regime change in Iran, it was a very easy sell for President Trump.

So actually, we see that the dog and the tail were equal in a way that both sides wanted to use the opportunity and to change the regime in Iran. The problem, of course, is that they forgot that it takes two to tango. They did not ask the Iranians. And there was a flawed assumption that actually air activity alone, together with the underestimation of the Iranian history and tradition and the strength of the regime itself, would allow the regime to survive even after the decapitation of Ali Khamenei.

So what happened since then is actually, after three or four days, we got into some sort of strategic improvisation because of the fact that nobody actually planned what would happen the day after the regime will survive. Like President Trump told the British prime minister, don’t wait three days; the war will end in three days. Actually, the war did not end in three days.

And of course, the issue of the Strait of Hormuz that touches us all—it was not that the American intelligence that I know well did not think about that opportunity. The problem was that the decision-makers thought that until the Iranians would have the ability to take over the Hormuz Strait, eventually the regime would collapse.

So what we are having since then is a problem that we actually created by deciding to go to war, that it was almost impossible to reach the purposes of the war. The war was never intended to degrade Iran’s capabilities. Israel and the U.S. did that, definitely, in terms of its conventional build-up. But the war was to create a condition to stage a regime change. And actually we got not a regime change, but a change within the regime, much worse than what we had before.

I don’t think that Ali Khamenei, let’s say, was a guy who was easy to deal with. He was a pragmatist, but he was a balancer of the system, who used to balance between the more extreme part, the IRGC, and the more moderate parts from politics and diplomacy. He was a guy that you could do business with, because he was the ultimate decision-maker.

Now what we have—and it is another problem that we cannot reach an agreement, on top of any other problem—is that we have a decentralised regime that is actually controlled by the extreme elements that have the final say in Iran.

So we are back again to square one today, when we have Israel pushing the U.S. to return back to the war; we have the U.S. thinking what to do, whether to continue diplomacy or to return back to war, while having the maritime blockade, knowing that after 40 days, nothing can change in the Iranian calculus, meaning that the same position they presented before the war in Geneva, more or less the same position they are presenting now, adding to it the control of the Hormuz Strait. And we have to remember that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war itself.

So the bottom line of where we stand right now is a really complex situation, where I think especially Iran and the U.S. prefer to have the political route, but the gaps are so wide, while Israel is pushing behind the U.S. to return back to war, promising that decapitating the civilian infrastructure will do the job.

So now we are in a very tricky situation where, if there is not going to be an agreement—and it would be very hard to reach one—I think that the chances of returning back to escalation are extremely high.

So that’s, in a nutshell, for your important question. Thank you.

Zoon Ahmed Khan, Research Fellow, CCG

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Amersi, and also Danny, for sharing your perspectives.

Now we have a panel discussion with three experts who have deep expertise on what is happening in the region, from three regional perspectives as well. So let me first invite Professor Niu Xinchun, who is Academic Vice President of Ningxia University and Executive Dean of the Institute of China-Arab Studies. Welcome.

Let us also invite Daniel Levy, who is President of the U.S./Middle East Project, and Fabian Zuleeg, who is Chief Executive of the European Policy Centre.

Okay. So, as you enjoy the dinner, I think I will just briefly start with one comment. I am from Pakistan, a country that is active in the mediation process and also neighbouring Iran. And I remember, you know, back when whoever was following the election in 2012 would know that the primaries and that entire election campaign made the possibility of an intervention in Iran really real. I mean, at least in the region, we felt that there was one side, especially Mitt Romney, whose election could possibly have led to a military intervention in Iran. And the region was fearful of that possibility, but we thought if that were to happen, the world would react more vehemently.

But today, those interventions have happened, and the world’s reaction seems to be disunited, to say the least. So let us firstly just start with Professor Niu Xinchun: your take on what is happening today. What is this conflict really about? What are the implications, and what can we really, sitting in this room, learn from how things are unfolding? Thank you.

Niu Xinchun, Academic Vice President, Ningxia University; Executive Dean, Institute of China-Arab Studies

Okay, I would talk a few words about the implications of this war on China. I think China suffered a lot economically from this war. Maybe compared with the United States, China may be the one that suffered the most because, firstly, China is the biggest trade partner with the Middle East. Last year, the trade between China and the Middle East reached more than 500 billion U.S. dollars, but the trade between the United States and the Middle East was just about 140 billion U.S. dollars.

And China is the biggest Middle East oil importer. Last year, China imported Middle East oil at about 4 million barrels per day, and the United States is actually a net oil exporter. Also, China has a huge economic presence in the Middle East. So the war has heavily affected China’s interests.

Of course, in the past two months, China has actively tried to help and facilitate negotiations between Iran and the United States. The Chinese foreign minister has made 26 calls with other countries’ leaders, including the United States, Iran, and Pakistan, and most of the related countries.

But the problem is that the United States and other Western countries and the international community hope China to play a more active, more assertive role in facilitating negotiations. But personally, I do not think China will take that step forward.

The reason is that non-interference is still the basic principle of Chinese foreign policy. We are willing to do everything to facilitate the negotiations between Iran and the United States, but I do not think China will use the economic coercion method to put pressure on Iran. Actually, we never did that. So I think China will continue to play the neutral role, instead of putting economic cooperation as a condition for Iran. So I stop here.

Zoon Ahmed

Thank you for that intervention.

You know, I think that is a principle. A few years ago, a Chinese student I was talking to, said, China does not have an ideology yet that they are pushing to other countries, so that is something lacking in China’s global leadership. And a response to that is that that is exactly what China does not want. You know, China is wary of what is the vast majority of the world’s perspective on interventionism, on exporting ideologies, et cetera. So I think that principle of non-interference is really one of the foundational cornerstones of Chinese foreign policy. That was a very interesting point.

So, Daniel Levy, what is your take on where the situation stands right now? And I also want to add that, at that time, in 2012 or 2013, right, it was Rouhani’s election which sort of also created that space for maybe a shift in leadership with a different perspective. So it created room for the possibility of the nuclear talks and everything. So do you see any such changes in the foreseeable future that can make an exit strategy more palatable?

Daniel Levy, President of the U.S./Middle East Project (USMEP)

I mean, my first sense is simply one of relief that you have food in front of you. Otherwise, this would have been, by far and away, the most unpopular panel I had ever had the misfortune of speaking on—might still be, but at least it will be because of something we say. At least now we are just background noise to dinner. That is a better place to be.

And I think something that Danny Citrinowicz said, and others have kind of alluded to, is a point of departure for me, which relates back to where we were in 2012, 2013: how much difficult all of this is when you have, in their own different ways, hollowed-out leaderships, hollowed-out decision-making structures. I would argue, in all of the three main protagonists.

The easiest one to assert is the U.S. I mean, as you hinted at it, I think there is a significant degree of accuracy to the reporting that has been put out in the public domain, that the Israeli prime minister was not taking anything spectacularly new to Washington, D.C. What was new was the Washington, D.C. he was taking it to: that you have a hollowed-out agency process; expertise is shunned.

Actually, it was fascinating for me. I do not know if people are familiar with the Stephen Colbert show. It is one of these political comic talk shows, and often you get a greater granularity of seriousness in those shows than you do in what is supposed to be the proper news. Colbert interviewed John Kerry a few days ago, and he asked Kerry the question that would have been obvious for anyone to ask any of those former officials: did Netanyahu come to you with a similar plan? Kerry said yes. And what was your response? Kerry said, we all said no.

But now you have a U.S. decision-making system which, I mean, to call it unpredictable, unstrategic, incoherent, divorced from reality is an understatement on all of those terms.

So you have that on the U.S. side. On the Israeli side, I also think things are somewhat different, which is why the voice we just heard—and I come back to you again, Danny—is a voice that is so out of the mainstream of the decision-making conversation in Israel today. And Israel’s state decision-making capacity is all the more impoverished by that being the case.

And this is a phenomenon of latter-era Netanyahu. By the way, this is a prime minister who was quite risk-averse over his many, many years in office. I disagreed with him on everything, but he was risk-averse, and that was an important part. Today, not only is, let us say, moi, the state really has become his survival and the survival of the state, and being the permanent wartime prime minister, and his court cases—the man sends his lawyers to the court that is hearing his case every week to say, sorry, Benjamin can’t appear this week; he has got some wars to fight, and the elections are coming up.

But also the direction that a new Israeli elite has gone on—these details may not resonate with most people in the room—but you have a newly appointed head of the Mossad, very controversial; a recently appointed head of the internal security agency, Shin Bet, very controversial.

So what I am suggesting is, both in the U.S. and in Israel, you don’t have the kind of inter-agency process that may have prevented you going to a place where not only are we in strategic improvisation, but we are in strategic improvisation led by people who are not very good at it.

And then the third leg of that tripod is who was taken out on the Iranian side, and they were taken out precisely so that you can’t, or it is much more difficult to, deliver a more realist-oriented Iranian decision. And therefore, where does that leave us?

Well, it leaves us where we are stuck, which is, just as the strikes from the air were not going to deliver what perhaps the initiators of this hoped they would, neither will the new thing the President has fallen in love with, which is this naval blockade. You know, they stumbled into this idea, and now you have the double blockade imposed by both Iran and the U.S.

And at the moment, Trump loves it. He loves it because you guys—part of the reason he loves it is China is taking a hit. The rest of the world is taking a hit. He thinks that it is going to escalate the pressure on Iran and that they will not be able to bear it. A happy by-product, as far as he is concerned, is European pain.

But what I think he will again underestimate is that while the U.S. is feeling less pain, the U.S.’s threshold for pain is different, and it is different to that of Iran. And so over time, as it is not the game changer—because it will not be the game changer—the blockade will traverse into a problem for Trump, because as timid as Republican elected are, with each passing week the midterms get closer. Petrol is not getting cheaper at the pump. This is going to cause more problems inside America, and therefore we are back to where we were, which is: can you get a deal? In much more difficult circumstances now, it would be a much narrower deal. Do you escalate? I tend to agree that it is one of the more, if not the most, likely scenarios.

By the way, he will be told something like, you escalate to de-escalate, one more major show of force, and they will see you are serious, and it will be okay. And it is absolute nonsense. After you escalate, you will be back, perhaps in a worse situation, in general, to where you are right now.

Or—and I kind of give this a high percentage, a high-ish percentage chance—Trump simply walks away. He finishes the speech he has given several times already, which is the victory speech: we won. And now he just has to finish it and say, now it is your problem. It is not our problem. We walk away.

One comment on China. As Professor Niu—and I have heard you make variations on this case, and you have invariably been correct—China is not seeking, and does not see it as its interest, in inserting itself in an ownership way on this question. That’s what you have said, and I share that understanding.

I wonder if there is something that falls short of that, but that becomes very relevant at a certain moment, and it is: can China be a certain guarantor of Iranian behaviour at a certain moment, perhaps in particular vis-a-vis the GCC? The GCC is on the horns of a very acute dilemma, the GCC states. Everything they have done with the administration—and even when you have a president who personally went, as his first major visit, to the Gulf, to Saudi, Qatar, to UAE, is very taken by these wealthy, tall, attractive, as he talks about them—it is his language, not mine—Arab leaders, and yet it bought them nothing in terms of ability to have the ear of Washington when their most existential interests were at stake.

So there is a dynamic between unreliable America, an Israel that does have the influence, an Iran that targeted them, as was obvious and predicted, but which clearly is not acceptable, especially as far as they are concerned. China brokered the the Saudi-Iran thing. Is there a role there at some stage?

Zoon Ahmed

Thank you. Thank you, Daniel. I think we will come back to Professor Niu with the questions about China’s potential role. But first, let us come to you. Would you like to respond?

Niu Xinchun

Okay, I have to go.

Zoon Ahmed

Yeah, okay. Would you like to make closing remarks on your...

Niu Xinchun

I will go to CCTV Channel Four for a live interview.

Zoon Ahmed

Can you be back after the interview?

Niu Xinchun

I will be back after ten.

So I just want to give my concluding comments about China’s role. I think Levy mentioned that, firstly, China will continue to insist on its non-intervention policy. And second, I think most of the European countries also agree that Trump has chosen this war. You break it, you own it. So the United States should find a way to fix this problem.

This is not the first time the United States or the international community has turned to China and asked China to help fix the problem. Last time, when the North Korea nuclear problem happened, the United States also asked China to put economic pressure on North Korea to try to make North Korea make concessions. That failed. And in 2022, when the Ukraine crisis happened, the United States also asked China to put economic pressure on Russia.

So this time, the United States did the same thing. Every time they break something they cannot fix, they ask China to pay the price to fix that. I don’t think that China will follow that. So thank you very much.

Zoon Ahmed

Thank you. Thank you. Please, a warm round of applause for Professor Niu. Thank you. Thank you so much.

I will also just briefly add, I mean, it was last year that Iran and Pakistan also had some challenges on the border, and then China intervened to create a space for trilateral dialogue, which really helped build trust again. And again, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, too, it was just recently that China facilitated what we could call a relative detente. So I think China has been proactive, in some sense, to create more understanding diplomatic channels between powers that have challenges in the region.

So now, Fabian, over to you. I mean, a lot of people are talking about Europe’s response to the war, the kind of pressure that Washington is trying to place on Europe. What is your take on the situation right now? And what is it for Europe? What does it mean for Europe?

Fabian Zuleeg

I think firstly, before I get into the response of Europe and the geopolitics and the geo-economics, I think it is important to just recall the human cost of this, and that we are not only talking about what is happening in Iran. We are talking about the whole region. We are talking about what is happening in Lebanon, what continues to happen in Gaza. So we also have a wider stability problem, which unfortunately does not look like it is going to be resolved anytime soon.

What we also have is global repercussions. It has already been mentioned. Maybe some of that is not unintended, but certainly for Europe, this is an energy shock which is already having an impact. I would go further than this: this is a global energy shock. It is a global economic shock, and I think what we are going to see is a global recession. It is very hard to turn that boat around at this moment in time, because companies are already adjusting their expectations. We are seeing flights being cancelled. We are seeing the forward contracts on oil prices going up. So this will already have a negative impact, even if it ends tomorrow. And it does not look like it is going to end tomorrow.

For Europeans, I think there is a unanimous wish in Europe that Iran will not acquire nuclear weapons. But Europeans have also, in the past, disagreed with the U.S. about how best to achieve that. And Europeans, frankly, do not believe in starting a war to achieve these kinds of goals. That is not something which any of the European countries is supporting, whatever they are saying in public.

But the reality is that Europeans do not see this as a potential solution, and it is adding to the distance to Trump. And we have also seen, in those cases where we had European governments making the decision to withhold the rights for U.S. flights to go over their territory, this has led to, I would say, a further distancing, because it was already there, with Trump looking for punishment now.

So the repercussions of this are going to go into the future, and it is going to strain the transatlantic relationship even further than it has up to now.

Unfortunately, even though—and that is maybe a point I would also make to our Chinese colleagues—even though the mess might be created by the U.S., we will have to deal with it. And in particular, I think if there is some form of ceasefire, I would see it inevitable that Europeans are involved in some way in the Strait of Hormuz, including, for example, demining, which is going to be a major issue.

And I would think that this is actually an area where an international coalition would make a lot of sense. That, of course, is not at this moment. At this moment in time, Europeans are not going to get involved in a hot war, but I think it is something which we will have to look at before soon.

And of course, there should also be involvement in the wider region about trying to resolve these issues, trying to find a way of living together peacefully. But I have to say, Europeans, I do not think, have a lot of leverage. Unlike China, maybe, I think there is a limit to what Europeans are able to do, and we have already seen that in previous conflicts.

My final point, and this might sound rather pessimistic, but I think we have to recognise that Trump is at the weakest point in his second presidency, possibly at the weakest point in his political career. He, I think, is at the moment in political life where the population turns against him, and that is across the board. When you see what is happening in domestic politics, which I think is the only thing he really cares about, we are seeing that what he is doing is deeply unpopular.

I think it is almost inevitable that this will have political consequences, including at the midterm elections. Is that something which is positive? Well, I would think anything which hurts his presidency is a good thing, but the reality is that given his character, given the way he looks at the world, given his politics, the chances are that he will lash out, that he will escalate, that he will try to do something even more extreme. So we have to be, I think, globally prepared for what comes next after this, which might be even worse than what we have seen up to now.

Daniel Levy

Yeah, if I can just add to that. And of course, I think you were implying this: that lashing out will not necessarily be in the context of this Iran war. The obvious one that they have been building towards is Cuba. But it could be any of a number of things.

I also just want to pick up on something, because I tend not to agree with Professor Niu. I do not think the Pottery Barn rule, which he was referring to—you break it, you fix it—can apply here, because what has been broken is the global economy. And therefore it is not that everyone else can go, ha ha, now you have got the problem. No, everyone has the problem.

And therefore, whether it is directly with Trump, whether it is trying to up the ante on how this impacts America—so it could be states trying to intervene with the American president. And people may have noticed some of the messaging, for instance, that came out of the Gulf during the last several weeks was, well, there are certain investments that we will not be able to make now. You draw your conclusions.

The fact that they can continue to inflate the American stock market and the S&P 500, which is one thing Trump does pay attention to, makes that more difficult. But I do think others can’t avoid it. I mean, you know, fuel, food, fertiliser, et cetera.

And then my last comment would be, you cannot do this without also thinking about how one reins in an Israel that has just gone off the tracks. And this is, unfortunately, the learned experience of Gaza. It was the impunity around Gaza which I think empowered this, amongst other things. And, you know, whether it is in Lebanon, whether it is—you know, it is not just Trump who may look to cause havoc elsewhere. Israel may be back doing worse things in Gaza.

And so one has to think in those terms. And sometimes, well, I think everyone now is stuck in a place where there is a real paucity of political imagination. We have never faced this situation before, and I shut up.

Zoon Ahmed

Thank you, Daniel, before we become the most unpopular panel of the year. But thank you so much.

And I think I will close with what Fabian mentioned. I mean, the human cost really is what it is first and foremost about, and the global repercussions are in front of us. So let us hope -- I mean, we cannot just be hopeful all the time -- but I think we have enough motivations and incentives as different parts of the world to try to inch towards a real solution and a status quo that allows...

So thank you, both of you. Thank you also to Professor Niu. And we have one comment. Okay.

Mohamed Amersi

Thank you very much. My speech was largely confined to China, but I think it is very, very important that I also shed some light on what our panellists have said here. So some of my prognoses may sound a little bit unrealistic, but they are very, very well informed.

My assessment of the GCC is that it is largely broken. It will be very difficult for it to stay intact after this. I would imagine that Qatar and Oman are largely going to pivot towards Iran. I think the UAE and Bahrain will continue being under the umbrella of the U.S.-Israel relationship. And I think that Saudi Arabia is the unknown, but they are likely not to join either camp, and more likely to continue with their Turkey-Pakistan alliance. So I suspect—I know for sure—that these discussions are actually taking place after my visits to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, and I will be going there again after China.

The second point that I would make is that Netanyahu’s strategy is largely to break up Iran. Iran, for those that do not know, there is a central Persia that is about 40 per cent of Iran. And then on the periphery, you have Balochistan, Kurdistan, Turkmenistan, Arabistan, and one or two other provinces. And the CIA tried their best to go into Kurdistan and at least see if there is any appetite to peel that away.

Coming back to the Wesley Clark doctrine, that he wanted seven states to be broken up, Iran is the last on the list. And so this is not a new project in itself. It is a project that is in the making. And finally, they are trying to see if they can realise this.

Within Iran, before the war began, there was some idea that maybe the time is ripe for some sort of rethinking of how Iran works, especially with Reza Pahlavi trying to lead an effort which has largely failed and will fail. But the breakup story is a very, very touchy one within Iran.

The two other points I would make, which we have not touched upon, is what is the future of Israel. There is waning support, as we see now in the United States. If you look at all the think tanks and other people that have sought out opinions within the United States as to whether the U.S. wants to continue backing Israel with a blank cheque forever, I believe that this is highly questionable and will require some major recalibration on the part of Israel if it wants to continue renewing its support.

And finally, on the Strait of Hormuz, I am saying something which I know is in the making, which may not be known publicly. I think that there is a chance that if the United States fails to give Iran reparation for the damage that has been caused to Iran from the illegal strikes, then there will be some appetite in allowing them to charge a toll for the strait.

The question is that Iran controls the northern part of the strait, Oman controls the southern part, and a deal could be struck between the United States, Iran, and Oman for the tolls to be shared between Iran and Oman, and Oman to cater for some U.S. interests as part of its share. Alternatively, lift the sanctions. Alternatively, pay 20 billion dollars of the money that has been blocked. All these ideas are on the table.

The last discussion that was supposed to happen yesterday did not happen because Iran presented maximalist demands to Pakistan, which were conveyed to the U.S. And in those demands were, I am aware of, the conditions that were so difficult for anyone to accept that Trump has called off the visits of Kushner and Witkoff.

In the meanwhile, as you know, Abbas Araghchi was in Oman. He was there to see if Oman can convey messages to the rest of the Gulf and see if some sort of leverage can be put by the Gulf states on the United States to exercise restraint. And then he is in Moscow to see that if the war does break out, what is the appetite for Russia to continue supporting Iran. That is the latest. Thank you.

Zoon Ahmed

Thank you. Thank you so much, Mr Amersi. A round of applause also for our unpopular panel—joking. Thank you. Thank you so much. Let us continue to enjoy the dinner and continue the conversation. Thank you. Thank you so much.

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The session focused on the trajectory of China-U.S. relations after the Xi-Trump meeting, the prospects for managing strategic competition, and the implications of “a constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability”.

The event was moderated by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, and drew diplomats, scholars, journalists, and representatives from international organisations, think tanks, and the business community.

During the Q&A session, Vebjørn Dysvik, Norwegian Ambassador to China; Marcelo Suárez Salvia, Argentine Ambassador to China; Colum Murphy, Senior China Economy and Government Reporter at Bloomberg News; Zhuorui Fu, Associate Economic Officer, UN ESCWA; Shi Yinhong, retired Professor at the School of International Studies, Renmin University of China; and Zhao Shengchuan, Professor at Josai International University, raised questions and exchanged views with Shambaugh and Wang.

This transcript is based on the event recording and has not been reviewed by any speaker.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder & Secretary-General, CCG

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, friends and colleagues, good afternoon. A very warm welcome to the Center for China and Globalization, and to this special edition of our CCG Global Dialogues series.

My name is Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of the Center for China and Globalization. First of all, I thank you all for your presence as we gather to explore one of the most consequential relationships of our time: the future of U.S.-China relations.

We meet at a pivotal moment. The dynamics between the United States and China are shaping not only the bilateral landscape, but also the very architecture of global stability, trade, and innovation. Following the recent high-level summit between President Xi and President Trump, we find ourselves at what many call a critical crossroads. The consensus to build a constructive relationship of strategic stability offers a new framework, a diplomatic anchor in turbulent seas. Yet the fundamental forces of strategic rivalry and deep economic interdependence continue to coexist, defining a relationship that is as complex as it is crucial.

The question before us today is not merely academic; it is urgent and profoundly practical in an era of persistent contestation: How can these two great powers stabilise their interaction? Where are the realistic avenues to expand cooperation on global challenges, from climate change to public health? And perhaps most pressingly, how can both sides effectively manage risks and prevent miscalculation amid inevitable competition?

These are the questions that today’s dialogue seeks to address. To guide us, we are honoured to welcome a scholar whose work has illuminated the U.S.-China relationship for decades. It is my great pleasure to introduce our distinguished keynote speaker, Professor David Shambaugh.

David Shambaugh is Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. He is also a distinguished visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution. Professor Shambaugh is an internationally renowned scholar on contemporary China, Asian affairs, and, of course, U.S.-China relations, with a career spanning academia, policy analysis, and extensive field research. He brings a rare blend of theoretical depth and practical insight. His perspectives have informed policymakers, business leaders, and scholars across the globe.

We are privileged to have him with us today to set the stage for our discussion. Following his keynote, Professor Shambaugh will be joined for an in-depth dialogue with Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, former Counsellor of the China State Council, and a professor at China Foreign Affairs University. Henry Huiyao Wang has dedicated his career to fostering international exchange and think tank diplomacy, engaging in profound dialogues with world leaders and thinkers. His unique global perspective will help bridge theory and practice, ensuring our discussion is both grounded and forward-looking.

Our agenda today is designed for substance and interaction. After the dialogue segment, we will open the floor for your questions, because the insights from this distinguished audience, comprising policymakers, senior scholars, business leaders, and journalists, are an essential part of this global conversation.

Before we begin, I would like to extend my sincere welcome to our distinguished guests, including His Excellency Marcelo Suárez Salvia, Ambassador of Argentina to China. Welcome, Your Excellency. His Excellency Vebjørn Dysvik, Ambassador of Norway to China. Welcome. Also, Ms. Amakobe Sande, UNICEF Representative to China and Professor Shi Yinhong from Renmin University. We also warmly welcome scholars, diplomatic officials from various embassies, business delegates, and media friends. Thank you all for your presence.

Let us begin this important conversation now. Please join me in giving a warm welcome to our keynote speaker, Professor David Shambaugh. Welcome.

David Shambaugh, Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs, George Washington University; Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution

Henry and Mabel, colleagues and friends, 各位观众, distinguished members of the diplomatic corps here in Beijing, I am very honoured, actually, that all of you came out on a rainy day in Beijing. But thank you for making the effort. I know getting around Beijing is not the easiest thing with the traffic, although I think traffic has improved slightly from the last time I was here. The air has also improved considerably.

Thank you for coming. It is truly a great pleasure for me, and that is an understatement, to return to Beijing, a city I first visited in 1979 when I was a student, and have lived in myself for six years altogether. This is indeed another home of mine, I might say. But for reasons I am not going to go into, this is only my second visit in the past 11 years. Therefore, I am sincerely grateful to Henry, to Mabel, and to CCG for the invitation to return and for making this visit possible.

I truly hope that my long absence is now firmly in the past, and that I can look forward, hopefully, to many more visits in the future, resuming my longstanding relationships with the many institutions and friends here in Beijing and in China, and making new friends, particularly with the younger generation.

I have been coming to China every year from 1979 to 2015. That is a long time. I have studied at three different Chinese universities as a student. I have been a visiting scholar at six different institutes of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and other universities and think tanks. We have a long and good past. It is wonderful to be back, and I am really very grateful.

I would also like to begin by paying tribute to CCG, in all sincerity, for the extremely important role that you have played for the past 18 years since your establishment in providing multifaceted forums for dialogue between China and the world, both inside China and, of course, around the world. I think Henry and Mabel live on airplanes. I do not know how you travel as much as you do. I receive your CCG activity emails in my inbox, as I am sure many of you do. One day they are in Latin America, the next day they are in Europe, the next day they are in Southeast Asia, then they are back in Beijing, and then they are off to some other place. I do not know how you do it.

But in all sincerity, I want to congratulate you on the forum that you established 18 years ago, and on how it has grown into what it is today. In fact, just this morning over breakfast, I was reading your annual report, which, by the way, is here on the table. If any of you need copies, I commend you to pick one up on your way out. It is very impressive in its range of activities. As they say in Chinese, 加油 keep it up. You really deserve congratulations for what you have created, established, and developed. People-to-people exchanges among thought leaders and other elements of societies are really more critical than ever before in today’s very turbulent world.

I am going to speak for about 20 minutes, I am told, about a very big subject: U.S.-China relations, the state and future of the relationship following the very recent summit meeting here in Beijing between our two presidents. So, let me say a little bit about how I view the results of the summit and the possible evolution of the relationship going forward. Then Henry and I are going to have a constructive, strategic, and stable dialogue.

中美建设性战略稳定关系 is the new 提法 (tifa). We have a new tifa. For those of you who speak Chinese, tifa means narrative. There is a new narrative to define the U.S.-China relationship, an official narrative, which is very important because policies derive from narratives. Narratives are like a grand strategy, 大战略 in Chinese. We have a new tifa coming out of this last summit: to build a constructive, strategic, and stable U.S.-China relationship. It is the first time those terms have been used in these narratives.

First, before I talk a little bit about the narrative and unpack it, let me give you my bottom-line takeaways and evaluations. Let me talk a little bit about the summit, because I am sure you have all been following it and digesting the tsunami of information that came forth during and susequent to the summit. It actually takes a number of days, oftentimes weeks, before you really get to understand what happened and what came out of a summit. We are beginning, day by day, to learn more. It occurred just a week ago, so I do not think we have heard everything yet. I have no inside 消息, no inside knowledge.

There were relatively few concrete and specific deliverables, as Americans call them, that came out of the summit. There was no joint communique, no joint agreements, and very little tangible that one could identify in the immediate aftermath of the summit. Day by day, we are learning a little more. But that is not the most important thing.

In Washington, where I live, there has been some criticism of the summit because it did not achieve so-called concrete deliverables. Americans are very concrete. They like specifics; they do not like abstract phrases. They want concrete deliverables. This summit did not produce concrete deliverables, so there has been a bit of criticism and frustration in D.C. I have to be honest with you.

But for me, the greatest value and the most important outcome was that the summit occurred at all. It is absolutely crucial that our two governments and top leaders meet, and do so with some frequency. This is just the first of four meetings this year. They have three more to go. There will be a return state visit by President Xi, General Secretary Xi, to the United States in September, a meeting in Shenzhen, and a meeting in Miami. So this is really important.

This particular summit succeeded in putting a floor, I think, under a very fluctuating, rocky, and troubled relationship. It has not been in free fall; I would not say that. A few years ago, in the second year of the Biden administration, it was in free fall. So the Biden administration tried to put a floor under it and arrest the deterioration. This time we needed a floor to be relaid, you might say, and that is the major accomplishment to my mind. A floor was relaid, as well as establishing some guardrails and boundaries, both of which will serve to stabilise relations and, I hope, begin to re-establish a more lasting framework to manage the competition.

“Manage the competition” is a particular American phrase. The Chinese side does not like that phrase and does not use that phrase specifically. But the summit allows us, I think, to have a new framework to restrain and limit points of friction and keep the elements of contention, including the all-important issue of Taiwan, within manageable boundaries, hopefully.

So I view this summit as having been quite successful. Let me be very clear about that. I am not disappointed by it, because I think the signals that were sent, both the optics of the summit as well as what we have learned about the substance. So I think it might hopefully be a turning point in the relationship. I have been studying U.S.-China relations long enough to know that there is never any real turning point. We never get around the corner and stay there in a stable place. But this is a new attempt, and it is the best attempt in about 10 years, I think. Let us hope it endures.

The United States and China are not going to stop competing and having points of friction, many points of friction. But I think it is important to understand what competition means. Let me digress a little onto that subject.

What I have found most instructive recently in terms of understanding competition is the May 17 press conference and media briefing by State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi. He gave a very extensive readout on the summit. You should all read it. It is four or five pages long. On the subject of competition specifically, let me quote briefly what State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang had to say, because I think it is very useful and instructive.

For the last six years, the Chinese side has refused to even engage with the Americans over the term competition. They thought it was some sort of negative, hostile conflict. You only compete with adversaries. But now the Chinese side seems to have come around to not viewing competition as an adversarial phenomenon, which is not.

Foreign Minister Wang said, and I quote, competition should be healthy and stable, “where competition is kept within proper limits and is not turned into a zero-sum game.” “Major-country competition is nothing new,” he said. “When competition does happen, it must be a healthy one where we learn from each other, pursue excellence together, and compete fairly in compliance with rules.” “The purpose of competition,” Foreign Minister Wang said, “should be to outdo oneself, so that both sides become better.” That is a positive-sum definition of competition.

Then he concluded that “it should be constant stability where differences are manageable, and the relationship should not be like a roller coaster”. Notice the word “manage”, 管理. We Americans have been working on the Chinese side with this concept of managed competition for six years. It seems to have finally sunk in a little bit.

I completely agree with Foreign Minister Wang’s characterisation, and I commend him on it. The entire press conference is worth reading. I just read a little bit. Competition is an entirely natural 自然的 part of life in many domains: in commerce and economics, in sports, in the realm of ideas and even ideologies, and in geostrategic affairs. So there is nothing abnormal about competition. Quite to the contrary, as Foreign Minister Wang said, it can spur one to improve themselves and to compete with others, and that in itself is a positive-sum phenomenon. Now, to effectively manage competition necessitates direct exchanges at many levels and candid dialogues. So I think that was a very useful contribution by Foreign Minister Wang.

He also said that President Xi raised with President Trump the topic of the Thucydides Trap. That is interesting. It is not clear to me that President Trump has read Graham Allison’s book and even understands the notion of a Thucydides Trap, but obviously President Xi has, and has had personal discussions with Professor Allison.

This is important, I think, because his book, which had a very bad title, Destined for War—believe me, I know about bad titles. Publishers sometimes give articles and books very provocative, inappropriate titles with which the author does not share. Believe me, that has happened to me personally. Personally, that is one of the reasons I have not been here for 10 years. The Wall Street Journal gave a very inappropriate title to an article I wrote 10 years ago.

Professor Allison’s book looks at, I think, 16 historical cases of rising powers and established powers, going back to Athens and Sparta. He found historically, 14 of the 16 cases resulted in conflict, usually because the established power was feeling threatened. Sometimes the rising power attacked the established power early because they thought they had an opportunity. Sometimes the established power attacked the rising power to keep it from parity and from becoming a peer competitor. Anyway, in 14 of 16 historical cases, the historical record is pretty clear and very dangerous.

I think it was very appropriate that President Xi raised this with President Trump. But the point here is that nothing is structurally predetermined in international affairs. In political science, in what I do, we call this the agent-structure paradigm. Leaders possess agency, and the exercise of human will can ameliorate and overcome structural dynamics that produce tensions in a relationship. So nothing is predetermined, and I hope President Trump took that away from his discussions.

The last thing that Wang Yi said I found very useful was that he reported, among the other topics discussed, people-to-people exchanges should be increased. Indeed, they do need to be increased. These have atrophied badly between the United States and China during and since Covid, and we need to rebuild people-to-people exchanges on a reciprocal basis.

Cutting off dialogues, or worse yet, banning people from the other country, is not helpful. In fact, it is harmful. We need to be more tolerant and open to various perspectives. Again, this is what CCG, Henry, and Mabel do so well.

People-to-people dialogue needs to be rebuilt. And I hope that includes not just tourists and students. Students are very important. President Xi reiterated his invitation to 50,000 American students to come to China over a five-year period. That is a very nice aspirational number, but it is going to be very hard to achieve, especially given that today, as we sit here, there are only 1,200 American students in this entire country. Ten years ago, there were 20,000 American students in this country. There are, by contrast, 270,000 Chinese students in the United States this academic year, including in my classrooms. We have got to work on that.

But I would also like to suggest that we need to work on improving scholarly exchange, not just student exchange—scholars who already have their PhDs and are already researching different topics. There are so many interesting things going on here in China that the international China studies community, not just the American China studies community, is very anxious and curious about. We all want to come here. We want to do research in archives, libraries, factories, laboratories, and travel in the countryside. I hope that when the two governments get around to implementing the people-to-people component, that they really pay attention to the scholarly component.

I am relatively positive about the recent summit. It was very businesslike and obviously very formal. It was a state visit, and the Chinese side puts on such ceremony like hardly any other country in the world so well. It was a very respectful and polite summit, and there was even personal warmth between the two leaders. It was very obvious and good to watch.

We have this new framework to constructively stabilise and develop a strategically stable relationship. Foreign Minister Wang—I am not going to go into it—also identified eight specific areas. So, again, I commend you to look at his May 17 press conference. The United States and China, according to him, are going to improve exchanges on foreign policy, military-to-military relations (hugely important), the economy and trade, public health, agriculture, tourism, people-to-people ties, and law enforcement. Those are the eight priorities. I think those are the right priorities.

Let us move back to the new tifa, the new narrative, and unpack that a little bit. I will be very interested to hear Henry’s observations on this new phraseology. Both governments have officially committed themselves to this as the guiding framework for the relationship.

I personally am not the biggest fan of slogans and narratives in international relations to define relationships, but I think they can be very useful at certain times. I see the utility in them because they serve as a kind of compass to guide a relationship, even a road map, you might say, to keep it more or less going in the same general direction, what the Chinese call the 主要方向, so you do not get off the road and have an accident or run out of petrol. But if you have a Chinese EV, you will not run out of petrol.

I think this new phrase is better than previous phrases. I was not a particular fan of the 新型大国关系 [new type of major-country relations] that was announced between President Xi and President Obama many years ago. But we have a new one now, so let us talk about this.

Given the extreme complexity and the various systemic elements of the U.S.-China competition, stability is indeed a very worthy and appropriate goal for the two sides to work towards. Nonetheless, as in economics, equilibriums are hard to sustain. True stability is very difficult to maintain.

And I recall, in this context, my good friends and colleagues Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University and Kenneth Lieberthal of the University of Michigan, who was one of my mentors, and Jisi is one of my mentors and friends. They wrote an article about 10 years ago for the Brookings Institution in which they used the term “dynamic stability”. [Transriber’s note: The speaker appears to be referring to Lieberthal and Wang Jisi’s 2012 Brookings monograph, although the term “dynamic stability” does not appear in that work.]

In other words, you should not think of stability as something static and fixed. That is not the way to think of stability. It is unrealistic, not something where you achieve stasis, right? Life, all of us in our relationships, personal and between countries, evolves. Relationships are affected by all kinds of factors all the time. The question is how to create a framework that permits evolution, you might say, while working to achieve basic equilibrium. I think that is the first thing I would say about the 稳定 stability factor. Stability is not stasis. You have to think of it as a more fluid concept.

What about the term constructive, 建设性? That is an interesting term. When it first came out, it made me think about the history of the People’s Republic of China. There is a certain period of the 1950s known as the 建设时期, the build-the-country period. But that is not what they have in mind here.

I think “constructive”, first of all, is different from “cooperative”. Do not equate constructive with cooperation. They are two different concepts. Constructiveness indicates intention, and the intention to act and speak constructively indicates a kind of positive intention towards another party. Even criticism—in English, we have a common saying, “constructive criticism”. You all have heard that term. That means you can criticise someone if it is intended constructively for them to sort of self-reflect a little bit on whatever, and to maybe alter their thinking. That is an important point. Not all people or societies take criticism constructively. Some are reflexive; they just cannot take any criticism. I am not identifying anybody in this context. The point is to have an open mind and take criticism constructively, because it is positively intended.

I have spent my entire professional career studying the role of mutual perceptions in U.S.-China relations, beginning when I was a graduate student here at Peking University from 1983 to 1985. That is a long time ago, folks. I researched and wrote my PhD dissertation here. I was in fact the first foreign, not just American, student permitted by the Ministry of Education to study in an international relations department in China in 1983. They opened the door, and I was the first one to walk through that door. Many more have walked through the door subsequently. It was a wonderful experience, two years in the 国政系. I also played for two years on the Beida [Peking University] basketball team, and we had a lot of success. We won two city championships. I played in the Chinese national basketball tournament for two years. I had great experiences. I have wonderful memories of Beida, and previously Nankai University and Fudan University.

The reason I am telling you this, sorry about the tangent, is because I was researching a dissertation on China’s America specialists and their perceptions of America, 中国的美国问题专家看美国知觉. I am an American China specialist, so I wanted to look at my counterparts: What about China’s America specialists? What are they thinking about the United States? How do they understand the United States? That was my doctoral dissertation almost 40 years ago, and it turned into a book titled Beautiful Imperialist, 美帝 (mei di)—mei for America, di for imperialism—because Chinese views of America at that time were ambivalent. On the one hand, America was to be emulated, studied, and learned from. On the other hand, America was imperialist and should be rejected and criticised. So there is this ambivalent tension Chinese views of America for a long time. It goes back even earlier than the 1980s.

The reason I raise this is that if I have learned nothing more in my decades of study of perceptions in the U.S.-China relationship, it is that it is actually THE most important factor, much more important than the trade balance or other functional dimensions of the relationship. We need to understand each other better. And language means different things to different people. One should never assume that others understand your language and see things the way you do.

This is precisely why sustained dialogue between our two societies, and all societies, is crucially important. All of you representing other countries here in China, I know, have the same view. Here again, I wish to pay real tribute to Henry, Mabel, and CCG for what you provide in China’s dialogue with the world. There is no institution like this in China other than CCG. Very impressive. Keep up the good work.

Last point, and then I should stop and we should have our dialogue. What about the term strategic? Constructive, strategic, stability: those are the three operative adjectives and nouns in this new tifa. Strategic is interesting because there are differences of definition that need to be further explored through dialogue. For Americans, I can tell you, the term strategic usually, if not always, refers to the security and military domain. Full stop. Security, military equals strategic for Americans. That is how we think. Not for others.

The Chinese—and I have been reading these articles in the last week after the summit—many Chinese scholars are writing very interestingly that, oh no, 战略 strategic is a kind of comprehensive, elastic term that encompasses all dimensions of a relationship, and therefore it’s strategic; all dimensions equal strategic. Well, that is a big difference in the way Americans and Chinese think about that term. I think we need to have some dialogues to unpack our thinking about “strategic” and about “competition”.

We are making progress on competition. As I said, I think Foreign Minister Wang’s statements this week, and even at the Munich Security Conference, show a lot of evolution in Chinese thinking. I am not going to say progress, but it is just evolution. So it is good.

So, Henry, keep it up. We need to have more of these kinds of dialogues. I have gone on long enough, but those are my general impressions of the summit and the state of the relationship. Henry, you and I can now sit down and have a constructive, strategic, and stable dialogue. Thank you very much.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President, CCG

Great. Thank you, David, for your very comprehensive, forward-looking, and very good recap of the summit we just recently had between China and the U.S.

As we all know, as Mabel just introduced, David is a very famous and renowned China expert in the U.S. As you said, you studied in China for so many years and did all those studies. Of course, you went back to the U.S., and you were also the chief editor of The China Quarterly for almost a decade. That was really a very prestigious China research journal, a top journal in the world, while you were in the UK for 10 years. You have also published many books.

I know you came to Beijing two years ago with a Central Party School Track II dialogue, where I was also participating. I am glad to see you come back again, and, as you put it, to promote better dialogue and understanding.

I am very glad to have you join us for CCG Global Dialogue. We have had almost 100 dialogues, including with a few dozen top American scholars, such as Joseph Nye, Graham Allison, Tom Friedman, Jeffrey Sachs, and many more. Now we are adding you to this long list of well-known strategic global dialogues.

Your timing is very significant. You came just one week after the summit. My first question and comment to you is that this visit, I personally feel, is very significant. It is almost a decade—nine years—since Trump’s last visit. This is his second visit. You can see that President Trump used much more positive terms with the Chinese side. He basically praised what China has done and expressed many good gestures towards China. I think that has been appreciated.

At the same time, as a Chinese person, I feel China is now getting a lot of international attention. Since the beginning of this year, we have had almost all G7 leaders come, except Japan. At the end of last year we had President Macron, and at the beginning of this year, Mark Carney, then Starmer, then Merz, and almost all of them. Then after that, Putin. You see those big powers all coming, and that really shows that China has become a focal point, an internationally attractive assembly place where world leaders come to compare notes and build consensus.

How do you think China has reached this kind of influence and impact in the world, with almost all G7 leaders and other global leaders coming? Also, we are in a much more turbulent world now. We still have a war going on in Ukraine. We have a terrible war going on in Iran. The whole world has these choking points. What do you think about this? This is the first U.S. state visit in nine years. During the four years of Biden, as you rightly said, we never saw a U.S. official visit China, which is unthinkable for the two largest economies in the world. There was no dialogue or exchange.

Now this high-level exchange has resumed. We are going to see another President Xi visit in September, another APEC summit in Shenzhen, and the G20 summit in Miami. Could 2026 be a turning point, as you just mentioned, between China and the U.S., and perhaps another turning point for China, the West, and the world as well? Maybe you can give some of your thinking on how special 2026 can be, or what China has done right.

David Shambaugh

Thank you, Henry. There were a number of elements in there, and I will see if I can unpack them. But your main point about foreign heads of state and dignitaries increasingly coming to China is a very well-taken point. That is not necessarily a new development. China’s diplomacy, in quantitative terms, is really unparalleled, both here in Beijing and in travel by President Xi. President Xi is not travelling as much in recent years as he used to, but I was reading the other day that he has made 71 trips abroad to 112 countries during the time he has been in office.

Anyway, I think Beijing and China are becoming more of a destination point for various heads of state. Part of that is the result of the Trump factor. We know what has been happening within Europe in particular: very unfortunate transatlantic policies and verbiage. So, several European heads of state have beaten a path here to Beijing. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney came here and delivered a very significant address in Davos about middle powers.

So China is reaping some of the benefit of the alienation that American allies and others are feeling about the United States under President Trump. There is a kind of, you might call it, a bump or an effect—the Trump bump. How is that for a phrase?

Nonetheless, even without Trump, other countries are hedging. I just published an article in Foreign Affairs last week about how the whole world is hedging against both America and China. Countries around the world do not trust either power. They do not trust China, they do not trust America, and they certainly do not trust Russia. Everybody is hedging, and part of hedging is in fact engagement.

You just had President Putin here last week. I think China is playing its diplomatic role very effectively at the moment, and will continue to. That is important. For the rest of 2026, there are going to be these multilateral meetings. I will give President Xi and China real credit here in the realm of global governance. China has really stepped up its game in the global governance domain under President Xi.

I teach about this in my Chinese foreign policy classes. Up until President Xi became the leader of China, China was very ambivalent about multilateralism. Verbally, they were supportive, but in practice not. There has been a much greater convergence of China’s behaviour and participation with the verbiage and language, which has always been supportive of multipolarism.

Ladies and gentlemen, multipolarism and multilateralism are not the same thing. International relations specialists will tell you that polarism has to do with poles, with powers. Powers attract other countries to them like magnets. That is what a power is. Multilateralism is institutional: the United Nations and all these other IGOs in the world.

China is now playing a much more central role—the new Global Governance Initiative that China just published three or four months ago. I was along with Xi Jinping’s Global Civilisation Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Development Initiative. Now we have a Global Governance Initiative. These are all indications of China’s increased activism—not just centrality, but activism in world affairs. This is very positive. Very positive. So I think we can anticipate that, going into the end of 2026 and into next year, that that trend will continue.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you. Yes, David, absolutely. You see China becoming more active, particularly in turbulent times, making many proposals and initiatives, particularly for global governance, where we are actually embracing a multipolar world. Global governance is really at the heart of the issue. This centrality that you mentioned is gaining some momentum now.

Again, you mentioned during your speech that I was quite delighted to hear that the U.S. and China, as President Xi put it, have reached constructive stability and strategic stability. I know the U.S. added “on a reciprocal basis”. But I remember that in 2017, when the first national security strategy report came out under the first Trump administration, strategic rivalry was really the buzzword. Strategic rivalry was even before Russia. So this turnaround, from Trump 1.0 strategic rivalry to Trump 2.0 strategic stability, is really a big shift over the last decade.

The first Trump term started with a trade war, a tariff war, and sanctions. Even today, there are about 2,000 Chinese companies on the American entity and sanctions lists. But that profile does not really work that effectively. As a matter of fact, I had a dialogue with the late Joseph Nye about a year or two ago. He told me that there is a cycle in U.S.-China relations roughly every 20 years. China and the U.S. were at war in the Korean War, that was the lowest point. Twenty years later, the Nixon moment came, and then there was a revival, followed by another downturn.

Are we now seeing the bottom? Are we starting to realise that we cannot really decouple? One of the things I noticed when I went to the United States last month for a world economy summit with 500 CEOs was that I never heard anybody talk about decoupling with China. Even senior U.S. officials were saying that the U.S. does not seek decoupling now.

In that sense, are we achieving this kind of realisation because we have achieved mutually assured disruption? From MAD, mutually assured deterrence, and mutually assured disruption, to what you just said: mutually assured construction. By that kind of realisation, after nine years, we figure out that as wars are going on and the world is in a different chaotic place, the U.S. and China have to work together. We have to, as President Trump put it properly, recognise a G2 or near-peer status.

What we get from strategic stability, or what you have called for many years managed competition, is that we have to recognise reality. We cannot go on fighting each other or sanctioning each other. We have to find a way to coexist peacefully. Even though strategic stability may not be that concrete, as you said, in the Chinese narrative, if you have a guiding narrative, then everything else follows through and can be much easier. That is how Chinese people approach things: it is a long-term objective.

What do you think about this paradigm shift, from the first term’s strategic rivalry to the second term’s strategic stability? I hope we are going to bottom out and maybe keep managed competition, as you mentioned. Minister Wang mentioned Olympic-style competition. Maybe we could seek a more stable world as time goes on. What do you think about this paradigm shift, or this move from strategic rivalry, which the Trump administration no longer emphasises? I have not heard any official talk about strategic rivalry. On the contrary, I still hear Europeans talk about systemic rivalry, which probably was inspired by the first Trump term. But the U.S. is not mentioning strategic rivalry; now it talks about strategic stability. It adds some modifiers at the end, but it is still strategic stability. What is your take on that?

David Shambaugh

Again, these phrases and narratives are important for us to consider, but we should not put too much stock in them. Just because you declare something does not make something that way in reality. We can declare that the U.S.-China relationship is a strategically stable relationship, but in fact, that is aspirational, I would argue.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Could this also be a recognition of reality?

David Shambaugh

The reality is comprehensive competition, comprehensive across all domains and every region of the world.

Henry Huiyao Wang

But it has to be managed.

David Shambaugh

But it has to be managed, exactly. I was the first one to use the term “managed competition” about 12 years ago, Henry. That is interesting; you knew that. I also coined the term “competitive coexistence” six or seven years ago. That is what I think we should try and achieve in the U.S.-China relationship.

The U.S. and China are going to be competing across every domain and every region of the world as far as the eye can see. We need to recognise that reality. We should not deny it, but you have to learn how to manage it. There are different mechanisms for management, beginning with dialogue, but there are other institutional mechanisms for managing strategic rivalry, in the military domain, for example.

Let us be clear about why the narratives are important, because they set the general direction, the 主要方向, and they produce guardrails and a road map. That is all very positive. We did not have guardrails and a road map before last week. Throughout the Biden administration, they tried a little bit, but the Biden administration did not succeed very well. Now at least we have a framework, a floor under the relationship, and we have guardrails around it to a much better extent.

But look, these are the two big powers in the world. If you take International Relations 101, you start with Athens and Sparta, and you move on through late 19th-century Europe, into the 20th century in the Cold War, and into the 21st century. These two powers are competitive. They are intrinsically competitive in every domain. But that goes back to what I was saying earlier, that competition is not a negative concept. It is not a zero-sum phenomenon. It can be a positive-sum, constructive element in a relationship. So I guess that is how I would respond.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. You mentioned the Thucydides Trap. Actually, President Xi talked to President Trump during the meeting, saying that this trap does not have to happen and we do not have to follow that old path. I remember we had a dialogue with Graham Allison a few times. I even wrote a book on how to escape the Thucydides Trap, summarising our dialogues. Basically, I think the title of his first book is very frightening: Destined for War. We want to avoid that.

But peace in the whole world is in danger now. You see what happened in the Russia-Ukraine war, and what happened in Iran with the U.S. and Israel. Larger peace and the stability of the world are in jeopardy, while China is the largest trading partner with every one of them. That is why I understand why President Trump and Putin came to China, and also why the Pakistani prime minister is coming, and why the Iranian foreign minister was here not long ago. They all want to know where China stands.

If China says, for example, that the Strait of Hormuz has to be open, that war should not continue, and that dialogue must be sought, that is an enormous message China can give. I think Trump has gained some consensus from China on that as well.

On the other hand, Trump also said that the U.S. does not want to see Taiwan become independent and does not want to send soldiers 9,500 miles away. Do you think that, since the U.S. president wants to be a peace president, as he said in his inaugural speech, and now he is involved in wars and wants to calm them down, he is looking for a larger peace? China is looking for peace across the Taiwan Strait, so perhaps they now have a lot of common understanding on peace.

Trump can better understand China’s position, because for China, to take Taiwan would be very easy. You can see what Iran did by blocking Hormuz. If China were going to block the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan probably would not have to be fought; it could get into real difficulties. I think the separatist movement has no future. Is that also why President Trump recognises reality, and also China’s support for peace in the Middle East and eventually maybe in the Russia-Ukraine war?

Do you think there are many exchanges on these greater global peace and security issues, including peace across the Taiwan Strait, that both China and the U.S. want? Many people interpret Trump’s visit to China as seeking China’s consensus on some of those peace issues and global conflicts. China did make a very strong statement to make sure peace is maintained in the Middle East, and they also talked about Iran. That was in Wang Yi’s statement on the bilateral talks between President Xi and President Trump.

What do you think about the future, and Trump’s position on Taiwan, which is also quite positive, I think? He does not support Taiwan independence, and he does not want to fight 9,500 miles away.

David Shambaugh

Thank you, Henry. I neglected to answer your previous question about the first Trump administration’s National Security Strategy references to China and the second Trump administration’s National Security Strategy references to China. They are very different, obviously.

So what has changed between Trump 1.0 and Trump 2.0? That is, I think, President Trump himself is less encumbered by the bureaucracy, who sees China across the American bureaucracy as a peer competitor. Trump does not have that view of China. Trump does not think in global strategic terms. He is a businessperson. He does have some intuitive sense, though, about great powers, and he understands China in that context. He wants a major commercial relationship with China in both directions: Chinese investment into the United States, and an improved climate for American business here in China, which has had difficulties for a number of years.

It is again an example of this agent-structure paradigm that we call in political science. The agent is the president: he is the leader, and he is imposing his personality and his own views about China, and Russia by the way, onto the bureaucracy. It is affecting American support for Ukraine, and it is affecting the China relationship and Taiwan.

So I will answer your question with regard to Taiwan, but here we have a classic example of a leader who is really imposing his vision. Indeed, in China, the leader is imposing his vision. I am sure the bureaucracy here...I know the bureaucracy here sees the United States in adversarial, competitive terms. But the two leaders met last week, and they have created this new environment. It is not a G2. It never will be a G2. People who argue in that direction, I think, are dreaming. But it is now a managed competitive situation.

Now, with regard to Taiwan, I haven’t been privy to previous discussions at that level about Taiwan between previous American presidents and Chinese leaders, but this time there was some significant. But that is the significant outcome of the summit that I saw. Two things: number one, going into the summit, we were all expecting that the Chinese side would somehow get President Trump to say that he opposes Taiwan independence instead of saying that he does not support Taiwan independence. That did not happen. He did not use that language. There were fears that Trump was going to say he supports the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China, but Trump did not fall into that trap and did not say that.

When it comes to Taiwan arms sales, Xi Jinping directly asked him—I saw the footage—“Are you going to militarily intervene in Taiwan?” And Trump replied, “I do not discuss that.” That is continuity of the strategic ambiguity principle that the United States has followed with respect to possibly intervening in a Taiwan situation. Possibly. The United States has never, by law or policy, been committed to intervening. Americans have always said it will depend on the situation. The Taiwan Relations Act simply stipulates that the United States shall give Taiwan adequate articles of self-defence, I think is the language.

So, Trump dodged three traps on Taiwan: the “oppose independence” trap, the “peaceful reunification” trap, and the commitment not to sell weapons to Taiwan. That was when he was here in Beijing. Then he gets on the airplane, leaves, goes back, and is very provocative. He says to the media journalists on Air Force One, “I need to talk to the person”—he called him the person; he did not call him the leader or president—“in Taiwan concerning this.”

Well, that is what we are all waiting for now, right? A telephone call between Trump and Lai Ching-te. I do not know if it is going to happen, ladies and gentlemen. If it did, it would be highly provocative. It would violate every principle that the United States has had since 1979. The United States does not talk to the president and the government on Taiwan or the authorities. We do not call it a government; we call it the authorities. But in his first administration, Trump did receive a phone call of congratulations on his election.

So we have to wait to see whether the $14 billion arms sales package is going to go through. I do not know. But last point: if you read Wang Yi’s speech, I think one of the most significant parts of it is that Wang Yi says President Xi really got through to Trump about China’s perspective on the Taiwan question and its historical dimensions. I think this is registered with Trump in a way that it did not previously, and perhaps did not with other previous American presidents. So progress was made in that regard. We will have to wait and stay tuned. But there are three actors here: Beijing, Washington, and Taipei.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I see. I noticed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson mentioned that China opposes any official ties with Taiwan, and any discussion of a possible call. I think the MFA spokesperson strongly condemned that. It is also interesting to hear that, because the U.S. has used up its arsenals and military supplies in the Ukraine war, it may delay or cancel arms sales to Taiwan. That was also in the news.

I do see some positive signs from this visit. At least Trump is saying that they do not want to send soldiers 9,500 miles away. I am sure there will still be another three summits. I hope this is recognised as China’s core interest. Of course, the U.S. has many core interests everywhere now: in Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe. They all need China’s support and understanding, or maybe some consensus there. If we can have a better understanding of each other, maybe we can solve these things much more easily.

Let us come to another subject, perhaps our final two questions. One question is that we saw Trump bring 17 top CEOs, the biggest companies in the U.S., to China. That was really impressive. President Trump said many CEOs still wanted to come, and they only allowed the number ones to come; other senior executives were not able to come. There was a big coverage of those major CEO visits.

The business ties between China and the United States are still pretty strong. To see how eager all those big CEOs were to come shows the interest. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also indicated that American interest in China is still very strong. Of course, they also set up two boards, one on trade and one on investment, specifically to increase trade and explore categories of goods that can be exempted from tariffs, as well as investment and what non-sensitive, non-security areas can be invested in.

I think, also, people-to-people exchanges and students are important. Maybe next time, China could announce visa-free entry for Americans. The U.S. is the only G7 country that has not received visa-free treatment. Maybe we can reopen the consulates shut down in Houston and Chengdu. There are many low-hanging fruits that we could pursue.

One of the things we need to get rid of is this over-security issue. Too much of everything is treated as security. There are about 2,000 Chinese companies on the U.S. sanctions list, whereas only about 20 U.S. companies are on the Chinese sanctions list, mainly for selling weapons to Taiwan. With these two boards on trade and investment, maybe we can lower this hype of securitisation, which is everywhere: people-to-people exchanges, students, professors, academics, think tanks, and experts. Over-securitisation is probably something we need to overcome. What do you think we should do to increase business and people-to-people exchanges?

David Shambaugh

Henry, I could not agree with you more. In fact, last night, we were discussing this over dinner. I too feel that the relationship has become over-securitised on both sides towards the other, and there is collateral damage being done to the business community, to the academic community, and to others who should be interacting normally between our two societies.

Both sides have prioritised national security. Xi Jinping has made it the number one national goal. China’s number one national goal is no longer development. 不是发展，现在第一是国家安全, right? That is a change; that is a narrative change. The same is true for the United States. The American side has over-securitised various activities of Chinese entities, not just companies on the entity list in the United States.

I think both sides have to step back and remove these impediments to normal people-to-people interaction. It is going to be very hard to build the framework relationship that they have just stated they are trying to do until they can unwind and dismantle some of these impediments that both sides are putting on. That is the responsibility of each country to define their own national security: What is real national security and what is not necessarily.

So I just wanted to say one last point on the Taiwan arms sales question. Whether the new $14 billion package is approved or not, there is already a six-year backlog of weapons that have not been delivered to Taiwan. So far as the Taiwanese are concerned, it is not the current package they want; it is the six years that are sitting somewhere in the pipeline. The types of weapons that have been moved from Northeast Asia to the Persian Gulf to attack Iran are not the types of weapons that the Taiwanese would be receiving from the United States. Taiwan is not going to get Tomahawk missiles, ladies and gentlemen, and those sorts of munitions.

Henry Huiyao Wang

David, on the securitisation issue, maybe I have somewhat different views from yours. China did not put the U.S. as a strategic rival. China did not sanction thousands of U.S. companies. It was actually the opposite. When China faced the U.S. national security strategy, where China was described as the number one rival, even before Russia, and with 2,000 Chinese companies on American lists, of course China had to put security as a top priority because China felt threatened. There is quite a bit of reinforcement of China’s position, to some extent.

But I do think President Trump’s visit to China is a great way forward. A good example is that under President Trump, we have solved the TikTok issue. It has been solved pretty well and is now operating smoothly.

Maybe we should take advantage of the fact that 17 CEOs came. Next time, when President Xi visits the United States from September 24 to 26—President Trump announced those dates—perhaps China could bring 18 or maybe 20 Chinese CEOs. Let us even have a China-U.S. CEO summit, alternating between the two countries every year. That would be really great. Maybe we can gradually build up some trust.

As you said, we have put a floor at the bottom. I hope now is the bottom, and we can gradually rise up. Of course, we have structural problems. As the two largest economies, there is bound to be some competition, and particular things will happen. But let us not get into conflict. As I discussed with Graham Allison, if we end up in a fight, possibly a nuclear fight, we are going to return to the Stone Age. It would devastate the whole world, and that is not an option. When that option is mutually deterred, the only option left is that we work together. Let us conquer Mars together. Let us fly to the moon together. Let us tackle climate change.

I give high credit to President Trump’s visit this time, and I am sure 2026 will be a good stabiliser for China-U.S. relations.

David Shambaugh

I certainly hope so. And I like very much your suggestion of a CEO summit, which maybe they could do under this new Board of Investment, because we need more Chinese investment into the United States in certain industries. We have national security concerns too, but there is a large variety of sectors in which there are no national security concerns, and Chinese companies should be welcomed into the U.S., and vice versa: American companies here. So we need to improve that dimension.

The last point I would make is: What do we need to be careful about going forward? I would say we need to be more careful about over-securitisation. That is the first thing. I completely agree with you, Henry.

The second thing we need to be careful about is not over-institutionalising the relationship. There is a temptation to go back—this is what governments do: “Let us set up working groups, then we will turn a working group into a vice-ministerial dialogue, turn a vice-ministerial dialogue into a ministerial dialogue, and then we will go up to even higher.” During the Obama administration, there were no fewer than 98, basically 100, bilateral U.S.-China dialogues at the government-to-government level. Trump came in 2017 and cut them to under five. Good. It was a waste of airplane fuel, flying these delegations back and forth, preparations going into these meetings, and then they would produce some communique, perhaps at the end, and then the communique would not be implemented.

Many countries, not just the United States, including European countries and others, developed what they called “dialogue fatigue”. China loves dialogues, and dialogue is intrinsic to diplomacy. But I think there is a temptation, now that we are to put a floor under the relationship, to reconstruct the architecture of dialogues and ministerial interactions. I believe in working groups. Small is beautiful. You do not need this big edifice, because it is never implemented. So I think we have to be careful not to go there.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I have a different view on that, because China is very highly centralised. There is always a top-down approach. Government bureaucrats have to work through these things, and then they can trickle down to business. Different countries may start differently. For the U.S., a smaller government is better and fewer meetings are better. But in China, it is really about building consensus through collectivism, and then trickling down. I still think we need high-level summits, like what happened just last week, and also high-level meetings. I think eventually they will promote better relations. Maybe at the Obama time there were too many, but now there are too few. We need a good balance.

David Shambaugh

Wang Yi identified eight specific areas in his press conference that the two sides agreed to. This is critical. The American administration, after the summit, did not say anything about those eight areas. It is the Chinese side that said eight specific areas. So I would imagine and hope that they can establish working groups in all eight areas: public health, and all eight. That is the first step. My suggestion is that I do not want it to become too large. I want it to be efficient, focused, and professional.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. On that note, we will open to our distinguished audience and experts for comments and questions. We have the ambassador from Norway. I saw you raise your hand. Yes, and the ambassador from Argentina too. One represents Europe, one represents Latin America. Good.

Vebjørn Dysvik, Ambassador of Norway to China

Thank you very much for the invitation and the introduction. It was very useful. You have not been picked up by the Trump administration yet, Professor, but if you were, what kind of advice would you give to Trump about what to do next, the next step after the summit? That is one question. The second question is: What do you think he or his administration will actually do?

David Shambaugh

I can tell you that the current Trump administration has not contacted me at all since they came into office. The first Trump administration did. I had a number of interactions with them, as I have had with every American administration, Democrat and Republican, going back to Jimmy Carter, for whom I worked on the National Security Council and at the State Department during the Carter administration, at the time of normalisation of relations. I have advised every administration since, until this current one.

This current administration, first of all, does not believe in experts. They do not want experts in their administration, and they do not want to consult experts outside their administration. I was saying to somebody over lunch that they are very opposed to expertise. So I do not expect to be getting any phone calls from the Trump administration any time soon.

If they did, I would give the advice I just gave: Do not over-institutionalise the relationship. The Chinese are going to come at you, is what I would anticipate, because that is what China does. I would say: do not fall for it. Start small working groups, as I just said, manageable and focused. That is one piece of advice.

And just keep the momentum. Fortunately, we have three more heads-of-state meetings this calendar year alone. That sets the calendar. There is not a lot of time between these meetings, and it takes a lot of preparation. It should take a lot of preparation. Unfortunately, prior to this most recent summit, the American side was not prepared. I will be very honest about this. The Chinese side was very critical of the American government. The Chinese side was reaching out and wanting to have very detailed conversations to arrange every aspect of the visit, not just the optics and photo ops—the president stands here, the president goes there—but the content. This Trump administration operates very differently.

If they contacted me, I suppose I would talk to them. But I would tell them: be wary of over-institutionalisation and over-securitisation. That is what I would tell them.

Marcelo Suárez Salvia, Ambassador of the Argentine Republic to China

Thank you very much, Henry and Mabel, and all your CCG team, for organising this. Professor, thank you very much for your very informative input. Maybe you kind of responded to one of the questions I had, but I will still pose it again.

In the absence of outcomes and deliverables from this summit, why do you think, according to your experience in bilaterals at the highest level, that the U.S. delegation did not want to mirror, for instance, a readout or something like that, so that we could check whether whatever has been said on the Chinese side has been fully agreed by the U.S. side? That is one question.

When we talk about managed competition, may that also mean there might have been some conversations about how to regionalise the world in terms of where to compete and how? Because during a briefing made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—I could not attend, by the way, so this is hearsay—one of my colleagues asked if there had been any mention of Latin America during the summit, and their response was negative. So might regionalisation be part of this managed competition? Thank you.

David Shambaugh

I am afraid I have already forgotten your first question. But they did not do a tour of the world in their dialogue, although the White House readout three days ago or so mentioned the Middle East and Iran. They discussed those separately, somehow, and North Korea. The most interesting thing in that statement is that the White House said both leaders agreed to the denuclearisation of North Korea. That jumped out at me. Neither the United States nor China has made that statement. The Chinese side has not made that statement in at least a decade.

So, if indeed the Chinese side is in favour of denuclearising North Korea, which now has between 40 and 60 nuclear warheads, ladies and gentlemen, that is an interesting potential area of strategic cooperation.

But they did not talk about the whole world. Usually, when American and Chinese presidents get together, they do march around the world. Latin America, I hate to say it, is usually not included in that discussion. It should be. Latin America, as you probably know, is the Trump administration’s number one priority in the new National Security Strategy, more than the Indo-Pacific region. China is deeply embedded in and involved in Latin America. I have done a lot of research on that subject in your country, and in Chile, Brazil, and Peru, so I am aware of the role that China plays in the Western Hemisphere.

But no, as I understand it, the two presidents did not go into that.

But your first question—Why was there no joint statement? Good question. First of all, that is not the way President Trump operates. If you are going to have a joint statement, it has to be negotiated well in advance and agreed to, and then issued as soon as the meeting is over. That is not the way Trump does diplomacy. That is my guess.

The Chinese side maybe thought, “What about a joint statement?” to the U.S., and the Trump administration, I am just guessing here, said, “No, thank you,” because Trump is too spontaneous. You do not want to be boxed in by anything like a pre-prepared joint statement. That would be my anticipation.

I am not against joint statements, except that they are excessively long. I was living here in 2009 and 2010 when President Obama came, and they issued a joint statement that had 144 items on it. And I am sure they are going to implement that. That is what I mean by over-institutionalisation.

We did not have a joint statement. That is okay. That is not the significance of this summit. It is not the so-called deliverables in a joint statement. The significance of this summit is, as we have been discussing today, just that it took place. The relationship has now got a framework, it’s more stable, and moving forward.

Henry Huiyao Wang

But we do see some concrete outcomes, such as Boeing, and the 170 billion U.S. dollars every year, and also exchanges on both sides, with many further economic activities. So it does provide some—

David Shambaugh

Yes, a good framework. Contracts were signed.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. Okay, Colum. From Bloomberg.

Colum Murphy, Senior China Economy and Government Reporter, Bloomberg News

Thank you very much. Just very quickly, is the Board of Investment an example of over-institutionalisation? Is that something that we should be worried about?

And secondly, on the issue of all of these leaders coming to Beijing, and as you say, China’s diplomacy, quantitatively, is on the uptick for sure. We’ve seen more visitors coming. But is China really grasping that opportunity? I think that is one of the arguments that you made in your recent piece. And if so, why not?

One possibility, in my view, is perhaps an inability to oversee, or to get over, bilateral considerations. Now, specifically, I’m talking about, on our doorstep, the two biggest economies in the world, China and Japan, and yet we can’t seem to figure out a solution to that. So I guess my question is: in terms of the diplomatic opportunity for Xi Jinping and China, it seems to be present, but what are some of the factors that might explain why China is not fully grasping that opportunity?

David Shambaugh

Okay, thank you. Let me see if I can retain your two questions in my head.

On the first question—a very good and valid question—is the new Board of Investment and Board of Trade an example of over-institutionalisation? Answer: yes. First of all, the whole notion of managed trade is inconsistent with the WTO and with the rules we are all supposed to operate by. Similarly for investment—you know, mutually agreed investment.

So it’s unclear what these two boards are supposed to do. They weren’t defined at all. They were just announced. If the investment board is a forum for just informing the other side of possible investment opportunities, then it is a dialogue mechanism, then that is worthwhile. But there is no way a bilateral board is going to regulate flows of FDI between the two societies. A Board of Trade can’t do that either.

So I suspect—check back in three months and see if either of these two new boards even exists. My guess is they won’t, and they shouldn’t.

And your second question about my Foreign Affairs article. What I would suggest is: read the Foreign Affairs article. I make the argument there that all countries in the world are hedging between America, China, and Russia. Europe is caught between three predatory powers: China, Russia, and America now. Europe is in a very difficult strategic position. But every other hemisphere—

The question is: can China take advantage of Trump’s bullying and coercion, and the inexcusable behaviour—and I say this as an American—that has come out of this administration towards friends, allies, neutral countries, the Global South, the Global North, everybody? He is handing Xi Jinping a golden platter for strategic advancement on the global stage.

The question is: can China take advantage? The answer, I argue in this recent Foreign Affairs article, is that so far, not. It is still early days. It takes a long time to take advantage. But the reason is that all these regions of the world—Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa even, and the Indo-Pacific region—and individual countries all have problems with China. They have their own problems that predate Trump, and those problems are not going to just disappear.

So we’re in a different kind of world now. It’s not a bipolar world. It is certainly not a G2 world. Nor is it a bipolar world. It is a much more diffuse world. So I don’t know. That’s what I would say.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Well, I do think China’s attractiveness has increased. For example, China recently announced that from May 1, goods from 53 African countries coming to China will be exempted from tariffs, with zero tariffs. That is going to encourage a lot of European companies to set up shops in Africa and re-export to China with zero tariffs. So we do see a lot of good gestures out of that.

Maybe we’ll invite a lady to raise a question.

Zhuorui Fu, Associate Economic Officer, UN ESCWA

I want to ask about managed competition in the field of AI—

David Shambaugh

Can you identify yourself, please?

Zhuorui Fu

Sure. I work at the UN, and I spent nine years in the Middle East, seven years of which were in Iran. AI, and especially AI compute, is the new oil. It occupies the same strategic weight as rare earths, oil, and others. Saudi Arabia is building data centres of five gigawatts, which is pretty big, but the biggest are still China’s and the U.S.’s. Nobody competes with them.

Jensen Huang came to China just now, and people realised that the chip embargo on China did not kill the Chinese AI industry. Actually, China is quickly finding AI substitutes.

So my two questions are short and sweet. In the AI domain, do you think it is a zero-sum game between China and the U.S.? That’s number one. And number two, regarding managed competition in AI, do you think it is a better way of saying: actually, we failed to kill you, or we failed to subdue your industry, so let’s find a way to coexist?

David Shambaugh

Okay, thank you. I was trying to follow. I’m the last person that you should ask about AI. But it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to recognise the importance of this in today’s world, the potentialities of it we have not yet discovered or seen. That’s the one thing I was hoping would come out of this summit. That is the one working group that we really need, that is not among Wang Yi’s eight working groups: an AI working group between the U.S. and China.

First, it is not a zero-sum game, to answer your question. Not at all. These are the two leading countries in AI. But there is so much synergy between Silicon Valley and Zhongguancun, and China in general. Both countries are innovation superpowers. It is not zero-sum. Innovation is a positive-sum, competitive thing. So actually, competition in AI is a good thing for both sides.

So I hope that answers that part of your question. But we need to have such a dialogue, because it is entering the military domain. Both the Pentagon and the People’s Liberation Army are already deploying AI systems.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think actually this summit touched upon AI, and they agreed that they are going to have some kind of mechanism on that. So this is good.

Professor Shi from Renmin University.

Shi Yinhong, retired professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China

Thanks, Dr Henry Wang. I have taken full consideration of the positive meanings and significance of Professor David Shambaugh coming here. I suppose that if you speak in Washington, your tone would naturally be somewhat different.

For this tifa, I have great doubts, because three questions have not been answered. The first question: where does this competition, or rivalry, come from? Second, which are structural, situational, and idiosyncratic? Third, what kind of mutual concessions are required for managing them?

Without answers, it will remain a rhetoric. And unfortunately, I think you have paid a little too much attention to scholastic language analysis. I always pay much more weight to concrete things.

The conclusion is that the rhetoric seems to be bought by China through American material trade gains worth tens of billions. Beijing’s priority before the summit, I think, must be not extorted too much trade demand by Trump, too much to surpass the real domestic economic demand at home. But this bottom line seems to have been broken.

The Chinese government agreed to buy at least 17 billion U.S. dollars’ worth of American soybeans and other agricultural products annually through 2028. This is a threefold increase compared with its commitment made last October in Busan. So the bottom line of real demand at home has again been broken.

According to Washington’s declaration and Beijing’s confirmation, China will approve the purchase of 200 American-made Boeing aircraft for Chinese airlines.

I remember again and again that during the Labour Day holidays in China, airlines kept their so cheap as to be incredible. Still, so few people bought air tickets, and even fewer people took high-speed rail. And 绿皮火车, slow railway trains became more popular than ever before.

I think that the Chinese economy and its financial capability—for example, our influence on other continents, Africa for example, and our foreign-aid capability—are correspondingly going down. This is the most fundamental basic fact for China, just like the inability to win the war in Europe is the most important defining fact for Russia.

I think China’s economic and financial capability, and for example, its influence on other continents such as Africa, and its capacity for foreign aid, will correspondingly go down. This is the most fundamental basis for China, just as the inability to win the war in Europe is the most important defining fact for Russia.

So I think, of course, we can declare a lot of things. But other people on other continents are realistic just like us. Maybe if we promise in rhetoric too much, this will in turn hurt us even more, because finally we cannot deliver. We have to deliver first of all to the Chinese people.

Zhao Shengchuan, Professor, Josai International University

Thank you very much for the invitation and for your insightful thoughts. I am a professor teaching in Tokyo. I am Chinese, so I think it is natural for me to ask you a question regarding relations with Japan.

What is your viewpoint about Japan’s role in affecting the U.S.-China relationship, as China’s neighbour or as a partner nation of the U.S.? Is Japan something, or nothing, in affecting the U.S.-China relationship? What are your thoughts on that? I want to know. Thank you.

David Shambaugh

Well, thank you for the question. I do not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Japan. However, Japan is America’s leading No. 1 or No. 2 ally in the world. That’s simple. Together with the United Kingdom, this is an unbreakable, unshakable alliance. Very deep.

And it is not going to change, in my expectation. So it is just a fact of life, a fact of strategic life, and a fact of diplomatic life. I understand what is probably underlying your question, but I am not going to go there with regard to recent statements by the Japanese prime minister. If that is what you are fishing for, sorry, I am not going to go there.

Geography doesn’t change. Japan is where it is. Japan is an American ally, and the United States is Japan’s important ally. So it is a fact of strategic and diplomatic life. Other countries in the region and in the world need to understand and accept that.

As for Professor Shi, for those of you who don’t know, he is one of China’s leading—truly leading—historians and international relations scholars. He is an old friend of four decades, and it is wonderful to see you again.

You asked again a number of very insightful questions. I had a hard time remembering them all. You mentioned high-speed rail at one point. That is something that we in America definitely need and should welcome from China and from Japan—the Shinkansen. So we can start with the investment in high-speed rail.

You also asked about several other items. Competition—where does the competition come from? I think that was your initial question. Well, I think of the competition like a soccer match with no extra time and no referee. It is continual. Competition is like dynamic stability, it is evolutionary. It is fluid. It is constant. You have to manage it with referee and rules. But we live in a world today where there is no referee. The United Nations is not the referee. The World Trade Organisation is not the referee.

So there have to be normative restraints on countries, even if international law is not sufficient to restrain countries. Competition between great powers goes back to Athens and Sparta. For us not to acknowledge competition between the United States and China is simply not recognising reality.

So I think once you recognise it, then you can talk about it, and you can unpack it, and then you can maybe work on it and try to narrow differences and ameliorate competition. Again, ladies and gentlemen, if you leave here with one thing today, competition is not inherently negative or zero-sum. So it is a good thing. Competition helps us all.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, I think given the time, we will probably end here. I agree with David that infrastructure would be a good area to start. It is less sensitive, and I think the U.S. is at a time when it needs a very advanced high-speed railway system, and China certainly can offer a lot of help. The high-speed rail that was supposed to be built in California has not really moved much. So we hope that many more areas can be identified as positive for both sides.

Today, we had a very good and constructive dialogue, I would say, and very frank discussions. Of course, we have different views, but that does not prevent us from engaging in deep dialogue and promoting better understanding.

I do think that since the summit between President Trump and President Xi over the past week, U.S.-China relations have probably entered some kind of new normal. At least we are engaging in more dialogues, more discussions, and more exchanges. I hope that momentum continues with another three visits. And maybe, as our leader just said, we should really put the U.S.-China relationship into a constructive strategic stability.

On that note, I want to thank all of you very much, and again thank Professor David Shambaugh for coming to CCG this afternoon to engage in this CCG Global Dialogue. Thank you. Welcome.

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The luncheon was hosted by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG. The panel discussion was moderated by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG.

Keynote speakers are:

• George Fu Gao, Academician, Chinese Academy of Sciences; Former Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

• Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations (U.S.); professor and director of global health studies, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University

Ambassadors in attendance included Scott Dewar, Australian Ambassador to China; Koula Sophianou, Ambassador of Cyprus to China; and Ian Marshall, Ambassador of Grenada. Also present were representatives from the Embassy of Australia, the Embassy of the Netherlands, the Embassy of the UAE, alongside scholars, business representatives, and members of the media.

CCG has broadcast the video recording of this luncheon on Chinese social media platforms and has also uploaded it to its official YouTube channel.

This transcript is based on the video recording and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Distinguished guests, excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, and thank you all for joining us today at the Center for China and Globalization VIP luncheon again. The CCG VIP Luncheon is a flagship high-level international exchange platform established by the Center for China and Globalization. It serves as a key bridge connecting global political, business, and academic communities to promote pragmatic cooperation between China and the world. Since its launch, this luncheon has maintained a China-based global perspective, closely following China’s opening up and international cooperation strategies. It has become one of China’s most influential non-governmental diplomatic and business exchange platforms.

Today’s theme is “Strategic New Opportunities for China’s Healthcare Industry in the Post-Pandemic Era”. China is steadily deepening its healthcare reform, upgrading the big health industry, and improving universal healthcare coverage. Under the new Five-Year Plan, China’s average life expectancy is expected to reach 80 years, advancing steadily toward even higher goals. These developments and changes not only affect the health and well-being of the entire population but also present new opportunities and challenges for medical enterprises, pharmaceutical companies, and multinational drug firms.

Today, we are honoured to host this VIP luncheon, bringing together leading experts with deep experience in scientific research, policy, and global health. We also have professionals from medical enterprises, the big health industry, multinational companies, investors, and related practitioners who join today’s event. We believe this luncheon will foster rich and substantive dialogue, offering valuable insights and connections for all participants.

Before we start, let us take a moment to acknowledge some of our special guests and VIPs who are here. We have representatives from distinguished diplomatic missions, including several ambassadors and government authorities, as well as academic institutions, healthcare and life science professionals, corporate leaders, and media representatives. They include:

• His Excellency Mr Scott Dewar, Australian Ambassador to China

• Her Excellency Ms Koula Sophianou, Ambassador of Cyprus to China

• His Excellency Mr Ian Marshall, Ambassador of Grenada

We also have embassy representatives from the Australian Embassy, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the UAE Embassy.

International organisation representatives include Olga Dzhumaeva, Head of the East Asia Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).

Government and academic representatives include Denis Simon, Chairman of the Association of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO) and former Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University; Yang Xiaolin, Vice President of Anhui Provincial People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries; and Sha Yang, Consultant, Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery Khoo Teck Puat Hospital Singapore.

We also have corporate representatives from many medical and healthcare industries, so welcome to all of you. We have also invited media friends from China High-Tech Industry Herald, People’s Daily, CCTV, Caijing Magazine, and others.

Now, please welcome Dr. Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, to introduce our programme and also introduce our two distinguished keynote speakers: Mr Gao Fu, Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and former Director-General of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention; and Dr Huang Yanzhong, Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, a well-known American think tank. Welcome all of you, and the floor is yours, Dr Wang.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Thank you, Dr Miao. Distinguished guests, excellencies, experts, ambassadors, officials, and all the guests here today, this is the 23rd CCG VIP Luncheon. Over the past two years, we have held 23 sessions. It has become a landmark global exchange platform in Beijing.

We have many friends here, and we warmly welcome you. I also know that today we are competing with Trump, because there is a lot of attention on his upcoming visit tonight. Actually, he is arriving this evening. So I appreciate all of you coming to this luncheon at such short notice as well.

I noticed Roberta Lipson is here. You are one of the leaders of United Family Healthcare, a very large hospital enterprise. It is really great to have you here. We also have many expert friends from embassies, ambassadors, and experts across disciplines. We also have senior journalists from CCTV and other media. So it is really great.

Today’s luncheon, “Strategic New Opportunities for China’s Healthcare Industry in the Post-Pandemic Era,” is very important. We say “post-pandemic,” but we still see some small-scale pandemics or outbreaks happening. So it is important to remind ourselves how to continue improving pandemic prevention, and also how China’s healthcare industry has developed over the past several years.

Dr Miao just mentioned that, during the 15th Five-Year Plan, China’s life expectancy is expected to reach 80 years. That is an enormous objective and a great achievement. For these new opportunities and new challenges, we are very proud to have invited two prominent experts to share their thinking with us today.

First, I would like to introduce Academician Gao Fu. He is a prominent biologist and immunologist who works on virus host jumps and global health, and he is also an advocate for globalisation and interdependence in science. That is really important. I am glad to see an advocate for globalisation and interdependence, which is a rare value now in this era of great-power rivalry.

He has also served as Director-General of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and Vice President of the National Natural Science Foundation of China, among many other important posts. He has played a key role in improving public health emergency response mechanisms and has been instrumental in advancing the modernisation of China’s public health system and the global health security agenda.

He has been instrumental in promoting the control and prevention of the infodemic and infovirus, a term he used early and widely. That is very impressive. Now, I think Dr Gao continues to focus on the institutional challenges and solutions for reforming China’s healthcare system in the post-COVID era, advocating science-based infectious disease surveillance and early warning systems, emergency review mechanisms for drugs and vaccines, and cross-border coordination in disease control.

As one of the early discoverers of the virus and its receptor during the COVID-19 pandemic, he has actively promoted the innovation chain from basic research to industrial translation. He helped facilitate the development and application of the world’s first approved COVID-19 neutralising antibody drug and recombinant protein subunit vaccine, providing a practical model for how the biotech industry can serve national public health needs, and also international needs.

Dr Gao has been elected as a foreign member or fellow of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society of London, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the World Academy of Sciences, among many world-renowned organisations. He has received international honours, including the UNESCO–Equatorial Guinea International Prize for Research in the Life Sciences, the Galilea Medal of Russia, the Nikkei Asia Prize of Japan, and the Nigerian Government Award of Excellence in Global Health.

He is committed to sharing China’s experience in global health governance and promoting the vision of a global community of health for all in cross-border epidemic response, technical assistance, and international cooperation in the bioindustry. Among other things, he is also the author of several popular science books, including Cat and Mouse Game Between Humans and Microbes, and he works actively to enhance public understanding of science.

He has a very impressive CV, and I cannot cover all of it. So without further ado, let us welcome Dr. Gao to give his talk and presentation.

George Fu Gao, Academician, Chinese Academy of Sciences; former Director-General, Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention

Thank you, Henry. Thank you for inviting me to be here to share my view on almost, I should say, everything about post-COVID. Finally, we have passed through COVID. So where are we now, and what can we do?

When Henry asked me, “Can you come here to share your view about post-COVID, about Medicare and healthcare?” I said, “Okay, why not?”

So I am going to share my view in three parts. First, I will talk about my understanding of what we are doing at the moment in China for Medicare or healthcare. The second part, because I am a scientist, I would like to talk about post-COVID-19: where is the science, and what can we do with science, technology, and entrepreneurship? So where are the investment chances for everybody? That is my view. And the third part, I would like to say that we are living in the AI era, not just the post-COVID-19 era. So we have a lot of things we can do, especially for the infodemic and infovirus, and a new interdisciplinary field, infodemiology.

So these are the three parts I am going to cover here within my 15 minutes for the introduction. Henry told me to give a 15-minute introduction, and then we will have an open discussion.

The first slide I have is two Chinese words: “危机 weiji.” “Wei” means crisis, and “ji” means chance. So we have been experiencing so many crises, including the one at the moment. This is a Chinese word. The first one is double C. In the world, we are threatened by double C. We have hot wars at the moment: Russia-Ukraine, Iran-Israel, and the U.S. We have a Cold War. A lot of people used to be friends, but now they do not talk to each other. They are like a football wall. And then we have the tariff war, everything. So this is why we have the crisis.

Meanwhile, you have to think about where the chance is and what we can do under this crisis. So this is why I have this slide as my first slide.

Now, although we are at CCG—Henry created it together with Mabel—the last G of CCG is especially important: globalisation. So I would like to use the word: Where are we now? Post-COVID, is it the end, or is it the dying period of globalisation? Do you really think we still have globalisation? We have anti-globalisation movements all over the world. So globalisation is dying. I am not saying it is already dead, but it is dying. Because without globalisation, another problem follows: interdependency. So this is why so many governments encourage their own independence—interdependency is another word.

We thought we would work together. We would go to Mars together, led by Elon Musk. We would explore Mars. Of course, Elon Musk decided that we are not going to Mars; we are going to the Moon first. Right? He has come back to his idea. So this is where we are now. So this is why we need to redirect our thoughts and, for me as a scientist, our research.

Anyway, Henry, I hope your G will survive. I hope so. We will still have CCG here. Henry, without globalisation, it will be a waste of resources for the whole world. It is a waste of resources. So we still have to work together. If we do not work together, it is a massive waste of resources.

So this is why I want to remind everybody, because we are talking about health, that when the WHO was established in 1948, they defined health in three aspects. Health means a complete state of physical well-being, mental well-being, and social well-being. So this is why you are here, smiling and sitting here, because socially you are healthy. Your social health is healthy, because this is social life. You need social life.

This is to remind everybody about the three aspects of health. This is why, in my last part, I am going to touch on something about the infodemic. It has something to do with your social well-being. That also provides you with some industrialised ideas for your thinking.

This is why I am writing a lot of books about public understanding of science. Think about it: we used to have vaccine hesitancy. Now we have an anti-vaccine movement in the whole world. A lot of people do not want to have the vaccine. They think the vaccine is really risky for their kids.

However, if we want to live up to 120, we need to think about this. My focus at the moment, in my research, is that when you get into your 60s or 70s, should you get another round of vaccination? We have very good vaccination programmes for kids, but we have never thought very seriously about the elderly. How can we promote our immunity? How can we remind our immune system again? Some elderly people with infectious diseases, no one really takes care of them. But we are still talking about 120 years. Where is 100? Are we ready for the science? Are we ready for the technology? Are we ready for the products? Actually, we are not.

So this is why, in my last part, I will remind everybody: forget about the infodemic, forget about the anti-vaccination movement. Let us come back to think about how science and technology can help us survive at least to 120. Someone is already talking about 150. But if we are still fighting each other, if we do not have Henry’s last word, globalisation, how can we work together?

All countries are producing their own systems, and then we do not share data. We do not share achievements from different countries. I think we are in trouble.

So this is the first part of my talk. I have given you a lot of stories. I also want to tell you where Medicare or healthcare reform in China is at the moment.

In my opinion, China’s reform has two words. First, freedom. Give freedom to the farmers. Give freedom to individuals. They can do whatever they do. That is the first keyword.

The second keyword is openness—globalisation. Because for China’s 1.4 billion people, China opened the door. Roberta is here, right? Your company was set up very early. I have known Roberta for a while, right? So openness and freedom. If all countries do this, openness and freedom, I think we are in business.

So this is why I want to show you what the so-called Five-Year Plan is. We are now in the 15th Five-Year Plan for China. We still want to address something about this.

I think what matters is what we are talking about post-COVID. I want to remind everybody of the words from our President, Xi Jinping. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he said “people-centred” and “life-centred.” In Chinese, 人民至上 and 生命至上.

When you are talking about people-centred, that means the population level. Whatever policy you are making, you have to think about the population level. Life-centred means the individual level. Whatever you are talking about, how can you save every single individual life? So this is the policy you should cover.

Then after that, I want to tell you about One Health. We have to really think about the health of animals, the health of the environment, and the health of people. Without environmental and animal health, I do not think we have human health. That is why we have One Health, universal health. Now we even have planetary health, because we thought Elon Musk was going to take us to Mars. So how can you know what you would bring back when you come back from Mars? We do not know. Maybe some microbes—because I am a microbiologist—maybe it is not a virus, maybe it is bacteria. We never know what we will have.

I also review our National Health Commission. Dr Lei Haichao called this the Sanming experience. In Fujian province, we have Sanming. So for that, in my opinion, my personal view, there are two words again. The first expression is public welfare, so-called 公益性.

The second is community-level health. Because of China’s situation, to be honest, you have travelled so much and to so many places in China. If you are living in Shanghai, Beijing, or Guangzhou, you may think life in China is even much better than in New York or Sydney. But if you go to some areas, like Sichuan, or to my hometown in Shanxi province, in some rural areas, you may think, “Oh, this really is a developing country.” It is an unbalanced situation in China.

So this is why people ask me why we want to introduce traditional Chinese medicine in rural areas, and why we are working so hard to promote a health system and policy focused on the community level. Because without that, I think we will have trouble.

Think about the 17 SDGs from the United Nations. What do you really want? Equity and equality. You want to balance this. If you do not balance the health system for the wealthy and the poor, I think you are in a little trouble.

So exactly, I think this will end my first part about policy and what we are doing. Now I want to come to my second part: science and technology. Obviously, science and technology play a role.

I want to show you that in my own field, there are a lot of things. Why do we have trouble? Why can we not reach 120? It is behaviour and ecological change. A lot of diseases are behavioural diseases. Without cruise travel, we would not have the Andes virus, right? Without ecological change, if you did not disturb the Amazon forest, you would not have the Andes virus. Those viruses are hidden in that area.

So a lot of problems really come from behaviour. This is why body weight management is so important. It reminds you of your behaviour and of ecological change. This is why One Health and environmental health are everything.

Think about your behaviour change. If you do not believe your behaviour has already changed over the last 200 years, think about what you wore in the 18th century and what you wore in 1990. People always forget about this. I like to use this one to remind everybody that your behaviour has changed. You forgot about this.

That is why, in China, last year, there was a law on public health emergencies.

Now I want to think about science, technology, and the bioindustry. I am the president of the Chinese Society of Biotechnology. So we have BioChina. We also have a development report from my society.

So where are we? I saw that when Henry had the introduction about today’s luncheon, he used the words “following,” “running alongside,” and “leading.” I saw this. So when we talk about where China is in the medical industry, some people say, “Some of it, we are still following someone. Some of it, we are already running alongside. Some of it, we are already leading.” I can say that, at the moment, some areas are really leading.

I will give you some examples. For example, cell-based therapy in China is really leading. This is a very important field. Because we have so many clinical doctors, they are leading in this area.

Secondly, active pharmaceutical ingredients, APIs. You may not know APIs in my field, but you know the antibiotics. 80 per cent of antibiotics in the world, including in the U.S. and in European countries, are from China.

Then you have brain-computer interfaces. China is almost leading at the moment.

And then you have digital tissue sections. Before, you might have had some problems with misdiagnosis for some cancers. At the moment, because of digital tissue sections, you have pathologists all over the world to help you. This is why AI is so important.

I will give you some examples here. APIs, active pharmaceutical ingredients. China is really leading at the moment. This is why we still need globalisation. Do not just go back to your country and create your own APIs. Let us trust and let us work together. All over the world, share the data and share the products.

Next, I want to give you very quickly my own experience during the COVID-19 pandemic. My research group developed a vaccine, a protein subunit vaccine. I am running a basic research lab. My research is about how the virus gets into your cells, but that gives you a chance for vaccine development. We developed a vaccine, a protein subunit vaccine.

Then we also developed some molecular antibodies. Our monoclonal antibody was co-developed by Eli Lilly, an American company, even during the pandemic period. Even my own group collaborated with Eli Lilly, [inaudible], and Junshi Biosciences: three academic groups, Chinese companies, and Eli Lilly, a big pharma company. Together, we produced the monoclonal antibody. It saved millions of lives in 2021.

Now we are in the AI era. It will help us solve so many problems. Meanwhile, it also creates new problems for us. One of the problems is the infodemic: the anti-vaccination movement at the moment. Scientists are working so hard. Remember during the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists and professionals were attacked. Some people thought the virus was made up by scientists and professionals because they wanted to make money. So this is why they released the virus. There were so many rumours.

Because human beings do not have very good brains. We are not clever enough. This is a very good example.

Can we really live to 120? Recently, one good example is Sid Sijbrandij. He had a tumour, and the tumour was cured for two years. In 2024, the tumour came back. Then he organised his own team. He is so rich, and he organised his own team: geneticists, genomic scientists, computer scientists, everyone working together with him. Now he has recovered. This is big news, a big story.

So this is why, in the AI system, a good thing is that personalised medicine is here. And we will solve even cancer. Hassabis, the Nobel laureate, also mentioned this. So in the AI era, it is possible to solve all these cancer problems. Meanwhile, we have problems with ethics and morality. And infodemics are here.

We have the infodemic. That means misinformation and disinformation flow everywhere. Every morning, you are filled with fake news.

Here is an example. This is a very good example. I know maybe you do not like Charlie Kirk. Maybe you do not like Brian Thompson. However, you cannot kill them. But that is exactly what happened. Why is that? It is just infovirus and infodemic. Your brain is filled with so much hatred.

So that is another problem. I remind everybody: when you are talking about health, physical health—everybody sitting here is healthy. Mentally, those guys, the killers, are ill. They are not healthy. And socially, they are not healthy either. When we had monkeypox, people thought Bill Gates made up this virus. Can you believe it?

We grew up, and we know Francis Bacon said, “Knowledge is power.” But at the moment, remember Orwell’s novel 1984. He said, “Ignorance is strength.” At the moment, this is where we are living.

So my last slide is about the infodemic, infovirus, and infodemiology. Again, I will add up to tell everybody: when you are talking about healthcare and Medicare, think of three parts—physical, mental, and social. Without that thinking, I still think you are not in the business.

Thank you. I will stop here. Let us have a discussion. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you, Professor Gao. That was a great, excellent presentation. I think we’ve learned a lot. You covered quite a wide spectrum of this field, from pandemic to health development in China and the world, and all the latest innovations and all the areas that we need to pay attention to, particularly in the final part. I like the idea of the infodemic. That is, we are getting into the age of information explosion, but also fake news. So we must be very, very careful.

Before I introduce our next speaker, I also want to point out Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Chief Economist for Asia Pacific, Natixis, who just joined us. I saw you can come in. So next, I’d like to introduce another expert for his talk with us today. I’d like to introduce Dr Yanzhong Huang.

Dr Yanzhong Huang is a senior fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directs the Global Health Governance roundtable series, and a professor and director of Global Health Studies at Seton Hall University School of Diplomacy and International Relations. So he’s also an international expert, but more on the global health front as well. He’s currently on leave, serving as a Boeing Visiting Chair in International Relations at the Schwarzman Scholars Program at Tsinghua University. We have another professor at Tsinghua University here, Denis Simon, who is the former Provost of Duke Kunshan University. So a lot of experts are here today.

Professor Huang’s expertise encompasses Chinese public health, global health governance, and US China relations. He is the author of Governing Health in Contemporary China and Toxic Politics: China’s Environmental Health Crisis and Its Challenge to the Chinese State. His work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, the American Journal of Public Health, and peer reviewed journals like the China Journal of Health Security. He co authored his first article, which systematically examined China’s soft power in 2006—that’s twenty years ago.

Dr Huang has testified before US Congressional committees on multiple occasions and is regularly consulted by leading media outlets, private sector organizations, and of course government and non government bodies on global health and on China. He is a lifetime member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a member of the National Committee on US China Relations, and a member of the CSIS bipartisan alliance for global health security. In 2012, New Jersey named him one of the twenty brainiest people in New Jersey. Okay, that’s great. Excellent. So without further ado, I’d like to invite Professor Huang to give his part of the talk for this VIP luncheon. Welcome.

Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations (U.S.); professor and director of global health studies, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University

Well, thank you, Henry, for that very generous introduction, and thank CCG for organising this event. It’s a real privilege to share the stage with Academician Gao, someone who was quite literally at the centre of the storm in ways I was not. I’ll try not to say anything that makes him wince too visibly.

I want to be upfront about my intention today. I’m not here to deliver a definitive report or a tidy list of conclusions. Think of what I’m doing as the Chinese saying goes, “抛砖引玉 paozhuan yinyu”—throwing out a rough brick in hopes of inviting better jade in return. My hope is that what I say sparks a real conversation and that Dr Gao, Henry, and all of you, will push back, correct me, and fill in what I’ve missed.

I will, like Dr Gao, cover three areas in roughly equal time: public health, the healthcare industry, and global health. Fifteen minutes go fast, so I will move quickly.

So first, let me start with what I think is the most important question any of us in this room should be sitting with: if another pandemic came tomorrow, are we ready, or can we do better? I ask this not rhetorically. I ask it because, honestly, I’m not sure we know the answer. We’re certainly not running short of those pathogens of pandemic potential, called PPPs. There are just so many PPPs, right? Purchasing power parity, public private partnership—now we’re talking about pathogens of pandemic potential. We are thinking of hantavirus, norovirus, the outbreaks linked to cruise ships that are happening now.

In this respect, I want to flag an encouraging and important development in the post-COVID era that Dr. Gao actually alluded to. That is, China has overhauled its law on the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases. That law entered into force on September 1 last year. Two things stand out.

The first is on reporting. The law tries to fix a long standing and stubborn problem—the disincentive to report early. Basically, it explicitly protects and rewards individuals and institutions who report in good faith, even if the event is later ruled out. I think that’s a meaningful signal, both culturally and legally: you won’t be punished for raising an alarm.

Second, on data and privacy, the law limits the use of personal health data strictly to disease prevention purposes. Those of you who remember the controversy over digital health codes during COVID will appreciate why that matters, both legally and politically.

Now, let’s cast your minds back to early 2020. After the Wuhan outbreak, there was a moment—brief as it turned out—of genuine institutional introspection. There was a real appetite for honest assessment. That was encouraging. But here’s what I found powerful: since COVID, the public conversation seems to have gone quiet. What happened in Guangdong during the chikungunya outbreak last year only deepened that uncertainty, because there we saw local governments made containing the outbreak the overriding political task and adopted a mass mobilisation playbook for a mosquito borne disease that is really fateful.

But that uncertainty is certainly not unique to China. In the United States, COVID 19 has become essentially a forgotten pandemic. We saw the politicisation of public health, as Dr Gao pointed out, vaccine skepticism. And actually, we have a vaccine sceptic being the Secretary of Health and Human Services. That is undermining the U.S. capacity in pandemic prevention and preparedness, another PPP. So if another pandemic came, we’re likely even less prepared than we were before 2020. That was essentially the conclusion we drew in the Council on Foreign Relations special report released in 2023.

So that’s about public health—my two cents. Let me shift to the healthcare industry. Here I will get a bit more personal, and I hope you will indulge me.

Certainly, the headline story today on health coverage is generally positive, right? With roughly five per cent of GDP, China has actually built the world’s largest health infrastructure, and coverage now exceeds 95% of the population. AI and telemedicine, as Dr. Gao mentioned, are beginning to redefine the ecosystem of healthcare in China. I think that is a remarkable achievement by any global standard. And I see it in my own life. My hometown in rural Jiangsu province now has access to quality healthcare that simply did not exist when I was growing up. I think that is real progress.

But coverage rates and progress in biotech can mask what coverage actually buys you. And this is where I want to pause on something that should trouble anyone who cares about health quality. Because there remains a profound gap in the system. Just last month, I was in my hometown. A relative of mine suffered a cerebral haemorrhage requiring emergency surgery. Her total bill came to roughly 100,000 yuan. After insurance reimbursement that is about 60%, she was left paying nearly the entire year’s average rural income out of pocket. So that is not a story about insurance coverage; that is a story about a system that still has a very real threshold beyond which ordinary families fall.

The equity gap isn’t just about money; it’s about the underlying architecture—who designed these systems, for whom, and with what assumptions about risk and dignity. I raise this not to be grim, but because for those of you from the private sector and the diplomatic community, this is precisely where innovation, investment, and advocacy can make a real difference: supplemental insurance products, technology-driven cost reduction, new care delivery models. The gap is large, and the need is urgent.

So finally, let’s move to part three: global health. I suspect this is of most interest to the diplomatic community in this room. On the eve of the World Health Assembly, which will begin later this week or early next week, I saw that Health News yesterday published an article basically saying China will use the assembly platform to share its experience, put forward Chinese solutions, and contribute Chinese strength toward building what it calls the global community of health for humanity, and to inject, in their words, stability, certainty, and consensus into global health governance. This is not just propaganda, right?

China now accounts for 30 to 31 per cent of the world’s innovative biopharmaceutical drug candidates, second only to the US at 33 per cent. In 2023, the gap was 13 percentage points. By 2025, it had narrowed to just 2.5 points. Chinese companies have added more than 4,000 innovative new drugs to global pipelines since 2022. China hosted 7,100 to 7,700 clinical trials in 2024-2025, surpassing the U.S. and making it the world’s number one location for clinical research.

This has profound implications for global health governance. Chinese dominance in manufacturing APIs and key starting materials, along with a rapidly growing innovation pipeline, will accelerate new therapies and drive down prices, thereby democratising advanced medicines that were previously unaffordable in lower- and middle-income countries.

Meanwhile, China’s global health posture has shifted considerably in the post COVID era, just as the United States is stepping back from global health, and the “America First” global health strategy released last September is quite explicit about this. China is stepping forward. We’ve seen China pledge $500 million to the WHO over the next five years, making it the agency’s largest state donor. We’ve seen China channel resources through UN agencies like UNICEF to fill gaps left by USAID’s withdrawal in Southeast Asia. And China has launched the Global Health Innovation Institute in Shanghai again last September, positioning itself as a producer of global health knowledge and affordable treatments, not just a builder of infrastructure.

But the structural constraints have not fully changed. China’s combined foreign aid budget in 2024 remained very small compared with USAID’s $42 billion. The head of China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), China’s equivalent of USAID, has stated explicitly that China has no interest in filling the U.S. void, and we are not seeing any significant increase in Chinese health aid thus far.

There is also a chronic shortage of professionals trained at the intersection of public health, diplomacy, and implementation science. China still lacks a coherent global health strategy. That gap is complicated by geopolitical tensions and the growing securitisation of health on both sides—the BIOSECURE Act, as you may know. There are concerns about APIs being weaponised—just one illustration of how fraught the tensions have become.

So what does all this mean for the room? A few things. For the private sector, China’s expanding global health footprint creates real opportunities in medical technology, digital health, and manufacturing partnerships with the Global South. The MOU for an insulin production facility in Nigeria, signed earlier this year, is one example of how commercial and diplomatic interests are being woven together.

For the diplomatic community, the normative landscape of global health is generally in flux. Questions about data sovereignty, accountability standards, and the terms of health partnership are being contested in real time. And for China itself, the question is whether this moment of U.S. retreat can be converted into durable soft power, or whether structural limitations, including budget constraints, human capital gaps, and commercial incentives, will blunt that opportunity.

So, to return to where I started: Are we ready for the next pandemic? Has the healthcare system become genuinely more equitable? And is China’s global health ascent as substantial as it appears? My honest answer to all three is: maybe, partially, and we’ll see. Well, that’s not a satisfying answer, but I think it’s an honest one, and I hope it’s a useful provocation. I’m genuinely curious what you think. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, great. Thank you, Dr. Huang, for your stimulating and also quite informative presentation. So I think we’ll hear all sides. We’ll see how we can best achieve the results, seize the opportunity, but also, on the other hand, acknowledge the outcomes and the successes we have.

So now we are open for discussion. I think Dr Gao is probably taking a phone call. Let’s already have Professor Huang here, and then we can start. And also, let’s hear comments, questions, and interjections, and all the rest. So, Yanzhong, maybe you can come up.

I don’t know if Roberta, you are the top expert in China’s hospitals. Perhaps you could share a bit of your thoughts as well. I welcome other experts to share your views on this as well. Because we see so much happening in the health industry in China: AI, aging, and also the ratio of doctors to nurses is far behind World Bank standards. So what are the opportunities and challenges, maybe from your perspective? You used to be in charge of such a big hospital system in China. Your comments and views, please.

Roberta Lipson, Founder, United Family Healthcare; Chair Emeritus, American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in China

So first of all, having lived through two pandemics in China—SARS and COVID —I must say that I was very pleased to see the word “pandemic” in the title of this afternoon’s discussion, because I tend to attend a lot of healthcare seminars, talks, and conferences, and everybody is very, very reticent about bringing up the issue of pandemic preparation and this discussion between, for example, the U.S. and China. And this has made me very, very concerned.

The way COVID turned political, and where the whole global discussion has gone since then, was really contrasted so clearly with SARS, which at the beginning, China was extremely open, invited the U.S. CDC, invited all experts from all over the world, and we all benefited from that. And I saw a very, very different response, a very politically sensitive response, during COVID. Not having seen the recovery from that yet, the fact that we’re starting to have these discussions is super important. The infectious disease regulation is super important. I’m glad to see that that has come.

But I think that often when I’m at U.S.-China track two meetings and various government discussions, on the one hand, people say healthcare is the one least sensitive issue that we should be able to find common ground on for discussion. On the other hand, we’re all so protective of our data and we are so closed on data that these discussions are not happening. It’s not been the entry point for the U.S.-China cooling or warming of relations. It has not come up as much as many of us push for it to be on the table. So really glad, Henry, that you decided to have this as the title of your luncheon. And I’m really grateful to the two experts up there for all the work that they do and continue to do. I know you’re pushing that open discussion forward in every way you all have the platform to do it.

Henry Huiyao Wang

But also, Roberta, I know you are the Honourable Chair of AmCham in Beijing. But also, I know since Trump is coming tonight, I would like to hear what you see as the potential opportunities for collaboration between China and the US on the health industry and research, and I know there’s a lot of drug applications or tests also conducted. So what are the opportunities? Let’s talk something.

Roberta Lipson

I’m not sure I have a crystal ball on that. I think the opportunities are huge. Are we going to talk about them? Are we going to take advantage of them? I sort of still doubt it. The only healthcare-related thing that I know is on the table is further discussion on fentanyl precursors, which is great. I’m happy for that. But there’s so much that we’re missing out by not talking about. I think we’ll see more progress in trade, maybe tariffs, Boeing, soybeans, and maybe a discussion on the Iran war—I don’t know—but healthcare, I don’t think is a priority for them.

Henry Huiyao Wang

But I know, on cancer research, on some basic research, on medical collaboration, there’s still a lot of potential there. I know that Mr Zhang Milun, Senior Director of External Affairs at the Danaher Group, I don’t know if she has anything to add, because they’re from the industry. You are a big multinational in China, so we’d like to hear from an industry perspective as well.

Zhang Milun, Senior Director of External Affairs, Danaher Group

Thank you very much, and thanks for introducing me. Actually, I just joined Danaher, so I might not have a precise industry perspective. However, I can speak in very general terms about how MNCs, pharma, and biotech play in this China opportunity. I think there are several things.

After the pandemic, especially in the past two years, because of geopolitical tensions, there are concerns from the global headquarters about whether we should continue to invest in China. I worked at Amgen and previously at Novartis. I think there are concerns from the industry, especially on the U.S. side or the headquarters side. However, I think it’s inevitable or undeniable for us to see that there are still tremendous opportunities in China in two ways.

One way is that China is a huge market with an aging population. So there’s still a lot of demand, even though we are facing price pressure and local competition, regardless. Especially in such uncertain times, I think China offers a stable and growing opportunity for MNCs. On the other hand, what Danaher has tried to play very well, I believe, is to immerse itself with the local industry, with the local companies, to see what Chinese opportunities can bring to the world. We saw last year we had a lot of BD deals—billions of dollars of BD deals—and now Chinese companies are going abroad. I think in the future, not only through BD deals but also through collaborative commercialisation.

So I would say these are still very exciting and challenging times for the industry, as we can see opportunities both ways: from global to China and from China to global.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great, great. Thank you. Good share. Any further comments? Any comments from Singapore? Denis, you want to jump in? Okay.

Denis Simon, Chairman, Association of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); former Executive Vice Chancellor, Duke Kunshan University (DKU)

Thank you. You know, I think the logic underlying the need for some collaboration is there. I don’t think that we have to make too much of an argument, not only for cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, and other things. If you look at the past since 1979, over forty years of collaboration in science and technology, collaboration in healthcare, medical collaboration has been one of the highlights, in fact, one of the most successful areas. One of them, as you know, is folic acid to help pregnant mothers avoid birth defects. That has proven not only bilaterally important but also important to the globe. Mothers throughout the world, by taking folic acid, have now diminished the likelihood of having birth defects.

So I’ll give you one specific one, which I mentioned: Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s is not only a major problem in the United States, but as Chinese men and women have started to live older, they now are encountering diseases they would not have had before, Alzheimer’s being one of those.

Could the two of you maybe discuss what a collaboration scenario might look like? In other words, step one, step two, step three. And maybe it’s not President Trump and President Xi that inaugurate this. I know Professor Huang and I did some work with CSIS in Washington, and we’ve been trying to talk back here in China. But I think one of the problems is that the concrete step one, step two, step three, we haven’t been able to articulate that. I wonder if the two of you, between yourselves, might be able to lay out what the roadmap of that collaboration might look like.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, so before we do that, maybe I’d like to hear from Alicia as well. I know you’re based in Hong Kong, Taipei, and all those places. Maybe you are in Beijing now.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Chief Economist for Asia Pacific, Natixis

I’m not an expert on this topic, although I’m on the board of a new think tank in Taipei that is all about health and public health. It’s an Asia wide think tank called CAPRI. We did a study on vaccine hesitancy—exactly the topic you mentioned—across the Asia Pacific. It’s actually not only a U.S. problem; it is going to be a serious global problem. So I just wanted to highlight that.

We were beyond the issue of whether we are heading towards a new pandemic or not. I think what I really want to agree with absolutely is what was said, well, you didn’t say we are less ready, you didn’t dare say that, but I’m going to say maybe we are less ready because the social fabric, instead of having learned the lesson, I think we’re really thinking, why did it all happen? Everybody wants to forget it. And if anything, they’re more hesitant. I think that’s a very worrisome issue because it’s going to be much harder, in my view, to deal with the next one if that social fabric isn’t there. So I just wanted to highlight that big problem in my view. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, good. So anything from Singapore? We have a doctor from Singapore. Maybe you want to comment as well. Before we get into our experts’ great views.

Sha Yang, Consultant, Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery Khoo Teck Puat Hospital Singapore.

Hello everyone. I am a maxillofacial surgeon. I’m from Singapore. I’m currently in Beijing for a foundation fellowship for this year. I don’t really have a global view like the rest of you guys. But coming from a medical professional point of view, I just have a very simple example, something very micro.

After coming to China. I’ve realised there are many magical surgical equipment in China that works really wonders, and they’re at a fraction of the price of what we try to get in Singapore. However, every time I try to talk to the manufacturer or approach the purchasing personnel, the answer is always, “I can’t really bring it to Singapore because it doesn’t have this and that.”

So one of the barriers, I feel, from the medical user perspective, is that the system in China feels very much separated from the rest of the world. I mean, Singapore being small, we just fall back on international standards like JCI. If a hospital has JCI, then you know it’s being recognised. And if something has the European CE mark on it, if it’s ISO recognised, then you fall back on that. But we don’t seem to have something similar from China, so it becomes quite difficult for us to justify. However, on a personal level, we all know that they work really well, but they are not recognised internationally.

Therefore, small countries like us, even if we want to really use those products, it’s quite difficult to make exceptions for each and everything that we want to import. So it’s a small ask from my personal perspective: if it’s possible to have a collaboration, maybe if we could have that kind of standardisation for Chinese products, it would become much easier for these things to go overseas. And vice versa, it would be easier for things to enter China as well if that kind of international recognition can be developed somehow.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Good comments. Good suggestions. Okay, Roberta, you want to?

Roberta Lipson

Just something quick to add to that. A couple of years ago, there was a law passed in China about international accreditations. So we used to have JCI here, and all of our hospitals were JCI accredited, and then they were told to leave, and we were told not to use international accreditation agencies anymore. That’s a real loss. It’s a real shame, especially as now China is trying to attract patients from all over the world, and we’re seeing patients really interested in some of the new cancer treatments that are only available in China. We’re seeing patients come from other countries to seek medical care. So that was a real loss.

An opportunity is looking at the Project Orbis, where I think now eight countries have signed on to recognise each other’s clinical trials for cancer cures, and China has not become a signatory to that. So I encourage whoever’s interested in that to look into the Project Orbis agreement, which, if China joined, I think would make a difference not only for Chinese industry but for patients all over the world, including patients in China who would get quicker access to foreign drugs as well.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great, great. I don’t know, Director, you may have some comment for us. Director Olga of the East Asian Regional Office of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. You are a top expert as well.

Olga Dzhumaeva, Head of the East Asia Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

Thank you very much. I don’t think I’m a top expert, but I was really happy to see the title of the presentation because Red Cross teams, doctors, and nurses were among those who were not staying indoors, who had to work day and night in response to the COVID pandemic. And I just wanted to first really thank you for the brilliant analysis and brilliant presentations. Dr Gao, thank you for taking us back to 1948 and the comprehensive perspective on health—physical, mental, and social—but also linking it to the whole infodemic around it. And when we saw it again with COVID, people were suffering mentally, but they also didn’t know who to believe, what to do, or where to go.

And also Dr Huang, again, brilliant questions, thought provoking questions, but a very painful realisation in your presentation that COVID is a forgotten crisis. And yet it was the most deadly single disaster that the world has faced in many years, claiming millions and millions of lives.

And of course, last year at the World Health Assembly, we were all celebrating the adoption of the regulations to prepare for pandemics and to address epidemics. So again, from our perspective, what we saw was important was the availability of drugs or vaccines, the availability of instructions and support structures, but also people on the ground who can communicate and create that trust so that people can be aware. In the IFRC, we did research post COVID. It was trust and local action that were actually one of the key elements that helped to manage the response to COVID.

I’d like to return the question back to you: Are we ready for the next pandemic? But also, are there approaches to have cross-border cooperation, to organise simulation exercises, to really try and test if something happens? What do we do on the vaccine front? What do we do on the communication between borders front? How do we do surveillance and share this data? How do we bring communities on board through community-based systems and structures so that we can act as one big comprehensive body that could respond to that? And because China has a very strong and influential position, what would be China’s role in maybe encouraging those cross-border cooperations and simulation exercises? Thank you so much.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you. Thank you, Director, for your excellent comments. So maybe we will have our experts for this round of discussion—comments, questions—and then you can give your general view as well. So let’s start with Dr Gao, please.

George Fu Gao

Okay, thank you. I tried to catch some of the questions and some open discussions. One of the issues is about birth defects, a great accomplishment not just for China but for the whole world. Without that, I don’t think life expectancy could reach that high. So this is why I talked about, in addition to children’s health, elderly health at the moment, so we need to really pay attention to both ends.

And for Alzheimer’s disease collaboration, definitely, that’s something common to two countries. I don’t know whether you know that one third of AD patients live in China, from statistics. At the moment, we don’t know exactly because our population is 1.4 billion; the population is very big. Of course, I should say we thank the national statistics. Without that statistic, we don’t know the number, but at least one-third of AD patients are in China. So this is a great challenge for China. I think it’s a very good field for collaboration between China and the rest of the world, including Australia, America, etc. Without relief from AD or AD-related dementia, if we have so many AD or dementia patients, how can we live in a healthy society? You might have a long life expectancy, but if you have so many AD or dementia patients, they are living a kind oof life where they need so much healthcare. So when they take up so many resources, I think this is something the U.S., China, and other countries can really do together.

Another issue you touched on is about clinical trial data. At the moment, the USFDA is about to have that law. They did want to have Chinese clinical data used in the U.S. So, for a while, we pushed very hard to share clinical data in order not to necessarily repeat all these clinical trials all over the world—China, then Australia, then the U.S.—that is not necessary. Maybe if one wants to do it, just a very simple Phase III clinical trial. So how can we have mutual benefit from this clinical data? At the moment, the whole thing has reversed back to, say, no mutual recognition of clinical data. I think this is very bad. I think this is something we should push very hard. Otherwise, again, it’s a waste of resources, a waste of time, a waste of relief for patients. The patients are waiting for good medicines and good measures, and we are waiting for another clinical trial. I think this is something maybe CCG and your colleagues and friends sitting here should push for. This is for the whole of mankind’s future.

And another question you asked: Are we ready for the next pandemic? Well, it all depends on how you define readiness. What do you mean by ready? Because we have already experienced this pandemic. Of course, we are ready. We knew the virus is there. We knew the viruses are there. This virus gives you a good example: we knew the virus; they don’t have passports, they don’t need visas, they travel anywhere. So from then on, we are ready, the virus is there, and they will travel everywhere. One cruise... We used to see one flight. The distance for a virus to turn into an outbreak in another place is just one flight. Now, one cruise. They stopped over, I think this one started from Argentina, went through that, they are going to... Cape Verde, right? That’s the place they are going. They stopped over so many places, and now we have so many places. From that, we are ready. For the preparedness, I do think we are ready. From that sense, again, I want to remind everybody about physical, mental, and social. I think we are ready, maybe physically—we are ready to receive the virus. Mentally, we are fighting each other. Socially, we still cannot sit together. So from that sense, we are not healthy, we are not ready.

How do we do surveillance? That’s my field. Back in 2018, when we just experienced the Zika outbreak, I was invited by a journal called Cell. Cell asked me, “George, can you write a small commentary about emerging pathogens?” I wrote something there in 2018. It’s very brief, only three sentences in the abstract, very brief. I said, you know, the viruses are there. What can we do first? Put your money into basic research. With basic research, help for the measures, help for medicines, help for vaccines—that’s investing your money in basic research. And then do surveillance. When you talk about surveillance, it’s global surveillance. At the moment, without collaboration, without global surveillance, without data sharing, from that sense, we are not ready. So when you talk about surveillance, it must be global surveillance. We really need to convene a kind of thing to work together. For example, I was involved in a USAID organised project called the Global Virome Project. Then the whole project was removed because of Tony Fauci. They think Tony Fauci supported this programme. The Trump administration just removed this project. So at the moment, global surveillance. Thank you. That’s my very quick comment. Maybe.

Yanzhong Huang

Well, thank you, Dr Gao. I’m just going to quickly follow up on what you just said in terms of our readiness. Certainly, after COVID, we have seen some efforts to basically fix the loopholes, like now we have a pandemic accord, although the appendix will have to be approved in this coming World Health Assembly. We have a pandemic fund overseen by the World Bank, and we also now have a hub in Berlin for exchanging disease-related surveillance. So there’s a lot of progress being made indeed, and that’s impressive. But in the meantime, unfortunately, we’re seeing the U.S. withdraw from the WHO. The WHO is now in a real financial crisis. They are slashing funding and staff. That is inevitably going to have an impact on global disease prevention, preparedness, and response.

And then, if you look at what people always look to China for help, in the meantime, we have to remember that China contributed $500 million over the next five years, but that is not going to offset the losses incurred by the U.S. withdrawal. Not to mention that at the global level, global health financing has dropped. In 2025, we’ve seen more than a 20% drop in global health financing. Also, geopolitical tensions: during COVID, even when facing a common threat, the U.S. and China had no serious cooperation or collaboration at all. Even today, we haven’t seen any real government-level dialogue. So that really makes me think it’s not a good sign for future pandemic preparation.

And then back to Denis’s question about potential U.S.-China collaboration: Could they find a win-win on issues like Alzheimer’s and non-communicable diseases? Of course, that’s not disputable. But if you look at the ecosystem of mutual dependence, decades ago, China provided essentially the active pharmaceutical ingredients, and the U.S. imported those patented drugs. You saw that as a kind of mutual dependence. But now we see the ecosystem is changing. The U.S. not only has to rely on Chinese APIs and key starting materials, but also has to rely on innovative solutions from the Chinese side. Those outlicensing deals increased significantly since 2020, during COVID. In the meantime, we see the Chinese now heavily rely on the U.S. market; for innovators, pharmaceutical companies, and biotech startups, they heavily rely on the U.S. market. So you see a different kind of dependence.

But now that dependence is also changing. As Dr Gao pointed out, the U.S. is now considering this overdependence on Chinese products a big national security problem. So they are moving to sort of de-risk or decouple from China. So, actually, as Dr Gao just pointed out, they are moving to not use clinical trial results from China. They will also potentially limit Chinese access to the U.S. market. They are also going to basically build a standalone supply chain without Chinese participation. They might rely on friend-shoring or on-shoring, but without Chinese participation. We’re going to see a report come out, I think this month, about Chinese active pharmaceutical ingredients and how the U.S. responds to the risk posed by Chinese products. I haven’t read the entire report—I just saw the draft quickly—but my impression is that the U.S. will securitise its own supply chain and build a more protectionist system without Chinese participation. Eventually, you’re going to see that U.S.-China decoupling is going to continue.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, Ambassador, please.

Scott Dewar, Australian Ambassador to China

Thank you very much, Mr. Wang, Dr Gao, and Professor Huang. Thank you for your presentations. I wanted to talk about Australia-China medical and health cooperation, if I could. Our Prime Minister was here last year, and one of the areas he focused on was MedTech cooperation.

I’ve just got back from Hong Kong yesterday; I was at the Asia Summit for Global Health. We had a big Australian pavilion there because we bring research and development. We’ve got a very good health ecosystem in Australia, including R&D. We don’t have any problems with our data. Australia’s Phase I clinical trials data is accepted everywhere around the world, including by the FDA, which makes us a great place to do Phase I trials because if Chinese companies do their trials in Australia, they’re accepted by the U.S. So we’ve got some real benefits there, and we’re really looking at cooperation with China in this space.

Hong Kong, I think, just from my trip yesterday, has a real opportunity here as a financial hub, of course, and as access into the Greater Bay Area. But I think there’s a bigger opportunity for China here. And this is just my own opinion, but for China, with a big trade surplus at the moment and trying to find ways to increase imports, I think China should be looking at that as an opportunity.

Countries like Australia offer great medical technology, great skills, great services that we could bring into this market that I think is going to help meet the growing demand in China, particularly with the ageing population. And I think we have a lot to offer in this, but I think there’s an opportunity here for China to do some of its high-quality opening up that brings in and makes it more accessible for foreign companies to bring their high-end goods here. And I think it comes back to some of those standardisation issues that the colleague from Singapore was mentioning. So I think there’s a real opportunity. It’s not just an opportunity for China’s own healthcare industry; it’s an opportunity for China to invite the world in and deliver some great health outcomes for the Chinese people.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. Thank you, Ambassador. Absolutely. There’s an enormous opportunity for China and Australia to collaborate in the future, particularly in the medical health sectors. Maybe we have a few minutes left. Any last round of questions, comments? Yes.

Roberta Lipson

I wonder what our two panel experts think about the absolute very strong firewall about collaboration on genetic material—anything that has to do with genetic material research. I feel like it’s a huge barrier, and I feel like it’s paranoia. I wonder if there’s any way to break through that. Okay, good. We’re here. Our last round of experts.

George Fu Gao

That definitely is a problem, but how do you think we can solve this problem?

Yanzhong Huang

You know, I totally agree that this is kind of crazy. For example, we saw initially that was not an issue—China sharing these samples with the United States. I think until 2018, that was not a problem according to the agreement they reached. After SARS, the U.S. and China shared disease samples in real time. Now certainly, that’s no longer the case.

Remember during COVID 19—and I’m honest; Dr Gao can correct me if I’m wrong—China didn’t share the samples; they shared the sequence, right? But now, to my understanding, the Ministry of Science and Technology basically says that you’re not allowed to share genetic resources with outside actors without government authorisation. And certainly the United States is doing a similar thing by securitising these genetic resources through the BIOSECURE Act, for example, not allowing shipment of U.S. genetic materials to be processed by Chinese companies like BGI.

So one of the concerns is that this could be securitised. For example, China did not allow the shipment of Chinese genetic materials for fear that they could be weaponised. But even when I was talking to my brother in law the other day, who is not well-educated, even he understands that in the U.S. you have millions of Chinese, why bother? If you really need those resources, you could easily get them from there. So I think sometimes when we securitise these kinds of things, it leads to really non-scientific, irrational decisions that are not to anyone’s benefit.

George Fu Gao

Roberta, I think that’s a very good question. As long as we still have nationalists there, I don’t think we can solve this problem. Scientifically, like Dr Huang said, you have millions of Chinese living in the U.S., and they already share the genetic material. You could use it. You are living in the US, right? Your genetic materials are already in the U.S. It doesn’t matter why I still want to have some genetic material from here. But the problem is that officials and those who made these laws have different opinions. And the U.S. is the same.

For example, you mentioned sharing genetic material, sharing viral sequences. The technology is there. If you give me the sequence—for example, in my lab, you give me the sequence, I can make the virus, like a coronavirus, an influenza virus. The technology is already there everywhere. As professionals, scientists can make it. So it doesn’t matter whether you share the sequence or share the virus, you can have the virus. So this is why, of course, a lot of people think, “Ah, the scientists made the virus,” a lot of stories. So the technology is already there; that’s the science. The question you ask is beyond science, beyond technology. So this is why I think it will be very, very difficult for both sides. That’s why I say I hope Henry’s G—CCG’s G for globalisation—is still there.

Our brains are blocked. I am a professional working on virology. He is a professional on sociology. He is a professional strategist. But by then, do you think we really have this disciplinary classification for the Earth? We don’t. Do you think really the Australians and Chinese—Scott and me—are different? Scott and I are Homo sapiens—we are one species. The viruses are so different. Some viruses use RNA as their genetic material storage; some use DNA. For example, monkeypox uses DNA to store its genetic code. Flu and coronavirus use RNA. But ordinary people think the virus is only one species. But this is a general question – a very good question. I do think we can solve it only when we solve the problem of the infodemic, when we eradicate the infovirus. Only when we are in that stage, maybe we are in the business. So for me, I don’t have a solution for such a question. Thank you.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, great. We are probably running out of time, so we will conclude here. But I think we have had a very good, stimulating, and constructive luncheon discussion. I also want to respond briefly in a personal capacity.

I think after SARS, COVID-19, and all the challenges that humankind has faced together, one lesson we have learned is that we have to work together. Of course, I believe we are better prepared than before. After all the ups and downs, lessons, and problems we have been through, we have gained a great deal of experience. That is why, as we said, the WHO is so important, and China continues to support it. We also still have the International Red Cross and other health organisations, and that is very important.

So I agree with Dr. Gao: mankind can be much better prepared if we are not divided geopolitically or ideologically. We are facing viruses, and we are all human beings. In that sense, we certainly can work together. We certainly can overcome our differences. In the face of viruses and pandemics, humankind should unite as one.

On that note, I think this is both the lesson we have learned and the experience we have gained, as well as the achievements and successes we have made. After all, humankind has successfully contained COVID-19, and now we are in 2026. I am sure China and the U.S., given that President Trump is coming today, as well as China and other countries, can all work together more strongly.

Just a few months ago, I hosted a foreign delegation. The head of the association brought a number of U.S. pharmaceutical CEOs, and they all seemed very bullish on China. China has huge potential. Given that health standards are rising and China is also ageing, this provides opportunities not only for China, but also for the world. So I think we have to work together. And this is exactly what CCG is doing. On globalisation and inclusiveness, we have to keep talking together.

So thank you all. In particular, I want to thank our two top experts for sharing their very unique views today. I also want to thank the ambassadors, industry representatives, international organisations, the media, think tank colleagues, and industry friends here today. Thank you all very much.

George Fu Gao

May I add one more sentence here? You know, when you are talking about data sharing or whatsoever, I thought that would remind everybody of common sense. Everybody must know the so-called reproductive isolation. Australians, the British, the US, the Chinese, Indian, when we got married, we still could have a kid. We are only one species. We are so close. But the influenza virus, they have A, B, C, D. Different subtypes cannot mix together. They have so called reproductive isolation. Again, we are fighting the virus; they are working together. Thank you. That’s my last comment.

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During the meeting, the two presidents agreed to define the relationship as “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability,” providing strategic guidance for bilateral ties over the next three years and beyond.

On May 25, the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) will host Professor David Shambaugh for a discussion on the future of China-U.S. relations following the presidential summit. Shambaugh previously served in the U.S. government and is currently Gaston Sigur Professorship of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, as well as Director of its China Policy Program. He brings both deep theoretical expertise and extensive first-hand practical experience.

The event will feature a keynote speech by Professor Shambaugh, followed by a dialogue with Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG and former Counsellor to China’s State Council, as well as a Q&A session with the audience. Wang has long been active in international exchange and think-tank engagement, and has held in-depth dialogues with more than 100 political leaders and prominent scholars from around the world, giving him extensive experience in policy dialogue and international engagement.

How to register

Please register via Eventbrite

Seats are limited; please sign up as soon as possible. Places will be allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. We will contact, via email, successful candidates separately after registration. (Automatic email replies from Eventbrite are NOT confirmations.)

Agenda

15:00-15:10 Opening remarks & Speeches

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary General of CCG

15:10-15:30 Keynote Speech

David Shambaugh, Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs, George Washington University

15:30-16:00 CCG Global Dialogue

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG and former Counsellor of China State Council

David Shambaugh, Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs, George Washington University

16:00-16:30 Q&A

FAQs

Can all registrants attend the event?

No, seats are extremely limited. We will contact, via email, successful candidates separately after registration, and only after you receive CCG confirmations can you attend. (Automatic email replies from Eventbrite are NOT confirmations.)

Is this an offline event?

Yes, this is an offline event. You need to be in Beijing to attend it physically. If you are not in Beijing, please do not register.

What if I am confirmed to attend but can’t make it?

CCG would appreciate a notice in advance so that other waitlisted candidates can take your place.

What’s the language of the event?

English.

Again, please register via Eventbrite

We will contact, via email, successful candidates separately after registration. (Automatic email replies from Eventbrite are NOT confirmations.)

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The seminar will feature two major sessions:

• 1) CCG Global Dialogue on “U.S.-China Educational Cooperation: Trends and Challenges,” and

• 2) a book launch symposium for Witnessing China’s Modernization.

An evening reception will also be held following the seminar, inviting guests and participants to socialize freely.

The CCG Global Dialogue titled “U.S.-China Educational Cooperation: Trends and Challenges” will feature Professor Denis Simon, Chair of the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO), who will provide a systematic analysis and insights into the latest developments, practical challenges, and future opportunities in China-U.S. educational cooperation. He will also engage in dialogue with Dr Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG. The session aims to build a multi-stakeholder platform for dialogue on international education and talent mobility while deepening understanding of changes in the global landscape.

The book launch event for Witnessing China’s Modernization will invite the book’s editor, contributors, and scholars to engage in discussions on mutual understanding and learning in international people-to-people exchange. The book brings together firsthand experiences from 18 international authors who have lived, worked, or traveled in China, presenting authentic observations and personal reflections on China’s social development through diverse narratives. Contributors include economists, anthropologists, senior professionals, and young researchers, who share perspectives on issues such as human rights improvement, gender equality, education and youth development, infrastructure and public service construction, and the enhancement of people’s well-being.

Event Information

Organizer: Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Date & Time: Tuesday, May 26, 2026 | 14:00–19:00

Location: Tongzhou District, Beijing

Language: English

Format: Hybrid (Online and Offline)

Media Plan: Multi-platform recorded broadcast

Dress Code: Business Casual

Agenda

13:30-14:00 Registration

14:00-14:05 International Talent Exchange Seminar - Welcoming Remarks

Dr. Mabel Lu Miao, Co-Founder and Secretary-General, CCG

14:05-15:40 CCG Global Dialogue “U.S.-China Educational Cooperation: Trends and Challenges”

14:05-14:35 Thematic Sharing: “U.S.-China Educational Cooperation: Trends and Challenges” (30min)

Dr. Denis Simon, Chair, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO)

14:35-15:20 CCG Global Dialogue (45min)

Dr. Denis Simon, Chair, AGTO

Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG

15:20-15:35 Q&A Session (15min)

15:35-15:40 Conclusion and Group Photo (5min)

15:40-16:00 Tea Break

16:00-17:30 Book Launch Event: Witnessing China’s Modernization

16:00-16:05 Opening Remarks (5min)

John Zhanjie Zhao, Deputy Secretary-General, CCG; Program Manager, Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)

16:05-16:10 Book Launch (5min)

Dr. Mabel Lu Miao, Editor of the book; Co-Founder and Secretary-General, CCG; Founder and Secretary-General, GYLD

16:10-17:10 Moderated Discussion (60 min)

Moderator: Zoon Ahmed Khan, Research Fellow, CCG

17:10-17:25 Q&A Session (15min)

17:25-17:30 Conclusion and Group Photo (5min)

17:30-19:00 Evening Reception / Networking Session

How to Apply

Participants Application Link:

Or you may scan the QR code below:

***As seats are limited, successful registrants will receive a separate confirmation email with detailed event information after registration.

Introduction of Guest Speakers

Dr. Denis Simon

Chair, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO)

Dr. Denis Simon is Chair of the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO). Born in Brooklyn, New York in 1952, Dr. Simon received the China National Friendship Award in 2006. From 2015 to 2020, Dr. Simon served as Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University. He has held tenured faculty positions at several top universities in the United States, including Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Penn State University, State University of New York, University of Oregon, and Arizona State University, and has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and served as a visiting professor at the University of Colombia.

He has published a number of books like China’s Emerging Technological Edge: Assessing The Role of High-End Talent. His research interests include innovation and R&D systems in East Asia, U.S.-China science and technology cooperation, and international talent exchange. He reads and speaks Mandarin Chinese fluently.

Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang

Founder and President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)
Director-General, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO)
Former Counselor to China State Council

Dr. Huiyao (Henry) Wang is Founder and President of CCG; Director-General of AGTO; and Former Counselor to China State Council appointed by Chinese premier.

Dr. Wang pursued his PhD studies at University of Western Ontario and University of Manchester. He was a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School and a Visiting Fellow of Brookings Institute. As a thought leader on global relations, international business, global governance, talent migration, global investment and trade, etc., he has published over 100 English and Chinese works.

Introduction of Witnessing China’s Modernization

As the global landscape continues to evolve, China’s development practices have attracted growing attention and discussion from around the world. Beyond grand narratives and abstract concepts, firsthand observations and lived experiences are becoming an important lens through which China is understood.

Against this backdrop, CCG’s new book Witnessing China’s Modernization: Understanding People-Centered Philosophy, Quality of Life and Overall Well-Being Improvement from Global Perspectives has been recently published by Cam Rivers Publishing. Moving from “witnessing” to “understanding,” the volume brings together the firsthand accounts of 18 international contributors who have lived, worked, or traveled in China. Through their diverse perspectives, the book presents a nuanced view of China’s development and the lived realities behind its rapid transformation.

Through vivid writing, the book deepens understanding of China’s development and future trajectory. Its contributing authors—ranging from economists and anthropologists to professionals and graduate students—bring diverse, cross-cultural perspectives that highlight China’s people-centered development philosophy and examine key areas such as human rights, gender equality, education and youth development, infrastructure, public services, and overall well-being. The book portrays China not as an isolated phenomenon but as a catalyst for rethinking development, cooperation, and shared human progress.

Editor of Witnessing China’s Modernization

Dr. Mabel Lu Miao

Co-founder and Secretary General, CCG; Founder and Secretary General, GYLD

Dr. Mabel Lu Miao is the Co-founder and Secretary General of the CCG, a leading Chinese non-government think tank ranked 64th place in the World’s Top 100 Think Tanks. She is the Founder and Secretary General of Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD) program, and Deputy Director General of the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO). She has been one of seven representatives of young global leaders from Northeast Asia met by the King of Belgium; a Munich Young Leader 2020 posting the first question to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres at the MSC 2021; and Co-Chair of T20 (G20 Summit 2021 Think Tank) Multilateralism Task force. She has been invited to speak at Doha Forum in 2018, 2019 and 2023 and at Paris Peace Forum for several times.

Dr. Miao holds a Ph.D. degree in Modern and Contemporary Chinese Studies from Beijing Normal University. She was a visiting fellow at New York University and Harvard University, a post-doctoral fellow of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUS), and a Lien Fellow at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Dr. Miao has published a number of books in Chinese, which detail developments in China’s outbound business and global talent. Her latest publications in English include The Challenge of “Going Out”: Chinese Experiences in Outbound Investment (2023); and The Future of China’s Development and Globalization: Views from Ambassadors to China (2024).

Contributing Authors (in alphabetical order by surname)

Neli Akhobadze, Research Fellow, Caucasian Association of China Studies; Sinologist (Georgia)

Zamir Awan, Founding Chair, Global Silk Route Research Alliance (GSRRA); Sinologist; Diplomat (Pakistan)

Carli Beeli, President, China Switzerland Connection (CSC) (Switzerland)

Dr. David Blair, Senior Economist; Columnist for China Daily; Former Chairman, Economics Department, Eisenhower School of National Defense University in Washington, DC (United States)

Bruce Connolly, Scottish photographer; freelance writer; radio host (United Kingdom)

Dr. Harvey Dzodin, Former Vice president of the ABC TV Network; columnist and commentator for global media (United States)

Benjamin Z. Freking, Associate Research Fellow, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Master’s in Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy, Tsinghua University (United States)

Matteo Giovannini, Senior Finance Manager, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) (Italy)

Michael Hermann, Chief Representative, Yunnan and Chongqing Offices, Humana People to People China (Germany)

Dr. Mohammad Saiyedul Islam, Senior Lecturer, School of Overseas Education, Sanming University; Senior Research Fellow, Daffodil International University Belt and Road Research Centre (Bangladesh)

Dr. Alan Macfarlane, Emeritus Professor of Anthropological Science, University of Cambridge; Fellow, British Academy; Life Fellow, King’s College, Cambridge (United Kingdom)

David Morris, President, 1Earth Village; Senior Fellow, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); former Australian and multilateral diplomat (Australia)

Tungamirai Eric Mupona, Vice Chairman, China-Zimbabwe Exchange Centre; Deputy Secretary, Harare Africa Forum; Doctoral Candidate, Zhejiang University (Zimbabwe)

Dr. Emanuel Pastreich, President, The Asia Institute (United States)

Dr. J. Renato Peneluppi Jr., Senior Consultant of global affairs; PhD in Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology (Brazil)

Davide Poloni, Sales Operations Manager, Porshe China (Germany)

Mars Pouyan, Founder, Quantum Vision Capital & Quamix.io (Iran)

Clavin Wee, Co-Founder, Young SEAkers (Singapore)

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BBC World Service

And here in the studio with me tonight, Henry Wang. If you’re a regular listener to our Business Matters program, you may well remember that Henry is normally joining us from Beijing, but you’ve broken away from a party in London tonight, Henry, to come and join us. And you’re looking very dapper, I should say, as well, in the studio. Thanks for coming in. Thank you. How was the party, first of all?

Henry Huiyao Wang

That’s good. It’s very impressive.

BBC World Service

I could do. And you’re here for business as well as part of your work as the President of the Center for China and Globalization.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, I’m also here for quite a few recordings and programmes.

BBC World Service

Well, tell us your takeaway then. What we’ve been talking about most nights this week is the, as the trip’s gone on. And you and I were just chatting before we came on air then. You’re actually a little bit more positive, perhaps, than some of the clips that we heard there about what’s been achieved this week. Why?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yeah, I’m actually quite positive this time. First of all, it has been nine years since the last state visit by President Trump. Also, if you remember, during Trump’s first term, the U.S. National Security Strategy defined the China–U.S. relationship as a strategic rivalry. This time, however, both President Xi and President Trump have framed their positions differently. They now view the U.S.–China relationship as moving toward strategic stability—a constructive strategic stability. I think that’s a really positive start.

BBC World Service

What does that tell you? Does that tell you that America’s perspective has changed or that China perhaps felt that it was perhaps being too deferential last time around?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think, after almost ten years, especially during Trump’s first term, the U.S. tried everything with China. We had a strategic rivalry, adversarial relations. There was the trade war, sanctions, “high fence, small yard” policies. But the current administration now seems to realise: we cannot fully decouple; we have to work together.

That’s why I’m very impressed with President Trump. He brought seventeen of the biggest U.S. companies to attend, and they were all very bullish. They expressed a lot of positive views—from Elon Musk to Tim Cook to Jensen Huang, all of them really positive and highly optimistic. So I think this is a good start, especially given that President Trump announced at the Great Hall that President Xi is going to visit the United States on September 24, and Wang Yi has now confirmed that the visit will indeed take place.

We are now in a full round of talks and summits. We finished the first round, and there will be a round in September, a round in November in China in Shenzhen, and a round in December in Miami for the G20. So, we have to carefully build on the progress and gradually improve. But already, we have seen quite significant improvement, and I’m sure we’ll hear more positive news in the coming months.

BBC World Service

Chris, what was your overall takeaway from the week?

Chris Low

Look, I think Henry nails it when he talks about the business executives who are on this trip. That’s what this trip was about. This was framed in the U.S. press as a summit on geopolitical issues, but it really wasn’t. It was a trade trip, and it wasn’t just top U.S. CEOs; it was top Chinese CEOs who were in these meetings as well. And I think. Both sides are beginning to realise there’s a lot to gain from mutual trade.

BBC World Service

I was interested that Henry kind of mentioned about this inability to actually decouple from each other. From an American perspective, Chris, does it feel like that realisation is coming around? Because there have certainly been attempts, and that is far from being just the Trump administration, has it? Henry mentioned about the Biden administration, too. This is the U.S. policy for a long time to properly decouple. Is that shifting now then in a business sense?

Chris Low

I think it’s shifting primarily as an economist travelling around the country and talking to people who are in U.S. manufacturing, agriculture, construction, all of them talk about the necessity of trade with China. Farmers, it’s because they sell goods there. Manufacturers, construction workers, it’s because they need Chinese products in order to manufacture their products in order to build their buildings. That interdependence runs deep. You know, I think complete decoupling, not only is it impractical from an economic standpoint, it’s effectively impossible.

BBC World Service

Where’s that element of need for Chinese companies these days, Henry?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think there’s a strong need for that, because I saw quite a lot of Chinese CEOs at the welcome banquet talking with their U.S. counterparts. For example, the founder of Xiaomi was taking a selfie with Elon Musk. I think Chinese companies have a huge interest in investing in the United States. Previously, the political environment was very negative, which limited opportunities—issues like the Huawei sanctions or TikTok’s regulatory challenges created uncertainty.

But there is clearly a strong interest from Chinese companies to invest overseas. They are not just relying on trade; they can also create jobs, generate local tax revenue, and contribute more broadly. So, by addressing political barriers and providing clarity, we should expect more investment from both sides.

BBC World Service

Have you touched on the area where perhaps there is still gonna be ongoing tension? My good colleague, Michelle Fleury, our North America business correspondent, has been writing out this in her newsletter this week. She’s called the race in AI between the two countries as the new Cold War.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yeah, absolutely. I was in Beijing before coming here to London, and I did an interview with Fox. They had a big crew there to interview Trump, and basically, they were asking the same question. AI is one of the most uncertain developments affecting humanity—we don’t know where it will lead. But absolutely, China and the U.S. have to work together to address that threat.

Thomas Friedman also said that AI is a common challenge for both China and the U.S., so we need to cooperate. There are so many uncertainties; we cannot just fight on our own or fight among ourselves. We really need to work together.

On top of that, there are ongoing wars in Iran, in Ukraine. I think China and the U.S. have to…

BBC World Service

Yeah, we haven’t touched on some of the geopolitics of the being covered, well covered on the news programs on the World Service. Chris, on AI specifically, are American companies ready to do that, to collaborate? I mean, they’re not seemingly that willing to collaborate with each other right now, full stop. Are they on issues around safety? We’ve seen that schism between OpenAI and Anthropic, for example.

Chris Low

I think the answer here has got to be at the government level in terms of supervision, regulation, etc. It’s a brand new industry. Global finance works because globally we have consistent regulations between countries and consistent supervision. And it’s got to be something similar to that where the adults in the room make the rules, enforce the rules, and work together.

BBC World Service

What are the next steps, then, you think, to building on that? Chris first, and then Henry?

Chris Low

Well, we already have here in the U.S. regulators who oversee tech and are getting involved with AI. In Europe, of course, you have the same, but we have very different rules. They’ve got to come together. China, too, has regulators who are involved in the internet and will evolve to working with the AI companies. But they also need to come together. This has to be an international effort because we have to have consistent standard policies.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, absolutely. I think this is the biggest threat we’re facing right now. China and the U.S. are the two largest AI powers in the world, and we need to find a way for AI to benefit not only both countries but the entire world. China has its own AI systems and is making progress, but we need global AI governance, as well as global AI dialogues and global AI company summits—mechanisms we currently lack. Geopolitical, ideological, and other divisions are preventing this. So we need to find ways to make AI truly beneficial for humanity, and China and the U.S., as the two largest AI nations, should set a good example and work together.

BBC World Service

Clearly, I mean, top of the agenda, isn’t it? I think in that September meeting, when President Xi goes to the United States. You’re listening to World Business Report on the BBC World Service.

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The programme opened with remarks from Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President of CCG, and Declan Kelleher, Chair of the Governing Board of EPC and former Irish Ambassador to China.

The first session, titled “EU-China relations in an era of strategic uncertainty,” was moderated by Declan Kelleher.

Speakers included Henry Huiyao Wang; Long Jing, Deputy Director, Center for European Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Raoul Bunskoek, Head of Clingendael China Centre, Clingendael Institute; and Justyna Szczudlik, Deputy Head of Research, Head of Asia-Pacific Programme and China Analyst, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).

The second session, “Managing trade imbalances on EU-China relations,” was moderated by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder & Secretary-General of CCG.

Speakers were Daniela Schwarzer, Board Member, Bertelsmann Stiftung; Peng Wensheng, Chief Economist, China International Capital Corporation Limited, and Dean of CICC Global Institute; Victor De Decker, Research Fellow, Egmont Institute; and Yan Shaohua, Associate Professor & Deputy Director, Center for China-Europe Relations, Fudan University.

Following lunch, the third session, “Navigating new geostrategic challenges in EU-China relations: together or apart?” was moderated by Shen Wei, Qiushi Chair Professor, Zhejiang University.

Speakers included Bernhard Bartsch, Director, External Relations, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS); Ignacio Molina, Senior Fellow, Elcano Royal Institute; Francesca Maremonti, Research Fellow for Asia, Global Actors Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI); Cao Hui, Assistant Professor, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Wang Yiwei, Jean Monnet Chair Professor, Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Center for European Studies, Renmin University; and Sun Chenghao, Associate Professor and Head of the U.S.-Europe Program, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University.

As part of the programme, CCG also invited participants to visit the Beijing “Two Zones” Development Exhibition, which presents the city’s work on the Integrated National Demonstration Zone for Greater Openness in the Services Sector and the China (Beijing) Pilot Free Trade Zone, and Sanjiao Temple Park in Tongzhou.

Participants also included: Julio Arias, Policy Officer, Delegation of the European Union to China; Julian Gray, Programme Officer, Delegation of the European Union to China; Elixabete Arrieta, Junior Policy Analyst, EPC; Ivano Di Carlo, Senior Policy Analyst, EPC; Amanda Paul, Deputy Head of Europe in the World Programme & Senior Policy Analyst, EPC; Tang Min, Vice President, CCG; Han Bing, Nonresident Senior Fellow, CCG; He Hangyu, Associate Research Fellow, CCG; Yuxuan Jia, Associate Research Fellow, CCG; Veronica Liu, Research Fellow, CCG; Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder & Secretary-General, CCG; Kris Liu, Director of International Cooperation Department, China Development Institute (CDI); Kaspar Pucek, Research Fellow, Security Unit and the Russia & Eastern Europe Centre (CREEC), Clingendael Institute; Maria Teresa Salvador, Project Collaborator, Elcano Royal Institute; Serena Wang, Project Officer, China Programme, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

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POLITIKEN, May 7, 2026

CNA, May 11

Wang Huiyao, Founder of the Center for China and Globalization, says a Trump–Xi meeting could help reset bilateral relations, reduce geopolitical uncertainty and support efforts to de-escalate conflicts, though key issues such as trade and Taiwan remain sensitive.

CNN, May 11

Wang Huiyao, a former counselor to China’s State Council, said the tight two-day schedule, with many issues on the table to negotiate, will make it difficult to match the spectacle of Trump’s last visit to Beijing.

“I doubt the level of ceremony or grandeur will surpass the 2017 visit,” said Wang, head of China’s semi-official think tank Center for China and Globalization.

“This time, we’re here to get down to business, and there’s a war going on.”

Al Jazeera, May 13

In an interview with Al Jazeera, Henry Wang, president of the Center for China and Globalization in Beijing, said President Donald Trump’s upcoming visit to China is “timely and significant” as the war on Iran and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz threaten the global economy.

Wang said China has strong ties with both Tehran and Gulf states, noting that 40 percent of China’s petroleum passes through the Strait and that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Beijing last week, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for an end to the war and for the waterway to remain open.

Wang said both the US and Iran are “exhausted” and “stuck” with no intention to continue fighting, adding that “they need a ladder to come down gracefully” and that China could act as a “catalyst” or mediator to help end the conflict.

He rejected suggestions Beijing would use the crisis as leverage in trade negotiations with Washington, saying US policies of sanctions, trade wars and containment “don’t all work” and that the two powers now need to “coexist peacefully”.

On energy security, Wang argued China would be among the least affected countries by disruption in the Strait because 60 percent of its energy now comes from renewable sources, while it also has large reserves and alternative supplies from Russia and Central Asia.

He said Europe, Japan, South Korea and ASEAN nations are far more exposed to Gulf instability.

Wang added that China increasingly sees itself as a stabilising global force and could also play a role in efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war.

Fox News, May 12

Now TV, Hong Kong, 13 May

王輝耀：「(Tesla行政總裁)馬斯克跟特朗普有很多矛盾，居然也一起來，所以看得出美國總統中國之行還是很有號召力、還是很有吸引力。我們確實是，你中有我、我中有你，我們脫鈎其實是不太容易，所有大企業都有最大的生意在中國，美商會的調查就指，大部分美國企業還是會繼續在中國投資。」

Henry Huiyao Wang: “Elon Musk has many disagreements with Donald Trump, yet he still came along, which shows that a U.S. president’s visit to China remains highly influential and attractive. The reality is that our economies are deeply intertwined — you are part of us, and we are part of you. Decoupling is actually very difficult. All major companies have some of their biggest business interests in China. Surveys by the American Chamber of Commerce also show that most U.S. companies will continue investing in China.”

PBS, May 13

Henry Wang:

This 2026 summit is so different with the 2017 summit, because, at that time, China was not near-peer status. And China’s GDP has gone up in almost 70 percent of the U.S., and China has become a leading power on the green transition.

So I think, in that aspect, China has achieved counter-capability with the U.S. So, as I said, there’s a mutual assurance deterrence now. So we have to really find a way to work together.

Bloomberg, May 13

Henry Huiyao Wang Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) , says both Iran and the Unted States are seeking to de-escalate the ongoing conflict. He adds that China could provide a platform for both sides to “gracefully climb down the ladder” if China and U.S. can reach a consensus at the upcoming summit. Wang speaks with Haidi Stroud -Watts in Bejing on Bloomberg: The Asia Trade.

Washington Post, May 13

New York Times, May 13

Henry Huiyao Wang, the president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank, said China could do more to help Mr. Trump secure a peace deal with Iran if the U.S. president declared that he opposed the independence of Taiwan. The official position of the United States is that it “does not support” Taiwan’s independence, a rhetorical nuance that has long irked Beijing.

“Can they send this message a little stronger?” said Mr. Wang, a former Chinese government official. “I think that can be done if they expect China to do more.” If China is to give an “extra push” to clinch an Iran deal, Mr. Wang added, “it certainly needs more encouragement from the U.S.”

New York Times, May 14

Henry Huiyao Wang, the president of the Center for China and Globalization think tank, said in an interview in Beijing on Wednesday that the United States should toughen its official rhetoric against Taiwan “if they expect China to do more” on Iran. If China is to give an “extra push” to clinch an Iran deal, Mr. Wang said, “it certainly needs more encouragement from the U.S.”

ITV News, May 14

CGTN America, May 14

The Newsmakers, TRT World, May 15

The US president is in Beijing for a high-stakes meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping. Everything from trade and technology to the future of Taiwan and Iran is on the agenda during the first visit to China by a sitting US president in nearly a decade. The talks are also set to address Tehran’s effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, with Washington potentially seeking Beijing’s leverage to help reopen the key waterway.

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Trump-Xi Meeting In Beijing Likely To Discuss Iran: Top China Expert

By Russell Flannery, Senior Contributor.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will likely aim during their planned meeting in Beijing on May 14-15 to stabilize the crisis in Iran that has shaken energy markets and raised worries of a wider war, the president of one of China’s top foreign affairs think tanks said in an interview.

“I think first of all, they’re going to stabilize the current crisis in Iran,” said Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization, in Delphi, Greece to attend the annual Delphi Economic Forum held April 22-25.

“Chinese Foreign Minister (Wang Yi) has made nearly 30 phone calls with his counterparts of the whole region and all Security Council members” and European Union regarding the conflict, Wang said. “China has a strong influence with Pakistan, and hopefully we’ll get some consensus and then promote peace and stability,” with both the U.S. and China resultantly deepening their influence in the region, he said on Friday.

“China could be a very quiet promoter on this. China could do more in promoting the peace in Iran in crisis,” owing in part to its influence in the country as well as China being the largest trading partner with both Iran and all Gulf countries in nearby Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, said Wang, a former China Commerce Ministry official. Just this month, Xi spoke with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan during his visit to China, and talked in the past week to Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman. For its part, the U.S. yesterday called off talks in Pakistan with Iran after Tehran was reported to have said it wouldn’t hold direct meetings with American negotiators.

The U.S. and Chinese leaders are also likely to discuss ways to solve the conflict in the Ukraine following Russia’s invasion of the nation. “President Trump also has been working on the Ukraine-Russia issue for a long time,” Wang said. “He needs China to help to stabilize and promote the peace in Ukraine-Russia,” said Wang.

Beyond the two regional conflicts, Trump and Xi will also likely try to stabilize broader bilateral U.S.-China ties that have been strained by disputes including geopolitics and trade, he said. Other nations would be pleased with improvement so that they “don’t have to pick sides and you can get some positive things going on for the time to come,” Wang said.

Trump and Xi may agree to the formation of trade board and an investment board between China and the U.S., he said. “That would be a great mechanism to establish, so that both sides can see what traded items they can purchase from each other, in order to increase their imports and exports as well as their investment,” Wang said. The boards would establish guidelines for sensitive and non-sensitive items for trade and similar areas for investment, Wang predicted. ‘Those are the things I think will be greatly discussed.”

Other issues likely to be raised include the lowering U.S. tariffs on fentanyl and the Chinese opening of free visas for Americans to come to China, as well as longstanding differences over the status of Taiwan, the thriving self-governing global tech hub over which Beijing claims sovereignty. Beijing will ask Trump to denounce Taiwan’s independence and support peaceful reunification, Wang also said.

Among his takeaways from this week’s Delphi Economic Forum, Wang noted an interest in global governance issues. “There was a lot of global governance talk,” he said. “People want a new multi-polar world, but then support global governance and a multilateral system. So that is still the main consensus we hear from here. We can’t just let the global system break down.”

A second focus was the future of Europe. “The Europeans have to really overcome their domestic challenges, populism and economic nationalism. There was a lot of discussion on that,” Wang said.

And third hot topic was complex China-U.S. relations. “There’s more talk about China-U.S. collaboration. There’s high hope that China-U.S. and EU can work together to stabilize the world,” Wang found.

And finally, energy disruptions were a great concern. “There is enormous worry from the Arab world and Global South, particularly from ASEAN countries, and Japan, South Korea and the like, because they’re heavily dependent on energy flows coming from the Middle East. That has become a choke point now,” Wang said.

Wang holds an undergraduate degree in English and American literature from the Guangdong University of Foreign Studies. He pursued MBA and PhD studies at the University of Windsor, the University of Western Ontario and the University of Manchester, where he obtained a PhD in International Management. He has been appointed a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, Brookings and taught as an adjunct professor at Peking University, Tsinghua University, China University of Foreign Affairs, and the University of Western Ontario Richard Ivey Business School.

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See also Wang’s interview with Semafor:

Trump-Xi summit could see more Chinese investment in US, China expert says

Pekingnology

Henry Huiyao Wang on Beyond Blocs

Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization, has recently written in Foreign Policy that Europe and China will not align nor compete, but selectively cooperate…

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4 months ago · 30 likes

How US tech hegemony is locking out the Global South

The world deserves better than a monopoly that builds walls and hobbles development

In global discourse, a script has been handed to us: the United States and China are locked in a “tech race”. But this is really a misnomer. True competition requires a level playing field. When one runner trips the other to ensure victory, it’s not a competition; it’s cheating.

So, when Washington deploys an arsenal of sanctions, export controls and diplomatic strong-arming to hamstring China’s technological ascent, it is not competing. It is an act of suppression.

This reflects a deliberate strategy to preserve American supremacy in the technologies of the future. Take 6G for example. Washington’s intent is clear: by bundling development with “trusted” supply chains and alliance politics, it is working to build a new global regime centred on US-led standards and closed loops, rather than a universal, open-access model.

The US obsession with retaining its crown is not rooted in advancing humanity’s collective interests; it is about preserving a monopoly. The US has used patent barriers, export bans and price gouging to act as the gatekeeper of modernisation.

As a result, the spread of technology is channelled through a system of sluice gates. This systematic hindrance builds a high wall, shutting out the Global South and locking developing nations permanently at the bottom of the global value chain.

The impact on the Global South is a daily reality of exclusion. Nowhere is this more visible than in agriculture.

American giants have weaponised intellectual property laws to monopolise seeds. This forces African farmers into a cycle of debt, buying seeds at inflated prices while being blocked from traditional replanting practices. In South Africa, many smallholders have been forced to the brink of bankruptcy through the planting of genetically modified seeds that are ill-suited to local weather and require patented chemical fertiliser and pesticides.

In Burkina Faso, after adopting Monsanto’s genetically modified organism (GMO) seeds in 2008, farmers sank into debt because they had to consistently buy new seeds and pay royalties. In Nigeria, hundreds of farmers’ organisations and civil society groups joined forces to call for a ban on GMOs, claiming they threaten livelihoods.

The information sector tells a similar story. From the 1970s to the 1980s, the Brazilian information sector experienced robust development. Local manufacturers accounted for 80 per cent of the domestic market. Cobra, a Brazilian computer manufacturer founded in 1974, was second only to IBM by 1984. It had the most microcomputers after the US and Japan.

Yet, Washington’s actions crushed the thriving industry. In 1985, the Ronald Reagan administration launched a Section 301 investigation and waged a trade war that led to Brazil opening up its market to US firms.

US tech dominance also means exorbitant prices for some healthcare. American pharmaceutical giants have leveraged patents to monopolise raw materials like hyaluronic acid – used in cataract surgery – driving prices sky-high. As a result, poorer people in Africa and Southeast Asia have been deprived of surgery that could prevent them from going blind.

American technological supremacy also poses security risks. The weaponisation of surveillance tools undermines the digital sovereignty of the Global South. Whistle-blower Edward Snowden’s revelations exposed how the US National Security Agency spied on countries from Brazil to India. So when Washington puts restrictions on Huawei’s 5G, the real concern is clear: if countries switch to Chinese telecoms, America loses its ability to snoop on their people and leaders.

Moreover, American military technological supremacy has emboldened Washington to wage wars with impunity: invading Iraq, on false pretences of Baghdad possessing weapons of mass destruction; kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife; and assassinating Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (in a joint operation with Israel), as well as bombing Iranian bridges, hospitals, universities, power plants and factories.

Indeed, being a technological laggard is tantamount to letting Washington assert its dominance, leaving many countries in constant fear. Even allies such as Canada and Denmark have not been spared from attempted coercion.

In contrast, China offers a stark, refreshing alternative: a tech path that is open, inclusive and focused on lifting everyone up. Instead of hoarding tech, China shares it – turning once-unaffordable innovations into tools for shared progress.

In solar energy, China’s large-scale production has sliced panel prices by over 90 per cent, making solar power cheaper than fossil fuels in sun-drenched regions worldwide. With 80 per cent of the global solar panel market, China isn’t just selling affordable, high-quality products, it is also sharing its expertise with other developing countries.

In Nigeria, for example, the transfer of complete solar panel production technology has enabled the construction of a local manufacturing plant that produces hundreds of thousands of panels yearly, enabling the country to power rural homes with locally made solar energy.

In agricultural technology, Chinese and Kenyan scientists have developed drought-resistant seeds that have boosted yields by 50 per cent for farmers, and trained a number of agronomists, as the East African country cuts dependency on agricultural imports.

In artificial intelligence, China embraces open-source methods as a pathway, with largely free commercial use, to democratise access.

Technology’s value lies in diffusion, adaptation and shared progress. If Washington keeps weaponising technology, building walls and prioritising control, it will not only stifle global advancement but also isolate itself from future innovation. True leadership is not about hoarding power; it is about lifting others up. The world deserves better than a monopoly that leaves developing countries in the dust.

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Held shortly after CCG completed a visit to the United States, the event aimed to share first-hand observations on the current U.S. political and academic landscape, and to invite Chinese and international experts to discuss new opportunities in China-U.S. relations.

The luncheon was chaired by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG. Drawing on his visit to the United States in mid-April, Wang shared his observations and reflections with participants.

Denis Simon, Senior Fellow for East Asia at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and former Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University; Lu Xiang, retired Research Fellow, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and CCG Senior Fellow; and Mabel Lu Miao, Secretary-General of CCG, delivered keynote remarks. Zhu Hong, former Minister for Commercial Affairs at the Chinese Embassy in the United States, also shared his views. The speakers took questions from the audience.

The luncheon brought together more than 30 Chinese and international participants from government, business, academia, and the media. Ambassadors in attendance included Karlis Eihenbaums, Ambassador of Latvia to China; Robert Lee, Ambassador of Fiji to China; Kenji Kanasugi, Ambassador of Japan to China; Hannes Hanso, Ambassador of Estonia to China; Peter Tan Hai Chuan, Ambassador of Singapore to China; and Hallam Henry, Ambassador of Barbados to China.

Deputy-head-of-mission-level diplomats from the embassies of Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Iceland, as well as diplomats from the embassies of Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, India, and Australia, also attended.

Senior China executives from multinational companies, including P&G, BP, Cargill, and Marubeni, were present, along with CCG Executive Council members, including Tang Haoxuan, Chairman of Fuaida International Trading Company. Journalists from major international media outlets, including Der Spiegel and CNN, also attended.

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