Dear Guest,

Greetings!

China’s first administrative regulation dedicated to outbound investment, the State Council Regulation on Outbound Investment, took effect on 1 July 2026. Against the changing landscape of China–US, China–Europe and Global South economic and trade cooperation, there is an urgent need to bring together relevant government departments, trade and economic experts, and representatives of globally active companies. The conference will provide a forum for interpreting the new rules, gathering business perspectives, facilitating cooperation and supporting responsible overseas investment.

Drawing on the international reach of a world-leading think tank and years of research on globalization, the 2026 China Inbound-Outbound Forum will connect international and domestic stakeholders, convene leaders from government, business and academia, and create a high-level platform through which Chinese companies can access global opportunities and expand international cooperation.

The 2026 China Inbound-Outbound Forum is hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), with the China Association of International Trade (CAIT), the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies (CWTO), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as co-organizers.

It will be held in Beijing CBD on 17 October 2026. We cordially invite you to attend the conference and join a closed-door exchange dinner with former senior officials of the Ministry of Commerce, ambassadors to China, representatives of international organizations and entrepreneurs leading international expansion.

Building on CCG’s extensive international network and twelve consecutive editions of the China Inbound-Outbound Forum, the conference will convene entrepreneurs and representatives of globalizing companies, leaders of international organizations and business associations, established companies, and experts in artificial intelligence and green development. The programme includes an opening ceremony, keynote addresses, a special session featuring prominent globalizing entrepreneurs, six industry and regional forums, and two high-level closed-door events. Participants will dine with diplomats from more than 60 countries, including ambassadors from 30 countries. In the presence of ambassadors and conference guests, three authoritative recommendation lists will also be announced: Chinese Globalizing Enterprises, Service Companies Supporting Chinese Global Expansion, and Emerging Young Business Leaders in Global Expansion.

We sincerely hope you will be able to join us. Our team will be pleased to assist with all arrangements.

With highest regards,

Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

September 2026

Contact: Liu Jun +86 157 1287 1680

Email: liujun@ccg.org.cn

Provisional Overall Programme 2026 China Enterprise Globalization Conference

Host:

Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Co-organizers:

China Association of International Trade; China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Date:

Saturday, October 17 2026

Venue:

Beijing CBD, China

Programme:

09:00–10:30 Opening Ceremony: Globalization Policy Signals and Major Trends

Moderator:

Mabel Lu Miao — Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Executive Director-General, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); Founder, Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)

Welcome Remarks:

Henry Huiyao Wang — President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Opening Keynote Speakers:

Chen Deming — Former Minister of Commerce of China

Chen Jian — Former Vice Minister of Commerce of China; Distinguished Expert, CPPCC National Committee Talent Pool for Consultative Governance

Erik Solheim — Co-chair, Europe-Asia Center; Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations

10:30–10:40 Launch of the UNCTAD World Investment Report

Presenter:

Li Nan — Senior Director, Division on Investment and Enterprise, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

10:40–10:50 Networking Tea Break

10:50–12:30 Keynote Addresses: Strategies for Chinese Enterprise Globalization

Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Henry Cai — Chairman and Founding Partner, AGIC Capital

Cao Dewang — Honorary Chairman for Life, Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co., Ltd.

Fu Chengyu — Former Chairman, Sinopec Group

Kai-Fu Lee — Chairman and CEO, Sinovation Ventures; Founder and CEO, 01.AI

James Liang — Co-founder and Executive Chairman, Trip.com Group

Liu Hanyuan — Chairman of the Board, Tongwei Group

Zhang Chuanwei — Chairman, Mingyang Smart Energy

Zhang Yichen — Chairman and CEO, CITIC Capital Holdings Limited

12:30–13:30 Business Buffet Lunch and Open Networking

13:30–14:45 Forum 1 (Auditorium 1): Artificial Intelligence, Digital Economy and Cross-Border E-commerce

Moderator:

Tang Min — Vice President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Featured Address:

Xue Lan — Dean, Institute for AI International Governance, Tsinghua University

Invited Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Ji Xinhua — Founder and CEO, UCloud Technology Co., Ltd.

Lyu Yixiong — Founder and Chairman, Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd.

Shi Peng — Global Chief Operating Officer, Mixue Group

Megan Wang — Managing Director, China, Project Management Institute (PMI)

Zhang Jingyang — Founder and CEO, Moore Elite

Zhou Hao — Founder and CEO, QuantGroup

Zheng Rujing — Founder and CEO, Spes (Haomai Technology)

Zou Xiaowu — Founder and Chairman, Eclicktech

14:45–15:00 Networking Tea Break and Room Transition

15:00–16:15 Forum 2 (Auditorium 1): New Energy and Green Globalization

Invited Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Liu De — Co-founder, Executive Director and Senior Vice President, Xiaomi Group; Chief of Group Leadership Development

Ni Jun — Chief Manufacturing Officer and Co-president of Engineering, Manufacturing and R&D, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL)

Zhang Hui — Vice President, Europe, NIO Holding Co., Ltd.; Chair, Automotive Working Group, China Chamber of Commerce to the EU

16:15–16:30 Networking Tea Break and Room Transition

16:30–17:45 Forum 3 (Auditorium 1): Enterprise Globalization and Project Management

Jointly organized by CCG and the Project Management Institute (PMI), this specialist forum focuses on full-lifecycle management of cross-border projects undertaken by Chinese companies. Drawing on PMI’s globally recognized body of knowledge, standards, certifications and industry practice, it addresses common challenges such as difficult cross-border delivery, weak risk controls and inefficient cross-cultural collaboration. The forum will combine standards, case analysis and targeted connections to produce replicable methods and strengthen systematic project governance, delivery quality and commercial value.

13:30–14:45 Forum 4 (Auditorium 2): Cross-Border Investment and Financing

Jointly organized by CCG and investment and financing institutions, this forum examines how cross-border capital can support industrial globalization. It will focus on evolving financing needs, efficient cross-border capital allocation, and two-way collaboration between industry and investors. By connecting policy guidance, fund-of-funds leverage and industrial implementation, it will bring together globalizing companies, industrial capital, financial institutions and professional advisers to support safe, compliant and high-quality international expansion.

15:00–16:15 Forum 5 (Auditorium 2): Career Development for Chinese Overseas Students and Returnees

This forum focuses on cross-border talent ecosystems and the talent strategies of globalizing companies. Drawing on professional networks in overseas-student career development, cross-border mobility planning and full-lifecycle talent services, it connects overseas-educated talent, Chinese companies operating internationally and specialist service providers. The integrated platform will offer career guidance, employer matching and cross-border support, expanding global career opportunities while supplying companies with high-quality international talent.

16:30–17:45 Forum 6 (Auditorium 2): Young Business Leaders Growth Forum

This forum is designed to cultivate the next generation of business leaders and strengthen the talent pipeline for enterprise globalization. It connects young entrepreneurs, returnee professionals, industry mentors and international platforms through growth support, practical opportunities and global perspective-building. The goal is to help emerging leaders identify global opportunities, strengthen international management capabilities and contribute a sustained new generation of business talent.

13:30–14:45 Forum 7 (Auditorium 3): China–Europe Cooperation Forum

A high-level dialogue on deeper China–Europe economic and trade cooperation and sustainable development. Drawing on extensive networks across European government, business and academia, the forum will focus on green transition, the digital economy, two-way investment and industrial-chain coordination. It will connect policy dialogue, business matching and practical co-creation to foster durable cooperation among companies, industry organizations and professional institutions.

15:00–16:15 Forum 8 (Auditorium 3): Central Asia and Neighbouring Regions Cooperation Forum

This regional forum focuses on economic cooperation with Central Asia and the South Caucasus and on investment opportunities around the Caspian economic corridor. It will examine trade facilitation, industrial investment, logistics connectivity and investment facilitation, providing official channels and practical support for Chinese companies entering Central Asian and South Caucasus markets and advancing mutually beneficial regional supply-chain integration.

16:30–17:45 Forum 9 (Auditorium 3): Middle East and North Africa Regional Cooperation Forum

Jointly organized by CCG and embassies of Middle Eastern and North African countries in China, this official regional forum focuses on deeper cooperation and opportunities in Gulf and North African markets. It will align economic-transformation strategies in the region with the capabilities of Chinese companies, covering two-way investment, industrial capacity, trade upgrading and infrastructure cooperation. Official policy interpretation, project matching and implementation support will help companies develop these markets and advance mutually beneficial economic and trade relations.

18:00–19:00 Networking Reception

Venue: Foyer outside the Main Conference Hall

Open to all conference participants, the reception connects the afternoon forums with the evening’s closed-door dinner. It will bring together government, business and academic representatives, leaders of globalizing companies, international organizations and diplomats. Partners may use the setting for brand presentation and business meetings, reaching the full conference audience and beginning targeted engagement with senior dinner guests.

19:00–21:00 Exchange Dinner for Globalizing Entrepreneurs and Diplomats in China

Venue: Private dinner venue (by invitation only; closed-door event)

The highest-level closed-door event of the conference, this invitation-only dinner will convene ambassadors and commercial counsellors, former senior trade and economic officials, leaders of major globalizing companies, and representatives of international and industry organizations. Centred on high-level dialogue, authoritative announcements and targeted connections, it will provide a trusted setting for policy communication, international resource matching and lasting cooperation.

Core Programme:

1. High-level government–business dialogue: ministry experts will address policy and practice in Chinese enterprise globalization; leading entrepreneurs will discuss global AI trends and new opportunities; and ambassadors will offer remarks on government–business coordination, two-way opening and industrial cooperation.

2. In the presence of relevant Ministry of Commerce leaders, ambassadors and dinner guests, three authoritative recommendation lists will be announced: Chinese Globalizing Enterprises, Service Companies Supporting Chinese Global Expansion, and Emerging Young Business Leaders in Global Expansion.

3. Themed table discussions: guests will be grouped by regional market and industry to match cooperation needs and connect resources. A cultural performance by Guo Shize will be presented during the dinner.

To register, please scan the QR code below.

Or use the registration link:

For further enquiries, please contact:

Tel: +86-10-65611038-8009

Appendix: Full List of Conference Guests

I. Former Ministry of Commerce Officials (alphabetical by surname)

Chen Deming — Former Minister of Commerce of China

Chen Jian — Former Vice Minister of Commerce of China; Distinguished Expert, CPPCC National Committee Talent Pool for Consultative Governance

II. Ambassadors to China (alphabetical by country)

H.E. Marcelo Suárez Salvia — Ambassador of Argentina to China

H.E. Hussain Al Hammadi — Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to China

H.E. Wolf Dietrich Heim — Ambassador of Austria to China

H.E. Bruno Angelet — Ambassador of Belgium to China

H.E. Dario Mihelin — Ambassador of Croatia to China

H.E. Alberto Blanco Silva — Ambassador of Cuba to China

H.E. Koula Sophianou — Ambassador of Cyprus to China

H.E. Michael Starbæk Christensen — Ambassador of Denmark to China

H.E. Tefera Derbew Yimam — Ambassador of Ethiopia to China

H.E. Mikko Kinnunen — Ambassador of Finland to China

H.E. Bergdís Ellertsdóttir — Ambassador of Iceland to China

H.E. Evgenios Kalpyris — Ambassador of Greece to China

Péter Király — Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Hungary in China

H.E. Kenji Kanasugi — Ambassador of Japan to China

H.E. Hussam A. G. Al Husseini — Ambassador of Jordan to China

H.E. Abdelkader El Ansari — Ambassador of Morocco to China

H.E. Vebjørn Dysvik — Ambassador of Norway to China

H.E. Khalil Ur Rahman Hashmi — Ambassador of Pakistan to China

H.E. Manuel Carvalho — Ambassador of Portugal to China

H.E. Dan-Horia Maxim — Ambassador of Romania to China

H.E. James Kimonyo — Ambassador of Rwanda to China

H.E. Vaness Tsin Jie Li — Ambassador of Suriname to China

H.E. Per Augustsson — Ambassador of Sweden to China

III. Ministry of Commerce Experts (alphabetical by surname)

Chai Xiaolin — Former Director-General, Department of WTO Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Director, Trade in Services and Investment Division, World Trade Organization

Senior official, Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce

Gou Haodong — Former Deputy Representative, Mission of China to the African Union

Han Bing — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Economic and Commercial Counsellor of China in Croatia and Poland; Former Minister-Counsellor of China in Egypt and Zimbabwe

Huang Rengang — Former Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of China to the WTO; Former Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of China in Australia

Huo Jianguo — Former President, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce; Vice President, China Society for World Trade Organization Studies

Jiang Shan — Former Director-General, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister-Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Canada

Jin Xu — Former Commercial Counsellor of China in the United Kingdom; President, China Association of International Trade

Lei Fengyun — Former Science and Technology Counsellor, Embassy of China in Austria; Former Chief Representative, UK Office of the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs

Lu Kejian — Former Director-General and Deputy Director-General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Japan

Li Xiaobing — Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in India

Ma Jianchun — Former Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Ambassador of China to The Gambia

Ma She — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister-Counsellor for Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in France

Peng Gang — Former Director-General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister, Mission of China to the European Union

Song Yaoming — Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Japan

Sun Jie — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation; Formerly served in economic and commercial offices of Chinese embassies overseas

Sun Yongfu — Former Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce

Tian Deyou — Former Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs; Former Minister-Counsellor, Economic and Commercial Office, Embassy of China in the United States

Wang Huiyao — President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Wang Kaiqian — Director, China International Electronic Commerce Center

Wang Qingyuan — Former Minister-Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs at the Chinese embassies in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico

Yang Yi — Former Director-General, Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Commerce

Zhu Hong — Former Minister, Embassy of China in the United States

IV. Entrepreneurs and Company Founders (alphabetical by surname)

Timo Blenk — Partner and CEO, Agora Strategy Group AG

Henry Cai — Chairman and Founding Partner, AGIC Capital

Cao Dewang — Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co., Ltd., Honorary Chairman for Life

Dai Anhui — Zhejiang Gaoshengtong Holding Co., Ltd., Chairman

Duo Xiaojing — Huangjing Global Business Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Fu Chengyu — Sinopec Group, Former Chairman

Gan Yuanshan — Boerfei Bioengineering Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Gao Min — Hanbo Group, Chairman

Gao Zhendong — Positec Group, Founder; Chairman

Hua Dongyi — Beijing Dadeson Science, Technology and Trade Services Group Co., Ltd., CEO

Hong Kai — Henling Technology, CEO

Ji Xinhua — UCloud Technology, Founder and CEO

Kai-Fu Lee — Sinovation Ventures, Chairman, 01.AI, Founder and CEO

Li Xiaopeng — DeWe Security Service Group (DWSS), Founder, Frontier Services Group, Executive Director

Liu Shuqi — Tongwei Co., Ltd., Chair and CEO

Liu Yonghao — New Hope Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Lyu Yixiong — Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd., Founder; Chairman

Ma Tiemin — Kaisheng Haofeng Agriculture Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Qiao Jian — Lenovo Group Limited, Vice President

Qiu Guangyu — Vice President, Meituan; Head of Keeta Overseas Business

Shi Peng — Mixue Group, Global Chief Operating Officer

Sun Piaoyang — Jiangsu Hengrui Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd., Chairman

Tang Xiuguo — Rotating Chairman, SANY Group

Wang Peng — Synear Food Co., Ltd., General Manager

Wang Xin — Founder, Global Honor Club (Li Jiamei)

Wu Jing — Returnees Today, Founder and CEO

Dr. Karim Alwadi — Beltway Group, Co-founder

Xu Fang — Galaxy Ventures, Founding Partner

Xu Gui — Shanghai Daoshen Huangu Technology Co., Ltd., Founder

Yang Rui — Dreame Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., Founder

Yu Dechao — Innovent Biologics, Founder

Yu Lu — Urban Planning & Design Institute of Shenzhen Co., Ltd. (UPDIS), Party Secretary; Chairman

Zhang Chuanwei — Mingyang Group, Founder; Chairman

Zhang Jingyang — Moore Elite, Founder and CEO

Zhang Yichen — CITIC Capital Holdings Limited, Chairman and CEO

Zhao Yong — Fuhua Group, Chairman

Zheng Rujing — Spes (Haomai Technology), Founder and CEO

Zhou Yu — Huakai Yibai Technology Co., Ltd., Chairman

Zhu Weiqing — Shanghai Baotan New Energy and Environmental Technology Co., Ltd., Founder; Chairman and CEO

Zhu Zhaojiang — Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd., Chairman and General Manager

Zou Xiaowu — Eclicktech, Founder; Chairman

V. Counsellors and Other Diplomats in China (alphabetical by country)

Ahmed Benyahya — Counsellor, Embassy of Algeria in China

Mansour Al Kaabi — Head of the Economic Section, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Zuo Ende — Senior Economic Researcher, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Abdulla Alnoaimi — Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Mansour AlKaabi — Head of the Economic Section, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Natig Khalilov — Chief Adviser to the Trade Representative, Embassy of Azerbaijan in China

Jing Liu — Senior Investment Director, Australian Embassy in China

Mandefro Shiferaw — Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Ethiopia in China

Franz Roessler — Commercial Counsellor, Austrian Embassy in China

Kaiyrzhan — Counsellor, Embassy of Kazakhstan in China

Ernst Prosman — First Secretary, Economic Section, Embassy of the Netherlands in China

Lene Jie — Trade Commissioner, Embassy of Canada in China

Counsellor, Embassy of Cameroon in China

Sofia Ancheta — Economic Counsellor, Embassy of Cuba in China

Suzanne Wong — Head of Global Affairs, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Andrew Duff — Economic Officer, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Onejin Wu — Economic Officer, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Karalea Davis — Specialist, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Wang Xiaojuan — Specialist, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Gonzalo Talavera — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Peru in China

Radouane Chaouki — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Morocco in China

Cecilia Chirita — Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of Moldova in China

Nuno Lima Leite — Coordinating Director for China, AICEP Portugal Global; Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Portugal in China

Chandima Kiriwandala — Commercial Minister, Embassy of Sri Lanka in China

Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Saudi Arabia in China

Altay Ceylanoğlu — Counsellor, Embassy of Türkiye in China

Bai Jie — Commercial Secretary, Embassy of Uganda in China

Dimitrios Michas — Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in China

Sun Jinshu — Officer, Financial Section, Embassy of Hungary in China

Emanuele Aloisio — Financial Attaché, Embassy of Italy in China; Representative of the Bank of Italy in China

Rishikesh Swaminathan — First Secretary for Science and Technology, Embassy of India in China

Jörg Weberndörfer — Minister-Counsellor for Industry and SME Policy, Trade and Investment Section, Delegation of the European Union to China

Khaled Melad Rezek — Minister Plenipotentiary and Head of the Economic and Commercial Office, Embassy of Egypt in China

Daniel Necula — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Romania in China

Kuno Gschwend — Chief Investment Officer and Deputy Head, Swiss Business Hub China, Embassy of Switzerland in China

VI. Representatives of International Organizations and Institutions (alphabetical by surname)

Johann Caspar Fuhrmann — Representative, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Li Nan — Senior Director, Division on Investment and Enterprise, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Tatiana Rosito — Representative, World Bank China Office

Luo Xiang — Representative, United Nations Global Leadership and ESG Development Center

Mabel Lu Miao — Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Executive Director-General, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); Founder, Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)

Marshall Mills — Representative, International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Muhammad Amersi — Representative, Amersi Foundation, United Kingdom

Mohamed Al Barwani — Founder and Chairman, MB LLC

Megan Wang — Managing Director, China, Project Management Institute (PMI); Executive Council Member, CCG

Elisa Hörhager — Chief Representative in China, Federation of German Industries (BDI)

VII. Experts, Scholars, and Leaders of Technology and Professional-Service Institutions (alphabetical by surname)

Cao Mizu — Vice President and Director, Yiwu Shuzhao Artificial Intelligence Innovation Center

Cheng Zongchao — Director, EMBA Programme, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB)

Gao Jian — Deputy Director and Research Fellow, Atmospheric Environment Institute, Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences

He Shan — Samsung Global Research, Chief Research Fellow

Li Haitao — Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB), Dean

Li Wei — Professor of Economics and Associate Dean for Asia, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB)

Liu Jun — Deputy Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Liu Hong — Deputy Director of Public Relations and Communications, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Lu Ruquan — CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute, Dean

Tang Min — Vice President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Wang Zichen — Deputy Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Dr. Karim Alwadi — Beltway Group, Co-founder

Xiang Siwei — Samsung Global Research, Chief Research Fellow

Yu Lu — Urban Planning & Design Institute of Shenzhen Co., Ltd. (UPDIS), Party Secretary; Chairman

Zhang Wei — Vice President and Senior Fellow, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Zhang Xiong — Executive Vice Dean, E-Pharma Globalization Institute

Zheng Jinlian — Center for China and Globalization (CCG), Deputy Director; Research Director

VIII. CCG Council Members (alphabetical by surname)

Guo Shize — Founder and President, Yingzhong Overseas Consulting; Executive Council Member, CCG

Jiang Guohua — Zicheng United Construction Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Jiang Zhongyuan — Vice Chair, CCG Hong Kong Council

Jing Yuhong — Shanghai Zhongyou Information Services Co., Ltd., Executive Director

Ma Enduo — Amaes Food (Group) Co., Ltd., Chairman

Min Hao — Dongwu Shian IoT Technology (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd., Chairman

Tang Haoxuan — Fuaida International, Chairman

Wang Yi — LAIX Inc., Founder and CEO

Wang Xinghua — Chengdu Huafu Group, Chairman

Zhou Hao — QuantGroup, Founder and CEO

IX. Executives of Chinese and International Companies (alphabetical by surname)

Cai Qinghong — Merits & Tree Law Offices, Managing Partner

Chen Peng — ICBC Brussels Branch, Head of Legal and Public Relations

Chen Xiaohua — Deputy Party Secretary, Huaxing Haian Group

Cui Xiaojing — JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd., Representative

Guo Xu — RELX, Director of Government Affairs

Guo Weifang — Baker McKenzie, Director of Business Development, China

Huang Jinghui — China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), Deputy General Manager

Huang Qijia — PwC China, Managing Partner, Consulting

Huang Ye — CIIC Group, Head of Overseas Development

Ji Lin — iFLYTEK Co., Ltd., Vice President

Jie Ling — Jianggen Capital, Director of Overseas Business

Li Xiaoxu — Hangzhou Tigermed Consulting Co., Ltd., Director of Strategic Affairs

Li Yifang — Hong Kong Xihui Holdings Group, Representative

Li Yao — KPMG Global China Practice, Partner

Liu Chang — Cargill China, Vice President of Government Affairs

Liu Shiliang — Former Managing Director of Investment Banking, China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC)

Liu Shuqi — Tongwei Co., Ltd., Chair and CEO

Mei Lin — Amazon Global Selling, Head of Asia Pacific

Qiao Jian — Lenovo Group Limited, Vice President

Qiu Guangyu — Vice President, Meituan; Head of Keeta Overseas Business

Shi Peng — Mixue Group, Global Chief Operating Officer

Wang Peng — Synear Food Co., Ltd., General Manager

Wu Yanyan — BMW Group, Vice President

Xia Xin — Vice President, Sanofi China

Xiao Lijun — IDG Capital, Partner

Xu Chengzhi — Windey Energy Technology Group Co., Ltd., Global Chief Public Affairs Officer

Xu Fengwei — Zhenjiang Co., Ltd., General Manager

Zhang Hui — Vice President, Europe, NIO Holding Co., Ltd.; Chair, Automotive Working Group, China Chamber of Commerce to the EU

Zhu Hui — Partner, China, Boston Consulting Group (BCG)

Zhu Hailuan — Vice President, Danaher China

X. Local Government Officials and Leaders of Chinese and International Business Associations

Cheng Fabao — Director, Beijing Investment Promotion Bureau of Jing County, Xuancheng, Anhui

Rami Khalil — President, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia

Deng Zhiqiang — Shenzhen Longgang Cross-Border E-Commerce Association, President

Jin Jinghao — Deputy Director, JETRO Beijing Office

Liang Cuiqin — Overseas Vice President, Malaysia ASEAN Business Association

Lin Xinru — Shenzhen Cross-Border E-Commerce Enterprise Association, Secretary-General

Ren Xinglei — China Association for Small & Medium Commercial Enterprises, Vice President

Wang Xin — Shenzhen Cross-Border E-Commerce Association, President

Dong Xuecheng — China Entrepreneurs Innovation Forum, Secretary-General

XI. Participating Organizations

(1) Companies

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Avatr Technology; Abbott China; Anker Innovations; Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP; Aukey; 1EarthVillage; Baidu; Banyu Technology; Baker McKenzie; Bain & Company; KPMG China; BYD; Boston Consulting Group (BCG); Boston Scientific; CKGSB Alumni Association; Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable; Chengxi Consulting; Dentons; Dahua Certified Public Accountants; Dalian Jiahe Technology; Dalian Xiangdu Property; Danaher; Dapresy Group; Dow Jones; Deppon Express; Deloitte China; DeHeng Law Offices; 4PX; DiDi; Philips Healthcare; FiberHome; Flybird International; SVOLT Energy; GE HealthCare; China Communications Group; China Development Bank; Gotion High-tech; State Grid Corporation of China; Hengtong Group; HongShan; Hony Capital; Huangjing Global Business Group; Huawei; Huawei Digital Power; Huairou Science City Administrative Committee; HP; IDG Capital; Geely Holding; ZEEKR; Jingneng Energy; BOE Technology Group; King & Wood Mallesons; Goldwind; Harvest Fund Management; JunHe LLP; Jiucheng Supply Chain; CBC Group; iFLYTEK; Cook Medical; Kuayue Express; LightInTheBox; Livzon Pharmaceutical Group; BDO China; Lenovo; Beijing Liangzi Business Consulting; Lunan Pharmaceutical Group; LONGi Green Energy; Roland Berger; London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG); Mindray; Medtronic; Embassy of the United States in China; Meituan; Mingyang Smart Energy; Merck China; Nizami Ganjavi International Center (NGIC); NETA Auto; CATL; nubia; OPPO; Palanda International Trade; Penggong Intelligence; PwC China; Qilu Pharmaceutical; Chery; 360 Group; Ruizhi Consulting; realme; SERES; Sailvan Times; Sanofi China; Thermo Fisher Scientific; SANY Group; Sinocare; Fosun Pharma; MicroPort; Shanghai Turing Intelligent Computing Quantum Technology; Shanghai Huijingchen Technology; Shanghai Daoshen Huangu Technology; Shanghai Ruili Biotechnology; Shanghai Yincai Network; SenseTime; Stryker; Shumaorong (Beijing) Technology; SF International; SF Express; Suzhou Sifang Intelligent Technology; StarTimes; Swiss Cultural and Arts Center; TCL; Tigermed; BY-HEALTH; Andon Health; Tianjin Zhongtian Data Technology; Baker Tilly China; Pan-China Certified Public Accountants; Trina Solar; Tianqi Lithium; Tongwei; vivo; Worldwide Logistics; Weiheng Law Firm; NetEase; NIO; Wuhan Burini Education Technology; Wuhan Xingqiao International Education Technology; SHEIN; Simcere; Innovent Biologics; ShineWing; Sunwoda; New Hope Group; Siemens Healthineers; XPeng; Xiaomi; HONOR; XCMG; Sungrow; Yipianhong E-commerce; EVE Energy; Yingke Law Firm; Yingke Yirong (Beijing) Information Technology; Envision Energy; Windey Energy; Yuntu Logistics; YSS Group; Zhejiang Gaoshengtong Holding; Merits & Tree Law Offices; IM Motors; CALB; Zhong Lun Law Firm; Zoomlion; CICC; CIMC Vehicles; CITIC Capital; CITIC Futures; China International Engineering Consulting Corporation; Sinosure; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; China General Nuclear Power Group; China National Offshore Oil Corporation; China Construction Bank; Export-Import Bank of China; China State Construction Engineering Corporation; China Railway Group; China Railway Construction Corporation; Energy China; China Three Gorges Corporation; Sino Biopharmaceutical; CRRC; Sinopharm; China Southern Power Grid; Bank of China; Beijing Yitan Jiujing Technology; Beijing Compliance Culture Development; Beijing Junya Xiangxin International Trade; Beijing Hehehui; Beijing Haoda International Cultural Exchange; Beijing Shubai Fangzhuang Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine; Beijing Ruiqi Business Consulting; Beijing Tenghua Jianbo Ducui Technology; Beijing Zhijie Consulting; Beijing Rongqing Technology; Beijing First Launch Business Center; Zishun Compliance; Zigong Haitian Culture; Dreame Technology; Zijin Mining, among others.

(2) Local Governments and Related Authorities

Beijing Investment Promotion Bureau of Jing County, Xuancheng, Anhui; Huairou Science City Administrative Committee; Investment Promotion Center, Department of Commerce of Jiangxi Province; Tangier Port Authority; Yangjiang Green Energy Industry Technology Innovation Service Center, among others.

(3) International Organizations

Finance Center for South-South Cooperation (FCSSC); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); World Bank; Asia Pacific International Arbitration Court, among others.

(4) Universities

University of Macau; University of Science and Technology Beijing; International Cooperation Research Center for Sustainable Industrial Park Development and Planning, Southeast University; SOAS University of London; RCEP Member States Research Center, Ningbo University of Finance & Economics; Nantong University; Center for Student Global Competence Development, Tsinghua University; Overseas China Data Research Institute, Soochow University; Suzhou University of Science and Technology; Tianjin Normal University; University of Northampton; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, among others.

(5) Research Institutes and Think Tanks

Guoyan Economic Research Institute, Development Research Center of the State Council; Guoyan High-Tech (Xiamen) Digital Economy Research Institute; Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences; Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce; Belt and Road Initiative Sri Lanka (BRISL); Samsung Global Research; Suzhou Innovation Ecosystem Research Institute; Xinhua China Enterprise Development Research Center; Yangze Huaan Think Tank; China Low-Altitude Economy Research Institute; China National Chemical Information Center; National Science Library, Chinese Academy of Sciences, among others.

(6) Chinese and International Business Associations

Australia China Business Council (Tasmania); Beijing Digital Economy Enterprise Globalization Base; GiC International Investment Promotion Association; Global Medical Aesthetics Innovation Conference; Global Intelligence Empowerment Center; Silk Road International Talent Alliance; CCPIT Lüliang Council, Shanxi; Green Trade Committee of the China Association for Statistics of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade; Asia Pacific Medical Technology Association; Zhongguancun Green Mine Industry Alliance; International Industrial Innovation Cooperation Committee of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; Foreign Trade Culture Committee of the China Enterprise Culture Improvement Association; Special Committee of the China Medical and Health Development Foundation; China International Talent Exchange Foundation; Commercial Sub-council, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade; China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.

China Association of Trade in Services; China Association for Socio-Economic and Cultural Exchange; Anti-Aging Medicine and Proactive Health Branch of the China Food and Drug Safety Promotion Association; All-China Environment Federation; Beijing Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment; China Association of International Trade; China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, among others.

(7) Chinese and International Media

People’s Daily; Xinhua News Agency; CCTV+; Dow Jones China strategic partnerships; D&S Media; The Straits Times; Global Times; Reuters; South China Morning Post; Entrepreneurs Daily; TRT World; Sina Finance; ABC, among others.

To register, please scan the QR code below.

Or use the registration link:

For further enquiries, please contact:

Tel: +86-10-65611038-8009

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Held under the theme “Powering the Future,” this year’s Public Forum focuses on the role of trade in services in economic development, job creation and the future of the global trading system. According to the WTO, more than 4,600 participants from business, governments, civil society, academia and international organizations are taking part, with 540 speakers appearing across a record 113 sessions.

September 15

On September 15, Wang joined a closed-door exchange in the WTO’s Green Room. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala delivered opening remarks at the session.

Later that day, Wang attended a high-level session led by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), titled “The tectonic plates of trade are moving: A new equilibrium?”

The session opened with remarks from PIIE President Adam S. Posen and was moderated by Bloomberg’s Brendan Murray. Speakers included Cecilia Malmström, Nonresident Senior Fellow at PIIE and former European Commissioner for Trade; Tatiana Prazeres, Brazil’s Foreign Trade Secretary; Vera Songwe of the Brookings Institution; and Joe W. Sullivan, Senior Director for Policy at the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

The discussion examined how the global trading system is being reshaped amid geopolitical tensions and economic fragmentation, and what role the WTO can play in supporting a more balanced and sustainable international trade order.

September 16

On September 16, Wang joined a special edition of PIIE’s Trade Winds series at the WTO Public Forum, “The state of play for global trade: Spotting trends and challenges.”

Hosted by Cecilia Malmström, the discussion featured Robert W. Staiger, Chief Economist of the WTO; Maria Martin-Prat, Ambassador of the European Union Permanent Mission to the WTO; and Nazak Nikakhtar, Partner at Wiley Rein and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis.

Staiger presented the WTO’s 2026 World Trade Report, “A Critical Juncture for the World Trading System,” followed by a discussion on the major forces shaping international trade, including tariffs, subsidies, export restrictions, industrial policy and geopolitical tensions, as well as the future role of the WTO.

September 17

On the morning of September 17, Miao attended “The New Map of Data and Future of Critical Minerals: Could Turkiye Become Eurasia’s Safe Harbour for Data Centre Investment?”

Organized by the Electrical and Electronics Exporters’ Association of Turkiye and the Istanbul Mineral Exporters’ Association, the session examined the rapid expansion of data-centre investment, associated energy and infrastructure needs, critical-mineral supply security, and Türkiye’s potential role in Eurasian digital infrastructure.

At noon, CCG convened its own session at the WTO Public Forum, titled “Unilateralism undermining the multilateral trading system.”

Moderated by Miao, the panel featured Wang; Maarten Smeets, Senior Fellow at the World Trade Institute and a member of the Steering Committee of the Trade and Investment Research Network; Elvire Fabry, Director of the Trade and Economic Security Programme at the Jacques Delors Institute; and Wenhua Ji, Professor at the University of International Business and Economics and Vice President of the WTO Law Research Society of the China Law Society.

The discussion considered the spillover effects of unilateral trade measures, risks of further fragmentation in the global trading system, the preservation of multilateral trade rules and possible pathways for WTO reform.

Later on September 17, Wang joined a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel, “Effect of Structural Economic Differences on Global Trade.”

Hosted by Angela Ellard of CSIS, the session will also feature Marion Jansen of the OECD, Ed Brzytwa of the Consumer Technology Association and Nazak Nikakhtar of Wiley Rein. The panel will examine how structural differences among major economies affect global trade and what those differences mean for the future of multilateral trade governance.

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CCG has participated in previous editions of the WTO Public Forum. At the 2019 edition, Henry Huiyao Wang publicly called for marine plastics pollution to become an area of WTO cooperation and urged China to help advance multilateral action on the issue. Also participating in that discussion was Zhang Xiangchen, then ambassador and permanent representative of China to the WTO.

The following year, China and Fiji launched the WTO’s Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade. The initiative has since expanded to 83 WTO co-sponsors, representing nearly 90 percent of global plastics trade.

On December 13, 2021, to mark the 20th anniversary of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), together with the Network for International Trade and Investment System (NITIS) and the China Institute for WTO Studies (CIWTO) at the University of International Business and Economics, held a hybrid seminar titled “Twenty Years of China’s WTO Membership: From Integration to Interaction.”

Participants included then WTO Deputy Director-General Anabel Gonzalez; former Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya; former WTO Deputy Directors-General Alan Wolff and Yi Xiaozhun; Zhang Yuejiao, former chair of the WTO Appellate Body; and Tu Xinquan, Dean of CIWTO.

At the 2024 Public Forum, CCG organized a session titled “Leveraging China’s Green Transition for Global Climate Mitigation: Perspectives, Opportunities and Challenges,” moderated by Wang and featuring former WTO Deputy Director-General Xiaozhun Yi, former Kenyan Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed, Elvire Fabry and PIIE President Adam S. Posen.

CCG in 2024 was greeted by Li Chenggang, then Chinese ambassador to the WTO, in Geneva.

The 2026 programme continues CCG’s engagement with international institutions and policy organizations on the future of the multilateral trading system and global economic governance.

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The result is his new book, 古道新章· 世界里的中国 Old Road, New Connections, a work of long-form photojournalism that traces the new connections taking shape along and beyond the ancient Silk Road.

On September 24, the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) will host a VIP luncheon in Beijing featuring Liu for a conversation on the making of the book, , whose English edition is published by ACC Art Books and Chinese edition by CITIC Press.

The luncheon will feature a visual presentation by Liu, including selected photographs from his journey and a 12-minute film edited by renowned Chinese filmmaker Jia Zhangke, followed by a dialogue with CCG President Henry Huiyao Wang and live Q&A with guests.

When and where

Thursday, September 24, 2026
11:30 a.m. – 2:00 p.m.

Venue details will be provided upon successful registration.

A seated lunch will be provided.

Guest reception and networking will begin at 11:30 a.m., followed by the luncheon and programme at noon.

Featured speakers

Liu Heung Shing

Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer and internationally acclaimed photojournalist

Across the shifting geopolitical landscape of the late 20th century, on assignments spanning the US and Asia, Liu Heung Shing photographed two of its seminal events: the rise of China through unprecedented economic reform, and the collapse of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev.

For this work he was named Best Photographer by the Associated Press in 1988 and 1989, and received the Photo of the Year award from the University of Missouri in 1989. In 1992 he shared the Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography with his Moscow colleagues, and that same year received the Overseas Press Club Award. His photographs of China are widely recognised as capturing an era of change — at once preserving native sensibilities and an independent point of view.

Liu was the first Time magazine photographer posted in Beijing since 1978, and later chief photographer for the Associated Press in Beijing, Los Angeles, New Delhi, Seoul and Moscow. He is the author of China After Mao, China: Portrait of a Country, and 1911: The Road to Revolution, and co-author of Shanghai: Portrait of a City, and A Life in a Sea of Red. M+ in Hong Kong holds the largest collection of his work, of which he is also a patron.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Henry Huiyao Wang is Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and former Counsellor to China’s State Council appointed by the Chinese Premier. In addition, he is a former Vice Chairman of China Association for International Economic Cooperation (CAIEC) under the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), former Vice Chairman, China Talent Research Society under the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. He is also currently the Standing Director of China Institute of International Economic Relations under PBOC, and a Director of Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and a Director of the China National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation, both organisations under the supervision of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In addition, Wang is a Steering Committee Member of Paris Peace Forum and Metropolis International and was an Advising Board Member for International Organization of Migration (IOM) of the UN. He is a Distinguished Professor of China Foreign Affairs University and sits on the Advising Board of Richard Ivey Business School of Canada, Advisory Committee for Global Competence Development of Tsinghua University. He was the former Dean of the Institute of Development at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in China.

Registration

Seats are limited, and advance registration is required.

Register now using this link

or scan the QR code

For further questions, contact:

ccgluncheon@ccg.org.cn

Organized by TEHA Group, the annual forum is structured around three broad areas: the global outlook, the agenda for Europe, and Italy.

The 2026 programme brought together political leaders, policymakers, economists, academics, business executives and other international speakers for discussions on geopolitical developments, the economic outlook, European competitiveness, energy, technology and other major issues.

Speakers included European Council President António Costa; Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama; Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković; Italian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Tajani; former Italian prime ministers Mario Monti, Paolo Gentiloni and Enrico Letta; former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina M. Raimondo; Mohamed El-Erian, Chief Economic Advisor at Allianz; Laurence D. Fink, Chairman and CEO of BlackRock; and other representatives from government, business, academia and international organizations.

Wang was the only participant from China among the invited guests and took part in two discussions, as well as a session of the forum’s Leader del Futuro programme for young managers and entrepreneurs.

On September 4, Wang took part in “A World in Turmoil,” a discussion under the forum’s “Future Global Challenges and Impacts on Business” session.

Other speakers included Niall Ferguson, Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Anne-Marie Slaughter, incoming Dean of the School of Public Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science and former Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department; and Levent Gümrükçü, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye.

On September 5, Wang participated in a panel entitled “Europe’s Path to Growth and Competitiveness,” moderated by Ben Hall, Europe Editor of the Financial Times. The panel also featured Enrico Letta, Dean of IE University and President of the Jacques Delors Institute; Marco Tronchetti Provera, Executive Chairman of Pirelli & C.; and Will Marshall, Co-founder and CEO of Planet. Raffaele Fitto, Executive Vice-President of the European Commission for Cohesion and Reforms, subsequently delivered “A View from the EU.”

Later that day, Wang joined the Leader del Futuro Meeting, held in parallel with the annual Villa d’Este Forum. Reserved for young managers and entrepreneurs under the age of 35, the programme brought participants together with speakers from the Cernobbio Forum. Wang delivered a presentation entitled “The Asian Century: China and the Next World Order.” Other speakers included Gina M. Raimondo, Bill de Blasio, Anacláudia Rossbach, Niall Ferguson and Anne-Marie Slaughter.

About TEHA Group and Villa d’Este

TEHA Group is an international management consulting group established in 1965 and headquartered in Italy, with a presence across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa and North America. Its activities include strategic and management consulting, scenario development and policy research, territorial development programmes, high-level training and leadership forums.

Villa d’Este, the long-standing venue of the forum, is a historic property on the shores of Lake Como in Cernobbio. Its history dates to 1568, when Cardinal Tolomeo Gallio commissioned architect Pellegrino Pellegrini to build the villa as a summer residence. It was converted into a luxury hotel in 1873, and the villa and its ten-hectare park were designated a National Monument in 1913.

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Time: 13:30-18:00, Friday, September 18, 2026

Venue: Nousland Beijing

Forum Introduction

The global drive toward carbon peaking and carbon neutrality is reshaping industries worldwide, while the green transition is opening up trillion-dollar growth opportunities. According to LinkedIn’s latest Global Green Skills Report 2025, demand for green talent is growing twice as fast as the supply of workers with green skills, highlighting a significant imbalance between supply and demand.

Against this backdrop, the Green Talent Parallel Forum will be jointly hosted by the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO) and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG). Under the theme “Green Talent Competitiveness in the AI Era: Green Skills and Green Leadership,” the forum will explore how AI can serve as an accelerator and how cross-sector collaboration can provide a pathway to implementation. It aims to advance the green transition from investment in technologies and infrastructure alone toward coordinated investment in both people and technology; from technology-driven development toward talent-driven development; and from fragmented, siloed initiatives toward ecosystem-based collaboration.

Agenda

Guest Registration

13:30-14:00

Opening Remarks

14:00-14:05

Moderator: John Zhanjie ZHAO – Director of External Relations, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); Deputy Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Remarks by the Host Organization

14:05-14:12

Denis SIMON (US) – Chairman, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO)

Remarks by Government Representatives

14:12-14:19

Tongzhou District People’s Government of Beijing Municipality

14:19-14:26

Relevant Beijing Municipal Government Departments

Keynote Addresses

14:26-14:36

Mohan MUNASINGHE (Sri Lanka) – 2007 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Former Vice Chair, 2021 Blue Planet Prize Laureate; UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); Chair, MIND

14:36-14:46

WANG Naixiang – Chairman, China Beijing Green Exchange.

14:46-14:56

Tamas HAJBA (Hungary) – Senior Advisor for China and Head of the Beijing Office, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

Major Announcements

14:56-15:01

Announcement ①: Establishment of the AGTO Green Talent Special Committee
A Green Talent Special Committee will be established under AGTO to convene international green talent forums; conduct research and publish global green talent reports; and build a bridge connecting talent, technology, industry, and capital – facilitating green tech deployment, green enterprise growth, and supporting the National Green Development Demonstration Zone in the Beijing Municipal Administrative Center.

15:01-15:06

Announcement ②: Release of the Special Support Policies for Green Talent in the Beijing Municipal Administrative Center
Introducing comprehensive support for green talent in the Beijing Municipal Administrative Center in areas such as talent attraction, housing, research, and entrepreneurship, with the aim to build a leading hub in Beijing for green talent cultivation.

15:06-15:11

Announcement ③: Launch of the “Grand Canal Talent Card” Mini Program

15:11-15:16

Announcement ④: Launch of the Green Talent Platform

Green Young Talent Talk

Young green talent will deliver micro‑speeches, sharing personal stories of how green skills and green leadership have become distinctive strengths in their careers.

15:16-15:23

WANG Yanqiao – Business Director, CNNC Carbon Assets Management Co., Ltd; Green Talent Representative of the Beijing Municipal Administrative Center

15:23-15:30

Michelle TIONG (Malaysia) – Secretary General, MAYCHAM China; Associate Professor, Marginal Oil & Gas Technology Development Research Institute, Xi’an Petroleum University

15:30-15:37

LI Mengwen - Deputy Director, Department of Power Demand-Side Management, Beijing Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection Center

Major Announcements

15:37-15:42

Announcement ⑤: Launch of the Green Skills and Green Leadership Initiative for Young Talent
The initiative encourages young people to acquire at least one green skill to enhance their career competitiveness.

Panel Discussion I – Bridging the Green Talent Gap: Reframing Perceptions

The discussion will examine the definition and scope of “green talent,” the competencies and categories of green professionals, sector-specific demand for green talent, and how companies can identify and activate green capabilities within their existing workforce.

15:42-16:40

Kai Haifeng HUANG – Co founder & Executive Chair, Ecological Development Union International (EDUI)

Atakan ÖZDEMIR – Chief Commercial Counsellor, Embassy Of The Republic Of Türkiye In Beijing

Wei WEN – General Manager of New Business, Talent Solution, LinkedIn China

BAI Xueshi – Head of Global Strategy Department, Sunshine Asset Management

ZHANG Qi – Executive Committee Member, World Green Design Organization (WGDO)

Moderator: ZHANG Wei – Deputy Director, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Tea Break

16:40-16:55

Panel Discussion II – Bridging the Green Talent Gap: Accelerating Cultivation

The discussion will sharing practical approaches and innovative methods in green talent development, with a focus on green talent training programs, AI‑enabled green skills learning, and young talent engagement.

16:55-17:55

Lei LIU – Director, Public Education Department, China Zigen Rural Education and Development Association

LIN Yuqin – Director of Global Partnerships, Boke Foundation

David ZHANG – Director of Global Integration, Project Management Institute (PMI) China

LU Yichuan – Chairman, Beijing Xiehe Service Technology Co., Ltd.

Moderator: John Zhanjie ZHAO – Director of External Relations, AGTO; Deputy Secretary General, CCG

Closing Remarks

17:55-18:00

Moderator: John Zhanjie ZHAO – Director of External Relations, AGTO; Deputy Secretary General, CCG

Register to Attend:

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China and the Next Global Order, authored by CCG President Henry Huiyao Wang, collects his latest writings concerning the changing world order, a change widely characterized as one of “world disorder”.

CCG and Springer Nature are currently publishing sixteen books under “China and Globalization” book series which covers global governance, diplomacy and international relations, and economy and commerce.

Event Information

Co-organized by: Center for China and Globalization (CCG) & Springer Nature

When: 14:30-16:30 Monday, September 14, 2026 (Beijing Time)

Where: CCG Headquarters (B10, 12th Floor, West Wing, Hanwei Plaza, No.7 Guanghua Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing)

Language: English

Free ebook: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-95-5370-9

Agenda

14:30 – 14:35 Welcoming Remark

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-general of CCG

14:35 – 14:45 Opening Address

Leana Li, Editorial Director for Books, China, Springer Nature Group

14:45-15:05 Book Launch

Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG; author of China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition

15:05-16:20 Seminar

Moderator: Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-general of CCG

Guests (by the order of family name):

David Blair, Vice President and Senior Economist at CCG; former Chairman of the economics department at the Eisenhower School of National Defense University in Washington, DC

Harvey Dzodin, Senior Fellow of CCG, Former Vice President of ABC Television in New York, Senior Consultant of the National Image Communication Research Center of Tsinghua University

Yasir Masood, Commentator on International Affairs for CGTN

Omid Motahed, Independent Researcher

Denis Simon, Bank of America Visiting Chair in International Finance, Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University; Former Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University

Su Hao, Professor, Director of the Center for Strategy and Conflict Management at the China Foreign Affairs University

Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG; author of China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition

Xu Chengzhi, Global Chief Public Affairs Officer at Windey Energy Technology Group Co., Ltd., former official with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

16:20-16:30 Q&A

About the Author

Henry Huiyao Wang, Ph.D. is the Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), a global think tank ranked among the top 100 most influential in the world. He had been appointed as Counselor to China’s State Council (China’s Cabinet) by the Chinese Premier.

He is the Chief Editor of Springer Nature’s “China and Globalization” book series and his latest English books include: China in the Multipolar World: Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era (Springer, forthcoming); China, New Geopolitics and Global Governance: CCG Global Dialogues (Springer, forthcoming); China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition (Springer, 2026); The Ebb and Flow of Globalization: Chinese Perspectives on China’s Development and Role in the World (Springer, 2022); Award winning book Consensus or Conflict: China and Globalization in the 21st Century (Springer, 2021); and Handbook on China and Globalization (Edward Elgar, 2019).

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One of the most influential international relations scholars of his generation, Nye developed the concepts of “soft power” and “smart power” and held senior positions in both academia and the U.S. government. Drawing on more than eight decades of personal experience, the book intertwines Nye’s academic and policy career with some of the defining developments in modern international affairs, including the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation, globalization, the war on terror, and the evolution of China-U.S. relations.

Nye maintained longstanding exchanges with CCG. In 2024, he authorized CCG to translate A Life in the American Century into Chinese.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, delivered welcome remarks and moderated the event.

Shen Yonggang, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of China Science and Technology Press Co., Ltd., gave the opening remarks, followed by the formal book launch led by Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG.

The launch was followed by a seminar bringing together Chinese and international scholars and experts, including

• David Blair, former Chair of the Department of Economics at the Eisenhower School, U.S. National Defense University

• Harvey Dzodin, former Vice President and Director of ABC Television and former Legal Counsel to President Jimmy Carter

• Li Huailiang, Dean and Professor of the Institute for a Community with Shared Future at the Communication University of China

• Andy Mok, Adjunct Lecturer at Beijing Foreign Studies University and CGTN commentator

• Ren Xiao, Professor at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University

• Yao Yao, Dean of the Institute for Urban Civilization at the Communication University of China and Director of the National Soft Power Research Center at China Foreign Affairs University

• Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General, CCG

The following transcript is based on a recording of the event and has been lightly edited for clarity and readability. David Blair, Harvey Dzodin, and Andy Mok delivered their remarks in English; the other speakers spoke primarily in Chinese, and their remarks have been translated into English for publication.

Shen Yonggang, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, China Science and Technology Press

Distinguished guests, dear friends, good afternoon! It’s a great honor to attend today’s book launch and to witness, together with all of you, the publication of the Chinese edition of A Life in the American Century. I’d like to thank the organizer and initiator of this event, the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), as well as CCG’s founder Henry Huiyao Wang, Mabel Lu Miao, and the think tank’s translation team. I’d also like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the experts, scholars, and friends who have followed and supported the publication of this book.

First, allow me to express, on behalf of the press, our profound respect for this book’s author, Professor Joseph Nye. Professor Nye is an internationally renowned scholar of international relations, and the concepts of soft power and smart power that he introduced have had a profound impact around the world.

At a time when the international situation is tangled with turmoil and global development faces severe challenges, understanding how Professor Nye’s thinking on soft power took shape is of critical importance. President Xi Jinping has pointed out that diversity of human civilizations is a basic feature of our world; as the future of all countries are closely connected, tolerance, coexistence, exchanges, and mutual learning among different civilizations play an irreplaceable role in advancing humanity’s modernization process and making the garden of world civilizations flourish. Strengthening China’s cultural soft power bears on the country’s standing in the global cultural landscape, and on its international status and influence.

The right path is never walked alone; the world is one family. As changes unseen in a century continue to accelerate, revisiting Professor Nye’s thinking on soft power carries real significance for our era, helping us understand relations among major powers and promote exchange and mutual learning between civilizations.

China Science and Technology Press is a national science and technology publisher directly under the China Association for Science and Technology. It has long been committed to advancing the communication of scientific knowledge, promoting scientific culture, and fostering academic exchange between China and the rest of the world.

I have always believed that a good book can serve as a bridge of ideas and understanding across countries and cultures. The publication of A Life in the American Century is a meaningful reflection of our press’s commitment to sharing ideas, advancing knowledge, and promoting mutual learning among civilizations.

Throughout the publishing process, our editorial team worked closely with CCG’s translation team, maintaining rigorous standards for the translation and carefully refining every detail of the book’s design and production. Our goal was to present the book’s ideas and value to readers with the greatest possible accuracy and care.

Looking ahead, we will remain true to our mission by publishing more outstanding works with international vision and intellectual depth, and by producing more high-quality books that promote scientific culture, encourage exchange among different intellectual traditions, and contribute to dialogue across civilizations.

Finally, I would like to thank once again all the distinguished guests and members of the media who have joined us today. I wish this book launch every success. Thank you all.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG

Deputy Editor-in-Chief Shen Yonggang, distinguished experts and guests joining us today — Dean Li Huailiang, Professor Ren Yuan, Professor Yao Yao, Professor Andy Mok — as well as our senior colleagues, friends from the media, and representatives from various sectors: good afternoon.

It is a great honor to be here today at CCG in Beijing for the launch of a newly published book from China Science and Technology Press: A Life in the American Century, the latest book by Professor Joseph Nye, the renowned American scholar, father of the concept of soft power, and former Dean of Harvard Kennedy School.

This launch is also tinged with some regret. Before his passing, Professor Nye entrusted CCG with translating the book, and with the strong support of China Science and Technology Press, we were able to bring out the Chinese edition. Sadly, however, he did not live to see its publication. Professor Nye passed away in May last year. His family, and in particular his son, have continued to take a close interest in the book’s publication in China. Just a few days ago, his son sent us an email congratulating us on the release of the Chinese edition.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks to CCG and China Science and Technology Press for making this publication possible. It makes today’s occasion all the more meaningful, and we are very grateful to have the opportunity to gather here for the launch.

We are also joined online by two distinguished guests, Dr. David Blair and Mr. Harvey Dzodin. Both are American scholars and commentators who have given considerable thought to the question of soft power, and both have also had connections with Professor Nye. Although they are not here with us in Beijing today, we are very pleased to have them joining us online.

Let me now briefly introduce the book. Its English title is A Life in the American Century. As everyone knows, Joseph Nye was widely known as the father of soft power. He was also a scholar-practitioner who moved between academia and public service, and he served as Dean of Harvard Kennedy School. Professor Yao Yao, who is with us today, also conducted research on soft power at Harvard. I myself was fortunate to spend some time at the Kennedy School as well, where I had many opportunities to interact with Professor Nye.

He served in senior U.S. government positions under both the Carter and Clinton administrations, including at the State Department and the Pentagon. He’s written many works — including our most recent book on soft power, compiled and published by CCG, called Soft Power and Great-Power Competition, whose Chinese and English editions have both now been published. But of course, the most famous of all remain Soft Power and Smart Power, along with The Powers to Lead and The Future of Power, and so on, all of these are major classics of his.

I think this new book is a genuinely important one. It is also Joseph Nye’s first full personal memoir, and in many ways it can be read as a strategic guide to the evolution of international relations over the past century.

Drawing on his dual experience as both a scholar and a policymaker, Nye reflects on the major transformations of the era he lived through — from Cold War nuclear strategy and non-proliferation, to the rise of globalization, the War on Terror, and the evolution of China-U.S. relations. At the same time, through the lived history of his own career and a great many previously little-known details, he shows us how the thinking of an international affairs scholar was actually formed over time.

For readers interested in international politics, international security, and international relations — including Chinese readers — I think this book offers an excellent window into the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, shifts in great-power influence, and changes in the international order.

Professor Nye offers a candid account of both the achievements and the failures of American diplomacy, as well as the deeper forces that shape power and the changing balance among major powers. In that sense, the book is both a summation of his own life and a vivid guide to understanding how the world of today came into being through the course of the past hundred years. It is, in a way, a living account of the American century.

So I think it also provides a valuable first-hand resource for anyone interested in international relations and international politics. I won’t go through the table of contents in detail, but the book follows the course of Nye’s life from his early years onward.

It begins with his undergraduate years at Princeton, then his Rhodes Scholarship and study at Oxford, and later his move to Harvard. It traces his academic career alongside the major political events of his time: the Vietnam War, the Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations, his service in the State Department under Carter, the Reagan and George H. W. Bush years and the end of the Cold War, and later his service in the Clinton administration, including at the Pentagon.

During the Clinton years, he also served for several years as Dean of Harvard Kennedy School and made a major contribution to the school’s development and expansion. The book then moves through the George W. Bush and Obama years, and concludes with his reflections on Trump, Biden, and the future.

As for this broader discussion, a number of senior scholars were unable to join us in person today because of scheduling conflicts, but they have all contributed thoughtful endorsements to the book.

For instance, Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University’s School of International Studies said:

“Joseph Nye is one of the contemporary international relations scholars and strategists I admire most. This book records his extraordinary life, along with his vivid descriptions and fair-minded assessments of historical events and political figures — including his patriotism, and his firm conviction that American power would not decline in his lifetime. But he also pointed out, with disappointment, the reality that American soft power has declined under Trump’s leadership. The rise and fall of America is bound to be a defining global theme of the 21st century, and one that will continue to shape the fate of Chinese people today.”

Let’s look at another senior dean, Professor Xue Lan, Cheung Kong Distinguished Chair Professor at Tsinghua University and Dean of Schwarzman College. He said:

“From 2001, when Beijing first encountered the concept of soft power at the height of its influence, to today, when America’s own conduct has driven a sharp decline in its soft power, Joseph Nye’s intellectual appeal remains as fresh as ever. A Life in the American Century, the memoir of the father of soft power, Joseph Nye, traces his personal journey and reveals both the achievements and the resilience of great ideas. As the Chinese edition is published, one can’t help but ask: facing today’s world, would Professor Nye still hold to his cautiously optimistic judgment? That’s a question perhaps best left for us, the readers, to reflect on further.”

We also have Jia Qingguo, former Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, and Director of Peking University’s Institute for Global Cooperation and Understanding. Professor Jia said:

“As the father of the concept of soft power, Professor Joseph Nye was not only highly regarded in academia, but also held important positions in American politics, making him a figure of genuine global influence. His life was rich and eventful, bearing witness to America’s development across many dimensions over the past half-century and more. This autobiography vividly recounts his formative years and his observations and reflections on many issues, and will help readers understand both the evolution of his thinking and the course of America’s development over the same period. I highly recommend this book.”

We also have Wang Yiwei, Jean Monnet Chair Professor, from Renmin University, who likewise gave endorsements. Professor Wang said:

“After Henry Kissinger, Joseph Nye is the author who has had the greatest influence on China within the American field of international relations. The concept of soft power Nye introduced is not only a household term in China, it has also entered Party Central Committee documents and become part of China’s political vocabulary. In official discourse, soft power is usually paired with “cultural soft power” — you could call it a successful fusion of Western international relations theory with China’s fine traditional culture.

Nye’s death came not long after Trump returned to the White House; he lived to witness the decline of American soft power. Having devoted himself for so long to China-U.S. cooperation, as a longtime friend of CCG, he also witnessed the rise of China’s soft power — perhaps one of history’s ironies. Nye developed the concept of soft power in part as a response to Paul Kennedy’s thesis in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; he skillfully carried American exceptionalism into international relations theory, and from there it quietly worked its way into political discourse and even flew into the homes of ordinary people, a genuine phenomenon. His memoir has been translated by CCG. Its publication is the finest tribute to his era — highly recommended.”

There’s also Professor Su Hao, a professor at China Foreign Affairs University and Director of the university’s Center for Strategic and Conflict Management. He wrote:

“More than 20 years ago, I visited Professor Nye at Harvard and asked him how soft power shapes power and interdependence in international relations. This final work of his is the product of a lifetime of effort and insight, and it vividly explains the role of soft power and its relationship to the rise and fall of American hegemony — very much worth our understanding and reference.”

And finally, there’s Professor Da Wei, a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University’s School of Social Sciences and Director of Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS). Professor Da Wei said:

“This book is this wise man’s review of his own life, and also a reflection on the American century he personally lived through. The world stands at a major turning point, and Nye’s thinking in the final moments of his life can help us take a more clear-eyed look at the world and at the grand question of where it should go from here.”

Turning now to Nye’s own views, he made a number of important observations about China’s soft power. For instance, he talked about the attractiveness of traditional Chinese culture, the popularity of Chinese films and television overseas, the 2008 Summer Olympics, the increasing number of foreign students and tourists to China, as well as China’s tripling of its GDP versus pre-reform levels, its foreign economic aid and open markets, had all greatly increased China’s attractiveness.

But Professor Nye also noted that China’s soft power still has a long way to go, as “China does not have cultural industries like Hollywood, and its universities are far from the equal of America’s. It lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of America’s soft power.” He raised these views from his own perspective, but he also, in fact, acknowledged that China’s soft power has already grown enormously.

He also had some fairly favorable things to say about China-U.S. relations — for instance, that “There is little evidence that an increase in Chinese soft power would unbalance American soft power.” Once a country’s hard power reaches a certain stage, its soft power naturally starts growing too — that doesn’t necessarily mean the soft power is aimed at the U.S. That’s the point he was making.

He also said: “If China becomes more attractive in the United States, and the United States becomes more attractive in China — it could help both of us overcome our differences.” I think that’s a very fair point.

He said: “The soft power interaction between the United States and China thus need not be seen as a competition, but rather as a more complex combination of competitive and cooperative forces.” All of that, I think, is a very weighty and well-reasoned position on his part. He also said soft power isn’t unique to the U.S. — these Chinese values have influenced most of East Asia. I think that’s a very fair point too.

He also said — speaking of the U.S. and China — that “There is no need for the countries to get caught up in a new Cold War, let alone a destructive hot war. Over the next 40 years, as China becomes stronger, both countries will need to adjust to a new normal. The US and China should maintain the current cooperative rivalry.” “The greatest danger we face is not that China will surpass us, but that the diffusion of power will produce entropy, or the inability to get anything done.” We’re now entering a multipolar world, and while Trump keeps talking about a “G2,” I actually think the U.S. and China should be cooperating more.

He also said “China is not an existential threat to the U.S. unless we make it one by blundering into a major war. The historical analogy that worries me is 1914, not 1941.” That was his own warning about the risk of a future hot war.

He and I had many conversations over the years. In one of them, he put forward a theory of China-U.S. relations moving in 20-year cycles. He said that the first 20 years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China saw extremely strained bilateral relations between the US and China, with two countries at war in Korea; in 1972, Nixon’s visit to China marked the beginning of a 20-year period of improving bilateral relations; after Clinton took office in 1992, bilateral relations remained good, during which China joined the WTO and deeply integrated into the global economy and international order; following the rise of Trump in 2015–2016, bilateral relations began to deteriorate and we are midway through the current cycle. Based on this 20-year cycle theory, Professor Nye predicted that U.S.-China relations would begin to improve by 2035.

I find this “20-year theory” quite persuasive. Ultimately, I think both sides still need to find a way to coexist peacefully. And I would say that Trump himself also seems to be shifting — from defining China primarily as a strategic competitor during his first term toward seeking a degree of strategic stability in the current period. To me, that reflects a further recognition that China and the United States still need to cooperate.

As for Professor Joseph Nye, I actually had quite a lot of interaction with him over the years. For example, during the pandemic in 2020, we held an online dialogue together with Friends of Europe. Then in 2021, I invited him to join us at CCG for a more in-depth conversation. At that time, international travel was still largely impossible because of the pandemic, so we held the discussion online as a livestream, and several hundred thousand people tuned in.

Also in 2021, he shared some of his writing with me, and I included one of his essays in a volume I edited that year, Consensus or Conflict. The book was published before the Russia-Ukraine war, and its basic message was that if consensus could not be reached, conflict might follow. Professor Nye contributed an essay to the volume, alongside more than 30 other prominent international figures.

Then in 2022, our conversation was included in the book CCG Global Dialogues, published simultaneously in Chinese and English. He revised the transcript of that conversation for us before it went in.

In 2023, he gave us some more essays, and we compiled another book for him, called Soft Power and Great Power Competition. That book later came out in a Chinese edition too, 《软实力与中美竞合》 . You can find copies of it at Harvard’s Kennedy School. We held another book launch built around that book, and invited him to take part with us.

In 2023 we also invited him to Beijing, where he took part in our eighth annual China and Globalization Forum — he was in very good spirits that time.

By 2024, Professor Nye was back in Beijing, leading a fairly large delegation for a dialogue with the Central Party School. I took part in that Track II exchange myself. He led the delegation and brought a sizeable group from the Aspen Strategy Group to China.

Later that year, Professor Nye invited me, together with Dr. Mabel Lu Miao, to attend the Aspen Security Forum, one of the most important forums in the United States focused on geopolitical and security issues. Very few Chinese participants usually attend, and that year we were the only Chinese representatives there.

I also remember seeing him there with his wife and taking photos together. That became a particularly precious memory. His wife passed away in late 2024, and Professor Nye himself passed away the following year, in 2025. She went first, and he followed not long afterward.

Just a few months before he passed away, CCG’s Zichen Wang went to see him. Professor Nye even signed a copy of his book for him, writing: “For Zichen, with all best wishes for your soft power! — Joe Nye.” That was the last time anyone from CCG saw him.

Today, I’m very pleased that we have had this opportunity to hear the introductions and insights of so many experts. My sincere thanks to Deputy Editor-in-Chief Sun Yonggang of China Science and Technology Press, and to all the other experts who joined us today. I would also like to thank the many guests from different fields here in Beijing, as well as friends from the international media and other sectors, for their enthusiastic participation.

That concludes my brief introduction to the book. Thank you all very much.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you to all our distinguished guests and experts. I was very touched just now. I had also kept in contact with Professor Nye until quite recently. Unfortunately, he passed away. But he left us with many important and insightful questions, and his views on soft power have had a significant impact on China.

Now, let’s move into our discussion session. I’ve already introduced the guests joining us for today’s discussion, but as for our topic, I’d like us not to focus solely on soft power itself, but also to bring in the new trends in soft power and global governance, and how we can strengthen China’s soft power. I would like to invite our experts to discuss this. There are two experts online, so I think we can invite them first to discuss this topic, then we move to our offline roundtable to discuss this topic.

We’ll go ahead and focus our discussion on new trends in soft power and global governance, as well as how to strengthen China’s soft power. I’d like to first invite our two guests joining online to speak, and then we’ll move on to the in-person discussion. We would like to invite Professor David Blair to speak on this topic. The floor is yours, David.

David Blair, Former Chair of the Department of Economics, Eisenhower School, U.S. National Defense University

Thank you. Good to talk to everybody. I was a fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs, which became the Belfer Center, in the late 1990s. So I got to know Joe Nye. He’s the director of the center. But I’ve learned a good bit from looking at this book. I had not realized that he grew up at least partially Baptist and considered being a preacher, which is something I would have never thought could have been in his background — very different from the usual demographic of a Harvard professor in the United States.

And I want to tell you one quick anecdote from the time I was there. It tells you a little bit about American politics, and especially about academic politics, the Kennedy School as a whole, and especially the Center for Science and International Affairs. It was considered by many other departments at Harvard to be unacceptably right-wing. And we constantly got protests from the Divinity School, of all people. And the psychology department sent a graduate student down to take Nye’s classes to prove — the assignment they gave him was to prove that Nye was an insane warmonger.

So that tells you something about what was going on in academia, even 35 years ago. Seriously, I want to talk a minute about his work, especially in the 1990s, when he was, during the Clinton administration, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which is sort of an advisory role for the intelligence agencies. And he was later on assistant secretary of defense for East Asia. And he developed a number of policies while there, especially in the second term, which I think raise important issues, thinking about U.S. and Chinese relations.

His main accomplishment — I’ll let you judge whether it was accomplished or not — was developing something called the Nye Initiative when he was assistant secretary, which basically was aimed at strengthening U.S, power in East Asia. Kurt Campbell, who later authored the pivot to Asia, was a protégé of Nye’s, and so that’s essentially the same.

In traditional thought, it’s important to understand how different the world was in the 1990s. The U.S. had just won, without much effort, the first Gulf War, and the Cold War had ended. And the U.S. economy — I think not sustainably, but the U.S. economy was booming at the time. So the U.S. government became very arrogant — not necessarily arrogance, they believed at the time that the United States needed to be there to manage the world. In Hillary Clinton’s terms, the U.S. was an indispensable power. And so what Nye and his followers and his successors were arguing is that the U.S. has to be continuously engaged in the world in a leading position, in order to maintain sort of the Pax Americana, the idea that the United States meant that the world can remain at peace.

Also during that time, there was a debate going on — a very strong debate within the Clinton administration — about whether to expand NATO or not. Bill Perry, who was Secretary of Defense at the time, strongly argued, along with a lot of other people, that NATO should not be expanded and that Russia should be welcomed into the Western alliance and into Europe. In the end, the Clinton administration and Clinton himself, I guess, overrode them. I’m not sure; I can’t find anything in the book about how Joe Nye came down on that. But he was working for Bill Perry at the time. Perry said later that the worst mistake of his life was not resigning in protest when Clinton made that decision. And I think the world could be much more peaceful if the Clinton administration had been more open, not only with Russia, but also with China and in the Balkans, probably.

So one thing that made this sort of liberal internationalist American dominance thinking possible — that was going on in the 1990s, especially in the Clinton administration — was that it seemed to be easy and cheap. You know, it didn’t seem to cost very much. It’s easy. Why not? Sort of the argument. But we learned later that it’s not easy and it’s not cheap. And right now, I think that the big debate going on in the U.S., in the Trump administration, is either to continue that policy to some extent, without the nation-building part of it, or to withdraw the U.S. economy and the U.S. policy from the world. And I don’t think anybody knows how it’s gonna turn out. The U.S. government changes its mind from time to time, depending on the case, and that’s to be expected.

But I do think the world Nye lived in, in the 1990s, has totally changed since then, partly because of the rise of China, partly because of messing around in the Middle East, partly because of economic problems. And now we’re facing a different world. And I think the key problem in the world is: what’s the relation between the U.S. and China, the other leading power? What’s its place in the world? Is it a leadership position? Is it a withdrawal position? What are we looking at? That’s the key issue.

Just one more point, Joe Nye was born in the mid-1930s, same period as both my parents. And I think he definitely lived in the American century. The time period he lived in was probably the best time to be an American. He was too young for World War II and Korea, too old for Vietnam. So he missed all the wars. If he’d been 10 years younger, he would’ve probably been killed in World War II. And it’s a time — especially from 1945 to the early 1970s — when the standard of living was there, becoming a very prosperous United States. And now we’re not in that time anymore. I think people born today, or people born in this century, are not gonna have as good a century as Joe Nye did, or as people my age did. Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, David. What you said was very impressive, especially coming from an American perspective. You mentioned that the context has changed, particularly in the United States and in the broader global order. We are now living through a very different moment from the “American Century,” and in some ways it is a rather gloomy period for American society and for individuals in America.

Against this backdrop, I think the world is also changing, with countries increasingly emphasizing their own particularities. But soft power remains very important, especially for developing countries and rising powers. And looking back at American history is also very important, because it can offer us useful lessons and inspiration for the future. I think David has a lot of genuine feeling in what he said just now about the American century.

Next, I think we can invite everyone to share more as well: on one hand, reflecting on our understanding of soft power, and on the other, looking at how it connects to new trends in global governance, and how we can strengthen China’s soft power — everyone’s welcome to weigh in. Next, we would like to have Harvey Dzodin to speak. Harvey, the floor is yours. Harvey is the former director and vice president of ABC Television, and also served as legal counsel to U.S. President Carter.

Harvey Dzodin, Former Vice President and Director of ABC Television; former Legal Counsel to President Jimmy Carter

Thank you very much, Mabel. And hello, everybody. Having met Professor Nye at the Harvard Club in New York two decades ago, I’m honored to say a few words this afternoon about the launch of the Chinese edition of his insightful memoir.

I congratulate CCG and the China Science and Technology Press for their initiative. This book is a must-read for any student of the continuum of power, from sharp, hard, smart, and soft.

I myself consider Professor Nye the Picasso of international relations, because, like Picasso, in his long and storied career, Professor Nye continually refined his views. He began as a national security realist who took hard power, nuclear deterrence, and American strategic primacy very seriously. His evolution toward soft power was not a rejection of hard power, but a recognition that military and economic capabilities by themselves could not explain or sustain American influence.

Professor Nye, in fact, spent his career explaining why America needed to combine hard power with attraction, alliances, and cooperation. And he left us just as the U.S. was moving toward a much more transactional conception of power. His soft power theory was never fundamentally anti-power. It was a theory about how power had become more multidimensional and multi-institutional. His final intellectual warning was that a country can possess immense external, hard, and sharp power, and nevertheless weaken itself by losing the qualities that make others want to cooperate with it. And I think recent events bear him out.

Although Professor Nye was a member of the American defense establishment, Nye was neither a hawk nor a dove. But along with Graham Allison and other colleagues, he was an owl — someone who recognized the necessity of deterrence, but who was acutely concerned about miscalculation, escalation, and unintended nuclear war.

Professor Nye is already sorely missed. We’re indeed lucky to have his last book to provoke our thoughts and to guide us in these challenging times. Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak today and participate.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Harvey, for your great words on this book and on soft power.

Now, we’d like to hand the floor over to the experts here with us in person, so that everyone can discuss together these new trends in soft power and global governance, and how to strengthen China’s soft power.

First, we’d like to invite Mr. Li Huailiang, Dean and Professor, Institute for a Community with Shared Future, Communication University of China. I think the very name of a Community with Shared Future already carries a strong sense of China’s own soft power. So please, share your thoughts with us.

Li Huailiang, Dean and Professor, Institute for a Community with Shared Future, Communication University of China

Thank you Dr. Wang and Dr. Miao for this opportunity to learn. First, congratulations to Editor Shen and President Wang. A book like this, published at a time as full of challenges as this one, is especially meaningful, and I want to thank you both for the excellent work you’ve done.

Speaking as a reader, I had a look through the table of contents and found it very appealing. I’ve read Professor Nye’s earlier work quite closely, so I’m fairly familiar with his ideas and arguments. But seeing them woven together here with the story of his own life makes this book feel even more accessible and engaging than some of his earlier writing. I’ll definitely go back and give it a proper read.

Having just listened to the two American guests speak, and to Dr. Wang’s introduction, I have a few thoughts. Following Dr. Miao’s request, I’d like to share a few unpolished ideas — one on how to understand soft power, and another on soft power’s relationship to China-U.S. relations, global governance, and building up China’s soft power — hoping they might spark further discussion, and I welcome any criticism or correction.

As for Professor Nye’s concept of soft power, what we generally understand by the term is actually somewhat different from what he himself meant. Nye identified three main sources of soft power: culture, political values, and foreign policy.

I noticed that Professor Wang Yiwei mentioned in his endorsement that Chinese government documents usually refer to “cultural soft power.” That is also much closer to what people in China generally have in mind when they talk about soft power. I have done some literature review on this myself, and my sense is that, in the Chinese context, “soft power” is often used essentially to mean cultural soft power.

That is not quite the same as Nye’s concept. In practice, we tend to leave out the dimensions of political values and foreign policy, and when we talk about soft power, we are usually referring primarily to culture.

This brings another point to mind. In fact, there may be two different understandings of soft power. What was the historical context in which the concept of soft power was introduced? It emerged against the backdrop of globalization, and I think that was precisely why it was able to spread so quickly and gain such broad influence around the world.

If Professor Nye were introducing the concept of soft power today, it might not have the same impact. At the time, globalization was advancing rapidly, and soft power and globalization were moving with the same historical tide. In a sense, they shared the same underlying spirit.

But if we take that line of thought one step further — and CCG is particularly well placed to discuss this — globalization itself, as I understand it, is not just one single thing. There are different forms of globalization.

For the wave of globalization that began in the 1980s, let me borrow a formulation by American sociologist Roland Robertson. In essence, globalization is the historical process through which the Western concept of modernity expands without limit across the world.. I have quoted this idea many times. It sounds rather complicated at first, but in plain terms, it can be understood as a process of Westernization.

Under that broad understanding, Westernization includes Western values, the globalization of production driven by Western multinational corporations, free trade, the market economy, political values, and Western culture. In other words, it is globalization in a very comprehensive sense.

In Chinese government documents, however, what we generally emphasize is “economic globalization.” It is somewhat similar to the way we talk about soft power: instead of simply saying “soft power,” we often speak of “cultural soft power”; and instead of speaking of globalization in an all-encompassing sense, we usually speak of “economic globalization.”

So in that sense, there are two different understandings of soft power, and also two different understandings of globalization. The form of globalization we tend to emphasize is about global value chains, the international division of labor, global markets, and global consumption. That is the globalization we are mainly referring to.

There is another point. Robertson’s formulation also brings in the idea of modernity, and modernization itself can also be understood in more than one way. Modernization, as a historical concept, grew out of the Renaissance, the first and second industrial revolutions, and the enormous expansion of productive forces that followed. Western sociologists, from Émile Durkheim all the way through more recent economists — including, I believe, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in his book on modernization, published around 1958, said modernization comes down to eight standards.

But how were these eight standards arrived at? They were drawn out of countries that had already modernized — Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and others. In other words, the standards of modernization were largely derived from the historical experience of Western countries. Because those countries had followed a particular path of development, that path came to define what modernization meant.

So from that perspective, modernization itself was also, to a considerable extent, understood as a process of Westernization. In the old Western framing, the world was often divided into “the West” and “the rest,” and modernization meant, in effect, transforming “the rest” according to the experience of “the West.”

China, however, later put forward the idea of Chinese modernization. That itself suggests that modernization does not have only one form. So when we look at globalization, modernization, and soft power, what China is talking about is in some respects the same as what the West is talking about, and in other respects different. There is both continuity and divergence.

There is still an area of overlap between them. The larger that area of overlap becomes, the safer and more peaceful the world is likely to be. The more common ground we share, the fewer conflicts we are likely to have.

But if there is no overlap at all — if you speak only in your own terms and I speak only in mine — then we simply talk past one another. There is no real mutual understanding. And in a world where cultures have no dialogue, no exchange, and no shared ground that people can recognize together, the world becomes a much less secure place.

So what I’d say is: through today’s launch event, and through Professor Nye’s book, if we can build more and more common ground, then conflict in our world will keep shrinking too. That’s just my own unpolished thought. Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Dean Li. What you said was very insightful too. On modernization and globalization, China and the West do have different concepts. Even now, when we talk about “Chinese modernization,” I believe that concept was influenced by Western modernization as well, but it has its own distinct character: we’ve folded in elements like humanity living in harmony with nature and common prosperity as part of what makes it distinctly Chinese. I think that’s true of cultural soft power too, as you were saying. We may end up realizing more of it through this very process of Chinese-style modernization.

And of course, I think your university’s think tank has also always been exploring what China’s globalization actually looks like, within China’s globalization. How can China play a role? How can China show the world more clearly that it can help drive globalization forward and do better within that process, for the shared development of all humanity? So the idea of a community with a shared future for mankind is woven into this as well. Thank you very much.

Next, I’d like to invite Ren Xiao to speak. Professor Ren, please go ahead. Professor Ren Xiao is a professor at the Academy of Regional and Global Governance at Beijing Foreign Studies University. Professor Ren is also an expert in American studies as well as regional and global governance, and I’d love to hear your thoughts.

Ren Xiao, Professor, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University

Thank you, everyone. First, congratulations to CCG and China Science and Technology Press for collaborating on something so meaningful.

I think Professor Nye has lived a life of complete fulfillment. We Chinese speak of the “three immortalities”: achieving great deeds [立功], cultivating virtue [立德], and establishing enduring ideas [立言]. He’s accomplished all three, so this has truly been an extraordinary life.

If we were to sum up his academic contributions — and let’s set his soft power work aside entirely for a moment, not touch on it at all, and just look at his other academic contributions outside of soft power — I think you could write a very long essay on that alone.

You could start at least as far back as the 1970s. He had a Harvard colleague, a longtime collaborator named Robert Keohane — anyone who’s studied political science or international relations knows this name. The two of them collaborated for many years; around 1974 or ‘75, they co-edited a book called Transnational Relations and World Politics, which is a highly influential work in our field. In 1977, the two of them co-authored and published Power and Interdependence, and that book went on to become a genuine classic.

Later, Keohane moved on to teach at other universities. He’s since retired, and he’s still alive. He ended up at Duke because his wife became president there, so he went along with her, the two of them went together. Before retiring, he was a professor at Princeton.

So Nye and Keohane collaborated together; I believe this was actually Nye’s last major article, also co-authored by the two of them. On top of that, Keohane has another very important paper, published in the journal World Politics, called “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” a very significant paper.

So, if we look at this purely from an academic perspective — setting soft power aside for the moment, since I’ll come back to it shortly — Nye made important contributions across a wide range of fields. Of course, the idea we are all most familiar with is soft power, which he first introduced around 1990. One of the earliest formulations appeared in an article he published in Foreign Policy, and the concept went on to have a major impact on the field. He later developed the idea more fully in book form, which was also highly influential. I think everyone here is already very familiar with that part of his work.

Personally, I’ve had the chance to meet and talk with him on a number of occasions — in Boston, Washington, Tokyo, Shanghai, Beijing — so I do have some understanding of his scholarship, his character, and other aspects of who he is.

Building on what has already been said about the high regard in which Nye has been held in China, I think it is fair to say that his influence here has been genuinely significant. Some people prefer the term ruan shili (软实力) for “soft power,” while I myself sometimes use ruan liliang (软力量). The wording is not really important; it is simply a matter of preference.

What matters more is where a country’s soft power actually comes from. In my view, if a country is making social progress, has a high level of education, and has a well-educated and cultivated population, then its soft power will naturally be strong. Conversely, if a country remains poor and underdeveloped, with low living standards, a low level of development, and a population with limited education and civic cultivation, then it will be very difficult for that country to possess much soft power, because it simply will not be very attractive to others.

This is because, for Nye, the most important element of soft power is attraction. So if a country wants to be attractive, it first has to embody the qualities I just mentioned — it has to be able to demonstrate them in practice.

Another very important aspect is whether you’re a country that other people actually like. If a country goes around throwing its weight around on the world stage, resorting to brute force at the drop of a hat, a country like that might have considerable economic and military strength, but its appeal suffers: once other countries stop liking you, you have no soft power. There’s nothing there. Your soft power takes a serious hit.

So fundamentally, I believe — and we do discuss China’s soft power quite often — that at the bottom, it depends on a country’s continued development, continued progress. That’s the fundamental thing. Of course, I don’t rule out the role of deliberate effort. Taking the initiative in certain areas can help strengthen a country’s soft power, so there is also an element of conscious effort involved.

Now, looking at how the balance of power between China and the U.S. has shifted in recent years, the change is visible to everyone: the China-U.S. power balance is changing, in three respects. China’s strength, soft power included, is rising. After the end of the Cold War, there was a widely used description of the international system: “one superpower, several major powers.” I think we are now moving toward an era of “two superpowers, several major powers.” That is the broader shift now taking place in the global balance of power.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Professor Ren. That was a genuinely insightful set of remarks. As you said, I think the point about soft power that has left the deepest impression on us is that, ultimately, it comes down to attraction. And attraction means first getting your own affairs in order and building up your own strengths, so that others are naturally drawn to you. There is probably an element of charm in that as well.

This may also connect with what Professor Li Huailiang said earlier. Beyond things like political values or foreign policy, when Chinese people talk about soft power, what probably comes to mind more readily is cultural soft power in particular. So in that sense, it is again about doing your own things well.

At the same time, once you have developed a system of your own, you are in a better position to attract others. But that system has to be strong enough and genuinely compelling enough for others to admire it and aspire to it. As you were saying, this kind of soft power is something we ourselves need to work more actively to generate.

I would also say that this is an important part of China-U.S. exchange itself. It reminds us that, as China continues to develop its own system, we can also draw on the achievements of other civilizations. And it reminds us as well of the depth of experience and knowledge that has accumulated through such exchanges over time.

Actually, that is why I was struck by Mr. Wang Yiwei’s point about cultural soft power and traditional Chinese culture. I have a similar feeling myself. If you have not engaged deeply with Joseph Nye’s thinking, you may not immediately realize that there is actually quite a lot of resonance between his ideas and certain strands of Chinese culture.

On this question of attraction as a form of soft power, there is something to the idea that a civilization can simply be itself — without invading others, without going out and provoking conflict — and still inspire admiration from others. I think that connects with this discussion as well. Thank you again very much.

And beyond soft power, Nye’s earlier ideas — on power and interdependence, neoliberalism, neorealism, and related concepts — are also part of an important intellectual legacy that deserves further exploration.

That is also what makes this book so fascinating. It is at once a personal memoir and, in a sense, a reflection of the broader historical trajectory of the United States. Nye brings together his own experience, his thinking as a scholar, and the development of the era in which he lived. That makes the book deeply meaningful. Part of what makes him such a compelling figure — and why he is so worth discussing and learning from — is the way his personal life intersected with the sweep of an entire historical era. In that sense, he was also a product of a defining moment in history.

All right, next I’d like to invite Mr. Andy Mok to speak. He is also an adjunct lecturer at Beijing Foreign Studies University and a current affairs commentator with CGTN.

Andrew (Andy) Mok, Adjunct Lecturer, Beijing Foreign Studies University; CGTN Commentator

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and be part of this very meaningful event. So when I think of Joseph Nye, I can’t help but think of another very influential American, who wrote a book called At a Century’s Ending. And this influential American, George Kennan, also wrote the “Long Telegram”, and is famous for identifying the cause of the Soviet Union’s aggression against the United States, and gave the world a term for describing that — which, of course, for international relations scholars, we all know as containment.

So when I think of Joe Nye giving the world this term, this concept, soft power, you can also think of Kennan as well. And I think what’s interesting here is neither of them created or invented what you were talking about. Joseph Nye did not invent or create soft power. George Kennan did not create the motives of the Soviet Union. But what they did was give it a name.

And why this is so important? I’ll use a quick example. For thousands of years, people looked up in the sky at night and saw stars. And it wasn’t until one day people realized these are not just a random collection of stars. There are actually groupings of them that we can call galaxies. And with that insight, we’re able to more deeply understand the universe and take more effective action. So I think this is, again, a very important contribution: Joe Nye giving us this term, soft power.

The question then is: is soft power a lagging indicator or a leading indicator of economic and technological power? I think Professor Ren gave us part of the answer here, but I want to elaborate a little bit on why it is a lagging indicator. So a country achieves economic leadership, technological leadership, and other countries, other people, want to emulate that country.

And I think one of the reasons, or the main reason, is that humans are hardwired to seek status, right? Whether that’s more degrees, more money, or higher office. And what happens is that this creates, I think at a subconscious level, a halo effect. If we emulate people we see as high status, we will also acquire some of those qualities.

So when we talk about soft power and the accumulation of soft power, I think one of the ideas is that it is not a leading indicator, but a lagging indicator.

Then why do we even care about soft power? I think it has a very practical use, which is that it reduces compliance cost — whether we’re talking about a family, whether we’re talking about a country, or whether we’re talking about tianxia, or the whole world. So I’ll use a quick example here from my book.

When we look at the Qin versus the Han, we can see the difference between hard power and soft power. The Qin was known for very strict rules, and, of course, enormous military success, but was very punitive. And this is expensive, right, because even if you don’t have to watch people, delivering the punishments can be very expensive. The Han, on the other hand, were very clever in that they gamified what it meant to be Chinese. They took a body of Chinese Confucian classics and said, look, if you can demonstrate your mastery of this body of knowledge, you’re Chinese. And why this is so important is that internalized soft power is not just cultural, but it is also philosophical, also political.

So by mastering and internalizing this body of Confucian classics, people automatically acted on their own in a way that was preferential for the state. I think we can project this onto the international arena as well, to see why countries should care about soft power — because it’s cheaper to gain compliance from other countries if you do have soft power over them. So I think that tells us that soft power is worth fighting for.

And when we think about fighting for soft power at the country level, especially when we think about China and the United States, I think it’s useful to think about Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War. Of course, this was written to explain what should be done about Japan. And I think we all know this: in On Protracted War, Mao says there are three phases — strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic counteroffensive. So when we look at China’s quest for soft power, the first phase was strategic defense. We probably all remember the days when China felt we had to protect our own culture, our own power, and sovereignty in this area. And I would say now we’re in the period of strategic scaling.

So while it looks like there’s not a lot going on, on the surface, under the surface I think there are very powerful changes, very powerful capabilities being accumulated — maybe naturally, but also, I think, deliberately, by China. And when we enter this strategic counteroffensive phase of global soft power, I think, remains to be seen.

But we can, of course, see some, I think, to use an Obama term, green shoots, right? So we look at the recent movie Dear You (給阿嬤的情書), a very kind of oddball movie, yet gaining such tremendous traction globally, especially in Southeast Asia.

We look at Labubu, we look at TikTok, as forms of soft power. But I think here, to again quote Mao, it’s important not to lose hope that China can fight against Hollywood, against global domination by most media, global media platforms, etc. — using Western terms, to think about political values. So one should not be discouraged, but at the same time not be overly confident either. We do see, again, very meaningful breakthroughs; but in my view, at least, we’re still in the strategic stalemate period.

So in terms of how to improve China’s soft power, I would say perhaps one thing is just patience. Nine women cannot create a baby in one month, right? It takes one woman nine months. That’s just the natural process.

But at the same time, I do think that there’s cause for hope, and even excitement, when we look at what’s happening — partly, perhaps we could say, because of mistakes made by the U.S. in terms of damaging its own soft power on the global stage. But of course, at the same time, I think, under the surface, there are very important changes happening in China regarding soft power. Looking ahead, I think we have a lot to be optimistic about. Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Andy. Excellent. What you just said about “gazing up at the stars,” together with Professor Ren’s remarks earlier, is genuinely fascinating.

Speaking as fellow scholars, and as people who are all here today to learn from Joseph Nye and discuss this book, I have been deeply impressed by what everyone has said. It brings to mind the traditional ideal of achieving great deeds, cultivating virtue, and leaving behind enduring ideas. Nye was, after all, developed the concept of soft power, and he has left us an extraordinarily important intellectual legacy — one that belongs not just to the United States, but to humanity as a whole.

And I think Nye himself — his life, the story told in this book, and the fact that he chose to reflect on his own experience in this way — was in some sense also an embodiment of American soft power. Simply by virtue of who he was and what he represented, he became part of that attraction.

It makes me wonder, when we talk about China’s soft power today, shouldn’t we also be encouraging more scholars like this, more individual stories like this, to emerge? Making his whole journey more widely known to others. Because if there were more people like this, wouldn’t each of them also become a symbol of a country’s soft power, whether cultural soft power or soft power in other forms? That’s a real source of inspiration for us too.

Also, what you said just now reflects a genuinely positive and optimistic view of China’s soft power, and I think that is right. When you mentioned the Qin and Han dynasties, it made me think of a similar contrast in aesthetics between ease and power. I immediately thought of taiji. It contains tremendous energy within it, yet expresses that energy in a light and seemingly effortless way. In fact, that can be a more efficient, more economical, and lower-cost way of exerting influence.

But behind that ease, there has to be a long process of building up substantial strength and momentum. So I wonder whether we today are still in the middle of that process of accumulation. The question is when we will be able to express power with greater ease — in a way that is more appealing and draws others toward us of their own accord. In that sense, it really is a process of quietly accumulating strength and, ultimately, learning how to make something weighty appear effortless.

Thank you so much for bringing up that cultural dimension just now. All right, next I’d like to invite Mr. Yao Yao to speak. I know Professor Yao Yao currently serves as Dean of the Institute for Urban Civilization at Communication University of China, and Director of the National Soft Power Research Center at China Foreign Affairs University.

I remember we first met at one of Mr. Joseph Nye’s lectures, back when he was still a professor. That was an event you organized. I remember Mr. Nye was in especially high spirits that day too. I recall that at that event, a Chinese scholar actually raised almost this exact same question we’re discussing today — about soft power — asking him: you’ve talked about America’s soft power, but where is China’s soft power? What will it look like going forward? So I’d like to invite you to share your thoughts on today’s topic as well. The floor is yours.

Yao Yao, Dean, Institute for Urban Civilization Studies, Communication University of China; Director, National Soft Power Research Center, China Foreign Affairs University

Okay, thank you, Professor Wang, and thank you, Professor Miao. Professor Wang told me about this event just the day before yesterday. I was away at a conference in another city, and the moment I heard about it I knew it was a wonderful thing, so I made a special trip back this morning just for this.

The reason is that from 2010 to 2011 I was sent by the Chinese government to Harvard’s Kennedy School under a joint PhD training program through the Sino-U.S. Fulbright Program, and my advisor there was none other than Nye himself. Getting into that Fulbright program doesn’t necessarily land you at Harvard, and even landing at Harvard doesn’t necessarily get you Nye as your advisor. I actually had to work hard for it at the time. I had three letters of recommendation: one written by Professor Yuan Ming of Peking Univerisity; one by Professor Xue Lan of Tsinghua, who was just mentioned as having recommended this book; another by Professor Li Zhaoxing, who was then Dean of the Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University and a former Foreign Minister of China.

Nye later held up those letters and said, “I can’t reject you,” because the weight behind those three names was simply too great.

So, going back to what Dr. Miao just mentioned — I remember your think tank was just getting off the ground around that time. After I joined my own think tank, Professor Nye continued to give me a great deal of guidance and support as well. And the event you mentioned earlier — the one we organized was called the Harvard China Soft Power Forum. That required official approval from Harvard University itself, and getting approval for something organized by Chinese students was genuinely difficult back then. Nye gave us tremendous support on that front.

The lecture you mentioned earlier was actually the very first session — he was the keynote speaker, and he spoke on soft power and China. After that, we went on to invite a series of other speakers, including Li Xiaolin, then President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Fu Ziying, then Vice Minister of Commerce, and Liu Changle, then Chairman of the Board of Phoenix Satellite Television. I’d say it was very well received; it really sparked a broader discussion at Harvard about the relationship between China and soft power.

Honestly, this book makes me very, very happy, because — truthfully — when Nye was advising me, he talked a lot about academics but very rarely about his own personal experiences. So he said very little about his younger years, including his time serving under both the Carter and Clinton administrations. I knew he’d already written an English-language memoir; and getting a Chinese edition published, I think, we really owe to CCG and to our publishing house here. Thank you for doing this hugely important work. I genuinely can’t wait to read it, to get to know him better through it.

A lot of what I do know about him, I actually learned from Professor Ezra Vogel. I remember Mabel was at the Fairbank Center at the time. And Professor Wang was at the Kennedy School, where I was also formally registered as a student. But back then Professor Ezra Vogel also gave me a class every two weeks, so Professor Vogel told me a great deal about Nye’s younger years, including the Aspen Institute you mentioned earlier.

Actually, the founder of the Aspen Institute was — and this is something Ezra Vogel told me — Paul Nitze, who discovered and championed Nye’s early career. Not the philosopher Nietzsche, to be clear — this is Paul Nitze, the father of America’s Cold War strategy, who came after Kennan. And so it should really be said that Nye’s first appointment was at the Department of Defense — that was when Nitze himself was serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Actually, the Aspen Institute itself was founded by Paul Nitze’s brother-in-law, a very well-known and wealthy American art dealer. He single-handedly created the Aspen Music Festival and the Aspen Institute. Nitze ran it at first, and later handed it off to Nye.

So I think getting to know a person is actually a very basic part of doing good academic research and public diplomacy alike. Given the time, I would just like to say a few very simple words about Joseph Nye’s theory of soft power, focusing on four pairs of dialectical relationships.

The first is the relationship between hard power and soft power. Nye introduced the concept of soft power, as some of the experts just mentioned, but in fact he never denied the importance of hard power. On the contrary, he saw hard power as a very important foundation for soft power.

As Secretary-General Miao mentioned just now, when we met Nye, he was full of energy and confidence, largely because Obama was in office at the time. But during the George W. Bush administration, he was actually in a very different mood, especially because of the wars in the Middle East. At the time, a journalist asked then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld whether America’s repeated use of military force was damaging its soft power. Rumsfeld’s answer has stayed with many people ever since: “I don’t know what it means.”

For Joseph, that was clearly deliberate on Rumsfeld’s part — there’s no way he genuinely didn’t know what soft power was. Joseph never let go of that episode; it stuck with him. So when Obama took office, it was, for him, like being liberated all over again. From what I heard, he was in great spirits about it. But even so, he was someone who believed in using force sparingly, not someone who ever denied the role of the military, of force, of national defense.

One thing has stayed with me — and this came back to mind because, as we were just discussing, many of us have recently been watching the documentary about General Secretary Jiang Zemin: back before the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Nye was teaching us at the time and he addressed the question of NATO’s involvement, should the U.S. send ground troops into Yugoslavia? His answer was: “I’m in favor — but only 51% in favor.” So you see, that captures the relationship between hard power and soft power in his thinking very vividly. He never denied hard power. I think this is a point where Nye is very easily misunderstood today, and it’s something I want to underscore.

The second point is the dialectical relationship between America and the world. Nye is, without question, a scholar who placed enormous emphasis on America’s openness and its connectedness to the rest of the world. But what I want to stress is that, throughout that whole process of connecting with the world, he remained 100% an American patriot. He never once denied or downplayed his love for his own country, and as a scholar, he never turned down the chance to serve his country, to take part in government. As I mentioned earlier, he held important posts twice, both times, of course, under Democratic administrations, the Carter and Clinton administrations.

And on that note, I saw Professor Wang Yiwei’s endorsement just now. It’s actually quite a clever observation that this soft power concept still, in the end, expresses a kind of American exceptionalism. That is, he emphasizes soft power, but there’s an implicit assumption underneath it not discussed. When he was lecturing, you could see it very clearly: that American soft power was, without question, the best in the world, that nothing surpassed it.

I actually had quite a few arguments with him over this point, if I’m honest. I remember, right when I was about to finish my studies and head back to China, he called me into his office, and that day we got into a bit of a debate.

Once you get into an argument, you don’t speak the way you would write an academic paper. I had actually said the same thing several times before, so that probably made him even more worked up this time. This was right after China had just wrapped up the Olympics and the World Expo, and China’s soft power was just starting to take off. He said, “Yao, don’t be fooled by China’s economic momentum right now” — back then China’s GDP had just overtaken the U.S. for second place — “but in your lifetime, your country’s soft power will never surpass America’s.”

I’ve remembered that line my whole life. At the time I said, “Well, Professor, I’ve still got a long life ahead of me — you know how old I am — so what makes you so sure that in my lifetime our soft power won’t surpass yours?” He then rattled off several “H”s. I’ve talked about this before, and a lot of people have quoted me on it, but none of them have the original version — because what he actually told me were four H’s, and whenever I’ve spoken about it publicly, I’ve only ever revealed two of them. I was worried about it getting “pirated,” so to this day I still only give the two — a lot of people have already talked about those two.

The first H was Harvard. “Harvard is the best university in the world, otherwise, Yao, why would you have come here in the first place?” That line actually stung a bit, choked me up. I’d say every university has its own strengths. I studied at both Peking University and Tsinghua in China, and they each have their own merits, but of course Harvard does have a great deal worth learning from. Since today’s event is about a book, I’ll mention — Huiyao, Mabel Miao, and I have all visited Harvard’s Fine Arts Library — and I honestly think that library is something genuinely worth learning from.

You can borrow as many books as you want, for as long as you want, as long as you can physically carry it out, you could take a whole truckload. And once you’ve checked it out, as long as no one else is waiting on it, you can just keep it and keep reading indefinitely. Even better, when you’re carrying out that many books, they give everyone, free of charge, a specially made plastic bag — you can load 30 pounds of books into it and it won’t tear. I think that kind of genuine encouragement to read is truly something Harvard does that we should learn from. We have to acknowledge that.

But he also mentioned another H after that — one I’ve also talked about publicly quite often, which was Hollywood. And the example he gave was pretty infuriating too. He said: even during the Middle East war, with so many Iraqis hating American soldiers, they still went to the movie theater to watch our films. What films does China have? Name me just one. That really got under my skin. Honestly, I didn’t sleep that night. But he passed away last year, and if we could actually have that conversation today, I’d want to ask him what he’d make of it now.

Over this past year, China has had real momentum with what’s being called the “new trio” of cultural exports going overseas, especially micro-dramas. Last week I saw a piece of data on this. It’s not just micro-dramas going overseas in general; there’s now a platform specifically for them called ReelShort. ReelShort is dedicated to putting out Chinese micro-dramas, and last year, in 2025 alone, it racked up 38 million downloads on the Apple platform — more than Netflix.

Doesn’t that tell you something about Chinese soft power? Of course, when I look at the content, most of it is what you’d call “wish-fulfillment dramas”. For instance, the highest-grossing title was called Billionaire’s Contract Wife, and honestly, most of them have “Billionaire” in the title somewhere. That also reflects something about this economic downturn: people wanting to watch wish-fulfillment stories, wanting to see a reversal of fortune play out on screen.

So, granted, Hollywood films themselves are sometimes uneven in quality, and we should recognize that culture itself is a kind of mirror; sometimes it works through emotional resonance, and intellectual resonance is really a separate, deeper layer. In any case, this is all worth discussing — China’s soft power does still need to grow, but we’re already seeing a number of new developments that deserve real attention.

I remember, back when we held our Harvard China Soft Power Forum, Nye kept insisting that I invite Li Zhaoxing. Why? Because Nye himself had served for years as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council under the Clinton administration. And it happened that right around the time of the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, he had gone back to Harvard. So he told me directly: he’d been 51% in favor of sending in ground troops, but as for bombing the Chinese embassy — he called that “stupid,” and said that if he’d still been there, something like that never should have happened.

He deeply admired — and this actually comes up in that biographical documentary about General Secretary Jiang Zemin we were just discussing — the moment when Li Zhaoxing went on CNN in the United States for an interview with Larry King and laid out China’s position, in English. And that, really, is the point I want to make. Soft power doesn’t mean refusing to push back, and it isn’t just about being pleasant and agreeable. Stating your position with clarity, justification, and restraint is every bit as much an expression of soft power.

So Nye held Li Zhaoxing in very high regard, and that whole episode stayed vivid in his memory. Unfortunately, because Li Zhaoxing was, at the time, also serving as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, the visit never ended up happening. The timing just didn’t work out.

The third dialectical relationship, the one I want to discuss here is the relationship between freedom and order that Nye emphasized so often. Professor Ren touched on this a moment ago. Since we were formally trained in international relations, in the Department of International Politics at Peking University — Professor Wang Jisi and Professor Jia Qingguo, who were just mentioned, were both our teachers.

Back when we were students, soft power hadn’t taken off yet as a concept. What we mainly studied was Nye’s theory of interdependence, because the theory of interdependence is really about globalization — the very thing Professor Ren researches about.

What interdependence talks about there was mainly the “stickiness” of economic and cultural ties binding countries together. But even so, Nye founded a school of thought called Neoliberalism, and what he emphasized there was a particular kind of world order — one led by the United States.

In 2017, he published an article in Foreign Affairs criticizing Trump for damaging America’s soft power, and damaging the American-led liberal world order he cared about so deeply. He argued that this liberal world order had been a very good thing — in his own words, it has helped secure and stabilize the world, and promoted globalization.

Now, as Professor Ren mentioned earlier, his closest, most trusted collaborator, Professor Keohane, actually published a rebuttal directly targeting that article. So these two men, who began as close collaborators, ended up, in the final chapter of their relationship, arguing against each other. Keohane said globalization is a good thing, but some scholars seem to deliberately overlook one point: that globalization today has long since been hijacked by large corporations and multinationals. He used the word “hijack” — that’s the actual word he used. And on this particular question, I’d say Professor Keohane was more objective than Professor Nye was. Nye really couldn’t stand to hear anything negative said about America — that much is genuinely true.

So I especially want to emphasize this: when it comes to supporting, or defending, concentrated power and capital, well, that’s America for you. As for what you said earlier about achieving great deeds, cultivating virtue, and establishing enduring ideas, I think we need to add one qualifier: all of that was in service of achieving great deeds, cultivating virtue, and establishing enduring ideas for America. Because he was an American, and that’s entirely as it should be.

But from our standpoint, from a Chinese perspective, from the perspective of a new model of globalization, we need to think about this from other angles as well. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has said repeatedly in speeches in the United States: China is not America, and China will not become America. And the crux of the matter really comes down to this liberal world order — this notion of great powers protecting small ones — and to globalization itself, and the different views on the forces of capital that stand behind it. This is a point I think we, as Chinese scholars studying this today, need to be very clear-eyed about.

The last dialectical relationship I want to touch on is the one between culture and politics. Actually, Dean Li put it very well a moment ago — soft power, for Nye himself, was never just about culture. I’d add one more point to that: culture, at its core, is ultimately subordinate to politics; fundamentally, this is a question of political science.

Let me give you an example. I was, at the time, in Nye’s office — and you’ve all probably been there too — and honestly, his affection for Japan actually ran deeper than his affection for China. I visited his home once, and I remember it clearly: his wife was a gallery artist, and their house was filled with Japanese ukiyo-e prints. You could see right there just how much he loved Japanese culture. But that affection didn’t necessarily translate into any special political consideration for Japan. Every position he ultimately held still came back to America.

My very first disagreement with him was in 2010, around the time the Hatoyama government fell. Hatoyama had, right from the start in 2009, explicitly proposed reconciliation among China, Japan, and South Korea and the building of an East Asian Community. At the time, Nye’s close friend, then-Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, said publicly: “I just want to assure you that … the United States is going to be part of this party.” Nye also, quite uncharacteristically, took the initiative to give an interview to Japan’s Bungei Shunju. You could call it a friendly warning, but really it carried a slight edge of threat directed at Hatoyama: that if Japan and China were to start running East Asia without the United States, that would become a very serious situation. That was the actual wording.

And in fact, less than six months later, Hatoyama was forced out of office amid public pressure. That was my first real argument with him. In other words, his personal love for Japanese culture never once got in the way of his conviction that the U.S. should keep troops stationed in Japan, that Japan’s political and diplomatic conduct should remain subordinate to the United States — that never changed. This is culture being subordinate to diplomacy. That’s the point I want to make here — that he was speaking, always, from an American standpoint.

So I think when we look at someone’s whole life, we have to look at it dialectically, comprehensively, and give it full and fair credit, because to be honest, the fact that his concept was able to enter China’s official discourse at all — let me close on this — is remarkable: in 2007, “culture as part of the soft power” became a specific, official term of art in the report to China’s 17th National Congress. Because in the official usage of the People’s Republic of China, the English word “power” has always been strongly disliked.

When we say “power politics,” we mean “强权政治,” the politics of coercive strength. When Nye and other American scholars refer to a “great power,” we don’t accept that framing; our official translation is “major country,” not “great power.” In other words, in our eyes, the word “power” carries connotations of imperialist great powers — something we’ve never been fond of. So the limit of our tolerance for the word “power” is really just this one instance: Nye’s own term, with “soft” attached — “soft power.” That’s the only use of the word we’ve ever fully accepted, right up to today.

I also want to add — as Dean Li mentioned a moment ago — that China’s official discourse has actually taken a further step forward recently, and that’s actually connected to an internal reference report I wrote myself. Last year’s communiqué from the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Party Central Committee didn’t include this language, but it did come up in remarks by central leadership. Specifically, in the process of drafting our 15th Five-Year Plan, a very important passage was raised: that during the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China’s hard power — economic, technological, and defense — and its soft power — cultural, institutional, and diplomatic — both saw marked improvement. This was the first time our official national discourse explicitly named soft power in this way, covering all three aspects: culture, institutions, and diplomacy.

So my point is that the term “soft power” has become deeply embedded in Chinese official thinking — we have really come to embrace it. And I want to add something that I have actually researched quite closely: as far as I can tell, the academic community’s current understanding of this newer official definition of soft power that I just described can ultimately be traced back to Nye.

What I find somewhat regrettable is that —Henry Huiyao Wang raised this early on — Nye himself became interested in Confucian culture only late in his life. Back when I was studying with him, I told him: “Do you know what Confucian culture actually means in the Chinese context?” In China’s earliest comprehensive dictionary, the character ru (儒), meaning “Confucian,” is defined as being refined and gentle. Confucian culture, in other words, already had soft power built into it from the start — and he found that fascinating.

It’s just a shame that by the time he learned all this, he was already too old, past the age where he could really devote focused time and energy to learning something new. Why was he so deeply knowledgeable about Japanese culture, by contrast? Because it was during his own younger years — younger even than I am now — that Japan’s economy was rising rapidly, so he immersed himself in studying Japan.

I think that, in turn, is a real lesson for China — it’s exactly why think tanks like ours, non-governmental think tanks such as CCG, need to do more to identify and cultivate the younger generation of Americans, to help them understand Chinese culture as early as possible in their lives. Through this kind of mutual learning between civilizations, we can help them — whether in the social sciences or in public diplomacy — go on to create new political vocabulary and new political theories that combine the strengths of both East and West.

On this point, I also want to stress that China’s vision of globalization is neither the anti-globalization backlash that populism speaks of, nor the so-called liberal globalization dominated by any single great power or by capital — it’s a new type of globalization altogether, one that is broadly inclusive and beneficial to all, that is also equal, and of course orderly, and — most importantly, I think — one that shifts focus away from the speculative, “virtual” economy and back toward the real economy.

On this front, I look forward to working together with all of my colleagues, especially fellow social think tanks like ours, and I’m confident China’s soft power will keep getting stronger. Thank you all.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Professor Yao Yao. Yao, that was so vivid, and you clearly have real, firsthand experience with Joseph Nye. As you were speaking, Professor Nye seemed to come alive again in my mind. We also had many opportunities to speak with him ourselves.

And I think, just as you said, in terms of personal charisma, he really stood out. We have met many people who developed influential ideas and theories in international affairs, but Professor Joseph Nye himself was, in a very real sense, an embodiment of soft power. He was a junzi — or, to put it in English, a true gentleman: someone of genuine character, grace, and personal charm.

Actually, what you said just reminded me. The last time I saw him in person was at the Central Party School. He was in dialogue with the school’s leadership, and by then he was already well into his 80s, and it was a three-day dialogue in a row. He had terrible jet lag. I could see he was nearly falling asleep, but whenever the professor on the other side was speaking to him, he’d force himself to stay alert and really listen. And he even turned to me at one point and asked, “What did they just say? Remind me again.” That left a real impression on me. I thought he truly is a courteous, well-mannered junzi, in the sense that Chinese traditional culture uses that term.

And on the other side, the four dialectical relationships you laid out just now, I think, carry very deep meaning too and reminds us to have a comprehensive understanding of this matter.

I think what we’re doing today, whether it’s publishing this book or discussing soft power more broadly, is really about using it as a mirror to look at ourselves as China, right? So I think this has also helped us understand what soft power really means at a deeper level, and helped us understand more deeply that, as China moves forward day by day in this process of globalization, what should our next step be? As we take in other cultures, other countries’ experiences, how should we move forward from here?

That’s another point that really stayed with me. You only revealed two of the H’s, and I was actually sitting there waiting to hear what came next after Harvard and Hollywood. But I think you’ve already captured the essence of the idea.

So perhaps the question for us today is this: as America continues to develop and sustain its own soft power, what should we be doing on our side? And that includes the last point you made — how we can give more young people from the West, and from around the world, opportunities to encounter Chinese culture earlier in their lives. For example, the Western idea of a gentleman has quite a lot in common with the Chinese concept of junzi, but junzi also carries its own distinctive connotations. It includes qualities such as grace and restraint — much like the idea of taiji that came up earlier. But how deeply do people really understand those qualities?

More broadly, culture itself rests on philosophy. Philosophy, in turn, shapes institutional culture as well as the more fluid, everyday ways in which culture is expressed in practice. What we really want others to understand more deeply are those underlying ideas and structures.

And I think, based on everything we’ve heard today, we really should organize a dedicated session on Joseph Nye at some point in the future. This has been fascinating, especially because what you’ve shared comes from such direct, firsthand experience. Thank you.

Now I’d like to invite Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General at CCG, to share a few thoughts. You were actually in that last photo we saw just now. I imagine you have your own thoughts on this topic as well. But let’s keep this a bit shorter, maybe two or three minutes, since we’re wrapping up shortly.

Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General, CCG

Thank you, Secretary-General Miao. It’s also been very rewarding to hear everyone’s sharing just now. Compared to what all of you have shared, my own interactions with Joseph Nye were, of course, far fewer in number and far less deep.

CCG — some of you may have heard — runs a few English-language newsletters that have built a certain degree of international influence, and I happen to be responsible for managing them. Joseph Nye was one of our long-standing subscribers.

The last time he was in Beijing was in 2023, when he came to attend one of our forums. Shirley Ren, Director of CCG’s publishing center, and I drove to pick him up and later took him back, so I had quite a bit of time to talk with him in the car. He was very curious about China’s domestic situation, the policy environment, and a range of other issues. As we explained these things to him, I was struck by how open-minded he remained throughout our conversations.

The last time I saw him was in March 2025. At the time, I was doing a mid-career Master in Public Policy at Princeton’s School of Public and International Affairs, and Princeton’s spring break happened to fall a week earlier than Harvard’s. So during our break, I went up to Harvard to see him. I didn’t want to trouble Secretary General Mabel Miao, so I simply emailed him directly. He responded very warmly and made time especially to meet with me.

While I was there, I also had the chance to speak with people around Harvard more broadly — some of his assistants, as well as other faculty members and students. His wife had passed away before him, and I think her death had a profound effect on him. You could really see what a full and rounded person he was — not only an accomplished former government official and distinguished scholar, but also someone who had shared a deeply devoted marriage for many decades. Her passing clearly affected him a great deal.

And in fact, not long after his wife passed away, he himself passed away as well. I remember that when I visited him in March, he had just written a long piece for the Financial Times. The latter part of the title was something like “Donald Trump and the End of American Soft Power.” His distress over the damage Trump was doing to America’s soft power came through very clearly in the piece — you could feel it in almost every line.

Since everyone was paying close attention at the time to the Trump administration’s policies, I also asked him what he thought was likely to happen next. If I remember correctly, he said he didn’t know either; he even wasn’t sure President Trump himself knew what he was going to say the next day.

So I think that, when it comes to dealing with the uncertainty of U.S. policy under the current circumstances, there may simply be no single silver-bullet solution. That uncertainty is inherent; it is something we have to learn to live with.

And just as our Secretary-General Miao mentioned earlier, Professor Nye genuinely cared about younger people like us, people of our generation. When it was time for me to leave, he took the initiative to bring out one of his books and offered to sign it for me. What he wrote was genuinely warm and heartfelt.

He probably also knew that our newsletters have a certain reach and influence internationally, including among Western experts, scholars, and officials who work on China-related issues. So he made a point of saying that he hoped our own soft power could continue to grow and become more influential.

Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

All right, thank you all very much. I’d now like to invite President Henry Huiyao Wang to speak. President Wang is also the editor of this book, so I’d like to ask him to share a few thoughts with us.

You touched earlier on the story of how we came to know Joseph Nye and why we decided to publish this book. I’d also be very interested to hear your thoughts on soft power itself, and on what lessons it may hold for global governance and for China.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you. I think this has been a wonderful afternoon. We are all extremely busy, and the fact that we have been able to spend so much time today discussing Joseph Nye’s new book is, in itself, genuinely meaningful.

Why do I say that? First of all, however we translate the concept, I think we reached a shared understanding this afternoon: for a society or a country, what lies behind hard power is something much broader — its appeal, its influence, and the many other ways in which it can shape how others see and respond to it. Of course hard power matters; that goes without saying. But I think soft power is actually broader in scope and encompasses much more.

So although we have translated and published Professor Joseph Nye’s book, and although his discussion of soft power is closely tied to the history of the American century, I think what we are really doing today, in discussing the Chinese edition, is creating an opportunity to reflect on China’s own soft power: how can we continue to build it and strengthen it? I think that is one of the most important meanings of today’s book event and of reading this book.

Nye himself, of course, recognized that China has an extraordinarily deep civilizational foundation to draw on. The question is how we can bring the soft power of Chinese culture more fully to life — how we can better express ideas such as “harmony without uniformity” and “great harmony under heaven.” I think there is still a great deal for us to explore and develop in that regard.

Then there is the hard power that Yao Yao mentioned earlier. China is now the world’s second-largest economy, with an enormous domestic market, and it is also doing very well in areas such as green globalization. I would argue that these, too, can become sources of soft power.

And of course, as others mentioned earlier, there is also the growing international reach of Chinese popular and folk culture. That is developing very quickly, and there is a great deal we can learn from it. In fact, in some ways it echoes the very channels through which the United States has historically exercised its own soft power.

I would also add that China’s balanced and multilateral approach to diplomacy — not forming exclusive alliances and not simply taking sides — can itself be a form of soft power. Through this particular style of international engagement, China is also projecting a certain kind of appeal and influence.

Of course, after reading this book and reflecting on its discussion of soft power, I also think there are still a number of areas where China could do better in projecting its own soft power. One of the most important is agenda-setting — our ability to shape agendas within the global discourse system. To some extent, the United States still dominates that space, and I think there is enormous room for us to improve.

Then there is cultural soft power. China has an extraordinarily long and rich cultural history, but compared with Hollywood, our culture is really only beginning to reach international audiences on a large scale. New forms such as micro-dramas, and even events like the recent robot games, may seem quite ordinary at home, but they can also become forms of soft power — new kinds of cultural IP with international appeal. There is still room to improve, of course, particularly in making these forms of communication more accessible, engaging, and easier for international audiences to connect with.

I would also mention the role of non-governmental think tanks in public diplomacy. In the United States, non-governmental organizations and think tanks participate in public diplomacy on a very large scale, creating a broad, grassroots network of people-to-people engagement. This is another area where I think we still have considerable room to grow.

Then there is our capacity for international storytelling and interpretation. China already has quite a few English-language media outlets, but the question is how we connect more effectively with the wider international English-language media ecosystem, and how we engage more deeply with the Global South, so that more voices — and more balanced voices — can be heard. There is still a great deal more we could do.

This also relates to talent. We still need more internationally minded people with the ability to operate effectively across cultures and institutions, and we could do much more to send such talent out into the world and give them more opportunities for international engagement.

There are also other areas in which we can strengthen our soft power, including the logic of our narratives and the way we frame issues in the first place. In particular, I think we need to move away from a traditional external-propaganda mindset and toward a model of empathetic communication — communication that begins by understanding how others see the world. That is something we genuinely need to work on.

Finally, we also need a more diverse and pluralistic ecosystem for communicating China’s cultural soft power. That means involving university think tanks, enterprises, and especially companies engaged in grassroots international exchanges, as well as young Chinese studying abroad, overseas Chinese communities, and many others. All of these can become important channels for building and projecting soft power.

And of course, when it comes to agenda-setting, I think China has already put forward many important proposals at the national level, including the Four Global Initiatives. Beyond that, there is also the question of how we can work more closely with countries of the Global South to strengthen soft power on a truly global scale. I think there is still a great deal we can do in all of these areas.

So overall, how should we understand Joseph Nye? Although much of what he wrote about was the United States, his ideas remain deeply thought-provoking, and there is a great deal we can draw on and learn from. Of course, he was speaking from an American perspective, and we fully understand that.

But if we look at the American century and at the nearly one hundred years of history that Nye himself lived through, we can also see that China today is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century and entering a new stage in its own national rejuvenation. I believe that, with our generation taking part in this process, and with more and more young people joining in, the building and strengthening of China’s soft power — and its greater presence on the world stage — is something we can expect to see take shape in the years ahead.

So with that, I would like to thank China Science and Technology Press, including Editor Shen Yonggang for joining us in person today, as well as the editors and senior editors who worked so closely on this book from beginning to end. We are deeply grateful for all their efforts. I would also like to thank all of our experts for the insights they shared with us this afternoon, as well as our translation team for their hard work.

That is all I wanted to say today. Thank you all again.

Mabel Lu Miao

Okay, thank you all very much. As President Wang just said, we are deeply grateful to China Science and Technology Press for its strong support for this book, and to all the experts who joined today’s discussion, both online and in person.

I believe this book can have a real impact. It brings the idea of soft power back into focus and encourages more people to think seriously about it — all with the broader goal of strengthening China’s own soft power. Whatever terminology we ultimately use, I think we have reached a point where China’s hard power has already grown substantially, while our soft power is still very much a work in progress. And that, in itself, can inspire a great deal of fresh enthusiasm and reflection among Chinese people.

Now that the country has reached this stage of development, there are still many areas where we need to do more and build further. Put simply, I think this discussion has really stirred something in many young people.

And when China’s own centennial history is written years from now, will it be the work of one person, or of many people writing it together? After all, Chinese culture tends to place greater emphasis on the collective. As for our generation’s own “Chinese Century,” we are usually more modest and simply say that the 21st century will be the Asian Century. But then the question remains: where is China’s own century within that? What would a Chinese Century actually look like? And what kind of Chinese Century do we hope to leave to the world?

Ren Xiao

In the future, Professor Yao can write a book called A Life in the Chinese Century.

Mabel Lu Miao

Exactly. And I think that could be something worth doing as well — perhaps Professor Yao and others could come together to write more about “A Life in the Chinese Century,” so to speak: the intersection between an individual life and a larger historical era.

I think that is part of what makes Joseph Nye so compelling, what makes this book so compelling, and really what has made today’s discussion so compelling. Here was someone whose life was deeply intertwined with his time, and with the broader currents shaping the world around him. In the process, he left behind a story rich enough to draw people in, to make later generations want to study not only his ideas, but the life and historical experience behind them. There is simply so much substance there. It is genuinely fascinating.

Thank you. Thank you all for your attention. That is also an important part of why we were so eager to publish this book in the first place.

And finally, thank you again to all of our speakers, and to our team. Our Publishing Center put an enormous amount of work into this book over a long period of time. It was by no means easy. In many respects, a book like this is genuinely difficult to bring to publication. So I want to thank them as well. Thank you all.

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The event focused on cross-border transactions, and the legal and compliance challenges facing Chinese companies operating in the UK and continental Europe.

CCG representatives at the roundtable included Professor Wang Yiwei, a CCG Non-Resident Senior Fellow and professor at Renmin University of China; Liu Jun, CCG Deputy Secretary-General; and Sicheng Yang, Research Associate at CCG.

Barney Reynolds has extensive expertise advising on transactions and investigations under UK and EU law and regulation, as well as navigating legal and regulatory systems worldwide. He has a broad practice advising clients on high-profile matters across the UK, Europe and the Middle East. He helped numerous financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis of 2009–2012, and the Credit Suisse and Silicon Valley Bank situations.

He has played a significant role in the development of financial regulatory regimes, including designing the rules for Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM). This is the only common law financial centre outside the Commonwealth and US — which now, after 10 years, accounts for over 7% of Abu Dhabi’s GDP. He advised the UK government and market participants on legal and regulatory issues arising from the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.

The following transcript is based on an audio recording and has been edited for clarity and concision.

Barney Reynolds, Partner, Financial Services Group, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP

Thank you for having me, and for coming on a Sunday morning. It’s very nice to meet you all. I met Professor Dr Wang two years ago at a roundtable in Shanghai, where I heard about China’s AI in particular. I was astonished by the quality of the thinking, and subsequently by how it has been borne out by events. Very impressive.

So, why is law central? Law is basically the modern way of organising a society through words. To invest most successfully in Europe, you need to navigate multiple legal and regulatory systems, from the common law (or Scots law) UK, to the continental member states and the EU. There is a morass of rules and interpretive mechanisms.

The two systems applied in international commerce are English law and New York law. They are estimated to be used for 80-plus per cent of all deals. The others in meaningful use are Singapore, Hong Kong, and ADGM law, which are all forms of English law. All are systems of reasoning, based on literalist techniques and argument over facts and evidence in making and applying the law. This is part of their attraction for business: argument is apolitical, so the terms of a deal, pretty much whatever they are, cannot be changed without your consent. Legislation is specific, and regulation largely risk-based. Both also result from, and are applied after, argument.

China’s system uses the code method of lawmaking: a scheme is set out on an anticipatory basis, which the courts then apply. It is a structural choice, made across two-thirds of the world, including the EU and all its member states except Ireland. In Europe, the anticipatory method has been used to create particularly far-reaching schemes – for instance the AI Act, the Securitisation Regulation and AIFMD.

Navigating Europe therefore means understanding that background and the reasoning techniques every relevant system deploys. Because argument comes from individuals, English law, like New York law, places a premium on individual skill, credibility and expertise. If you watch The West Wing, it’s all about arguments. The protagonists put their arguments to the President. The President then decides which he likes best, and runs with it. In some ways it’s how humans naturally interact. But in the common law environment it is intrinsic to the mechanisms of the state.

The reasoning in the continental systems is more purposive and less literal, with the courts seeking to apply the code as the legislators intended. There is often little written evidence of that. These systems deliver a very different type of outcome.

For lawyers, pivoting the system in a common law environment depends on mastery of the minute facts. In a code-based environment, you have to understand the thesis behind the laws as written, and what that thesis might be taken to be in novel situations. You must then explain how the provisions are best read in accordance with their conception and purposes, and how your desired course of action fits with that. In the EU it’s particularly complex because you’re dealing with member state laws too, each applying its own purposes. In addition, EU law has an integrationist teleology that is relevant in certain circumstances.

This is all quite jurisprudential, but why does it matter? Legal method is in my view a key missing variable in the analysis of economic prosperity. The common law method can lead to greater economic growth, because of its constrained permissiveness. You saw this in Hong Kong, in what was then an extreme version. In China, you have clearly discovered a way to achieve exceptional growth using the code method, and not just catch-up growth. Part of the secret is competition, which the common law also prizes. I believe the UK system could help you further, if deployed properly.

You might ask why, if I’m right, Brexit hasn’t yet restored Britain to the successful economic trajectory of the past. The answer is that the UK has yet to address the inherited EU code, which is at odds with its common law system and institutions. Replacing this will be a highly complex exercise which nobody has done before, and in my estimation would take a team of top lawyers around 18 months. Once that is done, Parliament and the regulators will take more of a back seat than now, intervening only when necessary and leaving more of the law’s creation and enforcement to lawyers and the courts, on an evolutionary basis. Various other institutional adjustments are needed. It may take another electoral cycle for this dialogue to begin, since it isn’t yet part of the national debate.

English law can serve China well in its UK and European deal-making, whether in sovereign and other debt trading, shipping, insurance, financial services, digital asset trading, potentially AI, or other commercial matters.

Q&A

Q: What should Chinese investors understand about political change in the UK, and how should they approach a new government?

Barney Reynolds

The changes are largely to do with redistributive policy and oscillate around it. There is an extra ingredient: the relationship with the EU and, to a lesser degree, the US (a regrettable ordering of priority which arises from ignorance of the significance of legal systems). For deals, the government matters less than you might think. The UK runs on law, and much of the day-to-day machine is operated by the civil service. That makes the UK more predictable, and deals more actionable, than the political headlines suggest.

To navigate the complexities, develop a thesis – not only of what you want to do, but of why it works for the UK. Then reflect it in documents that match the facts exactly, however far people drill down.

Q: How should the recent difficulties with some Chinese investments in the UK be viewed?

Barney Reynolds

There have certainly been issues, but I believe many can be overcome if rigorous legal thinking breaks the problems down and shows, through common law argument, why the specific investment intentions are win-win. If the paperwork and the facts align, and are expressed simply and argued correctly, I am optimistic there is a way through.

Q: What role do lawyers play in getting major transactions and policy changes through the UK system?

Barney Reynolds

They are central to the UK system. They join up interests, rationalise them, explain them, and put them in writing, so that people say, “Oh yes, that works” – or, in a commercial context, “Yes, we’ll do exactly that”. The method travels with its practitioners. Hong Kong, Singapore and ADGM are proof of that.

Q: Could Hong Kong regain its historic role as a gateway for China?

Barney Reynolds

Yes, it could. Hong Kong could supplement and enhance what you have built elsewhere, providing a meeting point for China and the global markets. The key is the common law method, and how it is applied. It is a way of life and a culture – lived, not merely learned. UK lawyers could help operate the Hong Kong system to maximum benefit, if that is desired. Doing so would not take business away from any Chinese city, whether Shenzhen or otherwise, but would add to it, including through foreign investment. Common law lawyers, imbued with the full common law culture and allowed to deploy their skills, would improve the investability of Chinese assets. But there are complexities in how this needs to be done.

Q: Does the UK need greater strategic autonomy in AI?

Barney Reynolds

AI brings with it all sorts of concerns yet to be mapped out. The UK has many of the ingredients for an autonomous solution – for a start, DeepMind is based in London. One issue is the inherited EU GDPR, which restricts automated decision-making and the use of personal data, but that can be replaced with something more sensitive to what is required. Autonomy matters to every major economy. But how necessary it is in the immediate term, and how the situation evolves, are open questions.

Q: How should AI be regulated without stifling innovation?

Barney Reynolds

Under the common law method, action is taken when a specific risk or problem has been identified. I don’t believe this is an area in which anticipatory legislation is helpful. The EU AI Act sets out many sensible positions, but there is little EU AI. I think it is best to identify the principles and legislate against specific harms when one can see what they are. There are clearly risks to address right now. The question is how to define them in a way that doesn’t go beyond what’s necessary.

Q: Could Chinese AI products gain acceptance in the UK and Europe?

Barney Reynolds

That’s a difficult one. There are already day-to-day applications of AI in China – I noticed several at Shanghai airport two days ago. Ultimately, people will try to buy what they want: if China keeps producing things that others want and cannot obtain elsewhere, demand will assert itself, subject to states preventing it for wider reasons. However, AI can be unpredictable and opaque. Other countries will struggle to evaluate technology they cannot yet fully comprehend, or address through their legal systems or common law contracts.

Q: Which ESG rules must a global financial institution follow when its headquarters and European operations face different requirements?

Barney Reynolds

You have to follow the laws of every place in which you do business. I have seen Chinese clients apply US, UK and EU sanctions assiduously. The same approach is required for EU ESG regulation, for EU business properly defined. (There are issues over asserted extraterritoriality to be navigated.) This is a topic where the world’s legislators, regulators and judiciaries approach things differently. The EU has gone far further than others, on an anticipatory basis. The common law approach tends to be more disclosure-based, with remedies if the disclosures are inaccurate. The code-based approach involves a greater degree of categorisation, with consequences following the taxonomy. The complexities of the area make the differences more acute, and navigation harder, than in some others.

Q: How can law help foreign businesses overcome regulatory barriers and invest in the UK or Europe?

Barney Reynolds

Good lawyers define the obstacles and work out how to navigate them with reasoning consistent with the applicable systems. That does not mean there is always a solution, but with a very good lawyer there normally is – and it is ultimately individual practitioners, operating in teams, who shape things most successfully at the highest levels.

Q: Should Chinese companies expanding overseas use a Chinese law firm or a local international firm?

Barney Reynolds

I’d say an international firm, using cross-border common law practitioners, who may or may not be located locally. “Lawyer” means different things in different systems. In a common law system, the lawyers train themselves to create arguments and different ways of looking at the facts. For international business those skills are essential if you are to get the best results. It’s a feature of the system from which they come, though of course individual abilities differ.

There are other differences too. In common law systems, discussions with lawyers are protected by the law of privilege, and their arguments are given the same weight as the state’s before a court or regulator. Hayek made the point in Law, Legislation and Liberty: it took him thirty years, and a return to Austria, to see how profoundly the roles of lawyers differ between types of legal system.

So, for the big cross-border deals, I would use the international common law firms, with local firms for local law, security packages and enforcement. This isn’t only about Chinese firms. The same is true of firms from other code-based jurisdictions. It follows from the relevance of individual argument within the system itself. Intriguingly, code systems do respect common law argument.

Q: What does intense domestic competition in China mean for its ability to sell technology abroad?

Barney Reynolds

I was here 20 years ago, and the country is transformed. As I understand it, a key driver has been internal competition and hard work. That means you are creating technology that operates increasingly at the frontier. Others will want it, and will pay for it. However, you still need to use lawyers to explain what it does, why it is desirable and safe, and what protections people have if anything goes wrong. And that all needs to be written down specifically opposite the facts in a way other legal systems can verify, including when people test it rigorously in argument as the facts evolve.

Q: Has the common-law system produced too much litigation and too many lawyers?

Barney Reynolds

No. The success of the system depends on rigorous argument before an independent arbiter. That is how the system learns. It is how people obtain redress and protect themselves from invalid claims. The state does not stipulate when people are allowed to dispute something. It does not control the demand for lawyers. Societies which argue in this way have also produced extraordinary innovation – Britain in the 19^th century, and the US in more modern times, particularly now in California and Texas, but also elsewhere.

China has managed, almost uniquely in recent times, to achieve ongoing growth on a code-based approach. But that requires an element of state coordination quite different from anything in a common law system. I do not believe one system can be changed into another – attempts were made to introduce common law features into Louisiana and Quebec, unsuccessfully. Equally, UK efforts to inject common law thinking into the code-based EU scheme had insufficient effect.

Q: How can China explain its governance system in a way that builds trust in the West?

Barney Reynolds

This is the most fascinating question of all, because I don’t think China’s system has yet been properly explained in the language of the West. You have your own structures across different topics, and some of what you’re doing is similar to Western code-based systems. I do believe that building trust starts with explanation. The question is not just the legal system, but also the administrative one and how social expectations work. All are interconnected, and are best understood and conveyed by lawyers versed in the language, operations and reasoning of multiple systems – particularly the common law – with a sufficient understanding of yours. They can then express the Chinese techniques in terminology familiar elsewhere.

Q: What makes cross-border cooperation on AI and data particularly difficult?

Barney Reynolds

On data, I suspect the value systems differ, which makes interoperability difficult, though potentially not impossible with the right legal arrangements. On AI, a significant issue is the uncertainty of the technology itself. There are regular stories of AI doing what wasn’t intended. How people identify, own up to and deal with that is partly cultural, since the legal system cannot get involved in real time. It might be possible to reach accommodations, but that would require a lot of thought, discussion and legal structuring. It may also involve embedding agreed rules and interpretations in the AI itself, and monitoring how those are applied so that, over time, trust can build. Even then, an audit of the code may be needed to prove that the AI cannot, in extremis, override those rules.

Q: How can Chinese companies demonstrate compliance with local laws in the US, UK and EU?

Barney Reynolds

When I have acted for large Chinese companies and funds, I have found them keen to comply properly with every system. Proving compliance to third parties is another matter. In common law countries, it partly involves trust in the responsible individuals, earned over time through interactions which test whether they “get” the system’s reasoning. In code-based countries the techniques can involve more paperwork and process – show-your-work solutions. But these are simplifications, and the reality is often more complex. In financial services, some of the proof points are particularly difficult. China is yet to be accepted as a consolidated supervisor by Western regulators, perhaps most importantly those of the US and UK. Achieving that will, I suspect, take time, discussion and a build-up of trust over how the rules are applied and over the checks and balances that ensure they are observed in practice.

Q: Why has Brexit not delivered the expected results, and what would need to change?

Barney Reynolds

As mentioned, the issue is the legacy of EU code, which is alien to the UK’s common law institutions. The UK has acquired millions of code-based provisions from almost fifty years in the EU system, and its institutions still produce laws by this method. There is no precedent for a proper exit from the legal methodology, except ADGM, which was of course a smaller exercise. Nor is it just a question of removing unnecessary code and reformulating what remains in common law style. The law also needs to cater for what the UK would have done had it been independent for all that time. I have mapped out the work and believe it can be done, with top lawyers, in 18 months. Until this is delivered, the results of Brexit will not properly follow. Some ancillary points need dealing with at the same time.

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France

On July 28, Wang and Miao visited Asia Centre in Paris, where they met Arnaud Leveau, President of Asia Centre; Gilles Briatta, a former European affairs adviser to the French Prime Minister; and other senior experts from the think tank.

On July 30, Wang and Miao met Franck Paris, the newly appointed Secretary-General of the Paris Peace Forum, in Paris.

On August 2, Wang and Miao visited the Jean Monnet House in Houjarray, Bazoches-sur-Guyonne, in France’s Yvelines department. During the visit, they met Jean-Marc Lieberherr, a grandson of Jean Monnet and Co-founder and Chairman of the Institut Jean Monnet.

United Kingdom

On August 6, Wang and Miao met Peter Trubowitz, Professor of International Relations and Director of the US Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).

On August 7, Wang and Miao met Barnabas “Barney” Reynolds, partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Financial Services Group. Following the meeting, they invited him to be the featured speaker at a CCG breakfast roundtable in Beijing on August 16.

On August 9, Wang met Alistair Michie, Secretary-General of the British East Asia Council and a recipient of the Chinese Government Friendship Award, in Edinburgh.

They revisited Consensus or Conflict? China and Globalization in the 21st Century, the English-language volume they jointly conceived and edited in 2021.

On August 10, Wang and Miao met Barry Buzan, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the LSE and a Fellow of the British Academy, in London.

On August 14, Wang and Miao visited the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), where they held discussions with Caroline Quinn, Deputy Head of the China Department at the Asia-Pacific Directorate; Fiona Henry, Head of the Hong Kong Team, NE Asia and China Directorate; Dr Chris Bond, Deputy Head of Research Analysts in the Asia Pacific Research Group; and Emily Riddell, Senior Research Analyst (China Foreign Policy), Asia Pacific Research Group.

On August 15, Wang and Miao met Professor Birgitte Andersen, Chief Executive Officer and Co-founder of the Big Innovation Centre, in London.

Brazil

From August 15 to 19, Wang attended the Paraty Dialogues in Brazil.

On August 20, Wang recorded a conversation with Trita Parsi, Co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

Austria

From August 23 to 24, Wang and Miao attended the 2026 Trilogue Salzburg in Salzburg, Austria.

During the event, Wang exchanged views with the founders of the 25th 2026 Trilogue Salzburg — Wolfgang Schüssel, former Chancellor of Austria, and Liz Mohn, Founder of the Liz Mohn Foundation.

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Co-hosted by the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO) and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), the forum is themed “Green Talent Competitiveness in the AI Era: Green Skills and Green Leadership.”

Addressing the widening structural gap between green job growth and talent supply, the forum will convene leading academics, green development experts, diplomats, international organizations, think tanks, universities, multinational companies, and non-profit organizations. Participants will exchange insights on green talent development, international cooperation, capacity building, and practical pathways to cultivate the skills needed for the green transition.

Time & Venue

Venue: Ballroom, Nousland Hotel, Tongzhou District, Beijing

Date: Afternoon, Friday, September 18, 2026

Preliminary Agenda

13:30–14:00 Guest Registration

14:00–14:05 Opening Remarks by Moderator

14:05–14:19 Welcome Address by Organizers

14:19–14:33 Remarks by Government Representative

14:33–15:03 Keynote Speeches

15:03-15:08 Launch of AGTO Green Talent Special Committee

15:08-15:13 Announcement of Beijing Tongzhou District Support Policies for Green Talent

15:13-15:18 Launch of Youth Initiative on Green Skills and Green Leadership

15:08–15:39 Green Young Talent Talk

15:40–16:40 Panel Discussion I: Reshaping Perceptions Amid the Green Talent Gap
Exploring the scope and definition of “green talent,” the competencies and categories required, sector-specific demands, and how enterprises can identify and activate “dormant” green talent within their workforce.

16:40–16:55 Tea Break

16:55–17:55 Panel Discussion II: Accelerating Green Talent Cultivation
Sharing practical achievements and innovative methodologies in green talent development, featuring successful training programmes, with a special focus on leveraging AI to enhance green skills learning and engaging young talent.

17:55–18:00 Closing Summary

Major Announcements and Deliverables

· Launch of the AGTO Green Talent Committee — establishing an institutional platform for dialogue and cooperation on green talent development

· Release of the Beijing Municipal Administrative Center Green Talent Special Support Policy

· Launch of the “Youth Pledge for Green Skills and Green Leadership” — creating a full-chain framework from “policy guidance – international governance – industrial practice – youth action,” offering a Chinese model for global green talent development

Who Should Attend

· Enterprises seeking to advance green transformation but facing green talent shortages

· Universities and institutions committed to green talent development

· Young professionals seeking to acquire green skills and green leadership capabilities

· Scholars and experts conducting research on green talent

Registration

1. Scan the QR code below to access the registration portal

2. Complete your personal information

3. Select Parallel Forum 3 under “Sessions You Wish to Attend”

4. Submit to receive your confirmation and participation QR code

Contact

Ms. Li: lilanxin@ccg.org.cn

About the Beijing Green Development Forum 2026

The Beijing Green Development Forum 2026 will be held on September 17–18 in Beijing Municipal Administrative Center under the theme “Green Empowerment, Low-Carbon Symbiosis.” Anchored in Beijing’s strategic positioning and guided by the principles of internationalization, industrial development, and public engagement, the forum serves as an international platform integrating idea exchange, technology commercialization, and industrial cooperation.

The forum features an opening ceremony and main plenary, multiple parallel sessions, and industry promotion events, alongside the International Green Industry (Beijing) Expo and the Urban Low-Carbon Lifestyle Festival. It will bring together Nobel laureates, representatives of international cities, and industry leaders for keynote speeches, high-level dialogues, deliverable announcements, and project signing ceremonies to chart pathways for green transformation. The forum is committed to zero-carbon event management, setting a benchmark for end-to-end carbon neutrality, and with a “never-ending forum” concept, will run year-round activities, contributing Chinese solutions and Beijing’s experience to global climate governance and sustainable development.

About AGTO

As an idea incubated at the Paris Peace Forum, the Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO) is an international, non-governmental organization dedicated to facilitating and promoting the global flow of talent. Initiated by the Center for China & Globalization (CCG) and supported by academic institutions, civil society, and the private sector, AGTO aims to establish an international platform for promoting global governance innovation on talent flow.

AGTO’s objectives include: holding an annual Global Talent Summit to form global consensus on talent cooperation, building collaboration platforms for organizations, and forging a “Talent Davos.” AGTO also aims to conduct research, publish Global Talent Reports, introduce and connect the best practices in the field, and provide talent training for international organizations. In the future, AGTO plans to create talent credentialing services, establish a large data center for global talents, and much more.

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The following transcript is based on a video recording and has not been reviewed by either of the speakers

Henry Huiyao Wang

At CCG, the Center for China and Globalization, we have a Global Dialogue series, so we would love to have you on this Global Dialogue. I know you are an expert on global governance, but you are also a great expert on the Middle East, particularly Iran–U.S. relations. To start, what is your take on global governance?

Trita Pars

The situation of global governance, of course, is in crisis mode. I do think one of the things that really came through here at the Paraty Dialogues is that there is a tremendous amount of energy and a realisation of the need to defend international law, and to defend the UN Charter, and the UN order, because their absence would be absolutely disastrous.

My own takeaway is that we do not necessarily need a perfect vision or a perfect definition of the problem. I think what is more important at this moment is to put forward a large number of practical, detailed proposals that take advantage of the energy that exists right now in defence of international law, push them forward, and use them as vehicles to be able to get to that larger picture.

The larger picture, of course, is that, as we transition away from unipolarity, it is going to become even more important for us to ensure that there is a global governance structure that is fit for this era — not just for the problems of this era, but for the fundamental change in the structure of the world that has occurred as a result of this transition away from unipolarity.

I think a search for a perfect vision is going to be a waste of energy. We have good enough a vision; we need to push really good proposals at this point.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Quincy is doing something very unique and interesting: really pushing for a new narrative and new thinking on global governance. We are entering a multipolar world, so how do we reflect that in the UN system and the global governance system?

Not many people are talking about multilateralism, and not many think tanks are really working on it. So that, I think, is what has drawn attention to this Better Order Project. What is the current focus of Quincy?

Trita Parsi

What we are doing right now is looking at the 20 proposals we have on seven different areas and identifying where the political opportunities are to push them forward.

There is a political opportunity on the UN Security Council reform, and a lot of progress has been made there. There is definitely an opportunity on our proposals on the Middle East order and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Because what you have now, as a result of this war of choice that Trump and Israel started with Iran, is that the old order has completely collapsed. As a result, there is, by definition, now a search for a new order.

When we first put forward a proposal, an obstacle we faced then was that there was already an existing order — not a functioning order and, in my view, not a good order — but there was some resistance from governments to thinking that long-term or what would happen after that order. Well, it turns out that it was not that long-term, because it has just happened. So we have an opening there.

One area where we have not made a huge amount of impact, unfortunately, and where we are trying to figure out exactly how we can be helpful, is around the norms around the use of force.

Over the last couple of years, we have seen a massive deterioration of these norms and the manner in which forces have been used which is in clear violation of international law, and almost normalisation of that. What the Israelis are doing in Lebanon is building on what they did in Gaza, and we believe there is a strong need for pushback.

But it is challenging because, at this point, it is not entirely clear to us where the best pressure points are. But we are constantly looking to see: we have solutions, when are the problems ready for these solutions?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, I agree with you, particularly on what you said about the use of force. It is really rampant and uncontrolled. China has long advocated no first use of nuclear weapons, and China still adheres to that.

I think that now, with AI and all these new technologies coming into play, perhaps we could also think about the “no first use” of AI in future wars. This is the kind of consensus we really need to build.

I know you are a top expert on Iranian issues. What do you think about what is going on there, what are the solutions, and what can other countries do?

Trita Parsi

A lot of countries have already played a critical role in mediation, both from the region, Pakistan, with China in the background as well.

But I fear that we are looking at a very bad situation. I think that there is a likelihood that the third round of this war will start relatively soon.

I also think that the mediators that have been involved so far are ultimately very good and creative. They bring legitimacy to the process because they are from the region, but they do not necessarily have much leverage with the U.S. and Iran.

At some point, there may be a need for a larger power to engage in that mediation precisely because of the need for such leverage.

China made a key contribution to the Saudi–Iranian deal, which had been negotiated by regional states. China came in at the end and was crucial in moving it across the finishing line.

The critical element that China contributed was that both Iran and Saudi Arabia deeply value their relationships with China. As a result, China ended up becoming the guarantor of this deal.

The Saudis had enough confidence that the Iranians would be careful not to violate the agreement because, if they did, they would end up embarrassing China and hurting their relationship with China.

And vice versa: the Iranians knew that the Saudis would be very careful about doing anything against the agreement because of the consequences in their relationship with China.

We do not have that element in the current negotiations — a mediator who has that type of leverage over the two parties. It is not entirely clear whether China would have it with the U.S. and Iran.

There is obviously the United States’ own rivalry and tension with China, which come into play here and were the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China.

But I do think that, at the end of the day, there is a likelihood that this conflict cannot really cross the finishing line in terms of reaching a deal unless there is that type of involvement.

Just take a look at the MOU. Yes, they did manage to negotiate and agree to it, but as soon as there was a conflict, there was not a third party that could act as the arbiter of that conflict. There was no mechanism in the deal making clear whom they should go to if there was a difference of interpretation.

So even if China does not play that role in the mediation itself, I think there may end up being a need, if there is another MOU or another agreement, to have some guarantor coming from other major powers.

It may not be China alone, but it seems to me that the deep mistrust and some of these other structural factors make it very difficult for the Iranians and the U.S. to actually resolve this on their own.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Just imagine two people or two parties fighting, and then they reach a temporary truce among themselves. It can easily be disrupted by either side, and there is absolutely no guarantor.

I think China is actually very actively involved. Pakistan, in particular, is involved in the mediation and has a good relationship with China too.

So I think you are absolutely right that, when the deal is being made, we need some bigger players to come forward and perhaps play a guarantor or mediating role.

China is the largest trading partner of both the Gulf states and Iran, and it has good credibility. I also think the U.S. and China are having quite a few summits this year. So, as you suggested, China could be a good mediator in this situation.

I also remember that, for the JCPOA many years ago, China was one of the signing parties.

Trita Parsi

Yes, China was an important player there, particularly in the implementation of the JCPOA. The Chinese played an important role.

One of the benefits of this negotiation vis-à-vis the JCPOA is the regional value — that you have the Qataris, the Saudis, the Pakistanis, and the Omanis deeply involved in the negotiations themselves.

That is important for the longevity of it, but it may not be sufficient to cross the finishing line. That is where it may be necessary to involve some other great powers.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. So I think this could probably offer new hope: if China became involved with other countries — the European Union, other actors, and BRICS countries — we could not only serve as mediators and help with the Iranian crisis, but perhaps also with the Ukraine–Russia conflict.

That model, I think, instead of having only two-party talks and only two parties signing—

Trita Parsi

I mean, there will, of course, be a lot of resistance from other players — the Europeans and others — who probably would not want to see China, or certainly not BRICS, involved.

But at the same time, this war is now more than four years old. There is no clear end in sight, and this is starting to become an endless war for Europe. That is going to be devastating, and it is certainly devastating for the Ukrainians themselves.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Maybe finally, since you are from a major and very influential U.S. think tank, I could ask a final question about U.S. internal politics.

What do you see happening in 2026? And how can the U.S. get out of this situation, particularly with the midterm elections coming up? What is your general assessment of the U.S. situation in terms of international relations?

Trita Parsi

The internal situation in the United States is that the U.S. is still, I would say, experiencing a legitimacy crisis of the two parties.

I think it is going to be very interesting to see what happens on the Democratic side on foreign policy, because there is a huge rift between the grassroots and progressives on one side and the Democratic Party establishment on the other.

We saw that already in 2024 with the elections, in which the largest number of people who voted for Joe Biden in 2020 would not vote at all in 2024. The plurality of them — 29 per cent — said they stayed home because of Gaza and Joe Biden’s policy on Gaza.

I think that is going to become a litmus test in a lot of different races on the Democratic side, and it may amount to a very significant shift in the Democratic Party’s approach to this issue.

The current establishment approach not only lacks support among the grassroots; it has active opposition and animosity towards it.

So I think that is going to be very interesting to watch, and it may end up being decisive for the direction of the United States vis-à-vis Israel in the broader scheme of things.

Because you also have a situation — not a similar one, but a situation on the Republican side in which, again, support for Israel and Gaza is becoming a litmus test on a lot of Republican congressional races as well.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. I think we have had a great discussion. We have all enjoyed it very much, and we have all enjoyed this Paraty conference in Brazil. We hope to see you again, either in the U.S. or in China.

Trita Parsi

Fantastic. Thank you so much. Appreciate it.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you.

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One of the most influential American scholars of international relations, Nye was best known for developing the theory of “soft power.” Over a career spanning academia and government, he served as Chair of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Dean of Harvard Kennedy School.

A Life in the American Century is Nye’s final book and memoir. Drawing on more than eight decades of personal experience, the book intertwines his academic and policy career with some of the defining developments of modern international affairs, including the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation, globalization, the war on terror, and the evolution of China-U.S. relations.

CCG maintained longstanding exchanges with Nye. In October 2023, he joined CCG’s 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing, , arguing that U.S.-China competition must be balanced with cooperation on transnational challenges, where “power with” matters as much as “power over.”

CCG founder Henry Huiyao Wang also maintained a decade-long relationship with Nye through conversations and publishing collaborations, including the 2023 volume Soft Power and Great-Power Competition. In 2024, Nye authorized CCG to translate A Life in the American Century into Chinese.

At the August 27 event, Henry Huiyao Wang will formally launch the Chinese edition. Shen Yonggang, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of China Science and Technology Press Co., Ltd., will deliver opening remarks, while Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, will give the welcome remarks.

The launch will be followed by a seminar bringing together Chinese and international scholars, experts on China-U.S. relations, publishing professionals, and media representatives. Discussions will focus on Nye’s intellectual legacy, prospects for building a constructive and strategically stable China-U.S. relationship, and the changing global geopolitical landscape.

Event Details

Date: Thursday, August 27, 2026

Time: 15:00–16:30 Beijing Time

Venue: CCG Headquarters, 12 B10, West Wing, Hanwei Plaza, No. 7 Guanghua Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing

Language: Chinese and English, with on-screen caption translation

Registration: Please bring your business card for on-site registration at the entrance.

Agenda

15:00–15:05 | Welcome Remarks
Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG; Part-time Professor at the University of International Business and Economics

15:05–15:15 | Opening Remarks
Yonggang Shen, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, China Science and Technology Press Co., Ltd.

15:15–15:30 | Book Launch
Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder of CCG; former Counselor to the State Council; Distinguished Professor at China Foreign Affairs University

15:30–16:10 | Seminar

(in alphabetical order by surname)

• David Blair, former Chair of the Department of Economics, Eisenhower School, National Defense University, United States

• Harvey Dzodin, former Vice President and Director of ABC Television; former Legal Counsel to President Jimmy Carter

• Li Huailiang, Dean and Professor, Institute for a Community with a Shared Future, Communication University of China

• Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG; Part-time Professor, University of International Business and Economics

• Ren Xiao, Professor, Institute of Area and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University

• Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder of CCG; former Counselor to the State Council; Distinguished Professor, China Foreign Affairs University

• Zhang Guozuo, Director, Research Center of China’s Cultural Soft Power, Hunan University

16:10–16:30 | Q&A

About the Book

Born at the dawn of what came to be known as the “American Century,” Nye witnessed — and at times participated in — many of the major changes in U.S. foreign policy and international politics over the following eight decades. His memoir combines personal recollection, intellectual history, and policymaking experience, providing a window into the evolution of American power and the changing global order.

Rather than offering an abstract theoretical account, Nye draws on episodes from his own career to examine questions that occupied him throughout his life: how power changes, how ideas influence policy, how great powers manage competition, and whether the “American Century” is coming to an end.

About Joseph S. Nye Jr.

Joseph S. Nye Jr. was a distinguished political scientist and one of the most influential scholars of international relations of his generation. He developed the theory of “soft power” and wrote extensively on U.S. foreign policy, power, leadership, and great-power competition.

His major works include Soft Power and Great-Power Competition, Do Morals Matter?, Is the American Century Over?, The Future of Power, and Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation.

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Published by Springer Nature, the volume forms part of the China and Globalization book series. It is available open access and can be read and downloaded free of charge.

Read or download the full book free of charge

About this book

This open-access book presents a curated look into Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang’s latest writings concerning the changing world order, a change widely characterized as one of “world disorder”. A quarter of the way into the 21st century, the world is now witnessing the definitive end of the post-Cold War unipolar moment and the beginning of a new multipolar world order.

Together, these writings explore the key questions facing the global community: How will the world navigate this structural shift defined not by a single hegemon, but by a complex web of competing power centers? How will major powers such as the US and China coexist in an era defined by both competition and cooperation? What role can China play as a new pole of influence emerges? And how can the international system adapt to reflect shifting economic weight, geopolitical realities, and the aspirations of countries across the global south?

Throughout, Dr. Wang offers forward-looking insights for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners. Equally, he highlights the indispensable role of international institutions—especially the revitalization and reform of the United Nations—in shaping a new era of globalization and multilateral systems, as the world moves toward the next global order and a new equilibrium where we must coexist, cooperate and compete at the same time.

Providing a panoramic view of today’s fragmented yet interconnected world and presenting insightful policy ideas from a Chinese perspective, this book calls on readers to reflect on how the next global order can serve all nations—large or small, North or South.

Contents

1 Introduction: A World in Transition

Part I Interaction and Exchange: Re-examining Tenuous Relations in a Transitional World

2 Reluctant Rivals I—China-US Relations under Trump, Practical Deals or More Challenges?

3 Reluctant Rivals II—China-US Relations under Biden, Containment and the Battle for Values

4 Maintaining Equilibrium—Can China and the EU Balance Global Relations?

5 Beyond the State—Innovative Forms of Exchange

6 Chinese Policy and Regional Relations

7 Perspectives on Governance

Part II Geopolitics and Multilateralism: Finding a Salient Solution to Geopolitical Tension

8 China’s Role and Contributions

9 Geopolitical Tensions and Multilateral Solutions

Part III Globalization and Economics: Tweaking the Sputtering Engine of Global Growth

10 Globalization as a Driver of Prosperity

11 China as a Driver of Global Growth

12 Exploring Solutions to Globalization Challenges

13 On the Sharing of Ideas and Power of Dialogue

14 Coming Full Circle—Forewords and Other Writings

15 Reaching the World

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The Center for China and Globalization (CCG) will convene a breakfast roundtable featuring Barnabas (Barney) Reynolds, partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Financial Services Group, in dialogue with Professor Wang Yiwei of Renmin University of China.

Drawing on recent regulatory shifts and high-profile market disruptions, the conversation will examine:

• Recent changes in the UK and European legal and regulatory environment

• Legal and compliance issues facing Chinese companies investing and operating in the region

• Cross-border transactions, financial regulation and enterprise risk management

DATE & TIME

Sunday, 16 August 2026
9:00–10:30 a.m.

FORMAT

Breakfast roundtable
Discussion in English

LOCATION

Beijing CBD / Guomao area

Featured speaker

Barnabas (Barney) Reynolds

Partner, Financial Services Group, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP | London

Barnabas (Barney) Reynolds is a partner in the Firm’s Financial Services Group. He is recognised as a leading financial institutions practitioner advising across a wide range of financial services matters, including mergers and acquisitions, governance, investigations and enforcement actions, AML and sanctions, and regulatory aspects of transactional matters involving banks, asset managers, insurers, derivatives, financial markets and infrastructure, payments, fintech, cryptocurrencies and digital assets.

Barney finds solutions to complex situations. He advises financial institutions, boards, and other senior executives on risk management, regulatory changes, and compliance. He frequently engages with policymakers and regulators on complex domestic and cross-border financial services matters.

Barney has extensive expertise advising on UK and EU regulation, as well as navigating legal and regulatory systems worldwide. He has a broad practice advising clients on numerous high-profile matters across the UK, Europe and the Middle East, including Bank of America, Barclays, Citi, Deutsche Bank, ICE, Morgan Stanley, Société Generale, and Wells Fargo. He helped numerous financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone crisis of 2009–2012, and the Credit Suisse and Silicon Valley Bank situations. He has played a significant role in the development of financial regulatory regimes, including advising on the establishment of the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), and work relating to the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). He also advised the UK government and market participants on legal and regulatory issues arising from the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union.

In Chambers UK, clients state that “Barney’s depth of knowledge in financial services and his understanding of the complex foreign policy matters is key to his tactical advice”, and that he has “great institutional knowledge and experience.”

Legal 500 notes that Barney is “highly pragmatic and approachable with the ability to take a very international view, drawing on deep and broad range of transaction experience” with one client commenting that he is “one of the most astute lawyers I have worked with in 30 years of banking. He has a very detailed approach to issues and always creatively finds solutions.”

Dialogue partner

Professor Wang Yiwei

School of International Studies, Renmin University of China

Programme

9:00–9:10

Registration and breakfast networking

9:10–9:15

Welcome remarks

9:15–10:00

Featured dialogue

10:00–10:25

Audience discussion

10:25–10:30

Closing remarks

Registration

Advance registration is required.

Registration link and QR code:

https://forms.zohopublic.com/centerforchinaandglobalizatio1/form/SignUpforCCGBriefingRoundtableonMay6th/formperma/CsU1ObDkU2OpO86xLX6DXpbavUOHVdTrxLWJc-3Xx4Y

Places are limited. Registration is confirmed only upon notification from the organiser.

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This is intended as an in-person event in Beijing on Sunday, August 16, 2026.

It is NOT an online event.

The following is the China Daily article, originally published on 10 August 2026.

Expert: HKSAR can contribute to ‘Health China’ in 15th Five-Year Plan

By Iris Muk in Hong Kong

With an efficient dual-track healthcare system that bridges Eastern and Western medical practices, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has the potential to contribute significantly to the “Healthy China” initiative in the national 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-30), according to prominent medical doctor Chiang Chun-yuan.

For over a decade, Hong Kong SAR has maintained the world’s highest life expectancy at birth, with government statistics showing averages of 83 years for men and 88 years for women. Under the national health plan within the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), China aims to increase its average life expectancy from 79.25 years in 2025 to 80 years by 2030.

In an interview with China Daily, Chiang, vice-chairman of the Centre for China and Globalization Hong Kong Council and an adviser to the University of Hong Kong’s School of Chinese Medicine, said the core value of the longevity healthcare market is optimizing “health span” — the period of life spent in good health — rather than merely extending lifespan. “The goal is to help people live healthily into advanced age without suffering through years of decline marked by uncertainty, side effects, and emotional distress,” he said.

Chiang added that “inflammatory aging” is a key challenge, characterized by chronic, low-level inflammation that develops with age. Unlike acute inflammation, which is a temporary immune response, this inflammation gradually damages tissues, accelerating functional decline and increasing the risk of chronic age-related diseases.

Chiang believes that the global dietary supplement market should expand beyond generic nutritional products to include targeted therapies. These therapies should aim to suppress chronic inflammation, restore internal balance, and address the fundamental causes of aging.

China’s population is aging rapidly, with the number of people aged 60 and above projected to exceed 400 million by 2035. China Silver Economy Development Report estimates the value of the mainland’s silver economy at around RMB 7 trillion ($1.04 trillion), representing about 6 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Healthcare expenditure in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for the fiscal year 2023/24 was HK$251.207 billion ($32 billion), accounting for 8.3 percent of its GDP. This is notably lower than the 17.5 percent of GDP spent on healthcare in the United States.

Chiang said this market is expanding beyond the elderly, reaching younger generations affected by chronic inflammation. “Growing awareness of early-onset systemic inflammation is expanding the market to younger demographics seeking proactive anti-aging and preventative health management,” he said.

Despite market growth, challenges such as false advertising and counterfeit products persist. Chiang stressed the importance of building trust through integrity and stringent standards for the industry’s long-term success. Hong Kong serves as a regional benchmark by enforcing stringent quality assurance, digitalized supply chain traceability, and regulatory alignment with international clinical standards. By expanding standardized, high-integrity models, innovations can be delivered effectively and sustainably, ensuring that advanced preventative care reaches those most in need while providing coordinated, innovative, and patient-centered care worldwide, he said.

“An innovation only matters when it reaches people’s needs. Delivering these breakthroughs to those who need them will be defined by our ability to provide the right care to the right people, in a sustainable way that brings value to both society and patients,” he added.

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The episode, uploaded to Al Jazeera English’s YouTube channel on 8 August 2026, also featured Alan Tonelson, founder of RealityChek, a blog, and Lian Jye Su, Chief Analyst at Omdia, a consultancy.

The transcript is based on the programme video and has been lightly edited to remove fillers and repetition. It has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Can the US slow China’s robotics and tech rise? | Counting the Cost

Scott McLean

…They do backflips. They direct traffic. They make your coffee. Humanoid robots are no longer a laboratory experiment — they are a growing market. Morgan Stanley estimates the market could hit $5 trillion by 2050, with more than a billion humanoids in use worldwide.

But there’s a problem, particularly for the U.S. Much of the global robot supply chain runs through China. Beijing now makes robot components at a scale and a price that its competitors struggle to match. Washington has banned new imports of foreign-made humanoid robots, citing national security. It also blocked power inverters used in data centres, and solar too. The move is widely seen as part of a broader effort to protect American industry and limit Beijing’s tech rise.

...

This dispute over humanoid robots is part of a much bigger tech rivalry between the U.S. and China. Washington has blocked the sale of cutting-edge semiconductors to China, also on national security grounds. Critics say this is aimed at slowing China’s military development and maintaining America’s lead in artificial intelligence. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has warned that Chinese AI firms may face sanctions over allegations of stealing American intellectual property. There’s also drones, solar panels, electric cars — all of these face steep tariffs aimed at keeping them out of the U.S. market. China has responded with export controls on rare earth minerals. These are vital for a wide range of high-tech products, and China controls most of the global supply.

All right, let’s discuss this further. Joining us from Maryland is Alan Tonelson. He is an economist and founder of RealityChek, a blog which discusses economics, national security, technology, and their intersections.

In Beijing is Zichen Wang. He is the Deputy Secretary General at the Center for China and Globalization, as well as founder and editor of the Pekingnology newsletter.

And finally, in Singapore, is Lian Jye Su, chief analyst at Omdia, a global technology research and advisory firm.

Gentlemen, thank you all so much for being here. I want to ask about the broader humanoid market and also that ban from the United States.

So, last year there were about 13,000 of these humanoid robots shipped around the world — a little bit more than that. You probably haven’t heard of most of these companies, so I’m going to help you out. This one is Chinese. This one’s Chinese. Chinese. Chinese. Chinese. Chinese. You get the idea. The only ones that are American are actually just these three here. So just to make the point here, it’s just literally this slice of the pie right here are the Americans — this is everybody else.

So the FCC says that this is about national security. This is what the FCC chair said recently. Watch.

Brendan Carr, FCC Chairman (voiceover)

These robot dogs, these humanoid robots, these power inverters — all of this is going to be critical to the economy of tomorrow and to our national security, and we’re acting right now to make sure that the U.S. domestic market has a chance to succeed and get investments, so that we don’t become overly dependent on foreign nations.

And it’s great that we’re taking this action now rather than five years from now or 10 years from now, when we realize, whoops, we got too dependent on a critical foreign supply chain. So there’s real national security risks here.

So again, Alan, look at the American market share. It is tiny. Is this truly about national security, or is it about the Americans having a bigger slice of that pie?

Alan Tonelson, Founder of RealityChek

Oh, it is absolutely about national security. In fact, I would argue that at this point, certainly, it is almost exclusively about national security, because every manufactured product that China sends to the United States — from solar cells to power inverters to robots — has got hardware and software that can be bugged. In fact, lots of these products have been found to have electronic surveillance devices in them.

And there can be no question that, given the fact that China is an increasingly hostile dictatorship, the United States cannot allow devices like this to permeate even its entire civilian economy. Not to mention those parts of the American economy that produce the so-called dual-use products that have got major defence applications, also.

Scott McLean

Zichen, does Alan have a point here? Is there a national security risk? I mean, the FCC even says that these devices, these humanoid robots, can even be commandeered by malign actors. Obviously, great for spying. Is that a fair point?

Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary General at CCG

Well, I have to disagree with Alan. First of all, I think the specific ban put out by the FCC says that only new models will have to be banned, which means the products that have already been certified by the FCC will still be able to be exported to the United States. So if it’s about national security, about all the robots from China, why not ban those that are already covered, that are already certified? So this is a half-baked reason.

I understand the language put out by the FCC chair, but I don’t think it’s the right approach. If he can identify a certain risk within a certain product or within a certain class from a certain company, he should name it. He should put remedies specific to the risks. Instead, what we are seeing is a blanket ban, and this is not a prudent way to measure national security.

Also, I would have to respond to what Alan just said: all these robots, yes, they have cameras, sensors, and communication systems. That’s how you make these robots work. All these products will have something like this, which in itself does not make it a national security challenge to the United States. We have testified —

Alan Tonelson

(interrupting) Given the fact that they come from China, they are a national security challenge. Given the fact that they come from China, they are a national security challenge, by definition.

Zichen Wang

I have to disagree with that, because the U.S. imports a lot of things from China —

Alan Tonelson

(interrupting) I know you don’t agree, but this country can’t afford to take chances. I’m sorry. Plus, the economic and the administrative costs — not to mention the technological challenge of inspecting every single such device that comes into the United States from China — are just totally prohibitive. So, this kind of a blanket ban is the most feasible approach, and once again, essential for U.S. national security. There’d be no serious debate about this, whatever.

Scott McLean

Yeah, and worth mentioning also, there are hundreds of lawsuits for—

Zichen Wang

Would you… ban tablets and iPhones from China?

Scott McLean

That’s a good point. Alan?

Alan Tonelson

You know what? That could be next. That could be next.

Scott McLean

But then you’d have to make those iPhones in the United States, wouldn’t you?

Alan Tonelson

Or you’d have to make them in the various other low-cost East and also South Asian countries to which iPhone manufacturing has been moving very steadily.

Scott McLean

All right, this is a very interesting discussion. I want to ask—

Alan Tonelson

(interrupting) I’m not concerned about iPhones coming in from Vietnam, or frankly from India. I am concerned about them coming in from China. Absolutely.

Scott McLean

Yeah. Also worth noting, there are hundreds of lawsuits out there of Americans alleging intellectual property theft from Chinese companies or Chinese individuals as well. But that’s a slightly different topic.

Lian Jye, I want to ask you: look, there are some 140 companies in China making more than 300 models of these humanoid robots, but they’re finding that the commercial demand is a little bit soft. If these robots are so great at manufacturing, which, we know, China does pretty great, why aren’t they putting them to use?

Lian Jye Su, Chief Analyst at Omdia

There are a few ways to look at it. I think you can look at it from a demand standpoint, where not all factories are ready for digitalisation, which means they are not ready for full-scale automation, which means, obviously, less adoption of humanoid robots. On the other hand, you can also argue that the robot itself is not yet general-purpose enough. They are good at specific tasks. Those may not necessarily be tasks that are associated with manufacturing or with factory floors at this point.

Scott McLean

Gentlemen, I want to ask about a much broader societal topic here. We asked our viewers on YouTube a pretty simple question: could a humanoid robot do your job? 32% of respondents said, “Yeah, it could.” 68% said, “No.”

So we thought, okay, what kind of jobs can these humanoid robots actually do? So basically, this is the percentage of each individual industry where jobs could be suitable for these humanoids. Notice a pattern here: all of these are, by and large, jobs that you do with your hands — agriculture, construction, manufacturing, insulation, and repair. These are blue-collar jobs, but even office workers — they’re not spared either.

So, Lian Jye, look — if you care about being able to make a decent middle-class living with your hands, or even any kind of middle-class living, should the alarm bells not be screaming right about now?

Lian Jye Su

Again, I think there are nuances in technology replacing jobs. We’re already seeing that, without the robot, AI is already replacing some of the more mundane and repetitive tasks within a corporate environment. There is going to be a point whereby the robot will be ready to take over certain repetitive or mundane tasks, or even hazardous tasks that no one wants to do at this point.

I think what we do want to look at is whether the robots are ready or not at this juncture. And actually, the answer is not really — most of the robots being deployed right now are deployed for either media and entertainment use cases or on stage for performances. So the type of tasks that they can do really well is still quite limited at this point.

Scott McLean

I want to ask you guys about labour market integration and how far these are going to get into the labor market. Look, this is by 2050 — this is a prediction from Morgan Stanley. Notice a couple of trends here: the United States is going to have the biggest impact on the labour market there, and then you have the Chinese, not far behind.

Bigger trend: higher-income countries — this is going to seep into the labour markets more. Lower-income countries, less so. But the Chinese, of course, their population is going down; they’ve had a one-child policy in place for quite a long time. But the Americans, though, due largely to immigration, their population is still rising. So, Alan, if such a huge percentage of the labor market is going to be affected by these humanoid robots, does it really make sense for America to still be importing new people?

Alan Tonelson

Well, that’s a very important question, and there’s a pretty clear relationship — at least one that I found, along with many other economic historians — that, all else equal, which you have to say whenever you’re talking about economics, the more immigrants that you let in, the slower productivity grows, because businesses don’t have the incentive to substitute capital and technology for very cheap labour.

Now, in terms of how the advance of humanoid robots is going to affect U.S. labour markets, obviously a very complicated question, and my crystal ball, frankly, is not incredibly clear on this. But certainly, it’s going to have a rather dramatic impact.

And if, in fact, these robots can substitute for lots of jobs that at present require manual labour, then we’re going to need fewer immigrants. And we can obviously tolerate population stability, which is actually the current U.S. situation. We can tolerate population stability much better.

Scott McLean

Zichen, a huge proportion of the Chinese economy is made up of manual jobs, manufacturing. It is the factory of the world. Should China not be a little bit more worried that these humanoid robots that you guys, by and large, are building are eventually going to take your jobs?

Zichen Wang

Well, first of all, I think Chinese society, the Chinese people, are generally more optimistic about the advancement of science and technology than many other countries. We think that a lot of these technology advancements will prove very beneficial.

For example, there is a very serious ageing problem in China, and also in Europe and in many other countries, but there will not be enough young people to take care of the old people. So all these robots could be of use.

Already, robots have replaced some of the household work — for example, robot vacuum cleaners, which, by the way, is also within the scope of the ban announced by the FCC. So those have already actually contributed to our lives.

And to address this issue of whether robots will replace human labour, I think we can also look at it from other angles. For example, as a country, as a government, as lawmakers, we should think of a universal basic income and other ways to compensate for the lost labour employment, increase benefits to the workforce, and retrain the workforce to make them ready for the challenges brought by this advancement of technology.

Scott McLean

So look, obviously these robots are interesting because they more or less look like humans, but the brain power of these is obviously powered by artificial intelligence. Now, this is a chart showing AI capabilities from AI Index and Barclays Research.

Obviously, this is somewhat subjective, but according to their analysis, this is the baseline here — 100%. This is how well a human can do it. So if the line is above 100%, the robots are doing better than us, or the AI is doing better than us. If it’s below, they’ve got a ways to go.

So when it comes to visual reasoning, just in the last couple of years, AI is better. When it comes to reading comprehension, also better — been that way for a while. But when it comes to complex reasoning, they have a way to go. But look at the trend line — they’re coming for us.

Lian Jye, have we really thought through whether all of this — AI robots — is a good idea, or whether this is something that we really need? Because it seems to me like people also need jobs; they need to show up and do work every day.

Lian Jye Su

It is about having good jobs for good people. The fundamental question is whether AI is good enough for those better jobs that we are preparing for. Are they actually replacing the more repetitive tasks that actually, in some cases, require higher accuracy but really large volume? In those cases, as you have shown there, AI has done a really good job of being able to process those tasks, process those mundane work within a corporate environment.

I think what is more important here, what is more nuanced here within our discussion, is the fact that translating AI from a virtual environment, from a web environment, into a physical environment — hence it’s called physical AI — is no easy task to be able to replicate what a human can do. And then, assuming that if I put AI into a robotics form factor, everything will be good and dandy — it’s not the way to go at this point. We are still very far away from that future.

Scott McLean

All right, gentlemen, I want to ask you about the cost-benefit analysis of these robots, and at what point it becomes worth it.

How far off are we from having a butler — a robotic butler — in every home? Well, in 2024, Morgan Stanley Research estimated that the cost of a humanoid robot in a high-income country at around $200,000. Now, as production increases and the technology gets better, prices are likely to fall to around $150,000 by 2028, and as little as $50,000 by 2050. Now, in countries benefiting from cheaper Chinese supply chains, that could be even lower — possibly around $15,000.

At that point, analysts estimate that one in ten American households could own a humanoid robot. In China, it’d be around 3%. Some basic humanoid models are already becoming more affordable — one Chinese startup has a model for $5,000. Now, it’s not going to do your laundry or walk your dog, but it gives you an idea of where things are going.

So my question to you, Alan, is: how cheap do these robots need to get before they become worth it?

Alan Tonelson

Well, we’re going to have to factor in not only purely economic costs, but the fact that these robots don’t get sick, they won’t go on strike, and they won’t complain. So I have a feeling that this progress is going to be coming a lot faster than even J.P. Morgan thinks.

Scott McLean

Zichen.

Zichen Wang

Well, I think technology is advancing so fast that we may not have a pretty good idea. But I do think Chinese manufacturing strength, its supply chains, its research and development will contribute to lowering the cost of robots that are affordable for most families.

Scott McLean

Lian Jye, at what price or at what point do you think that the robots are worth it to sort of roll out on a big scale?

Liang Jia Su

It will be in two stages, to me. I mean, for the next three to five years, I think you’ll first see them proliferating in industrial, manufacturing, and commercial use cases, as you mentioned just now. For home care robots, that’s at least ten to twelve years away. Even with cheaper pricing, we are lacking severely on the data and AI side of things to handle general-purpose tasks for all these robots.

Scott McLean

Zichen, can I just ask how big of a national priority is the development of these humanoid robots in China right now?

Zichen Wang

Well, it is one of the frontier industries that China has identified, together with AI and commercial airspace, and Chinese companies are already standing at the very edge of this industry, as you showed at the very beginning from the research by my colleague on the panel. So it is very important.

For example, there is a company in Hangzhou called Unitree, which is a leading robot developer. It is on the eve of being publicly traded on the Chinese stock exchange, and everyone is waiting for its debut. So it is indeed in the spotlight in China, and people are quite excited about their development.

Scott McLean

Alan, do you think that the Americans are also treating this as a national priority? I know that you’ve written that the difficulty in the United States is that it would be hard, if not impossible, to get all of the components to build these in the U.S. Doesn’t this open up a broader discussion about deindustrialisation and the fact that globalisation has almost completely hollowed out the manufacturing base in the United States?

Alan Tonelson

Well, that’s certainly been the case in industry after industry, including high-tech industries, and there really can be very little question that Washington has been literally asleep at the switch, if not actively enabling this process, for decades. And it’s going to take quite a long time to basically catch up, and to recognise that promoting high-tech manufacturing at home has got to be a priority for the entire society, for the entire government, for the entire American system. We’ve made progress in recent years, no doubt about that, but we have a very long way to go.

Scott McLean

But doesn’t this ultimately mean you’re going to either have to put tariffs in place or some kind of subsidies, so that you can compete with the very low manufacturing and, particularly, labour costs in places like China and other countries in Asia?

Alan Tonelson

Well, that’s already happening, and I think that’s going to continue happening, no matter who gets elected president, by the way, two years from now.

Scott McLean

Lian Jye, there is talk, obviously, about the applications of these humanoid robots in manufacturing, even in hospitality, and potentially in caring for elderly people. But I just wonder — aren’t there limits to this? I mean, what kind of a grandson would you be if you relied on a robot to take care of your grandma? Do you think a lot of people would really go for that?

Lian Jye Su

I will answer that question slightly differently, in the sense that it’s probably less of a grandson challenge, but more of a me challenge. I do expect that, by the time I become old, there will probably be a healthcare system that is built around automation, that is heavily leaning on robotic solutions, or, in some cases, less robotics but AI-based solutions that utilise not just robots for elderly care or hospital care, but also for diagnosis, for medication, for surgery. We are seeing a lot more adoption of healthcare robots as time passes on, and that trend is not going to stop anytime soon. So there is, I would say, yes, no limit to this. But there is a timescale factor in this — it might take longer than expected. Hence my argument of me being old rather than my grandmother being old.

Scott McLean

Zichen, obviously the Americans are trying to do what they can to limit China’s rise when it comes to technology — when it comes to, obviously, these robots, semiconductors, the list goes on. Are those measures working?

Zichen Wang

Well, I think they are having some impact. For example, stopping Nvidia from selling its flagship chips to China — certainly helped slow down the growth of computing power in China’s leading AI companies. But this is a prime example: the open-weight Chinese AI developers have been able to roll out their near-frontier models at a fraction of the cost, and these are being deployed everywhere, including in Africa, about which the New York Times had a big story yesterday.

So yes, it is slowing China down, but it cannot — it will not — stop Chinese development.

And also, if I may respond a little bit to what Alan said a short while ago: actually, the way to help the United States improve its manufacturing is to let Chinese companies, under U.S. law, under U.S. government supervision, facilitate Chinese R&D and Chinese investment into the United States—

Alan Tonelson

(interrupting) Absolutely unacceptable.

Zichen Wang

There is currently a board of investment being negotiated between the two governments.

Alan Tonelson

Good luck with that, because the last thing that the American — mainly free-market — economy needs is a larger role for Chinese state-controlled actors. That’s not only going to be terrible for U.S. national security, it’s going to be completely awful in terms of maintaining the United States as a largely free-market economy because competition from state-controlled actors is not market competition, and it’s going to badly distort markets. That’s the last thing that this country needs.

Zichen Wang

All the frontier AI companies and robotic companies in China, and EV companies — all of them, the leading players, are private ones, actually.

Scott McLean

All right, gentlemen. I wish we had more time. It is a fascinating — and also a bit of a terrifying — discussion that we have had today. We appreciate the time from all of you. Alan Tonelson, founder of RealityChek; Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary General at the Center for China and Globalization; and Lian Jye Su, Chief Analyst at Omdia. Thank you all once again.

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Event

The 13th China Inbound-Outbound Forum

Date

October 17–18, 2026

Location

Beijing

Participants

Company founders and CEOs; government investment-promotion officials; representatives of international organizations; and partners from leading professional-service institutions

Program

October 17 — Opening Ceremony, Thematic Forums and Matchmaking

09:00–09:30 Opening Ceremony: Globalization Policy Signals and Major Trends

Purpose: A high-level reading of the policy environment shaping Chinese companies’ international expansion.

· Policy dividends and strategic opportunities for Chinese companies amid a new phase of high-standard opening-up.

· How Chinese companies should respond and adjust their positioning as global trade and economic rules are reconfigured.

· How think tanks and industry organizations can work together to build policy and resource bridges for companies going global.

09:30–11:00 Keynote Addresses by Benchmark Business Leaders: Practical Strategies for Globalizing Chinese Enterprises

Purpose: Leading entrepreneurs share first-hand experience and unpack the underlying logic of successful globalization.

· A long-term strategy for Chinese companies navigating geopolitical and business-cycle volatility.

· The path from contract manufacturing to global brands — and the resulting leap in competitiveness.

· Balancing technology innovation and deep localization with profitability and risk management.

11:00–12:00 Entrepreneurs’ Session: Sustaining Overseas Growth and Building Resilience Across Cycles

Purpose: Entrepreneurs from different sectors discuss hard-won lessons, common pitfalls, and practical growth methods.

· Localization playbooks for different industries: a practical guide to avoiding mistakes from zero to one.

· Coordinated international expansion across industrial chains: how leading companies can bring ecosystem partners overseas and create shared growth.

· Business resilience and cash-flow management amid geopolitical risk and market volatility.

12:00–13:30 Business buffet lunch and networking

Afternoon — Hall A: Three Thematic Forums

13:30–14:45 Thematic Forum 1: AI and the Digital Economy Going Global — Compliance Pathways and Growth Models

Purpose: Clarifying compliance red lines and profit models in the AI era while capturing the upside of technology globalization.

· Compliance boundaries and implementation pathways for Chinese technology companies amid the global wave of AI regulation.

· Cross-border data flows and localized storage: regulatory differences among countries and practical responses.

· Taking digital products and services overseas: upgrading from tool exports to ecosystem operations.

14:45–15:00 Networking break and room transition

15:00–16:15 Thematic Forum 2: Globalizing New Energy — A Practical Guide to Overseas Manufacturing and Industrial-Chain Coordination

Purpose: Addressing the key pain points of new-energy expansion, including plant compliance, supply-chain development, and risk controls.

· Market-access barriers in major global new-energy markets and compliance essentials for localized manufacturing.

· Cross-border coordination across the new-energy value chain: building overseas supply systems and controlling costs.

· International cooperation opportunities in the energy transition and a systematic response to geopolitical risks.

16:15–16:30 Networking break and room transition

16:30–17:45 Thematic Forum 3: Global Expansion Services Ecosystem — Selecting and Coordinating Full-Cycle Service Providers

Purpose: One-stop access to leading professional-service providers to address the difficulty and risk of sourcing overseas-expansion support.

· A full-lifecycle service map, from pre-entry planning to post-launch operations.

· Coordinating legal, tax, finance, human-resources, and business-travel support to avoid hidden cross-border operating risks.

· Balancing standardized services with tailored needs for companies of different sizes.

Afternoon — Hall B: Three Regional and Country-Focused Forums

13:30–14:45 Regional Forum 1: Southeast Asia and the South Pacific — Capacity Deployment and Market Access under RCEP

Purpose: Connecting participants with official ASEAN and South Pacific resources and translating RCEP benefits into action.

· Putting RCEP into practice: tariff preferences, rules of origin, and a guide to business use.

· Manufacturing relocation in Southeast Asia and resource development in the South Pacific: entry paths for different sectors.

· Localized operations: cultural adaptation, employment compliance, and operating-risk mitigation.

14:45–15:00 Networking break and room transition

15:00–16:15 Regional Forum 2: Middle East and North Africa — Energy Transition and Major Infrastructure Opportunities

Purpose: Connecting with Gulf sovereign wealth funds and infrastructure projects while capturing large-scale energy-transition orders.

· Opportunities for Chinese companies in the region’s energy transition and new-infrastructure wave.

· Investment preferences of Gulf sovereign wealth funds and pathways for project cooperation.

· Trade barriers, foreign-exchange controls, and cross-border operating-risk management.

16:15–16:30 Networking break and room transition

16:30–17:45 Regional Forum 3: Latin America — Resource Cooperation and Consumer-Market Implementation

Purpose: A deep look at key Latin American market rules and the challenge of balancing high risk with high returns.

· Investment environments and market-access policies in major Latin American economies.

· International expansion by resource companies and consumer brands: essentials for localized operations.

· Systematic approaches to cross-border tax, legal, and foreign-exchange risk.

Evening Program

18:00–19:00 Networking reception

19:00–21:00 Dinner for Outbound Entrepreneurs and Ambassadors to China

Purpose: A high-level closed-door gathering with diplomats from 60+ countries and leading entrepreneurs, alongside the release of authoritative industry lists.

· Closed-door dialogue among senior Chinese and international government and business leaders, linking bilateral resources and cooperation opportunities.

· Release of the “100 Recommended Chinese Outbound Enterprises,” “100 Recommended Professional-Service Institutions for Chinese Companies Going Global,” and “100 Rising Young Chinese Entrepreneurs Going Global.”

· Private, in-depth networking to advance major cooperation opportunities toward implementation.

October 18 — Dedicated Targeted Matchmaking Day

Morning — Hall A: Thematic Forums

09:00–10:15 Thematic Forum 4: Global Compliance and Risk Control — Trade Barriers, ESG and Overseas Investment Security

Purpose: A comprehensive breakdown of compliance risks and practical frameworks for enterprise risk control.

· Building end-to-end compliance systems as global trade barriers intensify.

· Localizing ESG practices and addressing overseas investment security reviews through strategy and case studies.

· Protecting cross-border intellectual property and trade secrets, from registration through enforcement.

10:15–10:30 Networking break and room transition

10:30–11:45 Thematic Forum 5: Cross-Border Tax, Finance and Treasury — Structural Optimization under the Global Minimum Tax

Purpose: Solving core cross-border tax and finance challenges, optimizing tax costs, and protecting funds.

· Practical tax planning and structural optimization as the global minimum tax is implemented.

· Building global cash pools and managing foreign-exchange volatility for multinational companies.

· Cross-border asset allocation and outbound funds: compliance boundaries and common pitfalls.

11:45–12:00 Intermission

12:00–13:15 Thematic Forum 6: Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals Going Global — Registration, Market Access and Local R&D

Purpose: End-to-end solutions for R&D, registration, market access, and commercialization in global healthcare markets.

· Regulatory differences between Europe, North America, and emerging markets: filing pathways and timelines.

· Localized overseas R&D and clinical cooperation: partnership models and cost controls.

· Taking medical devices and health services overseas: market-entry and channel-development strategies.

13:15–13:30 Business buffet lunch

Morning — Hall B: Regional and Country-Focused Forums

09:00–10:15 Regional Forum 4: Europe — Responding to CBAM and Accessing Premium Markets

Purpose: Addressing carbon-border measures while developing routes to European brand access and technology cooperation.

· The EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): corporate accounting, reporting, and compliance.

· Brand entry and technology cooperation in premium European markets: pathways and case studies.

· Investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe: industrial-chain positioning and policy incentives.

10:15–10:30 Networking break and room transition

10:30–11:45 Regional Forum 5: North America, Australia and New Zealand — Investment Screening, Data Compliance and Technology Cooperation

Purpose: Understanding regulatory red lines in developed markets while identifying two-way opportunities in technology and resources.

· Latest trends in North American investment screening and data compliance, and corporate response strategies.

· Two-way cooperation opportunities in the resource and technology sectors of Australia and New Zealand.

· Brand localization in developed markets: channel building, marketing, and compliant operations.

11:45–12:00 Intermission

12:00–13:15 Regional Forum 6: Africa — Capacity Cooperation and Infrastructure Project Delivery

Purpose: Decoding African market opportunities and project implementation under China–Africa cooperation frameworks.

· Capacity cooperation and infrastructure investment opportunities amid Africa’s industrialization.

· China–Africa policy support: project applications, financing, and implementation pathways.

· Localized operations in Africa: talent, supply chains, and risk-control systems.

13:15–13:30 Business buffet lunch

Afternoon — Hall A: Thematic Forums

13:30–14:45 Thematic Forum 7: Cross-Border E-Commerce and Trade in Services — Global Brands and Supply-Chain Efficiency

Purpose: Moving from product sales to brand building and unpacking growth methods for e-commerce and service exports.

· Cross-border e-commerce beyond product listing: localized operations and traffic growth for brand development.

· Overseas warehousing and cross-border logistics optimization: balancing cost and delivery speed.

· Digital upgrading of trade in services: new models for education, consulting, and other services going global.

14:45–15:00 Networking break and room transition

15:00–16:15 Thematic Forum 8: Global Family Planning for Entrepreneurs — Wealth Succession, Children’s Education and Residency

Purpose: A one-stop response to the cross-border planning needs of founders and their families.

· Cross-border wealth succession: family-trust design and tax compliance.

· Preparing the next generation: overseas education planning and building a global outlook.

· Cross-border residency planning and comprehensive arrangements for family life and security overseas.

16:15–16:30 Intermission

16:30–17:45 Thematic Forum 9: Comprehensive Overseas Security — People, Assets and Emergency Response, followed by Closing

Purpose: Establishing a security baseline for global operations through practical protection plans for personnel and assets.

· Personnel security systems and emergency-response mechanisms in high-risk regions.

· Security for cross-border assets and overseas projects: integrating physical protection with digital risk controls.

· Evacuation and asset-preservation plans during geopolitical conflict and public emergencies.

Afternoon — Hall B: Regional and Country-Focused Forums

13:30–14:45 Regional Forum 7: South and Central Asia — Connectivity and Market-Development Opportunities

Purpose: Capturing demographic dividends and corridor-economy opportunities in emerging markets.

· Consumer-brand and industrial-cooperation opportunities arising from South Asia’s demographic dividend.

· Central Asian connectivity and energy-corridor development: areas for Chinese enterprise cooperation.

· Regional investment policies and key operating-risk controls.

14:45–15:00 Networking break and room transition

15:00–16:15 Regional Forum 8: Advanced Technology in Japan and South Korea and Northeast Asian Supply-Chain Cooperation

Purpose: Connecting with advanced technology resources and opening channels for supply-chain coordination and premium-market access.

· Technology introduction and joint R&D with Japan and South Korea: compliant pathways and cooperation models.

· Northeast Asian supply-chain coordination: component sourcing, capacity cooperation, and local support.

· Accessing premium consumer markets in Japan and South Korea: certification, channel building, and operations.

16:15–16:30 Intermission

16:30–17:45 Regional Forum 9: Emerging Belt and Road Markets — Niche Blue-Ocean Opportunities and Lean Market Entry

Purpose: Identifying underexplored markets and low-cost, lightweight implementation options.

· Evaluating investment opportunities and risks in smaller emerging Belt and Road markets.

· Lean international expansion into smaller markets: low-cost experimentation and rapid implementation.

· Finding policy incentives and localized partnership models in non-core economies.

18:30–21:00 Closing appreciation dinner

Registration and Contact

Reserve your place now for the 2026 Beijing gathering.

Dates: October 17–18, 2026

Eligible participants: Company founders and CEOs; government investment-promotion officials; representatives of international organizations; and partners at leading professional-service institutions

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China’s exports feed the Global South’s industrial engines

Far from stifling development, China’s export portfolio indicates a positive-sum diffusion of industrial growth

A scaremongering narrative has taken root in Western corridors and financial press columns: China, having saturated developed markets, is now aiming to crush fragile industries in developing nations, effectively slamming the door on their industrial dreams. It is a convenient little tale. However, it does not hold up against empirical evidence.

The premise assumes that China and the Global South are fighting over the same slice of the global consumption pie – cheap T-shirts, plastic sandals, toys. However, China’s export basket has changed. The share of intermediate goods, such as components and semi-finished products for downstream manufacturing, rose from roughly 42 per cent in 2017 to about 46 per cent by 2023.

Over the same period, the share of consumer goods fell from about 36 per cent to roughly 33 per cent while the share of capital goods held steady at around 20 per cent. This is not the cargo manifest of a predator hunting for sneaker shelf-space. It is the supply list of a systemic partner that is feeding other nations’ industrial engines.

Now look at the sector where you would expect the fiercest head-to-head competition – labour-intensive consumer goods. If China were truly monopolising the export space of others, its share would be stable or climbing. In reality, it is falling. China’s share of global garment exports fell to just under 30 per cent in 2024, a significant drop from its peak of over 40 per cent about a decade ago.

Footwear tells a similar story. China’s share has dropped while Indonesia and India have gained ground. Instead of elbowing others aside, China is moving up the value chain and creating space for lower-income nations in other sectors.

China is not shipping goods to outcompete Global South producers; it is shipping the building blocks that make factories viable. According to an Oxford Economics report, nearly half of China’s total exports are intermediate goods – components and raw materials that feed into other countries’ production lines rather than finished products for consumers.

Take Southeast Asia. Customs data from the first half of 2026 shows China’s intermediate goods exports to Association of Southeast Asian Nations member states rocketed 24.5 per cent year on year to 2.86 trillion yuan. These kinds of inputs help Vietnamese electronics assemblers, Thai auto-part makers and Malaysian chip packagers produce and export their own finished goods. This is deep integration – China supplying the “organs”, Asean flexing the “muscles.”

Beyond components, there are capital goods. China’s enabling role also comes into play here. For decades, a major barrier to industrialisation was the staggering cost of capital equipment. Today, Chinese-made industrial machinery is dramatically more affordable.

Capital goods account for a sizeable share of China’s exports to other developing countries. As Chinese capital and equipment are building industrial capacity across the Global South, China is turning itself into the “mother machine” of the industrialising world, transforming technology and production know-how that Western development aid never delivered.

Critics will point to trade deficits. Yes, China runs surpluses with multiple developing nations. But look closer. Take Vietnam for instance. Its 2025 trade deficit with China stood at around US$115 billion. Yet imports of capital and intermediate goods tell the real story. In 2025, capital goods such as computers, electronics, and machinery accounted for over half of its total imports. Vietnam’s deficit is a receipt for industrialisation.

In the 2025-26 financial year, India’s imports from China reached US$131.6 billion. That represents 16 per cent of India’s total imports. According to the Global Trade Research Initiative, around two-thirds of these imports – some US$82.6 billion – are concentrated in four categories: electronics, machinery, computers and organic chemicals.

In 2025, Thailand imported over US$100 billion worth of goods from China. Electrical machinery and equipment and machinery including computers accounted for a sizeable share. Thailand’s Office of Industrial Economics reported that in the third quarter of 2025, capital goods imports overall surged by 25.5 per cent year on year; raw materials and intermediate goods rose 14.3 per cent.

Clearly, intermediate and capital goods are partly responsible for these countries’ trade deficits with China, but they are the goods that underpin industrialisation. We are witnessing a historic reorganisation of global production – one that offers developing nations their first genuine shot at industrialisation without waiting for Western handouts.

To be clear, China’s exports pose a challenge to sectors such as automobile and home appliances in South Africa and Brazil. However, China’s exports are primarily the scaffolding on which other Global South countries are erecting their own industrial futures. Tear that scaffolding down, as some want, and you deprive scores of developing economies of a route out of underdevelopment.

Let’s also not forget imports. China is the top export destination for 79 countries and regions. In May, it expanded its zero-tariff import policy to 53 African countries. Painting China as a threat to development ignores how Beijing is widening its doors to products from the Global South.

China’s export boom is not zero-sum encroachment but positive-sum diffusion of industrial capacity. Its shrinking share in labour-intensive goods, its rising share of intermediates, its technology transfers, its growing import demand and its role in slashing industrial entry costs all point to the same conclusion: China is accelerating the Global South’s development, not arresting it.

Lastly, Western critiques are rather paternalistic, assuming developing nations are passive victims, incapable of making rational choices about their own trade relationships. That condescension, echoing the “white man’s burden”, is the real obstacle to the Global South’s prosperity.

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The event featured a dialogue between Professor John Quelch, CBE, American President and Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University, and Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG and former Counsellor to China’s State Council. Mabel Lu Miao, Co-Founder and Secretary-General of CCG, delivered the opening remarks.

Their discussion explored the prospects for stability in China-U.S. relations, the role of business in managing strategic competition, possible cooperation on AI governance, the changing balance of hard and soft power, and the future of business and higher education.

Among those attending were the ambassadors of Fiji, Japan, and Peru, as well as representatives from the embassies of Hungary, Indonesia, and Vietnam; international organisations including the International Monetary Fund; and companies including BMW, Cargill China, and Habib Bank.

CCG will shortly upload a video recording of the luncheon to its official YouTube channel. The following transcript has not been reviewed by the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-Founder and Secretary General, CCG

Thank you. Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Good afternoon. Thank you all for joining us today at the CCG VIP luncheon.

The CCG VIP luncheon is a flagship high-level international exchange platform established by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG). It serves as a key bridge connecting global political, business, and academic communities to promote pragmatic cooperation between China and the world.

Today’s luncheon is also a special edition of CCG Global Dialogue, our flagship platform that brings together policymakers, scholars, and business leaders from around the world to discuss the most pressing global challenges.

As a forum for open exchange, the dialogue fosters cross-cultural understanding and practical solutions on issues ranging from governance and sustainable development to economic cooperation and international security. Today’s theme is “Coopetition — how can China and the U.S. coexist?” It’s a new word, coopetition. I think it’s very important; we can discuss this further later.

As we look at the current global landscape, the relationship between China and rivalry, and shifting global supply chains against this complex and dynamic backdrop, finding ways to manage competition while preserving vital channels of cooperation has become one of the defining questions of our time, one that concerns policymakers, business leaders, and scholars on both sides of the Pacific. That is precisely why we are here today. Today we are honored to convene this VIP luncheon dialogue.

It is my great honor to invite our distinguished guest, Professor John Quelch, CBE, American President and Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University, to join us for the executive dialog. Professor Quelch will exchange in-depth views with Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and president of CCG, on how China and the United States can coexist and manage strategic competition. The dialogue will conclude with an open Q&A session with all of you.

Before we start, let us take a moment to acknowledge some of our special guests and VIPs who are here today. We have invited representatives from distinguished diplomats, government authorities, academic institutions, international organizations, corporate leaders, and media representatives.

They are His Excellency Robert Lee, Ambassador of Fiji to China; His Excellency Kenji Kanasugi, Ambassador of Japan to China; and His Excellency Carlos Vasquez, Ambassador of Peru to China. Welcome to all the ambassadors.

We also welcome the diplomats and embassy representatives from the embassy of Hungary, the embassy of Indonesia, and the embassy of Vietnam, as well as representatives of international organizations, including IMF and JETRO Beijing.

We also invited government and association representatives, including Gao Qi, Vice Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the China Chamber of Commerce and Trade Associations Conference; Huang Rengang, Vice President of Security and Secretary General of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; Song Yaoming, former Minister Economic and Commercial Counselor’s Office at the Chinese Embassy in Japan, and former Commercial Counselor in the Department of Asian Affairs, MOFCOM; and university representatives from the Long U.S.-China Institute at the University of California, Irvine, and Beijing Zhidian Education. We also welcome corporate representatives from BMW, Habib Bank, and Cargill China, and other important corporation and media representatives.

Distinguished guests, China and the United States are already deeply interconnected. Our economies, companies, universities, supply chains, financial markets, and scientific communities have developed together over several decades. We are part of each other’s economic and social realities. President Donald Trump’s state visit to China in May was historic and significant. President Xi Jinping is also expected to make a state visit to the United States this autumn.

So the real question is not whether China and the United States can avoid one another. The real question is whether they can manage their differences while continuing to benefit from cooperation.

Now, please allow me to introduce Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization and former counselor of the State Council of China, to deliver opening remarks. Welcome, Henry.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG

Thank you, Dr. Miao, Excellencies, Ambassadors, distinguished guests, and of course our friends representing a lot of famous organizations, chambers, international organizations, and multinational corporations. It’s really a great occasion.

Again, this is our CCG VIP luncheon that we do every month to really discuss a good subject and bring open dialogue to the key issues and challenging issues that are really facing all of us.

Last month we had a very special dialogue with Hank Paulson, former Treasury Secretary of the United States, in this room. This time we are very honored to have Professor Quelch. He’s a distinguished professor at Duke Kunshan University who has tons of experience. He has been the dean of three business schools across three continents. He was a dean at China European Business School and a dean of the business school at a university in Miami. And now he heads Duke Kunshan University as American President and Executive Vice Chancellor.

So it’s really a great occasion that we’re going to talk about coopetition, how China and the United States can coexist. So I think everybody knows that Duke Kunshan is more than an educational partnership. It brings together different education traditions, different institutional cultures, and young people from many countries. I’m also very honored to be sitting on the Duke Kunshan Advisory Council, so I know that this university is really a great JV product between China and the United States.

At a time when some people question whether China and the United States can continue to work together, the very existence of Duke Kunshan University reminds us that cooperation is not an abstract idea. It can be a possibility in real action. It can be built into institutions, sustained over time, and passed on to the next generation. So I think the presence of Professor Quelch is really significant today in our bilateral relations.

I’d like to also formally introduce our guest of the dialogue today, Professor Quelch. He is the American President and Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University, Distinguished Professor of Social Science at DKU, and also the John deButts Professor at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. Between 2017 and 2022, he was the Leonard Miller University Chair, Vice Provost of the University of Miami, and Dean of the Miami Herbert Business School. Before 2017, he was both the Charles Edward Wilson Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health. So you can see he has a very broad, profound business, teaching, and management experience.

In addition to that, Professor Quelch has substantial experience as a non-executive director. In the United States, he has served on the boards of Amerant Bangcorp, Gentiva Health Services, Pepsi Bottling Group, and Reebok International He has also served as a board member of three pre-IPO data and analytics companies: Datalogix, Vitrue and Affinnova. So, a wide range of experience in addition to his academic practice. In the United Kingdom, Professor Quelch has also served on the board of WPP, the world’s largest leading marketing services company, and for 25 years has served as a member and chair of the audit committee. Very, very impressive. In the UK, he has also been a director of Blue Circle Industries, EasyJet, and Pentland Group. So the list is very long. I think I’ll just introduce some of those things here.

Again, I also see that Professor Quelch is often interviewed by international media at different outlets, and he’s very thoughtful and has a lot of good ideas. That’s why we’ve invited Professor Quelch to come here today to join the CCG Global Dialogue and CCG VIP luncheon, to share his views and have a dialogue on how we can really work on China-U.S. relations.

So, without further ado, let’s welcome Professor Quelch to our dialogue chair.

So, Professor Quelch, really great to welcome you to the CCG VIP luncheon. As we know, you’ve been leading an American university in China — one of the very famous, Duke Kunshan University — and you’ve been there for a few years already. You’re a firsthand witness of China’s transformation over the last several decades. You’ve also been dean of China Europe International Business School, so you know the business community in China very well, including the multinationals.

So, I’d first like to have your thoughts on how you think China-U.S. relations are going. We’ve been through a lot of ups and downs. The good thing now is we had President Trump come here in May. And in Trump’s first term it was a strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, considering all those policies in his first term. But — I’m very glad to see this in his second term — we’re now having strategic stability. Both governments agree that we’re going to maintain strategic stability.

So, how do you see China-U.S. relations evolving and continuing? And what do you expect? As you know, we’re going to have several more high-level visits: President Xi is going to be in the United States in September, President Trump may come again to Shenzhen for the APEC summit in November, and President Xi may go to Miami again for the G20 summit in December. You also lived in Miami too. So overall, what’s your general assessment of China-U.S. relations?

Professor John Quelch, CBE, American President and Executive Vice Chancellor, Duke Kunshan University

Your Excellencies, thank you, Henry, and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It seems like there are a lot of cameras and lights, but not many microphones. So we will have to share the microphone in the spirit of co-opetition, Henry and I will be fighting over who holds the microphone.

So, to the question — just very briefly — I first came to China in 1981 as a tourist, and I’ve been back and forth over 45 years now, witnessing the great transformation that we’re all aware of. Those of us who are privileged enough to actually be on the ground and see it, as opposed to the many millions of my compatriots who have never been to China and actually don’t want to come to China because they might be contaminated if they came to China. There’s that degree of reluctance among a large portion — not just of the American population, but I think other populations as well, among certain allied countries.

But to your question, Henry — I think in the first Trump administration, China acutely became aware of what might happen and what could happen in terms of the tariff regime and other export control-related approaches that the United States might use vis-à-vis China and Chinese goods and services. And so China, from 2016 to 2020, was already planning a quiet decoupling of dependency in terms of trade and investment, and moving toward more engagement with Global South countries, etc.

So those patterns of trade and investment development were already being cooked up — they were already evident early in the first Trump administration. Everybody expected the Biden administration to be more relaxed towards China, and that did not happen. The Biden administration actually not only continued Trump 1.0 policies but also added further constraints.

Now we have a period of time in Trump’s second administration where the volatility of the administration’s policies is obviously driving many countries to think about how to be less attached to the United States in terms of trade and investment. And that, of course, is giving China an opportunity to present itself publicly as the stabilizing force — the adult in the room, if I can use that expression — for the benefit of the global economy.

Now, President Trump is a businessperson. He’s a transactional businessperson, as we know, as he would readily admit. And I think he’s actually not as ideological about China as some others in Washington, and therefore brings — curiously, perhaps surprisingly — a more pragmatic approach to the relationship. Not necessarily as predictable as any of us in this room would wish, but nevertheless a more pragmatic, business-oriented approach to the relationship, which essentially means the United States cannot walk away from China. It’s simply impossible. It would have devastating commercial consequences — and it’s not necessarily top of the agenda, but it would not be good for the world economy either.

So, where we are at the moment, I think, is the following: we have, in a sense, an umbrella relationship between President Xi and President Trump that may manifest itself three more times this year. But even if it’s only one or two, I don’t think it has to be all three. But one or two constructive and diplomatically useful meetings would, of course, set the tone in an umbrella of assurance to the world, under which the new so-called Board of Trade and Investment, and other dialogues occurring on a bilateral basis will continue to be productive.

And I think that, as someone who was not necessarily a student of diplomacy but a very commonsense person once said, “It all begins by talking. If you are not talking, you cannot achieve any kind of rapprochement or mutual camaraderie that can stabilize a relationship.” So, whether or not it’s your marriage, whether or not it’s two competitors in industry, whether or not it’s nation states, it all begins by talking.

So I think that where we are is we have a baseline rapprochement between the two leaders, which is extremely helpful because that signals to the underlings that they have to get on with serious conversations and not get into spats, walking out on meetings, or anything like that. They have to be seriously progressing a discussion of the issues at hand, of which there are many, many, as you know.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Thank you, John. Absolutely. You know, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Secretary Rubio just met in Manila, I think yesterday, and of course we’re expecting this presidential visit in September. And as you just said, there seems to be a pragmatism occurring now in these bilateral relations. But on the other hand, we should also think about this: since almost eight or nine years ago, when Trump won, the U.S. started many ways of containing China — sanctions and trade wars — and maybe at some point, people just suddenly realized, “Gee, we’re living in the same world.”

We were talking to Secretary Hank Paulson last month here. He was saying that the U.S. and China have achieved mutually assured economic disruption. So basically, that means we’ve reached a new equilibrium now. Because if we really do anything bad to the other side, we hurt ourselves too. So that’s one side, economically. On the other hand, you can also see the world is such a disrupted place now, with what’s happening in Ukraine, what’s happening in Iran, and the U.S. is not able to handle that properly. And then China actually emerged as one of the very strong stabilizers of the world economy and also confidence, and not causing panic in the world. For example, China’s energy was relatively stable. We have the former chairman of Sinopec here. You can see how that effort has really been maintained. So there’s a huge interest for the U.S. and China to work together.

So in that sense, do you see how we can really encourage this new equilibrium? For example, you mentioned the Board of Trade, which is great. Each side is going to exempt $300 billion in goods trade — almost like free trade for $300 billion — and that could be an oasis in bilateral trade, and we can expand that. You know, we can find more products. There’s no national security issues, it’s really neat for both sides, and it really helps the economy on both sides. So, that experiment, if successful, can be expanded. And also for the investment board, how can we find suitable companies to invest on both sides? So we hope that this kind of pragmatism can be sustained.

So, what’s your take on this new equilibrium that we’ve achieved, at least so far — will that stability be maintained? And what do you think, as a business professor, about the role of business in pushing this forward, this sustainable relation? Of course, there’s competition, but there’s also cooperation. That’s why we call it coopetition, right? That’s a management term that’s frequently used. So, what do you think about the status now, and how we can get down to the near future for this bilateral relation?

John Quelch

So the word coopetition was actually coined by a professor at Harvard Business School around 25 years ago — a guy by the name of Adam Brandenburger, who periodically shows up at NYU Shanghai as a guest professor. And of course, coopetition, as he examined it, came out of a business context.

Let me give you one obvious example in the pharmaceutical industry. Obviously, Merck, Roche, AstraZeneca, and GSK all go head-to-head, competing aggressively against each other. But at the same time, they have many cross-license agreements, where a GSK product will be sold by AstraZeneca in some countries where AstraZeneca is strong, and maybe an AstraZeneca product will be sold by Pfizer in countries where AstraZeneca has no action, but there’s a market for their drug. So these companies are cooperating at the same time as they’re aggressively competing against each other.

So that’s where the term coopetition comes from, and it is possible for nation states to do the same thing simultaneously. But I think it requires a mindset that’s a little bit more sophisticated than the standard ideological black-or-white point of view that, in the polarization of politics — especially in the West — is becoming much more fashionable.

So, if I look at the current administration, for example, I would say that Secretary Bessent, for example, the Secretary of the Treasury, is a very sophisticated thinker. Jamieson Greer, who is the U.S. Trade Representative, is also a very sophisticated thinker. And let me leave it at that. Okay, I won’t mention any further names.

But it’s important that the business point of view maintains a strong voice in the dialogue. And one of the things I’ve been noticing in the last three or four years is the reluctance of business leaders in the United States to really speak out on behalf of their shareholder interests when it comes to anything related to geopolitics emanating from Washington. There’s been a noticeable level of silence, vis-à-vis what one was used to seeing under the Biden administration. And that’s unfortunate, because if the business voice is not sufficiently part of the geopolitical dialogue, then it will become more and more of a polarized ideological dialogue rather than something more pragmatic.

When it comes to China and the U.S. in particular, I think, you know, the U.S. suddenly woke up one day — maybe in the basement of the Pentagon, or in Langley, Virginia — woke up one day to the reality that, gosh, China has really made so much more progress than we ever forecast it would make by this time. We’ve got to do something about it, because whatever you may think of the U.S., the U.S. is always going to find it difficult to be number two. That is going to be a very big psychological challenge for the U.S.

You know, at the same time, from my business experience, I would say that you often have situations in business where the number-two company chases the number-one company. And it’s rather like — if you’ve ever been to a dog race, a greyhound race — you know, the greyhounds go around and they chase a mechanical rabbit, okay? And sometimes the greyhound catches the rabbit and then doesn’t know what to do with it. So, you know, sometimes it’s nice to think we could become number one. But when you become number one, you have to know what to do when you’re number one, and that’s not as easy as being number two. So I just want to present these very simple thoughts as a little bit of advice to our leaders.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great, John. I think that you’ve vividly described this coopetition and, of course, the business dynamic. Absolutely. You know, when Trump came, he brought 17, 18 top business leaders. There’s a huge interest from business corporations, and we also see that bilateral trade has been stabilized between the U.S. and China somehow now.

But there’s also a new issue now: AI. We see that with this new visit of Trump to China, and President Xi’s visit to the U.S., there’s an AI dynamic. China and the U.S. are the two largest AI countries now, and so we’re getting into uncharted waters and territories. How can we do global governance? You’re just coming from Shanghai, where the World AI Summit Conference was hosted, and China has also established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization with 29 countries. So that means AI is really on the agenda, not only for China but for many other countries to think about.

I do think that China and the U.S. have a joint interest in maintaining this AI cooperation. Just imagine if AI became a bubble, right? That would devastate not only the United States, but the whole world, and the U.S. has invested so heavily in AI, and China is the same. But China is probably doing better on applications, with a large application scene. The U.S. stock market is already dominated by AI companies. Their market cap is many times over the other industries.

So, what do you think about AI cooperation? And also, we may want to avoid an AI arms race, right? We want to make sure that AI can really be a good force for mankind. So, what do you think about that area? AI — what can we do, and what can we not do?

John Quelch

The United States is leading in basic research in AI, but China is very strong in applications of AI. China’s approach is open source.

Some people who are cynical always say open source is what you do when you’re not the leader, because you can’t get anyone to pay for your product, so you open-source it. If you’re a private company like Anthropic or OpenAI, you and your investors have put a lot of money into developing your products, and you have to get a return on those products by charging for them in the marketplace.

In the Chinese context, it’s an open-source context where a lot of the money going in is from the state, not from individual private investors. So you have these two systems actually colliding, with AI as the catalyst for the collision. In my opinion, it’s not easy to get collaboration among these two groups. You can see that Anthropic and OpenAI are trying to shut down U.S. access to Chinese AI models, using, of course, the usual excuse of national security — which, you know, is used to justify everything these days — as a basis for saying we should not have these folks selling to Chinese organizations.

And the other basis for their complaint is that the Chinese AI platforms deliver 90% of the quality of the U.S. platforms but at 40% of the cost. So, you know, you have to decide if you’re a user: do you want the good-enough Chinese platform, or do you want to pay extra for the U.S. platform? So, this is a very heavy-duty competitive situation.

The one area where I think collaboration is necessary — you alluded to nuclear arms proliferation. You know, there’s a need for an AI arms proliferation treaty because, remember, AI enables you to go to war without costing your citizens any lives. You can go to war with AI and put no human being at risk among your citizenry, through drone technology and remote technology, etc. And think of the amount of devastation that has been incurred in Iran at the moment — and I’m not going to say only 18 lives lost on the U.S. side, but that is a very small number relative to the amount of destruction that has occurred.

So here is the area where I think there has to be cooperation because neither China nor the U.S. can afford for damaging AI technology to get into the hands of rogue operators and terrorists who are going to destabilize the global economy or hold it to ransom.

So this is my answer: not easy on the commercial front to get cooperation around a common set of standards because competition at the moment is very, very tough between these two groups. But on the higher-level issue of AI arms proliferation, there’s definitely a need for dialogue.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Absolutely, I think that’s very important. We should not weaponize AI, and maybe we should also not be the first user of AI as a weapon. I think if China and the U.S. start to talk on that, it will really benefit global governance and the global community.

As you know, President Xi not too long ago put forward the Global Governance Initiative, and I think this AI organization established in Shanghai is reflecting that. Because, as you just mentioned, China has this open AI system, so we can really put that to use for the Global South countries, benefiting their applications. I see quite a few Global South countries mention that they’re using Chinese AI to help with forecasting, help them in agriculture, and help them in rural areas — examples of AI applications.

John Quelch

And I think, Henry, you’ll find that pretty soon the Global South, when it comes to AI, will include Italy, Spain, France, and a lot of other countries that are not keeping up. So the open-source model can be very effective as a diplomatic tool for China, for sure.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think this global AI governance, and China’s Global Governance Initiative as a whole, is really very useful to propose and then to take action on. I mean, China is talking about global governance, but China also established the World Data Organization. China established the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, and China has invited 29 countries — almost 30 countries — to join that. So I think this really sets a very good example that can really be beneficial to these Global South countries.

So on the whole, I think, of course, the Global North, as you said in the past, has been industrialized. But now, with the AI era coming, some Global North countries may become Global South countries too. That’s your point.

So, what do you think about this? You know, in the global governance arena, China and the U.S. are such big countries now, and we’re actually in these two traps. There’s a Thucydides Trap — that number two catching up to number one — but there’s also a Kindleberger Trap, where number one is leaving, and can number two fulfill the global public goods? And so, in that sense, in the governance issue area, how do you think China and the U.S. can collaborate? Because the U.S. is pulling out of some global governance organizations — WHO is a good example. So, do you think that, at least on the AI new frontier, we can all work together? And so this U.S.-China dialogue on AI, is it a good sign for global AI governance in the future?

John Quelch

You correctly allude to the increasing distance that Washington is placing between itself and many of the multilateral organizations that are curiously a part of the rules-based order. Washington itself is actually rejecting some of the elements of the so-called rules-based order that it has previously stated should govern the way in which the world operates.

So I think China has done, as one would expect, a very clever and long-term job of gradually adding value in these various organizations, and gradually having Chinese nationals appointed to — maybe not necessarily the number-one position, but among the leading implementation positions — in many of these global institutions, and that, I think, has been very effective. And I think, again, the U.S. has woken up to the fact that the U.S. interest in these organizations is not nearly as strong as it used to be, say 20 years ago, so the U.S. is therefore backing off from these organizations.

But I think, while it may be backing off on the climate front — from the Paris Agreement, from WHO, from WTO, etc. — when it comes to something that is central to national security — and I mean central, not using national security as an excuse, but central to it — such as AI, there I think there’s going to be a much more focused mindset.

I’ll give you an illustration of this from the last 24 hours: a speech was made by the chief science adviser to President Trump, which is basically saying we’re going to completely change the funding system for basic research. We’re no longer going to just channel all of our money through universities — we’re going to channel some of it through individuals, corporations, and other mechanisms. And by the way, we’re not really going to put nearly as much money into life sciences anymore — we’re going to put the money into AI.

So, you know, this is an important statement. Often you find the most important statements are coming from second-tier officials. You have to read very closely below the Trump and cabinet level. The second-tier officials are often really telling you much more about what the direction of policy really is. So I think that, again, the governance may be active, but in areas that are important to national security and to the economy, which, of course, is now wrapped up with national security more than it used to be.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Absolutely, I agree. I think now it’s time to really stress this global governance because the world is fragmented, particularly in the AI era. We really need to have more global governance. It doesn’t matter, Global South or Global North; we all need global governance together because, after all, we’re all living on the planet. And China and the U.S. now, they want to explore Mars. They’re planning to fly to the moon — so even in outer space, there should be universal governance as well, if we need that, I think.

John Quelch

I would also add ocean as well because China has been, I think, very forward in terms of maritime exploration, but also in terms of governance issues around use of the oceans.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Absolutely. So, there are many more issues there. Now I want to turn to another question. We know the U.S. used to emphasize soft power a lot, right? We have Joseph Nye, who passed away not too long ago. By the way, we’re going to publish his memoir pretty soon in Chinese, which we’ve translated. And I also co-edited a book of his on soft power and China-U.S. competition.

So, what do you think about this — soft power, hard power? Then maybe there’s a new term, comprehensive power. You need not only hard power and soft power, but also the scale, and also the implementation power. You have all the other things, soft and hard, batched together. But the key is really the implementation, and also synchronizing this kind of comprehensive power.

The U.S. has a lot of soft power, but China is also gradually building up in that area. And the U.S.’s hard power, particularly on infrastructure, is falling behind, and then you see all that security and military. Of course, there’s still competition there. But I think we should really put more effort into the soft-power approach rather than so much on hard power. So, what do you think about that area?

John Quelch

Well, I’ve never held a gun in my life, so I have to be a soft power guy. I think what you say about integration is very important. Twenty years ago, I remember hearing our generals in the United States actually talk about winning hearts and minds as part of their military agenda — let’s say in the first Gulf War, for example, back at the turn of the century. Now you never hear any United States military leader ever talk about hearts and minds. It’s the Department of War, not the Department of Defense, right?

So I think this is a real unfortunate situation, because for soft power to be effective, it has to be integrated with hard power, and the messaging has to be consistent between the two.

You’re alluding to the decline in the appeal of the United States, and certainly there’s a survey — actually a couple of surveys in the last few weeks — that show the precipitous decline in public attitude, positive attitude, towards the U.S. across a whole range of different countries. I think in one survey there were only six countries where a majority of the people interviewed had a positive, as opposed to a negative, view of the United States. Not sure if I should name them, because I might get them into trouble, but Japan is one of them, and the others, I think, are not in the room — India, Philippines, Poland. I can’t remember the other two.

Anyway, my point is that under the Trump administration, there’s been a massive deterioration in public sentiment towards the United States — not towards Americans, but towards the United States.

So you might think that would cause a wake-up in Washington. Doesn’t matter. No one cares about it. You know, it’s all about hard power, strength projected by military and economic prowess — not really interested so much in cultural power.

But if I go back to just one final comment, slightly unrelated, but I think it’s instructive: if you look at how Japan became so respected around the world after the Second World War, I’ll give you two words to explain it: Toyota and Sony. How did Korea become respected around the world? Hyundai and Samsung. How is China going to be respected around the world? BYD and Huawei. The products and services that a country delivers to the world are actually very, very important in terms of determining public attitude.

In the era of social media, I would introduce TikTok as another element in this because prior to the Trump administration going after TikTok, no one knew that it was related to China at all. As soon as Trump — or his people — went after TikTok, suddenly everybody realized, well, this is from China. But instead of saying, in that case, “I don’t want to touch it,” young people in the United States said, “Oh, that means China’s not so bad — I like China if they’re delivering TikTok.” So, you know, that’s another example, in the modern day, of a brand — not an auto brand, not an electronics brand, but a social media brand — that is representing the values, or is perceived to represent the values, of a particular country.

Henry Huiyao Wang

That’s right. I think an industrial brand, a company brand, can also be a softer brand too. China now has so much industry coming up, and that’s really a new issue too — how we can really integrate with the world, how we can invest in other countries, and welcome other countries to invest in China. So, that will actually be a subject at our think tank. The Center for China and Globalization is going to hold our annual China Inbound and Outbound Investment Forum on October 17-18 in Beijing, so we welcome you to attend as well.

My final question, before I open it up to the distinguished audience: you’re a business professor. Our paths actually coincided. You have a DBA from Harvard, and you taught at the Ivey Business School, where I did some doctoral study in business as well. But one of the things that impressed me: you’re the business dean across three continents. You’re the dean of the London Business School, you’re the dean of a Miami Business School, and then China European Business School. So management education is really taking off, also in China. You must be very familiar with that trend — millions of, you know, EMBA, MBA, and a lot of related executive development training, and that’s really pushed China’s entrepreneurial drive, not only in China but around the world.

So business education is so important. Now you’re also in charge of Duke Kunshan with your Chinese partner. What do you think about business education, and now an elite Ivy League kind of school in China — this China-U.S. JV — makes a difference? Maybe you can give a bit of your experience and observations in this area of education.

John Quelch

Okay, thank you. So, I myself, just for your information, did not study business as an undergraduate — I studied medieval history, and then later became a business educator. And someone asked me, “Well, how can you go from medieval history to teaching and being a professor at a business school?” So I’d tell them: there are two things I learned when I studied medieval history. One was how to cut people’s heads off, and the other was how to take no prisoners. Next question. Actually, these two talents are very important in academic administration.

But I think the point I want to make on the undergraduate front is this: in all the years I taught at Harvard — I was very fortunate to be on the faculty at Harvard Business School for 30 years — in all those years, I never had an outstanding student who had done business as an undergraduate degree. All the business undergraduate degree students, they would all pass, they’d all get through, but they were never the top students. The top students had always done, you know, English literature, or physics, or Chinese studies — something completely related to the arts or sciences, not related to business. So I always advocate that, you know, if you want a business degree, take an MBA, but for your undergraduate education, you should study things that you like, that are going to expand your mind, and so on.

And of course, we have so many parents, especially in China, who worry: “Oh, is my kid going to get a job at the end of the four years if they haven’t done something practical as an undergraduate?” And we try to persuade the parents that actually the best thing you can do is let your child explore the universe of education as an undergraduate, and let them find what they truly enjoy and believe in. You know, I’ve come across many, many people — actually mainly women — who are maybe, in China, 40 years old, 45 years old. They graduated in thermal engineering, and now they’re artists, because that’s what they really wanted to do all along, but Dad and Mum forced them to become engineers. So they became an engineer for 20 years, and then finally they’ve got enough money to do what they really want to do.

So, when it comes to executive education, in many ways, there are enough MBAs and executive MBAs in the marketplace, right? And now, with the internet and AI, you can learn so much, so quickly, without actually doing the MBA degree. So in many cases, business schools now are focusing on experiential learning, networking, connecting like-minded and similarly aged students with each other, so that they can collectively engage in projects that may turn into fundable ventures that could lead to incorporated IPOs, etc. So, in other words, the actual content of the curriculum in an executive MBA program is much less of a factor than it used to be 20, 30 years ago because so much of the content is readily accessible, and the laws of economics and accounting don’t change that quickly, right?

So, what we’re finding in our executive education activity at Duke Kunshan — because, although we don’t have a business school for undergraduates, we do have a lot of executive education — one of the things we’ve found to be very potent at the moment is adding well-being and wellness components to the curriculum. And when I say well-being and wellness, what I’m talking about is, you know, team building, understanding the strengths and weaknesses of different colleagues, maximizing the performance of the team on behalf of objectives, but not putting at jeopardy the health of the executive, or his or her family, as a result of, you know, overstress and so on.

So let me just give you one example — I gave it to the lady from Cargill earlier. We had a group from a leading U.S. multinational company; I won’t say publicly which one. This group came — 40 people came, 25 men and 15 women — and their program included half a day in our athletics center. Our athletic center is a world-class athletics facility, as you know, and it even includes a rock-climbing wall, about 10 meters high.

So this company wanted everybody to go up the wall. Only five people made it to the top — all women, out of the 40 — not a single man made it to the top. All Chinese men, maybe a little bit too heavy, okay, a little bit too heavy. But the point is, something like that ends up having a huge effect on the company’s internal morale, because all these guys who look at these small Chinese ladies and say, “Oh, they can’t do anything,” you know — suddenly the level of respect that’s generated by such an experience and observation is really very, very important, and very high.

So, that’s just one anecdote. But what we want to highlight is that in leadership development, we’re not just sitting in a classroom listening to someone with some PowerPoint slides. We’re taking people to an athletic center and putting them through a series of team-based activities — competitive, but resulting in the manifestation of many, many revelations, both personal and in terms of the way they view their colleagues as well.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great. I also know that Duke Kunshan has made huge strides and enhanced its standing globally. And you have a huge number of applicants, and you only select a very limited number. So how’s that? It’s getting very competitive now, huh?

John Quelch

We have 20 applicants for every place, I would say. To be fair, that sounds like a very impressive statistic, but to be fair, let me just say: the Gaokao has to be taken by every Chinese applicant, but it counts for only 60% of the evaluation. The other 40% of the evaluation at our university is based on two-on-one interviews with a shortlisted set of the applicant pool, as well as other campus day activities, when they have to come from all over China as part of the selection process.

So, to be frank, if one of our applicants receives an offer from Duke Kunshan and they also get into Tsinghua or Peking University, they’re going to go to Tsinghua or Peking University. Okay, we’re not yet at that level. But if they get into Shanghai Jiao Tong, they might flip to us, or they might go to Jiao Tong.

Henry Huiyao Wang

You have a very good international position.

John Quelch

30% of undergraduates are international students.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Also, there’s a lot of American students there, right?

John Quelch

Yeah, I mean, that’s one amazing thing. You might find this hard to believe, but given all of the problems in the U.S.-China relationship, we still have 60 American 18-year-olds every year commit to a four-year university degree in China. So, all hope is not lost.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, great. So, on that positive note, let’s pause the dialogue here for a while. Now we’re open for questions and Q&A — any comments, questions, and discussion.

Yes, I know, Mr. Huang. He’s the Vice President of China’s WTO Studies, and MOFCOM. Okay, thank you, please.

Huang Rengang, Vice President & and Secretary-General, the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies

Thank you, Dr. Wang and Professor Quelch for this very interesting and enlightening interview. I like the objective and rational approach of Professor Quelch in his analysis and comments. My question is this: how do you view the fact that a lot of students in university schools are using AI to finish their papers, research, and homework? And I think some Chinese teachers, or deans, leaders of universities, are aware of this. What is your view?

John Quelch

I’m not sure this is confined to Chinese universities, by any means. But someone recently defined a typical American university as a place where, thanks to AI, you have students who don’t want to learn, being taught by teachers who don’t want to teach, and paying $60,000 a year for the opportunity.

So, what are some of the things that we do? First of all, our class sizes are small — at Duke Kunshan University, a typical class size would be 20 students to a class. What that means is that during the class, there’s a lot of participation and interaction between the students, among the students, and between the faculty member and the students. And what that means is that class participation — which cannot be dictated by AI, until we have a real-time earpiece that can tell the student, or even voice the student’s answer to a question, in real time in a classroom — the grade that a professor gives should, in my view, place more emphasis on classroom participation versus the written work, because the written work obviously can be contaminated.

Now, what we’re also finding is that some professors, in response to — let’s say, if they give an essay question to their students, or a problem set — what they might do is run the problem set through AI, and give the students the AI answer along with the questions. Then the students have to go beyond the AI answer to be able to get a decent grade. So, in that way, you can use AI to set a bar of performance that’s already higher than it would be pre-AI and force the students to go beyond the AI answer to a higher level of intellectual challenge. So these are a couple of approaches that some of our professors have been using to deal with the challenge.

Liu Chang, Vice President, Cargill China

Thank you so much, Dr. Wang and Professor Quelch, for the marvelous dialogue and sharing, which is really informative and enlightening. I’d like to ask a question about coopetition in education between the two countries, especially in high tech or higher education. There used to be a lot of Chinese students going to the U.S. for higher-level study — undergrad and graduate studies — but now it seems that, due to this decoupling or de-risking, fewer and fewer Chinese students are getting involved in key American universities, especially in cutting-edge technology majors. So, would you like to share your opinions on this tendency, or your analysis of this coopetition? Thank you.

John Quelch

Yeah, okay, thank you very much. So, in the undergraduate space, there’s less of a problem. There’s a significant number of Chinese parents who this year decided not to send their children to U.S. undergraduate programs, but there’s still a high number who continue to do that. The Hong Kong universities, and their campuses in southern China, have been extremely active and aggressive in terms of trying to capture a higher share of those undergraduate students, in the face of the U.S.-China problem.

When it comes to graduate programs, doctoral theses, and research collaborations, there’s definitely a very strong inclination to avoid any geopolitically sensitive area, particularly in STEM — and even in AI, even in the most benign applications of AI, say in global health, for example. Even in those areas, there’s some degree of increased vigilance.

Kenji Kanasugi, Ambassador of Japan to China

Professor, thank you very much for your very interesting presentation, and Henry, thank you very much for the invitation. My question is, going back to the basics, I think one of the important tasks of the Trump administration is to rectify the trade imbalance, the global trade imbalance, particularly with China. There are many ways to do so, and, of course, tariffs are one way. But another important element is the exchange rate of currencies. As you may recall, in the case of Japan and China, we had the 1985 Plaza Agreement — that was really a turning point.

But under the current circumstances, I don’t see the current Trump administration pursuing the exchange rate issue with China. As you said, Secretary Bessent — a well-respected business person with very good global views — is not really forthcoming in pursuing the exchange rate issue. Why do you think the U.S. is not really pursuing the exchange rate issue at this juncture? Thank you very much.

John Quelch

Let’s put it this way: it’s a little bit complicated for the man in the street. Remember, President Trump is quite a populist president — something like a tariff is pretty easy for an individual to understand as a way of dealing with a problem. Even though it’s a blunt instrument, it’s understandable. But start talking to the public about exchange rate mechanisms, and people quickly lose attention. Their eyes glaze over. So that’s one point.

The second point: it’s very important to the United States to maintain global settlement currency leadership. So bilateral conversations around stabilizing through controlling, or adjusting exchange rates on a bilateral basis can end up having an impact on harmony that doesn’t help the long-term determination to maintain global currency leadership. And I think the U.S. is worried about that. They don’t talk about it, but inch by inch, other currencies have been settling more and more of international transactions, in currencies other than the U.S. dollar. So, I think these are the two key reasons.

But I think it’s possible that, in the next two or three rounds of dialogue with the U.S., if we’re on an even keel, the U.S.-China currency relationship may come into play as part of the behind-the-scenes conversation. I think this is definitely something to watch.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yeah, we just have another two questions. I would like to add, Ambassador, that since the U.S. holds a large amount of treasury bonds with China, they may lose value if the exchange rate appreciates, and that’s another thing. The other thing is that the U.S. is exporting a lot of dollars. China may export a lot of goods, but the U.S. is exporting dollars. They have a foreign debt higher than their GDP now. So there are many issues there, but this could be a question both countries, as the Professor mentioned, would be dealing with in the future. Ambassador from Peru, yes, please.

Carlos Vasquez, Ambassador of Peru to China

Okay, thank you very much for this event. Thank you very much, Professor Quelch, for your very enlightening presentation — very interesting. Thank you, Henry, for the invitation.

Well, my country is in the middle of this harsh competition between these two juggernauts. We try to adopt the same approach that has been developed, for example, by Singapore, in the sense that, in terms of defense and security, our key partner is the United States; in terms of trade and investment, it’s China. But we have a disadvantage: we are in the natural area of influence of the United States, so the pressures that we are receiving are increasingly very, very hard.

But we’re forced, because of the structure of the Peruvian economy and the fact that China has become our first trade partner, and we’ve received a lot of investment in key economic sectors of our country, particularly the mining sector. We are exporting critical minerals to the rest of the world, and particularly to China. And on the other side, we’re having a lot of very fruitful conversations with the United States to, for example, develop the naval base of my country, which, by the way, is going to be very close to the Port of Chancay, which was developed by a Chinese company.

So, do you think this approach is still feasible, taking into account that the margin of maneuver of the third states that are affected by this competition between these two great powers is increasingly diminishing? On the other hand, we are forced to maintain very good relations with both of them. We don’t have any other option. We’re forced by the current circumstances to pursue this policy. But do you think that is still feasible, that it’s still possible to maintain this in the near and medium term, taking into account the current situation? Thank you, thank you very much.

John Quelch

I think you have no option. You cannot afford to put all your eggs in one basket. Then you lose leverage. And in addition, you’re not going to be patted on the back by Washington, or benefit that much, if you were to throw in 100% with the U.S. Once you’ve done that, you’re probably not going to get rewarded that much for it.

I think another key dimension to this is the way other countries in Latin America are also behaving. If there were to be a wave of countries that, given new largesse from Washington, or new military pressure, were to be forced to throw in with the United States, and Peru remained neutral, if I can use that term, that might be harder to handle. That could be an opportunity to be in that position, but it could also be difficult to be in that position. So, in a way, you’re playing on a chessboard that has all of your neighbors as part of it, not just China and the United States. So it’s not just a choice between China and the U.S., it’s between China and the U.S. vis-à-vis what others, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, are doing in this circumstance as well.

And I think, actually, intra-regional dialogue on this issue is hugely important for Latin America, because it’s very easy for the superpower — whoever it is, I’m just using the term generically — to use a divide-and-rule strategy: come to a continent and just divide and rule. In other words, try to put pressure bilaterally on each country to say, “Are you with us, or are you against us?” Latin American countries need to get together and make sure that they are not played in that way.

Arvea Marieni, Director, Ecological Transition Solutions and International Affairs, BEAM CUBE

Thank you very much. First of all, I’m also here representing a French company, which is at the state-of-the-art on virtual twins — we apply some algorithms. I’m making a point about Europe: it’s not to be discounted at the moment. We are dependent on U.S. technology, for instance on cloud — 73% from the three platforms. We’re taking steps. And I’d like to remind you of something that happened yesterday in terms of security: Hugging Face was hacked by ChatGPT because one of the models left the sandbox, and the savior was a Chinese model.

Robert Lee, Ambassador of Fiji to China

Thank you, Dr. Wang and Professor Quelch. I just want to make a comment, and embedded in that comment is a question, following on from my learned friend from Peru. The discussion is competition between China and the U.S., but as we look at countries like Peru, and like ourselves, Fiji, we are not only watching this game play out, but we are actually — I won’t say by circumstance, but more by an awakening — coming to suddenly see that it is not competition, it is coopetition that we need to learn ourselves. It’s not just between China and the U.S.; its the rest of the world is understanding this model of cooperating and competing, and learning how to pick sides.

Not in a collective picking of sides, but in a deconstructed picking: Peru picks on security and economics, but we’re going beyond that. We’re now going into almost a micro selection — of universities, of courses, of sports, across all sectors — and I think that will create a new form of power beyond soft power or hard power. It’s a calculated power of the other states, learning when to use soft power, when to avoid hard power, in both cooperating and working with the U.S. and China but also between the states themselves.

So we will learn how to work with Peru, whereas before we didn’t have to. Now we will seek out how to work with Peru because maybe our fortunes are tied a little bit to South America. We don’t know yet, but we will start exploring. Singapore is exploring Africa, and I think, even for Fiji — we’re in the middle of the ocean — we’re starting to think, “Hey, we’re not that isolated. We serve a purpose.” So my point is that this awakening transcends the states, it gets into education. The kids are now learning how to play the game, right? I think they’ve learned that before, how to play Mum against Dad, right, they’ve learned that skill. But now I think they’re learning that skill with the professors, with the schools.

My daughter is going through that. She spent one year at Northwestern, right, and she’s awoken, in a sense, saying, “I’m going to take a gap year.” Why? Because “I need to realize what I want, and I don’t know what I want.” So, “Will you allow me to take a gap year to go and discover who I am?” And for her to ask that makes me reflect on this issue — that the world, and the individual, is coming to a state of competition, not so much the states, and that transcends. I think that will change the dynamics across every sector, in the way we relate to our kids in education: picking study part-time in China, part of the program in the U.S.; they will learn to pick both sides.

And I think how that will then change this context has not been factored in. The other players affecting the U.S.-China relationship, like Vietnam, could tilt it either way. If South America goes more towards China, the U.S. reacts; then Africa starts pushing, Asia pushes another way. It’s going to be a balancing act.

John Quelch

Let me just say quickly. Newton’s law comes into play, I think, in this kind of scenario: to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction, right? And what that really requires, in my opinion, is a level of continuity of leadership, a sense of history, and the importance of diplomatic history that can inform current elected leaders’ decisions.

I think we see this sometimes in the United States today, that there’s no sense of history at all, no recollection of scenarios that were similar, that played out poorly in the past. And if the world is more complicated to navigate because it’s multipolar, if there’s a need for a small country to build these relations in an exploratory way with many, many countries, not just with, in your case, Australia and New Zealand, then that requires a lot of knowledge, a lot of history, a lot of experience. And you have to make sure that your government knows to capture that through the caliber of its foreign service personnel over time. And continuity in the foreign service is very important.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, we have the last two questions — one from the chief representative of the IMF in China, and also from a former chairman of Sinopec.

Marshall Mills, Senior Representative in China, IMF

Thank you. So my question is more from my previous life, when I worked on U.S.-China economic relations and China’s accession to the WTO, which fostered a lot of coupling between the U.S. and China business sectors. Now we see decoupling of the business sectors: U.S. companies are not investing, or at least not making new investment, in China. There’s resistance to Chinese investment in the U.S. Where do you think this is going? What will the new coopetition look like in the business sector between the two countries?

Fu Chengyu, Former Chairman, Sinopec Group

Okay, thank you very much for sharing about the U.S.-China relations, but I will ask a question not directly related to the current U.S. questions, but one that will have an impact on the long term of such relations, which is the U.S.-Iran war. What we understand is that President Trump can not stop the war. They have to continue because within the U.S. there are three forces pushing him toward the war. One is what we call the military-industrial complex. Second is zionism. And the third is Israel — Netanyahu, who is pushing Trump toward the war. MAGA people do not want war. And I think that’s why Trump renamed the Department of Defense to the Department of War. Now it seems Trump wants to stop for the midterm elections, but they couldn’t stop because the other forces — Iran will strongly oppose or retaliate — so that’s what’s keeping Trump from stopping.

My question is: what are your expectations for the end results? Will the Iranian administration totally change? Will the Strait of Hormuz be fully open? Or will we see continued fighting and closing of the Strait of Hormuz for another six months or a year? So, what are your expectations?

Song Yaoming, Former Minister, Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s Office, Chinese Embassy in Japan; Former Commercial Counselor, Department of Asian Affairs, MOFCOM

Thank you, Henry, for giving me this opportunity, and Professor Quelch, thank you very much for your insightful presentation — I very much enjoyed your perspective. If I may, I would like to hear your thoughts on one question: how can universities like Duke Kunshan University and think tanks like CCG make use of AI to expand academic collaboration, policy dialogues, and people-to-people exchange, so that they can continue to serve as a trusted Track Two bridge, even during times of strategic competition? Thank you.

John Quelch

Let me try to briefly respond to each of the three questions.

So, to take the last question first. I think this is actually a very interesting idea that you pose. We’re thinking about how we can work with other universities using AI dialogue, but with teams of students at different universities working on the same problem, but also sharing, in an AI-based dialogue, what their answers should be to, let’s say, how do we address climate change in the next 10 years? So, cross-university collaborations, either at the student level or the researcher level, are possible, and can be leveraged effectively through using AI tools.

On the first question, regarding trade and investment. Trade is always easier to deal with, I think, and easier to activate, than investment. And it’s true that there’s been a considerable slowdown in bilateral investment. Those investments that Chinese companies have made in the U.S. that are particularly laudable are investments in industries that are not necessarily super sensitive, you know. For example, there’s a Chinese company, I think I may pronounce the name wrong, Wanxiang, which is in the auto parts, or auto components, sector. Over the last 15 years, they made a number of investments in the Midwest of the U.S., buying companies that were almost bankrupt, or were bankrupt, and saving hundreds and hundreds of jobs in Ohio, Indiana, and so on by bringing their manufacturing expertise, which enabled them to turn around those businesses. And that company then became very well received and lauded by the mayors and governors of those states, and the cities where they saved the jobs.

So, my advice, wherever you’re going to invest, is to always remember the words of President Kennedy: ask not what China can do for you, ask what you can do for China. And you can apply the same thing to the United States, or any country. It’s a very important question to ask before you invest, and your reception as an investor will depend on how much you’re going to be contributing to the place that’s now hosting your investment.

So, on the war. I’m quite pessimistic on this issue. I’m not an expert, but I’m quite pessimistic, and I’ll tell you why. Forty-seven years is a long time between the United States and Iran, and it’s been like this all the way. President Trump obviously activated a military action that took out most of the leadership of the country. President Trump does not have a monopoly on retribution; he likes to think about retribution in terms of his political opponents domestically, but Iran also might have a view on retribution.

November is not that far away, for the Senate and congressional elections. I can imagine some nefarious thinking in Tehran about what surprise they could give President Trump, around about October the first, that would maybe upset the stock markets of the world, and maybe he loses those elections. I don’t know. All I’m saying is, from a geopolitical scenario-planning point of view, I hope someone in Washington is thinking about that.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, good. On that note, I think our time is up. We had a very good, stimulating, but also very in-depth dialogue with Professor Quelch at the CCG VIP luncheon. We also had extremely active participation from our distinguished audience, and your questions and comments were really all valuable.

I particularly think that the theme of the luncheon today is coopetition, and I think in the world of the 21st century, we have so many things coming — uncertainty, AI, climate, all that global debt, and all those issues around trade and investment. We really need cooperation — that’s still the buzzword — but of course we don’t avoid competition. We just finished the World Cup, so let’s have a World Cup style or an Olympic-style competition. I was so amazed that, you know, 48 countries participated where everyone played by the rules and a winner was selected. There are some frictions, but not really a fight, or “wipe you out,” or things like that.

So, I think in the spirit of the World Cup, and in the spirit of the Olympics, why don’t we have this friendly competition, but really maintain cooperation? So that’s probably this new concept, which is really an old concept that we need to give new meaning to, not just for business, but also for geopolitical, country-to-country relations into the future.

So, on that note, I really want to thank Professor Quelch for your excellent dialogue with us today, and we hope to have you again in the future. Okay, let’s take a photo together.

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Titled “Reimagining Globalization: Asia’s Vision for an Open World,” the session was chaired by Jake Yu, Global Managing Partner of Peregrine Ventures, USA.

Other panellists included Roger King, Founder and Chairman of ODS Holdings Inc., Hong Kong; Vinod Sekhar, Chairman of Petra Group, Malaysia; and Michael Yeoh, President of the KSI Strategic Institute for Asia Pacific, Malaysia.

Wang observed that China’s growing economic weight gives it both the opportunity and the responsibility to help sustain a rules-based global trading order — one reshaped for a more multipolar world rather than built around a single centre.

Mabel Lu Miao, co-founder and secretary-general of CCG, was also invited to attend the forum and speak at the session “Asia 2076: Eastern Wisdom, New Productive Forces,” held on the afternoon of 9 July.

The following article has been compiled from Wang’s remarks during the panel discussion and lightly edited and connected for clarity.

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I want to thank Frank for inviting me and congratulate Horasis on the tenth anniversary of the Horasis Asia Meeting. This is great. We have all the Asian leaders and Asian elites sitting in this room, and I have really enjoyed the discussion we have had so far.

The topic is globalisation. I think globalisation itself, as a system for the greater good over the last 81 years, needs to be upgraded, improved and enhanced. I am not saying globalisation is dead. I think we need to reform the system. That is probably what we need to do.

I would like to share a few of my thoughts about the megatrends that we are going to see.

Asia’s emerging role

First of all, Asia is going to become the biggest leading economy in the world. We already have over half of the world’s population. We are already getting close to 50 per cent of global GDP. Most of all, we have no wars right now here in the Far East. I mean, it is incredible.

China is still growing, maintaining around 5 per cent GDP growth and contributing over 30 per cent of global GDP growth.

I think Asia is going to become an anchor of the world economy for the foreseeable future — the next 25 or even 50 years. I think that trend is a megatrend that will continue. That is the number one trend I am seeing.

The second trend I am seeing is that Asia is also going to be a new saviour of globalisation. We see that globalisation has had all the bumps and setbacks, as well as deglobalisation.

The WTO is under enormous threat. The United States has pulled out of the WTO Appellate Body, and we also see the United States pulling out of 66 international organisations.

But in Asia, regional governance and multilateralism remain very strong.

Michael just mentioned RCEP, the largest free trade agreement in the world. We also talk about the CPTPP. Japan and Australia are really making the CPTPP more attractive. China wants to join it, and the UK has just joined it as well.

As a new set of rules and a new trade scheme for the world, Asia is really providing a lot for the people in this partnership. In that sense, Asia is setting a new trend for the future of the trading system.

Trade is still the most booming and active area of Asia. ASEAN is China’s largest trading partner. It used to be the United States, but ASEAN has since taken over. You can see how strong this area is.

That is my second trend: Asia is making new schemes, conducting new experiments and pursuing new reforms to really push for globalisation.

Number three is that Asia is also a major source of support and a main component of the BRICS countries. China and India are the two largest Global South countries and are enormously important.

The GDP of the BRICS countries is already larger than that of the G7. Newly thriving nations such as the BRICS countries are taking new shapes and forms, and China and India are really making a huge contribution there.

I would say that this is also, again, coming out of Asia.

The fourth megatrend I can see concerns the Asia-Pacific. Shenzhen is going to host the APEC summit this year. President Trump is coming. He will show off his new Air Force One. He said he is going to fly it to Shenzhen. We will see what comes out of that.

What I am saying is that the Asia-Pacific will probably become more stable. I see China–US relations moving from strategic rivalry under Trump 1.0 to strategic stability under Trump 2.0. That is going to move the Asia-Pacific towards greater strategic stability. I think that is great.

Number five is that the United States is actually pulling back quite a bit. The United States is pivoting towards Latin America and really concentrating on the Western Hemisphere.

In the Asia-Pacific, and Asia in particular, I see more room for movement. China will play a more active role. The Pacific is big enough to accommodate both United States and China.

You talked about global governance. China is proposing a lot of new schemes, such as the recent establishment of the international mediation centre in Hong Kong. China will host an AI summit next month in Shanghai. I am going to propose setting up an international AI organization. China has also just set up an international World Data Organization, or WDO.

I think there are a lot of new reforms coming up to really push globalisation forward.

The final trend I can predict is that the integration of Asia is going to be central to this new globalisation.

ASEAN, as Michael mentioned, is such a great model. It is a little bit different from the European Union. In the European Union, all 27 members have a veto. You cannot just do things. But ASEAN works by consensus, which is really great.

Can we really start from ASEAN? Can we have an Asian Union? Mahathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew mentioned this many years ago. Let us get China into this. Let us get India, Japan and South Korea into this. I see Asia gradually becoming an economic magnet.

Basically, these are two different philosophies that China and the United States are pursuing. The United States really has securitization, with 800 military bases around the world. China does not really have many military bases—basically none. But China is developing economically based organizations, starting from Asia.

We have the China–Africa Summit, the China–Latin America Summit, the China–Central Asia Summit, the China–Arab States Summit and the China–Europe Summit. There is a lot of collaboration that China can pursue to push for economic globalisation.

Asia itself is going to be a big magnet and a big driving force for globalisation over the next quarter-century.

In that sense, China has proposed more economically centred global governance.

As the United States pulls out of the WHO, China has announced that it will donate US$500 million to the WHO. China also supports the United Nations. Twenty per cent of its budget comes from China, while the United States has not paid on time.

China has almost become the largest contributor. China is also the largest peacekeeping-contributing country among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

I can see China and Asia also pivoting towards the wider world. Things are really becoming very significant. We need new global governance to reform the existing system.

I really appreciate President Trump’s visit and the movement in China–US relations from strategic rivalry to strategic stability.

We will probably have two major powers, but all the other countries do not have to pick sides now. They will just choose on the merits. Who is going to provide benefits? Who is going to bring more economic benefits?

We are entering a very interesting world, and Asia will make the difference.

A proposal for an Asia summit

In terms of the most important thing to do over the next 12 months, I would like to make a proposal out of this meeting.

We are having the 2026 Horasis Asia Meeting. In the next 12 months, we should have an Asia summit.

We have an African summit involving 54 countries. We have a Latin American summit. We have an EU summit. We do not have an Asia summit.

Let us get all the Asian leaders together. Let us come to Hong Kong or go somewhere else. Let us have an Asia summit.

That will probably be the most important thing, at least for Asian leaders to build up trust, have face-to-face dialogue and really come to the table—to have a big round table of all the Asian leaders.

Asia is the engine. It is the future growth of the world. It also needs to work with all the other continents.

I think we really need some critical new thinking over the next 12 months. I think it is clear.

A proposal for an “AI20”

I also have a proposal concerning artificial intelligence.

We are going to have a G20 summit in Miami in December this year. But we see that the world is becoming more and more dangerous.

Why can we not have an “AI20”?

Let us get the 20 largest AI companies to sit together and talk about the pros and cons, the dangers, the risks that we may face, and how we can work together.

Rather than remaining divided and having an AI arms race, we need to recognize that we could be creating a disaster. AI could be more dangerous than nuclear bombs. Humanity could be wiped out by AI.

Alongside the G20, let us have the AI20. Let us get the 20 largest AI companies in the world to sit together and talk about how we can really build a better world and how AI can serve humanity.

The balance between the market and government

There is always a swing back and forth. We talk about small government and a big market. The Third Plenum document of the Communist Party of China also said that the market should play a decisive role.

But as the world becomes more complicated and globalisation deepens, I think there needs to be a balance between the market and government.

For example, we saw the financial crisis. It was all left to the market, and then the market crashed.

China combined the market reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping with government planning, including five-year plans. That produced the miracle.

I think the United States is actually learning some of that. The CHIPS Act and other government interventions are examples. Government intervention in Europe has also been speeded up.

The way forward is to strike the right balance, as China is trying to do.

For example, China’s private sector contributes more than 50 per cent of tax revenue, more than 60 per cent of GDP, 70 per cent of innovation, 80 per cent of employment and 90 per cent of enterprises.

Then another part of the economy consists of SOEs, which do all the difficult jobs in key sectors, including disaster relief, earthquake relief and high-speed railways. These can be losing businesses, but they provide public goods.

Then there are multinational companies. They employ 40 million Chinese employees and account for 40 per cent of China’s exports.

We all talk about the overcapacity of China’s electric vehicles, but 20 per cent of those vehicles are made by multinational companies, including Tesla, BMW and many others.

This hybrid system that China has right now has supported the fastest-growing economy over the last four decades. That is probably the right balance.

You have a large private sector. You have some multinational companies. You have some SOEs.

Government and market forces have to really find a compromise. That right balance is something everybody is in search of, and I think China is conducting a big experiment.

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