Vuk Jeremić, former Serbian Foreign Minister and President of the 67th session of the United Nations General Assembly, and Srđan Šaper, editor-in-chief of Serbia’s Horizons magazine and a prominent European entrepreneur, attended the event and delivered keynote presentations. Representatives of more than ten Chinese companies also participated in the discussion.

The event was chaired by Mabel Lu Miao, CCG co-founder and secretary-general. Participants exchanged views on Serbia’s investment environment, opportunities for Chinese companies expanding into European markets, China–Serbia industrial cooperation, and potential areas of collaboration, including artificial intelligence (AI).

Jeremić said that Serbia and China had maintained long-standing and stable cooperative relations. Against the backdrop of ongoing adjustments in China–Europe economic and trade relations, Serbia could play a unique role in connecting China and Europe, providing a platform for businesses on both sides to establish partnerships and pursue industrial cooperation. Chinese companies had already invested in and undertaken projects in Serbia in mining, railways, roads, and infrastructure. Further opportunities for cooperation existed in AI, information technology, data centres and digital government.

Addressing recent political developments in Serbia and their potential impact on China–Serbia relations, Jeremić said that Serbia’s policy towards China had remained consistent and that changes in government would not alter the fundamental direction of bilateral relations. He noted that the relationship had remained stable over the long term, with close political and economic ties between China and Serbia representing an important advantage for the country. He encouraged Chinese companies to follow developments during Serbia’s political transition and actively plan their investment and cooperation arrangements for 2027.

Jeremić also introduced plans for a China–Europe Investment Forum to be held in Belgrade in May 2027. The forum aims to bring together businesses, government representatives and academics from China, Serbia and across Europe to promote dialogue, build connections and advance practical cooperation. CCG will serve as a partner of the forum and invite Chinese companies to attend the event and related exchanges in Serbia.

Šaper said that Serbia not only maintained good relations with China but also had internationally competitive IT professionals and technology companies. These resources could create favourable conditions for Chinese companies to pursue technological cooperation, talent exchanges and joint projects in Europe. He also stressed that cultural, ecological and people-to-people exchanges could foster greater mutual understanding between the two societies and provide a broader social foundation for business cooperation.

During the discussion, representatives from iSoftStone, Tianhe Solar and Beijing Zhidian Education raised questions about the impact of recent political developments on China–Serbia relations, Chinese investment and technological cooperation. They also explored opportunities and changes in policies and regulations in areas including AI, digital government and IT infrastructure, new energy, and corporate talent needs. Representatives from more than ten companies and organisations attended the event, including the China Semiconductor Industry Association, the Hebei Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, the Tongzhou District International Chamber of Commerce, Far East Holding and Huaxing Communications.

On 18–19 June 2026, CCG founder Henry Huiyao Wang and co-founder and secretary-general Mabel Lu Miao attended the Horizons Sustainability and Connectivity Forum in Belgrade, Serbia. The forum was organised by the Centre for International Relations and Sustainable Development (CIRSD), chaired by Vuk Jeremić.

CCG and CIRSD have maintained close exchanges and cooperation over the years. On 20 March 2026, CCG and Horizons, a publication of CIRSD, jointly hosted a CCG Global Dialogue at CCG headquarters in Beijing.

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AI is approaching a pivotal turning point: its capabilities are advancing rapidly as its cost drops. Knowledge and industrial expertise once tied to individual engineers, managers, and organizations can increasingly be translated into reusable, scalable AI capabilities. Lee said this could create a new source of competitiveness for Chinese companies expanding overseas.

In the AI era, globalization should mean more than exporting products and technology. It should also mean turning China’s industrial experience into productive capabilities that take root locally. By combining that experience with local talent, knowledge, and business needs, Chinese companies can help partners build sustainable AI capabilities and create value together.

Drawing on 01.AI’s work in business operations, industrial production, and AI education overseas, Lee discussed three priorities: bringing AI into core business functions under CEO leadership, measuring transformation by business results, and building sovereign AI partnerships that support long-term local development.

1. China’s New Competitive Edge: Turning Industrial Expertise into a Source of Global Productivity

Globalization has long been driven by the cross-border movement of goods, capital, production capacity, and talent. AI adds another dimension: specialized knowledge and the ability to perform complex tasks can also cross borders and be applied at scale.

Consider an engineer’s understanding of equipment, a sales manager’s judgment about customers, a factory manager’s knowledge of production optimization, or a CEO’s experience running a business. These capabilities are hard-won competitive advantages. But because they often reside in individuals and depend on close organizational collaboration, they can be difficult and costly to reproduce across teams and markets.

AI is beginning to change that.

As models improve and operating costs fall, AI agents are moving beyond answering questions to planning and carrying out complex tasks. Individuals and organizations can increasingly translate expertise into reusable AI capabilities and deploy them at scale.

This creates a way to make expertise that once resided mainly in the minds of engineers and managers available to a much wider range of people and operations.

However, simply deploying a few AI agents will not reproduce a company’s competitive advantage.

AI must understand how the business actually works. By connecting data, knowledge, and workflows into a dynamic context for business operations, companies can help agents understand business entities and their relationships, use tools, contribute to tasks, and continually test and improve their performance in real-world settings. Only then can professional expertise translate into measurable productivity gains.

By making expertise accessible beyond a small group or a single organization, AI gives Chinese companies a chance to turn decades of industrial experience into a new source of global competitiveness.

This marks a new phase of globalization: one that goes beyond exporting products and relocating production to building local teams, brands, and distribution networks.

The opportunity is not simply to bring Chinese products to the world, but to make China’s industrial experience a source of productivity worldwide.

Chinese companies can bring that experience together with local talent, knowledge, and business needs to help partners build capabilities that create lasting value. The shift is from taking products abroad to developing capabilities together.

But transferring expertise alone does not guarantee results. The challenge is embedding AI in real business operations, improving performance, and building capabilities local teams can sustain.

2. Enterprise AI’s Next Stage: From Knowledge Gains to Business Results

Sales teams use AI to prepare proposals, R&D teams to write code, finance teams to analyze reports, and customer service teams to deploy agents. These tools can help individuals work more efficiently, but the bigger question is whether they improve company performance.

McKinsey’s 2026 Global State of AI survey found that 80% of respondents said AI had increased their personal productivity, while only 37% reported a positive effect on their company’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).

The gap highlights a central challenge of enterprise AI: individual productivity gains do not automatically translate into better business outcomes.

Success is not measured by how much AI a company deploys, but by whether it improves its results.

As AI becomes more capable and less expensive, Lee said, the competitive question is shifting from whether a company uses AI to how deeply it integrates AI into core operations and management decisions. AI must do more than accelerate individual tasks; it must understand how the business operates and creates value, and contribute to analysis, decision support, and execution.

Enterprise AI is therefore moving beyond task-level efficiency toward decision-making systems designed to improve business results.

To support this shift, 01.AI developed TrueNorth, an enterprise AI decision hub that helps AI interpret business operations and turn insights into actionable steps whose progress can be tracked.

TrueNorth begins with a company’s objectives and uses ontology modeling to create a structured map of the business. By connecting data, knowledge, business entities, and their relationships, it helps AI understand how the organization works. Multi-agent collaboration and simulation support business analysis, scenario evaluation, and task execution, while ongoing tracking links insight and decisions to execution and feedback.

Technology alone, however, cannot deliver transformation. Organizations must change as well.

Lee said becoming AI-native requires CEOs to rethink how they manage. Rather than relying mainly on reports to understand performance, they should organize around directly responsible individuals (DRIs), make accountability clear, align execution with business objectives, and measure whether actions produce tangible improvements.

In practice, CEO-led AI transformation means the CEO must personally drive AI adoption across core operations, redesign workflows and collaboration around business goals, and assign a DRI to each task. Decisions need owners, actions need follow-through, and investments need to be assessed by their business impact.

Building on TrueNorth, 01.AI developed Boss AI to bring this CEO-led approach into everyday management.

Boss AI acts as an AI chief of staff for the CEO, helping managers spot operational risks and track key issues. It supports preparation before meetings, decision-making during them, and follow-up afterward. The goal is to shift managers from passively reviewing reports to identifying problems early, making informed decisions, and ensuring execution—with value measured by business results.

The essential shift is from helping employees work faster to helping the company perform better.

The same principle applies on the industrial front line.

01.AI is working with one of the world’s five largest iron ore producers on an enterprise AI project to give decision-makers a more complete view of operations and help them make better-informed choices.

Mining operations are tightly interconnected: equipment, materials, processing, transportation, and production planning all affect one another. AI must interpret real-time operating conditions, identify output constraints, assess how alternatives could affect overall production, and recommend practical improvements that meet safety, quality, and operational requirements. The results must then be checked against actual production data.

Whether supporting executive decisions or optimizing production, AI’s value depends not on how many recommendations it produces, but on whether those recommendations improve results.

3. The Next Frontier of AI Globalization: Building Productivity Locally

Scenario analysis in the World Trade Organization’s *World Trade Report 2025* suggests that, by 2040, AI could increase global trade by 34%–37% and global GDP by 12%–13% compared with the baseline scenario.

As AI makes specialized expertise less costly to deploy across borders, it could reshape global value chains and broaden access to high-quality resources that have traditionally been concentrated in a small number of companies and regions.

01.AI’s AI education initiative in Kazakhstan offers one example of this potential.

In September 2026, 01.AI partnered with Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education and Q.AI to pilot a national AI education platform in 10 rural schools, with plans to expand the program in 2027.

The project is testing an AI-supported, dual-teacher classroom model that draws on large language models’ ability to understand language, support knowledge-based interaction, and personalize learning. Excellent teachers based in cities teach remotely, while local teachers support students in person. AI assists throughout the process—from lesson preparation and classroom interaction to assessment and post-class feedback—helping teachers identify individual learning needs and tailor their guidance.

The goal is not only to narrow the urban-rural gap in access to quality education, but also to give more children learning experiences tailored to their individual needs.

As the program grows from 10 pilot schools toward a planned 500, it will require curriculum knowledge bases, support for local languages, teacher training, and an education data platform. Just as important, local teams need the skills to develop, deploy, and improve the products themselves, ensuring the program can be sustained over time.

As Lee emphasized, technology can cross borders, but capabilities must take root locally.

Through its work with Kazakhstan on Q.AI, 01.AI is providing AI technology while investing in local research and development, engineering and deployment, product adaptation, and talent development. By bringing Chinese technology and industrial experience together with local languages, data, knowledge, and talent, the partnership aims to help Kazakhstan build sovereign AI capabilities it can develop and sustain independently.

The experience points to a broader opportunity for Chinese companies in the AI era: to move beyond exporting products and technology and instead share expertise while building local capabilities with partners.

Chinese companies can contribute AI technology and industrial experience; overseas partners can bring knowledge of local markets and needs; and financial institutions, professional service providers, and international organizations can provide support. Together, they can embed AI in real-world operations and create lasting value.

01.AI aims to be a long-term partner in this process—not only helping customers solve immediate problems, but also working with local partners to build products, teams, and technical expertise so that AI can support industrial development and economic growth.

In the past, Chinese companies took products, production capacity, and supply chains abroad. In the AI era, they can bring decades of industrial experience abroad and turn it into AI capabilities that create new sources of productivity with partners worldwide.

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At the recent Valdai Discussion Club, I asked Russian President Vladimir Putin if he would be open to meeting Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) forum in Shenzhen. I also asked, more broadly, what role China could play in promoting peace in Ukraine, mediating and contributing to peacekeeping.

Putin was receptive, warmly welcoming the idea of a China-hosted meeting. Trump, too, has expressed a willingness to meet Xi and Putin. These expressions of openness offer an opportunity we must seize in pursuit of peace.

Some in the United States and Europe question the value of such a summit. They may fear restoring Putin’s standing or normalising the conflict without yielding any real progress towards an end to the war. That risk is still real but these largely Western fears must be tempered by the very real, very human cost of letting the war continue unabated.

From the very beginning of the war, I have been arguing that China has a constructive role to play. In March 2022, less than three weeks into Russia’s invasion, I wrote an article in The New York Times titled “It’s Time to Offer Russia an Offramp. China Can Help With That.”

In August last year, I extended that train of logic in Foreign Policy, where I proposed a seven-party format for peace negotiations and suggested that a peacekeeping force include troops from European and Brics countries. A meeting of the three leaders in Shenzhen could help lay the groundwork for these broader diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts.

Without Ukraine’s participation, such a meeting is unlikely to produce a diplomatic masterstroke that ends the war. But the three leaders need not put the war to rest at a table in Shenzhen to make progress. Serious consideration of a ceasefire along the current line of contact – an approach Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has supported – could give peace efforts fresh momentum, leaving the final status of disputed territories for subsequent negotiations.

Further agreement could be sought on the protection of nuclear facilities, or a mutual end to strikes on energy infrastructure, new prisoner exchanges or improved humanitarian access. Of course, issues of sovereignty, security guarantees, Russia’s security concerns and Europe’s security commitments would remain. But these need not all be resolved at once before a ceasefire can begin.

Already, years of war have inflicted immense suffering on both Russia and Ukraine. Neither side achieved its objectives, and both need a dignified way out that protects their core interests. Thus, we must open a path towards peace without requiring either side to concede defeat. China could help bridge this gap by bringing Xi, Trump and Putin together in Shenzhen to explore how a ceasefire and wider negotiations involving Ukraine might work.

The United Nations could stand at the core of such an arrangement by monitoring any ceasefire and preventing a return to fighting by physical peacekeeping if the parties are so inclined.

For a broader negotiation on settlement, I find myself returning to a seven-party format that would bring together the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, Britain and the US – alongside Ukraine and the European Union. An understanding reached in Shenzhen could give momentum to this broader negotiating process and free up the Security Council for action.

A peacekeeping force composed entirely of Nato or European troops might be unacceptable to Russia. Yet a mission without European participation would struggle to reassure Ukraine and its neighbours. Any workable arrangement would need to address both concerns.

In my Foreign Policy article, I proposed a peacekeeping force drawing troops from five European countries – Germany, France, Britain, Poland and Italy – and five members of the Brics grouping, such as China, India and Brazil. And while the exact formulation, from the composition and mandate to the terms of deployment, would need to be negotiated with the consent of Russia and Ukraine, and the agreement of the contributing countries, the core idea remains sound.

As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel among the five permanent members, China is well positioned to help. Its distinctive role in the global economy and dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, the US and Europe, give it channels through which to coax the parties towards peace. But this process must begin somewhere, and that somewhere could be Shenzhen.

Nor should Apec be the end of the diplomatic effort. With an understanding reached by the leaders in Shenzhen, the Security Council may pick up the momentum by advancing ceasefire and peacekeeping proposals. The Group of 20 could then join the effort to rally support from major economies with an interest in maintaining the deal. Each would play a different role and would not be tasked with settling the entire conflict.

China’s role in the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement in 2023 showed Beijing’s ability to open a door after years of enmity. The Ukraine war is different, and there can be no guarantee of a similar outcome. But diplomacy must begin somewhere, particularly when fighting has brought such destruction.

The central question is whether such a meeting could help bring the war to an end. In that light, any gain in prestige for an individual leader is almost irrelevant. And if the three leaders could agree on practical steps towards peace, they would give the United Nations and the wider international community a material basis upon which peace could be built. (Enditem)

Pekingnology

China Can Help Trump and Putin End the War in Ukraine, Henry Huiyao Wang writes in Foreign Policy

As Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin are set to meet on Friday at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage, Alaska, Henry Huiyao Wang writes in Foreign Policy on Wednesday, August 13…

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a year ago · 17 likes · 3 comments · CCG Update

The discussion will look back at China’s achievements since joining the WTO in 2001 and explore the opportunities and challenges facing China and the global trading system amid rising trade protectionism, geopolitical tensions and mounting pressures on global industrial and supply chains.

Drawing on their extensive experience in international trade and diplomacy, Lamy and González will offer perspectives on China’s engagement with the WTO, the future of the multilateral trading system and prospects for global economic cooperation. Experts, business leaders and think tank scholars will join the discussion.

Event Details

Date: Saturday, 7 November 2026
Time: 10:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m. (Beijing time)
Venue: Beijing
Format: Roundtable discussion and luncheon
Host: Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

About Pascal Lamy

Pascal Lamy served as Director-General of the WTO for two consecutive terms, from 2005 to 2013. He coordinates the Jacques Delors Institutes in Paris, Berlin and Brussels and serves as Vice-President of the Paris Peace Forum. Before leading the WTO, he served as European Commissioner for Trade, Chief Executive Officer of Crédit Lyonnais and Chief of Staff to European Commission President Jacques Delors, among other senior positions in the French government and European institutions.

About Arancha González

Arancha González is Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) at Sciences Po. She served as Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation from 2020 to 2021, and previously as United Nations Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the International Trade Centre from 2013 to 2020. From 2005 to 2013, she served as Chief of Staff to WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy. Her career spans international trade, development, diplomacy and European affairs.

Registration and Enquiries

Please note that this is a paid event. Participation is by invitation only, and places are limited. Those interested in attending are invited to register by scanning the QR code below.

or use this registration link

Email: ccgevent@ccg.org.cn

Tel: +86 159 1062 1460

Ruschmeier, who has lived and worked in China since 2017, subsequently published a commentary in Table.Briefings on 20 October, drawing on ideas discussed at the forum. In the article, he argues that Chinese investment and technological expertise could support Europe’s industrial renewal, and that Europe’s China Policy should be assessed in terms of its contribution to European competitiveness and prosperity.

The article is republished here with the author’s permission.

EU: Too much politics in the debate on China

Chinese capital and technological expertise could support Europe’s industrial renewal. Europe’s policy toward China should evaluate such opportunities based on their contribution to Europe’s own competitiveness and social prosperity.

On Oct. 17, I spoke at the China Outbound Investment Forum in Beijing with Henry Huiyao Wang, the founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization. He suggested that German industrial companies invest jointly in Germany with their Chinese partners. Former Chinese Minister of Commerce Chen Deming advocated at the conference for an investment agreement with the EU that could provide a reliable framework for such projects.

At European locations, it would be worth examining whether established corporate partnerships can accelerate industrial renewal. The benchmark for this should be the sustainable development of in-house technological capabilities.

In his 1986 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, US economist James Buchanan made a remarkable statement: “There is no political counterpart to Adam Smith’s invisible hand.” Buchanan drew attention to the rules governing political decision-making and to the interests of the parties involved – which the Scottish economist Adam Smith had already identified in the 18th century as key components on the path to the wealth of nations.

Even with good intentions, a politically desired outcome by no means arises automatically.

In my view, this implies a practical requirement for policy toward China. Its instruments need verifiable goals and procedures that allow for course corrections if the results fall short of expectations. This applies to trade restrictions as well as to the promotion of investment. The prospect of political acclaim offers no guarantee of their economic success.

China is not going anywhere. Its technological development is putting increased pressure on Europe to renew its own competitiveness. The credibility of tougher trade instruments also depends on what economic costs Europe is willing to bear in the event of a conflict. A policy toward China that proposes further restrictions should provide a clear justification for its expected security gains and economic costs.

To the extent that trade restrictions aim to buy Europe’s industrial players additional time, it must be clear what capabilities are to be developed during that period. What will Europe do with the time it gains? What investments will this trigger, who will finance them, and when are competitive offerings expected to emerge from them? The political decision on a policy instrument should answer these questions.

Experience in the US already provides evidence of sectoral gains in production and higher costs resulting from tariffs. The US International Trade Commission has examined such effects and explicitly distinguished its analysis from an assessment of the overall net economic benefit. Long-term competitiveness, in particular, requires its own set of criteria. Additional production resulting from a tariff barrier alone does not yet answer this question.

In the case of temporary protective measures, progress should be reviewed regularly. Their continuation requires an economic justification that also takes into account the costs to buyers and consumers.

Let’s take China at its word. Wang’s proposal for joint investments and Chen’s call for a reliable framework open up a concrete negotiating agenda. If Chinese companies want to bring capital and technology to Europe, governments and companies should develop projects based on this and that make a verifiable contribution to European competitiveness.

For Germany as an industrial hub, it would be necessary to clarify what development work takes place locally. How are employees trained, and which skills do European partners develop independently? Contract drafting and investment reviews must clarify access to critical technologies as well as control over sensitive data. It is also crucial to determine which capabilities European companies retain in the event of the partner’s subsequent withdrawal.

Such an approach acknowledges that each side pursues its own interests. For European companies, this includes ensuring that collaboration leads to the long-term development of their own capabilities. Chinese partners need reliable conditions for their investments. European companies’ access to the Chinese market must also be on this negotiating agenda.

The appeal from Beijing deserves a response from Germany in the form of verifiable proposals. Europe’s competitiveness could benefit if Chinese investment leads to greater industrial learning capacity at European locations. The success of European policy toward China should be measured by this criterion.

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In New York last month, US-China talks on artificial intelligence opened up a path of cooperation. This was affirmed by the Xi-Trump summit in Washington where both presidents agreed to establish a formal AI dialogue and hotline. With the next AI meeting set to happen in November, it is imperative that both countries further cooperation.

The AI ecosystem is in flux. American tech companies are draining their coffers as they commit vast sums to chips, data centres and energy before the revenue model is even settled. Trillions of dollars are being committed to the AI buildout. While this exposure is not the same as the overleveraging in the mortgage market that triggered the 2008 global financial crisis, a sudden bursting of the AI bubble could have far-reaching consequences.

Much of US economic growth this year has been from AI or AI-enabling companies. Yet, only 38 per cent of Americans saw “more benefits than drawbacks” in AI products and services – well below the global average – against 85 per cent in China, according to the Ipsos AI Monitor 2026. In May, the Ipsos Consumer Tracker found that most Americans would oppose a data centre in their community.

The surge in AI capabilities has raised concerns. Rogue AI agent behaviour has gone from attempting to delete an entire email inbox to escaping sandboxes to launch cyberattacks. In July, during an isolated evaluation, OpenAI agents circumvented their restrictions to launch autonomous attacks on developer platform Hugging Face.

That same month, Calif, a small US security company, created WeWorm to exploit a zero-click vulnerability in WeChat’s calling system, enabling it to seize accounts and spread between phones without the recipient answering. In India, cybersecurity researchers at Hacktron used Anthropic’s Claude models to break into OpenAI, compromising employee accounts and reaching potentially sensitive software systems.

Both hacking incidents were conducted under friendly auspices and caused no damage – Tencent Holdings and OpenAI were quickly alerted and patched the bugs. But they portend the threat of AI-enabled cyberattacks, both from poorly managed AI and actors empowered by the devolution of yet more cyberwarfare capabilities into private hands.

Encapsulating the moment is the increasingly urgent call for safeguards by leading AI developers and scientists. Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei proposes opening up leading laboratories to permanent independent evaluators and coordinating safety standards across companies and governments, OpenAI CEO Sam Altman is committing its models to third-party evaluation, and Google DeepMind chairman Demis Hassabis is backing pre-deployment testing of frontier systems.

Last week, an open letter by at least 420 scientists across the globe called for urgent measures to prevent an AI fallout, including the creation of an international body to record and track containment failures.

These concerns provide an agenda for the coming US-China AI dialogue. Talks, however, should extend beyond managing incidents and developing safeguards towards building a sustainable business case for AI. Given its increasingly self-sustaining AI ecosystem, China has plenty to contribute.

First, it is clear the US and China ecosystems possess different pieces of the same business case.

American developers need applications capable of converting their frontier performance into sustained revenue. China offers one of the world’s largest environments for testing, refining and commercialising applications across manufacturing, logistics, medicine, education, public services and embodied AI.

While China’s industry could benefit from investment and research at the cutting edge of frontier model development, its capabilities in coordinating data centres and power supply could help take the strain off US compute capacity.

Cooperation on efficient models, cooling and energy management could help both countries meet rising demand while reducing the costs borne by consumers and communities. A healthy ecosystem has room for both American frontier models and efficient Chinese open-weight models.

Chinese open-weight models offer lower costs per token, making them economical companions to American frontier models. Companies can use them for routine, high-volume tasks and reserve frontier models for problems that warrant their capabilities. This high-low mix can make American frontier capabilities more economical to deploy within a wider workflow, strengthening the business case for both countries.

To sustain this cooperation, both countries must also confront AI risks and manage them together. The United States and China established one narrow principle two years ago when they affirmed that people, not AI, should decide on the use of nuclear weapons. I propose going further to adopt a reciprocal no-first-use commitment covering AI-enabled autonomous weapons.

The final AI issue that must be discussed is institutional. Fragmented governance risks building walls of incompatible standards and duplicated infrastructure. The US-led Pax Silica initiative and China-led World AI Cooperation Organisation should not be posed in opposition to each other.

Instead, both countries should place their global AI governance and interests under a shared UN-linked umbrella, giving countries that use AI a voice alongside those that develop it.

Finally, an annual US-China AI summit would serve as a strong foundation, bringing governments together with laboratories, scientists, universities, companies and civil society organisations. For now at least, it is still ultimately people who decide what moral value our technology has through what we choose to do with it.

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On October 19, Trump said he would be willing to meet with Xi and Putin in China, although he indicated that nuclear weapons and denuclearization, rather than the war in Ukraine, would be his preferred focus. The following day, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly defended the prospect of such a meeting, arguing that it made sense for the leaders of the world’s three most powerful nuclear-armed nations to communicate with one another. Rubio also stressed that engaging in dialogue should not be mistaken for making concessions.

The developments followed an October 19 report in The Wall Street Journal, which said Putin had floated the idea of a trilateral summit during an October 9 telephone conversation with Trump, according to a former Russian intelligence officer briefed on the matter. The proposed meeting, the newspaper reported, could take place on the sidelines of the November 18–19 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen. The Kremlin subsequently acknowledged that the possibility had been raised, while stressing that no concrete proposals or agreements on a meeting or its agenda had been reached.

Beijing, meanwhile, has neither confirmed nor explicitly ruled out such a meeting. China’s Foreign Ministry has repeatedly said it has no information to provide, including in responses on October 3, October 19, October 20, October 21, and most recently October 22. No trilateral summit has been formally announced.

Well before these latest developments, however, Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization (CCG), publicly raised precisely this possibility with Putin himself.

On October 1, during the televised and livestreamed plenary session of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in Russia, Wang, a former Counselor to China’s State Council, asked the Russian president about a possible meeting with Xi and Trump at APEC—and whether China could play a larger role in promoting peace.

Putin’s answer provided one of his clearest public statements yet on the prospect of a trilateral summit: such a meeting was possible, he said, but its success would depend on agreeing on an agenda and, to a considerable extent, on China as the host.

The exchange took place during the Valdai Discussion Club’s October 1 plenary session. Below is the exchange as rendered in the English interpretation of the session, with minor punctuation edits for readability.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Mr. President. My name is Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG).

You mentioned that you’re going to APEC, and we actually saw you had a very successful summit last year with President Trump, and you had a very successful summit with President Xi this year. Of course, President Xi just came back from the United States, also had a very successful summit.

So I’m wondering, when you are at the APEC, this possible trilateral summit. So, what do you expect China can play some more role, for example, in promoting the peace, making peace, or peacekeeping, or guarantor, whatever, so that can really facilitate this summit to be successful? Thank you.

Vladimir Putin

I have no doubt that the summit will be successful.

As for the role of China, well, first and foremost, Chinese philosophy and its political thought has never had an issue of applying pressure or solving issues through military force. Well, it’s not part of Chinese philosophy. China always tries to do that through peaceful means, and we see that in the Chinese policy led by President Xi.

Could China play a role right now? Yes, of course. That is based on its increasing economic and military potential as well, on its strive to expand its zone of free cooperation. The initiative by President Xi, One Belt One Road, is aimed at precisely that. Together with China, we’re developing this initiative as well, as well as the Russian initiative, and we’re coupling them together. For example, the Russian initiative on Eurasian cooperation. We’re working together, and that brings positive results.

As for the trilateral meeting during the APEC summit, it is possible. I guess I have said that it will largely depend on China as host of the APEC summit, but yet again, it’s always useful to me to clear up the positions of each other and so on. But most importantly, we need to find the agenda, the issues that could be part of that trilateral summit. We need to identify the topics for the discussion. Largely, that would depend on the hosts of the event, and hence President Xi.

The official English transcript is also available on the Valdai Discussion Club’s website.

Interfax separately reported Putin’s remarks, quoting him as saying that Russia supported the idea in principle and that a potential meeting at APEC would depend largely on China as the host. It also highlighted his response that China could play a role in promoting peace.

The exchange draws international media attention

The exchange quickly travelled beyond the room.

Reuters reported under the headline “Putin says he’s ready to meet Xi and Trump if agenda is worked out,” based on Putin’s remarks at the Valdai session. The news agency subsequently included the same point in its broader report on Putin’s statements that day, writing that the Russian president was ready for a trilateral meeting if an appropriate agenda could first be agreed. Henry Huiyao Wang’s longstanding advocacy for China’s role in peacemaking

Wang has advocated a greater Chinese role in efforts to end the war in Ukraine since the early stages of the conflict.

In March 2022, he wrote It’s Time to Offer Russia an Offramp. China Can Help With That. in The New York Times. He has repeatedly argued that China’s relationships with Russia, Ukraine, the United States and Europe give Beijing unusual opportunities to contribute to a negotiated settlement.

In subsequent writings and public discussions, including an August 2025 article in Foreign Policy, Wang proposed widening the diplomatic table beyond Moscow, Kyiv and Washington and involving China in efforts to bring the conflict to an end.

His appearance at Valdai also reflects his unusually extensive participation in international policy debates for the head of a Chinese nongovernmental think tank.

He also appeared as a panelist in Responsibility: Individual or Universal? Eighth Session of the Valdai Discussion Club’s 23rd Annual Meeting.

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The discussion will look back at China’s achievements since joining the WTO in 2001 and explore the opportunities and challenges facing China and the global trading system amid rising trade protectionism, geopolitical tensions and mounting pressures on global industrial and supply chains. Experts, business leaders and think tank scholars will exchange views on multilateral trade and global economic cooperation.

Event Details

Date: Saturday, 7 November 2026

Time: 10:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m. (Beijing time)

Location: Beijing

Format: Roundtable discussion and luncheon

Host: Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

About Pascal Lamy

Pascal Lamy served as Director-General of the WTO for two terms, from 2005 to 2013. He is coordinator of the Jacques Delors Institute, vice-president of the Paris Peace Forum and chairman of the Brunswick Group’s European Advisory Board. Before becoming WTO Director-General, he served as European Commissioner for Trade, president of Crédit Lyonnais, and held senior positions in the French government and European institutions.

Registration and Enquiries

Please note that this is a paid event. Participation is by invitation only, and places are limited. Those interested in attending are invited to register by scanning the QR code below.

or use this registration link

Email: ccgevent@ccg.org.cn

Tel: +86 159 1062 1460

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The luncheon will bring together senior officials, business leaders, and scholars from China and Japan to discuss bilateral trade and economic cooperation, industrial supply chains, and people-to-people exchanges amid a shifting geopolitical landscape.

Event Details

Date: Wednesday, 28 October 2026

Time: 11:30 AM–2:00 PM (Beijing time)

Venue: Beijing, China

Format: Invitation-only VIP luncheon, featuring opening remarks, a guest presentation, a roundtable discussion and networking over lunch.

Co-organisers: Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)

Programme

12:00–12:05 | Welcome and Introductions

Mabel Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

12:05–12:15 | Opening Remarks

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG; Former Counsellor to China’s State Council

Mitsuaki Hoshino, Chief Representative, JETRO Beijing Office

12:15–12:45 | Guest Presentation

Fukunari Kimura, President, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO)

12:45–13:25 | Roundtable Discussion

Moderator

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, CCG; Former Counsellor to China’s State Council

Panellists

• Yusaku Nishimura, Professor, School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)

• Song Yaoming, Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Japan

• Takamoto Suzuki, Head of Economic Research Team, Marubeni China Co., Ltd.

• Zhang Jifeng, Former Deputy Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

13:25–13:55 | Lunch and Open Discussion

13:55–14:00 | Closing Remarks and Group Photo

Registration and Enquiries

Participation is by invitation only, and places are limited. Those interested in attending are invited to register by scanning the QR code below.

Or use the registration link

Email: ccgluncheon@ccg.org.cn

Tel: +86 159 1062 1460

Subscribe now

The WTO Buffer

The China-EU trade consensus has meaning beyond a list of commodities, tariffs and various restrictions. Two of the world’s largest trading powers have chosen to engage inside the rules instead of maneuvering outside them. It’s an example that quietly draws a bottom line for global trade.

There is an unmistakable sense of relief among seasoned trade-policy analysts after the conclusion of the China-EU trade and investment consultations recently.

For months, two of the world’s three largest trading powers had drifted dangerously close to a full-blown trade war. Sharp disputes over a proposed hybrid vehicle import quota, rare-earth export controls and a huge trade deficit had poisoned bilateral commercial relations. Senior political figures in Paris and Berlin publicly floated proposals for fast-track import restrictions targeting Chinese manufactured goods, while powerful European manufacturing lobbies campaigned aggressively for tougher unilateral tools. Billions of euros in cross-border sales hung in the balance.

Against this high-stakes backdrop, the joint communique emerging from Beijing on Oct. 9 delivered a substantial package of practical de-escalatory outcomes. Both sides will continue to explore tariff cuts on selected goods and agreed to establish a permanent dialogue mechanism for green-industry cooperation. They reached an understanding on hybrid vehicle trade and agreed to continue price-undertaking and review procedures in the existing EV anti-subsidy case instead of escalating to new tariffs. On supply chains, Beijing offered a “green channel” for rare-earths and permanent-magnet export permits, while Brussels promised to expedite dual-use export license cases with member states.

But the strategic prize of the agreement is the World Trade Organization anchor. Valuable as the transaction-focused gains are, the agreement’s most far-reaching provision lies in its explicit political undertaking to anchor all ongoing and future China-EU trade disputes firmly in WTO rules, with formal WTO dispute-settlement procedures recognized as the sole legitimate mechanism for resolving cross-border commercial disputes.

In isolation, this consensus might seem like procedural housekeeping. In context, however, it is a quiet but decisive victory for multilateral trade governance nd a practical buffer against the kind of friction that has spilled over into broader geopolitical conflicts.

Consider the timing. At the G20 Trade Ministers Meeting, which concluded on Oct. 1, the U.S. trade representative called for revisiting the most-favored-nation principle—the bedrock of non-discrimination—effectively seeking to legalize a world in which tariffs are set bilaterally rather than multilaterally. If the MFN principle erodes, the global trading system reverts to the law of the jungle. Against that backdrop, the recognition by China and the EU (together accounting for roughly one-third of global GDP) that the WTO is the sole legitimate arbiter of trade disputes was uniquely significant. It signals that the world’s No. 2 and No. 3 economies stand together to uphold the rules-based order, even as Washington moves to dismantle it from within.

By reaffirming WTO discipline as their shared benchmark, China and the EU delivered a much-needed substantive boost to a fraying global economic order. Going forward, any contested legislative text or regulatory proposal originating from either side is to be measured against established WTO rules. Moreover, policy measures that violate multilateral norms either in form or substance would carry significantly higher diplomatic and reputational costs.

The consensus also serves as a corrective to the EU’s own drift toward protectionist unilateralism. Brussels has spent years packaging protectionism in the language of security, resilience and green goals.

Three cases highlight the frictions. First, proposals for a voluntary export-restraint arrangement intended to cap Chinese hybrid vehicle market share at 15 percent would create de facto quantitative import limits in direct violation of GATT Article XI, which explicitly prohibits such restrictions. Second, the Industrial Acceleration Act’s mandatory 70 percent local-content requirement for key green-technology components breaches the WTO’s national treatment obligations, artificially tilting market-competitive conditions in favor of domestic European producers. Third, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism applies inflated default carbon-emission benchmark values unilaterally to imported Chinese steel and aluminum. Although Brussels insists that the mechanism is purely climate-driven and fully WTO-compliant, Brazil and a broad coalition of emerging-market economies have submitted formal objections, arguing that it imposes discriminatory one-sided cost burdens without proper multilateral review. The Beijing consensus does not automatically invalidate these policies, but it substantially raises the reputational and diplomatic threshold for rolling out trade measures in the future that are overtly discriminatory.

Yet, it would be naive to treat the new consensus as a cure-all even if it seemingly pulls the EU back to the track of abiding by WTO discipline. The real question is whether the bloc will match words with deeds or go back on its commitments. Facing sliding industrial competitiveness, a growing number of EU politicians, in line with the bloc’s overall stance, pose a challenge to WTO rules and have signaled a willingness to abandon multilateral trade discipline, even when it would serve their political interests.

The EU retains deeply embedded protectionist reflexes, fueled largely by lobbying from struggling, uncompetitive manufacturing. For many European politicians, trade barriers deliver quick relief for squeezed domestic industries, while tough structural reforms to boost productivity carry real political costs.

The urge to offload internal EU frictions via unilateral tools is not new. The 20th century illustrates that without a neutral venue to settle trade disputes, rivalries can spiral into political rupture—which is exactly the gap the WTO was built to fill. The China-EU consensus on the WTO will not resolve disputes overnight arising from the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, subsidies or overcapacity, but it creates a guardrail against spiraling into a deeper confrontation. With the consensus serving as a crucial safety buffer, flare-ups will more likely be channeled into the rules-bound space of WTO dialogue. Meanwhile, those breaking WTO rules will find it more difficult to hide comfortably behind the rhetoric of “defending worker.” They will have to answer for breaking the public commitment they just backed.

Last week, China’s Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao and European Commissioner Maros Sefcovic agreed explicitly that differences would be handled “under the framework of WTO rules.”

That sentence is the whole story.

For a global trading system under strain, this commitment is far more than just another bilateral deal. It is a tangible reminder that multilateral rules still offer the most reliable path to de-escalation—if both sides choose to uphold them. This year, two of the world’s largest trading powers chose to engage inside the rules instead of maneuvering outside them. It’s an example that quietly draws a bottom line for global trade.

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The forum was co-organized by the China Association of International Trade (CAIT), the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies (CWTO), with the Project Management Institute (PMI) and 01.AI as strategic partners.

The event brought together government officials, business leaders, diplomats, representatives of international organizations and business associations, scholars, and professional service providers. Discussions covered globalization policy, international investment, Chinese companies’ overseas operations, artificial intelligence, the digital economy, China-Europe cooperation, and international project management.

Noted speakers include Chen Deming, China’s former Minister of Commerce,

and Chen Jian, China’s former Vice Minister of Commerce.

Globalization policy and opportunities for Chinese companies

The opening ceremony was moderated by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG).

Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG and former Counselor of the State Council, delivered welcome remarks.

Chen Jian, former Vice Minister of Commerce and Distinguished Expert of the CPPCC National Committee Talent Pool for Consultative Governance, delivered an opening keynote address.

Kai-Fu Lee, Chairman of Sinovation Ventures and Founder and CEO of 01.AI, delivered a keynote address.

Massimo Meloni, Chief of the Policy Research Section, Division on Investment and Enterprise, UNCTAD, presented findings from the World Investment Report 2026.

The morning program also featured keynote addresses on strategies for Chinese companies operating globally.

Speakers included Jiang Xipei, Founder and Chairman of Far East Holding Group;

Miranda Wang, Managing Director for China at the Project Management Institute (PMI);

Kimi Liu, Vice President of Trip.com Group and CEO of Tripadvisor China;

Sasan Karimi, Co-founder and Vice President for Global Affairs at the PAIAB Institute;

and Ray Zhang, Founder, Chairman and CEO of Airdoc.

Chen Deming, former Minister of Commerce of China, delivered the concluding address of the morning program.

Artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and cross-border e-commerce

The afternoon forum on “Artificial Intelligence, the Digital Economy and Cross-Border E-Commerce” was moderated by Tang Min, Vice President of CCG and former Counselor of the State Council.

Speakers included Chen Kuan, Founder, Chairman and CEO of Infervision;

Chen Yonglan, Chairman of China Carbon Neutral Development Group Limited;

Liu Zan, Director of Brand Public Relations at QuantGroup;

Justin Liu, Vice President of PayPal China;

Kimi Liu, Vice President of Trip.com Group and CEO of Tripadvisor China;

Lu Yajun, Dean of the Bilibili Institute of Public Policy;

Min Hao, Chairman of Dongwu Shian IoT Technology (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd.;

and Wang Yingqi, Co-founder and Executive President of TowardPi Medical.

Following the presentations, Tang moderated a question-and-answer session with the audience.

Participants discussed international market entry, cross-border talent needs, AI applications, regulatory compliance, digital content exports, and sustainable development.

China-Europe cooperation

The “China-Europe Cooperation Session” was moderated by Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG.

Speakers included Peng Gang, former Minister at the Chinese Mission to the European Union and Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs at the Ministry of Commerce

Adam Dunnett, Secretary-General of the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China;

Rza Aliyev, Secretary-General of the Nizami Ganjavi International Center;

Karim Alwadi, Co-founder of Beltway Group;

Daniel Albrecht, a German attorney at law and Managing Counsel of Starke, and Board Member of the German Chamber of Commerce in China;

Anthony Wang, venture capital investor and Schwarzman Scholar;

Dennis Günther, Chief Strategy Officer of Huaou Tonghai International Services;

Timo Blenk, Partner and CEO of Agora Strategy Group;

and Xu Chengzhi, Global Chief Public Affairs Officer of Windey Energy Technology Group Co., Ltd.

Corporate globalization and project management

The “Forum on Corporate Globalization and Project Management” was moderated by John Zhanjie Zhao, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG.

Miranda Wang, Managing Director for China at the Project Management Institute (PMI), delivered the featured address.

The session also featured case studies presented by Fang Zheng, Head of North America Strategy at LONGi Green Energy;

Chen Shumin, AI Empowerment Expert at Midea Group (Meiyun Zhishu);

Zhao Shasha, Head of International Product Project Management at Envision Energy;

and Guo Xiumei, Head of PPMC at the Drug Information Association (DIA) and Head of Strategic Planning at CanSino Biologics.

Zhang Wei, Vice President and Senior Fellow of CCG, delivered the closing remarks, concluding the daytime program.

Global recommendations announcement and networking dinner

The forum continued in the evening with the “2026 China Outbound Investment Forum: Global Recommendations Announcement and Networking Dinner”.

Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG and former Counselor of the State Council, delivered opening remarks.

Other keynote speakers included Jin Xu, President of the China Association of International Trade under China’s Ministry of Commerce

and Ma Jianchun, President of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, under China’s Ministry of Commerce

During the dinner, Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, announced three global recommendation lists: Top 50 Recommended Manufacturing Companies Going Global, Top 50 Recommended Service Providers for Global Expansion, and Top 50 Recommended Young Business Leaders.

The manufacturing list covered industries including new energy vehicles, electronics, clean energy, healthcare, industrial equipment, and consumer products. The service providers list featured companies and organizations working in digital platforms, cloud computing, consulting, legal services, cross-border payments, and project management. The young business leaders list highlighted emerging entrepreneurs and executives in artificial intelligence, robotics, consumer brands, smart hardware, and digital services.

The evening program also featured keynote addresses by Massimo Meloni of UNCTAD

and Kai-Fu Lee, Chairman of Sinovation Ventures and Founder and CEO of 01.AI.

Cultural performances and networking activities provided further opportunities for participants from business, government, international organizations, and professional services to meet and explore potential cooperation.

CCG will continue to promote dialogue among businesses, policymakers, researchers, and international partners, supporting Chinese companies’ global development and greater international economic cooperation.

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Published by Springer Nature as part of the China and Globalization series, the open-access book presents a curated look into Wang’s latest writings concerning the changing world order, a change widely characterised as one of “world disorder”.

The book is available to download free of charge from Springer Nature.

The following transcript is based on an audio recording of the event and has been lightly edited for clarity. It has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. I’m Mabel Miao, Secretary-General of CCG. It gives me great pleasure to welcome you all to today’s book launch and seminar celebrating the release of Henry Huiyao Wang’s latest work, China and the Next Global Order.

Before we begin, allow me to briefly introduce our distinguished author. Henry Huiyao Wang is the founder and president of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), a global think tank ranked among the top 100 most influential in the world. He was appointed as a counsellor to the State Council of China by the Chinese premier. He is now a distinguished professor at the China Foreign Affairs University and was Dean of the Institute of Development Research at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. Wang is a leading expert on globalisation, global governance, and Chinese international relations.

Wang has published over 100 books in both Chinese and English, as well as hundreds of articles and papers related to globalisation, global governance, and global migration, China’s international relations, and Chinese outbound investments. He is the Chief Editor of Springer Nature’s “China and Globalization” book series and his latest English books include: China in the Multipolar World: Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era (Springer, forthcoming); China, New Geopolitics and Global Governance: CCG Global Dialogues (Springer, forthcoming); China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition (Springer, 2026); The Ebb and Flow of Globalization: Chinese Perspectives on China’s Development and Role in the World (Springer, 2022); Award winning book Consensus or Conflict: China and Globalization in the 21st Century (Springer, 2021); and Handbook on China and Globalization (Edward Elgar, 2019).

Today’s event is co-hosted by Center for China and Globalization and Springer Nature. We are honoured to be joined by the author, Dr Henry Huiyao Wang, along with the senior scholars, business leaders, media friends, and representatives from the publishing houses. Together, we will mark the release of this important book and explore solutions for the disordered world and suggestions for the next global order.

First, let me introduce our distinguished guests today.

David Blair, Vice President and Senior Economist at CCG and former Chairman of the Economics Department at the Eisenhower School, National Defense University, in Washington, DC. Welcome.

Harvey Dzodin, Senior Fellow at CCG, former Vice President of ABC Television in New York, and Senior Consultant at the National Image Communication Research Center of Tsinghua University. Welcome.

Rebecca Gray, Second Secretary for Political Affairs at the British Embassy in Beijing. Welcome.

Zoon Ahmed Khan, Special Commentator for CGTN and Researcher at the Belt and Road Institute, Tsinghua University. Welcome.

Arvea Marieni, Director of Ecological Transition Engineering Solutions at BEAM CUBE, Senior Adviser to the World Green Design Organization, and Jury Member of the European Innovation Council Accelerator. Welcome.

Yasir Masood, Commentator on International Affairs for CGTN. Welcome.

Omid Motahed, Independent Researcher. Welcome.

Hamid Sharif, President of the Global Think Tank Network, former Managing Director at the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Senior Partner at Samdani Qureshi Aqlaal. Welcome.

And, of course, our friend Denis Simon, Bank of America Visiting Chair in International Finance at Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University, and former Executive Vice Chancellor of Duke Kunshan University. Welcome.

Last but not least, Xu Chengzhi, Global Chief Public Affairs Officer at Windey Energy Technology Group Co., Ltd., and former official with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Welcome.

We are also joined by our distinguished guests from the publisher: Leana Li, Editorial Director for Humanities & Social Sciences Books and Regional Director for Books for China at Springer Nature Group, and Emily Zhang, Senior Editor for Business, Economics, and Political Science at Springer Nature Group.

Welcome, all of you.

China and the Next Global Order is one of the 16 books in the China and Globalization series published by Springer Nature and co-edited by Henry Huiyao Wang and me. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Springer Nature for their ongoing partnership. In particular, I would like to thank Leana Li, Editorial Director for Humanities & Social Sciences Books and Regional Director for Books for China at Springer Nature Group, and Emily Zhang, Senior Editor for Business, Economics, and Political Science at Springer Nature. Their support has been invaluable in publishing this book series.

A well, a warm welcome to all our distinguished guests today. We greatly appreciate your presence and look forward to a rich and insightful discussion later. Thank you all. Welcome.

Leana Li, Editorial Director for Humanities & Social Sciences Books and Regional Director for Books for China, Springer Nature Group

Good afternoon, colleagues, friends and authors. I am Leana Li from Springer Nature, and already on this occasion, in this setting, I feel more like a host than a guest, because we have been launching and announcing new books in the China and Globalization series so many times, and every time we gather here to enjoy a very insightful discussion among authors, contributors, policymakers, and scholars on relevant topics.

So today, again, it is a great pleasure to welcome you all, to the launch of China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition. This timely volume explores one of the most important questions of our age: how the global order is evolving in an era of profound geopolitical, economic, and technological change. As just mentioned, this book is the 16th volume published in the China and Globalization series.

Over the years, the series has become an influential platform for advancing international dialogue on globalisation, governance, development, and China’s role in the world. Through the contributions of leading scholars, policymakers, and practitioners, these books have reached audiences across the globe and generated significant impact in both academic and policy areas.

First of all, I would like to extend my warmest congratulations to Henry Wang for the successful publication of this book. This book arrives at a particularly important moment. The world is undergoing historical change. We see shifting power dynamics, growing geopolitical competition, rapid technological innovation, and increasing uncertainty in global governance. At the same time, countries remain deeply interconnected through trade, investment, talent floats, and shared global challenges. Against this backdrop, understanding the emerging international order is more important than ever. How will a more multipolar world function? What role will China play in shaping the future global landscape? And how can major powers manage competition while maintaining cooperation, where cooperation is essential? These are the critical questions that this book seeks to understand.

One of the book’s most valuable contributions is its focus on the idea or the concept of a great power coopetition, the recognition that competition and cooperation must coexist in today’s interconnected world. While countries may compete in certain areas, they also share responsibilities in addressing issues such as climate change, public health, technological governance, and sustainable developments.

Indeed, global challenges do not respect national borders. No single country, regardless of its size or strength, can address these issues alone. The future of international relations will depend not only on how countries compete, but also on how effectively they cooperate when cooperation is necessary. This perspective also resonates strongly with the mission of CCG, which then is reflected in the aim and scope of the China and Globalization book series.

Across its 16 volumes, the series has addressed a wide range of critical topics, including globalisation, economic development, governance, talent mobility, international cooperation, and China’s evolving relationship with the world. Together, these books have contributed to a broader and more nuanced understanding of China’s role in global affairs.

What makes the series particularly valuable is its ability to bring together voices from different countries, disciplines, and professional backgrounds. The resulting dialogue is richer, more balanced, and more relevant. At a time when public discourse sometimes becomes polarised, this commitment to intellectual openness and evidence-based analysis is more important than ever.

As we celebrate the publication of this last volume, we should also recognise the broader importance of scholarly work. Books provide the depth and perspectives needed to understand long-term trends and complex challenges; they help bridge research and policy, and they encourage informed public debate.

Looking ahead, the international landscape will continue to evolve. While we cannot predict every change, we can be certain that dialogue, trust, and cooperation will remain essential foundations for a stable and prosperous future. I hope this book will not only contribute to academic and policy discussions, but also serve as the catalyst for new ideas, deeper engagement, and stronger international collaboration.

Finally, let me once again congratulate CCG and all the authors on these important achievements. The publication of this volume in the China and Globalization series is a testament to intellectual collaboration and a shared commitment to fostering understanding in an increasingly complex world.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to listening to the discussion to follow.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Thank you, Leana Li, and also Emily Zhang from Springer Nature, and our very distinguished and dear friends from different circles of the international community. It’s really a great honour to welcome all of you to CCG today to launch my latest book, China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition.

We are using a management term, “coopetition”. This is a very timely book that we are launching here at CCG. So once again, I really appreciate all of you coming here this afternoon. I’m going to introduce this book, but we’re really looking forward to a good discussion, with comments and ideas on the topics we have.

So basically, this book is one of the books in the China and Globalization series that Miao and I have edited, which has been published by Springer Nature for the last six or seven years. It’s really very important that we have now accumulated 16 books, but there are more to come. We invite many more scholars, including our CCG experts, to continue to contribute.

So basically, this book series already has quite a few authors whose works are available online, and the series is designed to present a wide range of global views on issues related to China and on the growing opportunities and challenges amidst the rise of China. For example, since the launch of this book series, we have had books by Joseph Nye, books by Kishore Mahbubani, and books featuring over 60 ambassadors. We have had books by a number of CEOs, and contributions from over 100 top scholars, representatives of international organisations, former statesmen, and well-known scholars. So this book series is actually probably the largest collection of English-language books on China in the English-language publishing world, and I’m sure it’s going to be the largest because we still have a few in the pipeline.

The book we are adding to this series today is called China and the Next Global Order, which is a very big book that we have just published. This open-access book presents a creative look at my latest writings concerning the changing world order. And of course, we know that we are in a world that has been very chaotic and disruptive. And so, what about China? What about the next global order? How can we safeguard multilateralism and keep the world going as we expected?

Basically, we can see this disrupted world, and it’s also a multipolar world. You know, I would say it’s really a coming multipolar world. A quarter of a century has already passed, and we can see that the unipolar world is probably gone, but the multipolar world is here, and that’s where we are now. So it’s very important that we have some books to analyse this.

This book basically covers my writings over quite a long period, including quite a few years in the past. But basically, all the thoughts I’ve had, my ideas and my views on the changing global landscape and global order have always been there. So it also reflects a lot of my research on the think tank front. This is what we are reflecting in this book.

This book covers many of my original reflections, some of which are recent, while others date back a few years. In particular, we have included material from many well-known news outlets, including The New York Times, Bloomberg, The Economist, the Financial Times, the South China Morning Post, Arab News and many more. We have also included some of the articles I have published at different think tanks, including the Wilson Center, at different economic forums, and also in China Daily, Xinhua, and CGTN. So it’s quite comprehensive. But then we re-edited, reorganised and categorised them into different sections of the book.

We organised the book around three key topics. The first is the shifting nature of global interactions. The second is perspectives on the pursuit of genuine multilateralism and efforts to establish a new global equilibrium. I think establishing a new global equilibrium is really important. We haven’t reached that yet, but we’re in the process of reaching it. And the third is an exploration of the symbiotic relationship between globalisation and economics. So, what about globalisation? What about economics? We still need to continue with both.

At the heart of those themes lies China’s evolving role in global governance and world affairs, particularly in responding to a series of systemic transformations, including the shift of the centre of gravity towards Asia, and partly towards China, as well as a more diversified and more multipolar world.

So I’m not going to go into the details, but basically, in Part One, we talk about interactions and exchanges, re-examining relations in transition. There are delicate relations, and of course, we look at the rise of President Trump and US–China relations during his two terms. We also look at relations under the Biden administration, how to balance China–Europe relations, and, of course, beyond the state, how we can develop more innovative forms of exchange. We also look at China’s bilateral issues, policy issues and relations with countries in different regions, and, of course, particularly at global governance, which we have done a lot of work on.

And then, in the second part, we talk about geopolitics and multilateralism, finding peaceful solutions to geopolitical tensions. We talk about China’s role and the contributions it can make, geopolitical tensions and multilateral relations.

We also talk about globalisation and economics in the third part, where we cover globalisation as a driver of prosperity. Even though globalisation has suffered a huge setback, inclusive globalisation still has momentum. We also look at China as a driver of global growth, explore solutions to the challenges facing globalisation, and share ideas about the power of dialogue. We have held many dialogues, so this book actually collects many dialogues that we have had with well-known writers. And of course, we have included a lot of other writings as well.

Finally, we also discuss how to reach the world with our thinking.

So basically, this book offers forward-looking insights for policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and businesses. It also highlights the indispensable role of international institutions. The revitalisation and reform of the UN are also very important. So I think this is really a very comprehensive book.

We released this book only last month, but we have already had about 23,000 downloads as of today. It’s a free-to-download book, and of course, we have many other books as well. We have recently published quite a few books, including books by two of our authors who are online today, David Blair and Harvey Dzodin. Their books are also in this series.

So I think I’m just starting to warm up the discussion, basically to say that we’ve put a lot of effort into this. As a think tanker and a scholar, I’ve been thinking about all those big issues, the new roles that China can play, and of course, how we can work together amidst great-power competition and cooperation.

So, great-power competition and cooperation — I use the term “great-power coopetition”. I’m sure Denis Simon knows these management terms pretty well. We need to seek cooperation, but of course, we cannot avoid competition. But we don’t want rivalry. We don’t want decoupling and things like that.

So I think this is a book that I’ve been thinking about for quite some time, and it has finally been released. And I really want to thank Springer Nature again, including their head office. We visited Heidelberg in Germany in the summer, where we were very well received. I also want to thank Leana and Emily for their continued support, and of course, our editorial team and our members, and all the scholars and friends who have come today.

So thank you all very much.

Mabel Lu Miao

Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, and welcome to our close friends and new friends who have come to the CCG office or joined us online for our new book launch.

And congratulations to Henry on his new book. He has spent a long time working on and contributing to this book. He wanted to bring together his articles and views on global governance. We know CCG has long been committed to global governance, conducting extensive research and activities, and we have published numerous works on similar topics.

Henry’s new book, titled China and the Next Global Order: Coming Multipolar World and Great-Power Coopetition, responds to the fact that global governance is lagging behind reality and seeks to provide a systematic think-tank perspective on China’s role in the transformation of the global order.

In light of the current shifts in the global balance of power and the geopolitical landscape, the new book’s publication could not be more timely. I think, actually, these days we have seen a lot of news. We are seeing news about events such as the BRICS conference, and the declaration issued at the conference is quite impressive, especially regarding the rise of Global South countries as new powers. And of course, a few weeks ago, we heard about the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit and so on. A lot of new platforms are being established and evolving for global governance.

Today, we are convening so many dear friends to talk about this topic. We would like to further explore what the global governance situation is right now.

The Global South, as I mentioned, is gradually making its voice heard in global governance. How can China, the United States and, of course, Europe effectively cooperate with the Global South to advance the reform of global governance mechanisms? Additionally, climate change and global artificial intelligence regulation are issues that humanity urgently needs to address. How can existing and emerging powers in a multipolar world be coordinated to build consensus, establish cooperation and drive it forward?

These are some of the questions I just want to pose to all of you and invite our distinguished guests to discuss further.

First of all, I would like to invite David Blair to say a few words on this topic. I know you are joining us from Yunnan, so welcome. The floor is yours, David.

David Blair, Former Chairman of the Economics Department, Eisenhower School, National Defense University

Thank you. I want to congratulate Henry on raising what I think is the important question going forward in the world: what are international relations, international economics and international trade going to look like after the end of the globalisation that we’ve known most of our lifetimes?

So I’d like to raise a few questions. One is: have we ever seen globalisation that is not dominated by an imperial power, or at least by a hegemon? I can think of three primary globalizations in history, and by globalisation I don’t mean just levels of luxury trade. I mean there’s a significant amount of trade that changes average people’s lives and significant international flows of capital, and I think we’ve only had three periods like that in history.

The first is the Roman Empire, and it wasn’t really global; it was only in the Mediterranean Western European region. And the second is the British, the Pax Britannica, up until 1914 or so, and then we’ve had a globalisation period dominated by American hegemony since 1945, and I think that is coming to an end.

And the question Henry is raising is, well, what comes next? And I don’t think we have any very good political parallels and historical parallels to consider in thinking about that. But it’s really an important question.

Just as a note, it’s less important for the United States and for China than for anybody else, because the U.S. and China are both big countries with very large markets and almost autonomous sources of supply. They could be if they had to be, and they’re the gains from trade from a very large country are a lot smaller than the gains from trade for a small country.

So the real issue is whether the United States and China are willing to create a regime that benefits all the other smaller countries, which is basically everybody else, with the possible exception of the European Union.

So I think that’s an issue. I don’t know what the answer is, but I think we’re going to face difficult times trying to establish the next regime.

One issue I think Henry did a good job of bringing up, especially when he’s discussing his own experiences. I especially like the chapter where he was talking about his experiences going to the countryside and how his ability to travel and go to the United States and Canada changed his life, opened up his perspective on the world, and changed his worldview. Essentially, I thought that was very good, and I think that kind of globalisation has been very beneficial.

Although it’s not always that experience with a foreign culture leads to either liking that culture or being peaceful toward that culture, but I think the issue we’re going to have to face is what has been the effect of globalisation on average people.

In China, I think globalisation has been very beneficial for, say, the median worker. Median workers’ salaries have gone up 26 times since Deng Xiaoping’s opening up, and they’ve actually gone up almost nine times since 2000. That’s transformative for people’s lifestyles. My view is China’s standard of living is roughly equal to that of the United States or Western Europe today.

In the United States, on the other hand, average workers have not benefited. U.S. Wages have been constant since 1979. It’s just a coincidence that the year is 1979 because that’s the year we have a data series on median real wages in the United States. It was really in the early ‘70s, maybe mid ‘70s, when U.S. Real wages stagnated.

And now the point I’m trying to make is that it has very little to do with globalisation. In both cases, the reason Chinese average people benefited so much was because of policy decisions made by the Chinese government, in particular to create an economy, a highly competitive economy, and to enforce antitrust law, in my opinion, and to create a financial and banking system that encourages industrial growth. The United States, on the other hand, stopped enforcing antitrust law, reduced the amount of competition, and therefore there was less pressure on that. That means it transfers money to capital, and it also created a financial system based on speculation, basically, and on rapidly increasing asset prices, houses and stocks.

This change in the financial system really started a little bit in the 1980s, but mostly changed through the 1990s, and then during the Obama administration, the quantitative easing program dramatically increased asset prices, transferring money to wealthy people.

So we have to look at the effects on average people, and we have to look at what caused them. And I think what caused them has very little to do with globalisation; it has to do with domestic economic policies.

So, anyway, I’m glad Henry is raising this question because I think it’s going to be just to kind of close. I think American support for the old globalisation, the kind of open system, rules-based so-called system we’ve had in the past, is basically over. I don’t see any support from anybody on the political spectrum for going back to that system, and I don’t know how the world is going to adapt to a United States that’s basically acting in a transactional way, in an attempt to transfer some of the benefit that was taken away from American workers because of the past domestic policy decisions. I don’t think that’s going to change in the foreseeable future, so that I think that needs to be a constant position going forward to think about that. Okay, thank you very much.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, David, for your great remarks. Yes, I think today’s topic, the new wave of globalisation and new global governance, is related to Henry’s book, titled China and the Next Global Order. What comes next is quite important, especially when we look at the history and what happened during different waves of globalisation.

Thank you. Next, we would like to invite our dear friend Harvey Dzodin. The floor is yours, Harvey.

Harvey Dzodin, Former Vice President of ABC Television; Senior Consultant, National Image Communication Research Center, Tsinghua University

Thanks very much. We’re here to celebrate Henry’s latest book, and it is a very important one. The reprised content from 2022 to earlier this year merits our close attention, and the book does make it easier to find the dispersed gems in a single open-access volume under the auspices of CCG and the respected publisher Springer Nature.

There’s much to learn from the book, but I submit that while the content is current, the title is on the verge of becoming somewhat dated. Why do I say that? Because the world is increasingly moving at warp speed and seems to be changing on a daily basis. That reminds me of the 1960s British musical, “Stop the world! I want to get off.” Well, we can’t get off, but we must try our best to keep calm and to carry on and go forward as best we can. Indeed, the next global order, or at least its outlines, are already very much with us.

The post-World War II rules-based international order is crumbling before our eyes, and is being replaced or supplemented with newer groupings like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, which met recently, together with a multiplicity of NGOs like CCG.

Henry, you clearly see a constructive international order after the U.S.-dominated post-World War II era. You argue that the world is moving towards a more genuinely multipolar system in which China, the U.S., India, and the Global South increasingly share influence. You clearly don’t see a new hegemon replacing the old one, but you see a coopetition in which major powers compete where necessary, at the same time cooperating where their interests converge. Your vision isn’t limited to great-power diplomacy. As the world leader and founder of one of the world’s most highly rated think tanks, you clearly believe in the importance of multilateral institutions, people-to-people exchanges, and innovative forms of international interaction.

Even in this one, in your analysis, you see think tanks, civil society, business, academia, media, and other non-state actors as bridging institutions, as connective tissue between state actors and civil society, keeping dialogue open even at times when official relations become strained.

In this sense, you combine three levels of analysis: a changing distribution of power, new patterns of great power behaviour, and the networks that can connect societies across geopolitical divides. You passionately argue for reforming rather than abandoning multilateralism, so that international institutions better reflect today’s changed distribution of power and the aspirations of the Global South.

Your book isn’t merely an argument for China’s greater role; more fully, it’s a proposal for a world in which multipolarity becomes compatible with cooperation. Competition does not become confrontation, and non-state actors help keep channels of communication open.

Leave it to you, Henry, and to CCG to be so prescient that, like an expert surfer, you can catch and ride the latest big wave, even before it’s fully formed.

As the old saying goes, timing is everything. We can see two other contemporaneous works with which we can compare and contrast your excellent book. Henry serves as an advisor to the Vienna- and Beijing-based think tank Global Neighbors. Its founders, Javanka Porsche and its CEO Sid Chatterjee, argue in the latest edition of the journal Horizons in a monograph entitled “The Architecture of Survival: Why the World Cannot Wait for Governance Alone”, that non-state actors have now taken on a much greater share of the burden of governance. But unlike Henry’s book, in my view, they place too much weight on NGOs and not enough on the centrality of state institutions themselves. For them, these institutions are more than bridges; they’re integral elements of the key governing process itself.

Their outlook, however, is much closer to Henry’s than to Charles Kupchan of Georgetown in the Council on Foreign Relations, whose upcoming October book, Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come, while agreeing that the post-World War II rules-based international order is finished, Kupchan sees the U.S. leading a global concert, and we all know how the concert of Europe ended.

Henry, I think that it would be fascinating to hold a global debate with these authors, as your book underlines the topic of a new world order, and it’s certainly one of the most important on the global agenda. Congratulations on your latest book.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, dear Harvey, and thank you for congratulating Henry on his new book. Next, we would like to invite Professor Denis Simon, an old friend who is also a contributor to another book in our China and Globalization series. So I think you would also like to contribute some of your ideas on this topic. The floor is yours, Denis.

Denis Simon, Bank of America Visiting Chair in International Finance, Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University; Former Executive Vice Chancellor, Duke Kunshan University

Thanks, Mabel. Thank you. I have five points I want to make. As I was going through Henry’s book over the last week, President Xi Jinping gave a major speech at the BRICS conference, and I kept thinking about that speech. It was almost as if Henry had written this book anticipating that President Xi was going to write and deliver this speech at the major forum, because there’s a very close alignment between what President Xi was articulating, what several of the other countries were saying at that meeting, and the way this book is laid out. As we just heard, timing is everything, and I think it was very important.

So my first point is that I think, after you look at the work, you can clearly see that multipolarity doesn’t have to mean a new Cold War. The central argument of the book is that American primacy, which has dominated since the end of World War II, now necessarily has to give way to a more diffuse distribution of global power, even if the US goes kicking and screaming.

But rather than ending up in some kind of rigid blocs or inevitable US–China conflict, Henry sees a much more fluid situation in which we can have both, as he says, competition and, importantly, deliberate cooperation, not just accidental cooperation. In other words, deliberate cooperation comes from the necessity of addressing the big problems that the world faces, and those problems cannot be ignored in any way, whether it’s climate or trade or, as we have seen over the last few days, the discussion about AI governance and the management of AI development, all of which are now front and centre on the desks of leaders in all the major countries of the world.

The second point has to do with the fact of China’s rise. That China’s rise should itself be understood as pressure to reform the existing international order rather than an effort to overthrow it. This is very important. There’s a tendency in the United States, I think, now to see that the U.S.-China conflict really is a conflict for control and dominance. But I think Henry makes a very convincing argument that China’s effort is really not to overthrow that existing order.

The book basically says that China has been a beneficiary of globalisation, or the international system, and that there is very little reason for China really wanting to destroy that system, and the challenge basically is how do we take the existing institutions and rules of the game to accommodate the growing weight of China to bring global power. That’s why I think President Xi’s speech and this book really just come together and converge at a very good opportunity in our current events agenda.

The third point has to do with globalisation itself. Globalisation and interdependence are not something that has just been created. They have actually evolved in a way that they are now structural realities that bind countries together and also necessarily preclude any kind of comprehensive decoupling.

I know there’s been a lot of discussion about the bifurcation of the world order, with, for example, in the work that I do on science and technology, one part of the world led by China and another part led by the United States. But I think Henry argues persuasively that the integration of technology, supply chains, capital, trade, talent networks, etc., can’t simply be reversed, even by government policy, including President Trump’s tariffs.

The more realistic choice becomes a kind of managed interdependence, away from any kind of destructive fragmentation. It’s not really a contest between globalisation and national autonomy. The structural features of globalisation mean that we can’t allow or accept any kind of zero-sum game being played out, particularly in the case of US–China competition.

The fourth point I want to make is about the Global South. I think what we’re seeing today is really the Global South finally becoming much more of an independent centre of agency in the world, and not simply an arena for the playing out, let’s say, of US–China competition.

I found it really interesting. You may know that, in the last two weeks, the UN has decided to step away from the Mercator projection for how we look at the world. The world map will no longer be using Mercator, and in that new world map, the size of Africa, in particular, increases dramatically. And I wonder, you know, if you’re teaching international relations, I think you can just put that map up and spend a whole semester basically talking about how the world is going to be redefined. And I think it really fits in very nicely with some of the arguments that Henry has offered in this book, which makes the book even more than it seems on the surface.

This is not a new world order in terms of a bipolar world or a tripolar world, but there’s much more of what I would call a flexible geometry of the world order being created, in which middle powers and developing countries can now exercise considerably greater influence over the international rules and the alignments that are being put in place. And so I think I was just listening to the report about this Mercator projection decision by the UN, and it caught my attention. I kept thinking about it. I think there’s a lot to come from this, and it’s a very important symbolic statement by the United Nations.

Frankly, if the book has one shortcoming, it’s a bit optimistic, at least from where I sit, because, in some respects, Henry has to confront the reality that there are still a number of pressing big issues on the global agenda: Taiwan, the South China Sea, economic coercion, cybersecurity, etc. And I think the book ultimately provides a very articulate statement of Chinese internationalism for the coming 50 years. But we still have to figure out, one way or another, how, in the midst of all that, when there is still an intensification of strategic competition, we can transform that strategic competition into a more cooperative, multipolar world order.

And so, Henry gives us sort of the end we want to arrive at, but I would still like to see how we’re going to get there. We need a little bit more discussion, a little bit more debate, and a little bit more effort, obviously, in trying to make that become the reality that we all sense will be better for world peace and world stability in the years ahead.

So, congratulations, Henry! Great timing.

Mabel Lu Miao

Oh, thank you, thank you, Denis Simon. You offered several points that you drew from Henry’s book, especially when you said Henry is optimistic. I think Henry is optimistic, but sometimes I think the world has more positive forces that can make it better. I think this is one of the roles we can play.

And you mentioned the US and China, the Global South, and all those points. I think this book includes those points. It’s quite a comprehensive one. We know that China is going to have a global governance conference very soon in Xiong’an. President Xi proposed that. I think the world is a little bit fragile as well, and turmoil is happening everywhere. I think we need positive forces to encourage more people to talk about how to continue global governance and give more positive signals in that regard. I think China is trying to do that.

People like us, and I think Henry, by contributing this book, would like to send an optimistic signal to the rest of the world that there are still some good people trying to do that. I appreciate your comments.

Next, I would like to invite Xu Chengzhi, who is also a Senior Fellow. Xu is a senior economist. I would like to invite you to say a few words. Thank you.

Xu Chengzhi, Global Chief Public Affairs Officer, Windey Energy Technology Group; Former Official, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Thank you. First of all, I would like to congratulate Henry on the publication of his new book. Actually, when I look at the title, China and the Next Global Order, from my point of view, this is one of the most important themes in the world today, because the world has been changing a lot since the beginning of the new century. Especially in recent years, the old order has obviously broken down, and the new global order has not yet been established. So everyone is discussing what kind of new order there will be, and I think this is one of the most important issues in the world right now. That’s the reason why this book is really important.

I spent some time over the weekend looking at this book, and I found that it actually has a lot of content, and some of the ideas are very innovative. For example, I found that Henry mentioned that the AIIB could be upgraded to the GIIB. This is very innovative, and some of the ideas are also quite inclusive. I found that Henry mentioned that cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea is very important for Asia. I think these are also very tolerant, inclusive and good ideas.

From my point of view, I want to make a few points. First of all, on globalisation. Actually, I myself think globalisation is good for every country in the long run and in the broader picture. I mean, maybe, as our friend Blair mentioned just now, some people feel that globalisation is bad for workers in some countries. But when such a phenomenon happens during a period of globalisation, it does not mean it is caused by globalisation.

For me, it is mainly caused by, for example, in the United States, perhaps failed monetary policy and public debt, as well as market mechanisms, but not globalisation. For me, globalisation has actually solved many problems. If we didn’t have globalisation, I think the United States would probably have more serious problems.

So the second point I want to mention is that when we look at the world today, especially over the past 20, 30 or 40 years, we can clearly see that many traditionally poor countries and areas, like Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Eastern Europe, have developed quite well. You go there, and you see they are developing quite well. I was there many years ago, and I visited them again recently. I found that everywhere is full of opportunities and very dynamic. This is the reality right now.

At the same time, we have found that China plays a much more influential role compared with many years ago. China actually has a very positive influence on the development of these areas. Meanwhile, I would say that Western influence has perhaps stagnated. So I think China’s role is the reason why this book has this title. China actually plays a very important role in the development of these areas.

You know, we have the Belt and Road Initiative, and this has also caused a lot of misunderstandings in the outside world. But actually, I think that over the past 30 years, China has indeed helped a lot, whether through our state-owned companies or private companies. We have cooperated with local economies in these areas and contributed a lot to their progress.

That’s why I think, when we look at the world today, it is very complicated. I think it’s more complicated than before. So we must look at these problems in a more comprehensive and inclusive way.

When we look at the future, I think this book actually touches on a very important point, and that is multilateralism. This was also mentioned again by President Xi a few days ago at the BRICS meeting.

At the same time, this book also mentions the United Nations. Its role should be strengthened because, as I said, the Global South plays a more important role than before. So every country needs to be involved. Right now, we have several groups, you know, the G7, G20 and BRICS. These are groups, okay. But we really need a stable forum for all countries to come together, discuss and resolve problems. This is especially important in the age of AI, I think, more important than before.

So the United Nations actually needs to be reformed, of course, but its role definitely needs to be enhanced. We cannot just leave it aside. That’s not smart. That’s not wise.

So these are the points I want to make, and I want to congratulate Henry on the publication of this book, because it mentions several points that we need to think about more deeply when considering the future, based on the perspectives put forward by Henry.

Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Xu. You mentioned some of the ideas Henry proposed in this book. I think there are a lot of innovative ideas included in this book, including many op-eds and articles Henry has written this year. So I think this will attract more readers to pay attention to these ideas.

Thank you very much. Next, I would like to invite Arvea Marieni to share her ideas on this topic. Thank you for coming.

Arvea Marieni, Director of Ecological Transition Engineering Solutions, Beam Cube; Senior Adviser, World Green Design Organization

Thank you very much. Actually, I met Henry Huiyao Wang again this week at the UNIDO Forum in Xiamen, where I was invited to speak. But I’m happy to be here because I received the book a couple of days ago. I was going through it, and of course, I’ve been following the work that the Centre has been developing for a few years, especially in relation to countries in the European Union.

What I find extremely interesting is the connection and the synergies between different layers of topics and layers of governance. He has an approach which I think is typical of Chinese governance, which is an integrated resilience approach. This means that you consider risk factors, and it’s true, it is optimistic, but you consider risk factors in an integrated manner, taking into account the multicrisis, including the environmental, ecological and climate crises, but also the security crisis.

I’ve done some work in the past with a think tank connected to the German Ministry of Defence, and obviously, since the 1990s, the integration of climate and environmental management has been important. Because it is an engineering discourse, a discourse about resource constraints even before it is an environmental discourse, it has involved analysing the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of different economies in relation to stability and the possibility of maintaining societal operations under these extremely impactful events that we are now seeing unfold in every part of the world.

And in terms of the United States, we were discussing this, I think, also in Xiamen, but even in Shanghai. In terms of its integration into military discourse, we’ve seen, for instance, in the 1990s, the Pentagon considering China more vulnerable and considering that the United States would be a sort of fortress. And that was one of the elements that would push the US government, after the first presidency of Bush, the father, to take a more cautious approach to climate governance. Because, in a way, they thought, we’re growing, our industrial system is based on and very entrenched in oil. There is a very strong link, even a financial connection, after 1973. You know, the dollar-denominated petrodollars are actually managed on the basis of oil.

And they were thinking China would be less able to respond to this crisis because of drought and other vulnerabilities. But nowadays, we have the Colorado River, for instance, with water as a main factor of risk, which is showing not only a resource availability issue but also a governance issue. And FEMA is being weakened, and the United States’ most recent policies are actually weakening it further.

So this is, in my opinion, and in the opinion of some geopolitical analysts in France, one of the elements that is pushing the United States towards a more aggressive perspective in relation to its neighbours, because it is a question of forests and water in Canada. Of course, it is minerals in other parts of the world, but there is also this issue.

And regarding China, what I believe is going to be very important, and is already proving very important, is the systems engineering approach to governance that is redesigning a sufficiency-based economic approach. This is also because China is fundamentally not under, let’s say, the mythology of markets. As Stern, the British economist, would say, climate change is the largest, the greatest market failure ever. Well, if you do not change the pillars of that market design, you will not be able to address it.

And the Chinese system, because of its, I would say, less passionate embrace of markets in the way that we have embraced them, especially in financial development, is able to tackle these issues in a more convincing manner.

Just one last point, because otherwise I will take too long. Everyone is hearing about petrostates and electrostates. This is becoming a sort of refrain. I would say that, again, geopolitical analysis in France has been considering these issues from a securitisation and resilience approach.

Chimerica, Niall Ferguson, again a British scholar, the integration between China and the United States, America and China, as the basis and the driver of the second wave of globalisation, but also what the French call the deregulation of planetary systems, and this entrenchment between the US and China.

I remember, for instance, the congressional hearing in 1985. I mean, I don’t remember it personally, but I watched Carl Sagan, the astrophysicist, talking to Congress, and he was anticipating exactly what was going to happen in terms of physics, in terms of warming, in terms of resources, in terms of coal utilisation and the breakdown of planetary systems, in front of the US Congress.

And we see it. We see that the Chinese have been producing goods, but also receiving the emissions. I mean, we have consumed goods whose emissions were delocalised here years ago. Environmental impacts were delocalised here, and that is the reason why our costs went down. And this has been pushing consumption and the consumption model of the United States since the 1990s, until China became stronger in its industrial base, and its emissions started increasing more around 2004.

Before that, the US was the largest emitter, but you always have to consider that China was subsidising our consumption. And at the same time, and I’ll close here, China was also subsidising the United States in terms of monetary flows because it was buying Treasury bonds.

And as a way to react to American pressure nowadays, well, Mark Carney is a former banker. We can, as Europeans, as other countries, the middle powers, decide, for instance, to offload some of these Treasury bonds.

Mabel Lu Miao

Wonderful. Thank you, Arvea. I think you gave a very good speech, including your point about subsidies for consumption. I think this is also what China is doing right now for the green transition and green development. We call it green globalisation as well.

Thank you. Next, we would like to invite Hamid Sharif. Yes, the floor is yours.

Hamid Sharif, President, Global Think Tank Network; Former Managing Director, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

Thank you. Like Arvea, I was also asked to participate at the last minute, but I’m very pleased. I was visiting Beijing from Islamabad, and I happened to be here, so I’m very happy to be with colleagues. I’ve been following your work for quite some time.

I think the title is really interesting because it clearly indicates that we’re on the cusp of a new global order, or disorder, or chaos. I think that keeps a lot of people awake. A lot of people around the world are worried, especially after what happened in Venezuela, because that was a coup, if you like, against what we understand. And that was followed very soon by, you know... So this is an extremely worrying time. There’s a lot of thinking going on around the world. I know some people who are actually depressed. They worry so much.

So I think, in that context, it’s very important for the world to understand, and I think your book makes a great contribution in this respect: what are the intentions of one of the biggest players in the game? I think your book helps us to understand. Well, you don’t speak for China, but you can help us understand how China operates, how China thinks, and that’s important because the sources of information about China, unfortunately, continue to be Western. Even in a country like Pakistan, where you have a great relationship with China, ordinary people’s knowledge of China comes from Western sources.

And Western writers, for their own reasons, perhaps quite innocently, transpose their own experience onto China. They went out to dominate. They colonised, killed people and conquered continents. They destroyed the environment, went ahead with industrialisation and destroyed most of Europe’s forests.

And they expect that China will do pretty much the same. Because for them, the way they look at history is that history is sort of, you know, progressive. It’s not circular like the Chinese view. You know, they’re now at the top; everyone else is behind them. And because they’re behind them, they’re going to behave just like the leader.

So I think that, for me, is why it’s very important. I just want to make a few points. I mean, you cover so much, but I just want to focus on a couple of things.

I think multilateralism is very important. I was employee number 36 at the AIIB, and I was there again this morning. In a matter of 10 years, lending has really progressed well. Now, that is important, not just for the AIIB, but, you know, hopefully with your bank as well. It’s very important to break hegemony.

For so many years, developing countries had to rely on the West for any meaningful amount of money. Western countries have tended to be—I mean, they’ve been generous. I don’t want to take away from the generosity of some of those countries. But when the chips have been down, they’ve also been quite dictatorial. So there is a lot of space for change.

I think it’s very encouraging to see multilateralism developing, along with new institutions like the SCO. The G20 emerged out of the global financial crisis. Well, I don’t call it the global financial crisis. That was capitalism’s financial crisis. After that, the emergence of the G20 was very relevant.

And in that context, you know, the US–China rivalry and how developing countries manage that—that’s a huge debate in itself, and I don’t want to dwell on it. But I think reading your book can help those countries understand at least China’s intentions, help them navigate the situation, engage in dialogue better with China, and make China understand their point of view. I think that would be immensely helpful.

And of course, in this process, I think what’s very important is that we’re beginning to see something new. I see it at a micro level, even with the World Bank. I see a major policy, which I used to deal with at the AIIB, undergoing reform because of developing countries—not because of the developed world, but because developing-country members are saying, “Hey, that’s...”

So I think the dynamics have changed. Rather than being recipients of norms, we can now interact with those norms and begin to shape them. I don’t think it’s a disruptive process because the good thing, as the AIIB demonstrates, is that 90 per cent of the AIIB’s policies, maybe even more, are aligned with those of the World Bank. So it doesn’t have to be a disruptive process. At the margins, it innovates, and we did introduce some innovations.

And I’m so happy when they imitate us because imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, as they say. So it’s good to see that when we do something good, other banks follow.

And very lastly, I think climate change needs attention. I was just in Pakistan, and I was saying that, with what’s happened in Nepal recently, we do not have the necessary scientific capacity. We’re trying to create that sort of scientific capacity, but frankly, we just don’t have it.

And I would like to see urgent efforts, with China in the lead, concerning the Himalayas. Pakistan and India have to work together. Those countries have got to wake up. This traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan is killing South Asia, killing the whole Himalayan region, and I would love to see some initiative on that.

Because China actually has some very interesting technology for addressing this. It’s actually covering some of the glaciers with material so that it stops the melting. Now, that’s a very expensive solution, and there are people who question it. But it’s the beginning of a dialogue, a collective dialogue with top-notch Chinese scientists and others who can contribute.

I congratulate you on producing a book which I think will be immensely helpful.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Hamid. Yes, you mentioned multilateralism, which is very interesting. We are going to the WTO this evening for the WTO’s annual Public Forum. CCG has a session on the WTO agenda. The session is titled “Unilateralism Undermines Multilateral Trading System. I think it’s echoing what you said. Thank you very much. And next, we would like to invite Miss Rebecca Gray, who’s from the UK Embassy.

Rebecca Gray, Second Secretary, Political Section, British Embassy in Beijing

Thank you very much. Like a few others around the table, I think I was a very last-minute addition, so I won’t pretend to have read the book. But thank you for giving me lots of Golden Week reading.

I just want to say congratulations as well, and thank you very much, colleagues, for an interesting discussion today. I don’t want to repeat what’s already been said, but I think it’s very clear that multilateralism is vital to help us tackle some of the cross-border issues that have already been raised: climate change and the impacts of it, as we saw just a couple of weeks ago in Tibet and Nepal; the insanely impressive rate at which AI is developing; and health cooperation. We don’t want to see another COVID pandemic.

So it’s clear that multilateralism is important, and this conversation is extremely relevant this week, given what’s just happened at BRICS over the weekend, what’s coming up at the UNGA, and the big President Xi–Trump summit coming up in September also.

So what’s interesting about this topic is that while multilateralism is so important, it’s clear that the current order is being challenged, with some countries stepping back and the Global South looking for a more representative and equitable system. We don’t really know what comes next, and we’re seeing a rise in regional multilateralism.

And China has been very active in putting forward their vision of multilateralism, including through the global initiatives. But while we have this series of visions, there’s not really one agreed-on vision or clear steps on how we get there.

So it’s a very interesting book at a very interesting time. Thank you very much.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Rebecca. Next, we would like to invite Mr Ovid Motahari. The floor is yours.

Ovid Motahari, Independent Researcher

Well, I just want to thank you for inviting me here, and I want to thank also Henry. I saw him in United Family, and he invited me. He added me to his WeChat, so I wish him the best of luck, and I will study this book for sure. Okay, so thank you again very much for inviting me.

Mabel Lu Miao

No problem. So maybe we hand over to Yasir Masood.

Yasir Masood, International Affairs Commentator, CGTN

Good afternoon, everybody, and thank you very much, Mabel, and thank you, Henry. I had a very good chat with you last week, which was wonderful, and all the comments have been very enlightening. So I will try to add something different from what I perceive of the book.

When I think about this book, I have to turn the clock back to the close of the 20th century, when a book called The Clash of Civilizations was very popular, in which it was clearly defined what the future held for humanity. And at the cusp, at the dawn of this century, with the rise of China, I would like to reiterate the fact that President Hu Jintao, in 2006, first used the concept of a community of shared future, a community of shared destiny, to improve relations internally, including with Taiwan, and with other countries as well.

When we talk about China’s foreign policy and peaceful coexistence, which have been the main pillars of Chinese policy for a very long time, this is really a vision that the world needs. Why? Let me give you a few glimpses.

My friend Xu Chengzhi mentioned how China is making inroads in terms of its development in the African continent. Let me come up with a few figures. Even today, there are more than 50 interstate conflicts raging in Africa alone. So this is the kind of international system we have. Even in Africa alone, they are miles away from the basic concepts and functioning of democracy and development. The whole Global South, which you have extensively mentioned in your book, is still burdened with 90 per cent of the debt.

And of course, there are mushrooming issues and problems pertaining to the international system. That is why I see this as an epic, a very important contribution to the existing corpus of knowledge. The world needs to understand how we can make this world a better place. It’s not about China alone. It’s about the entirety of humanity, because the system through which we are living has brought a lot of destruction to humanity for far too long. And I think there is an immense, dire need to look towards alternatives.

I would briefly make a few comments on your book. When we talk about multipolarity, is the world really becoming a multipolar world? And if so, this brings me to my next question: what is actually the driving mechanism of multipolarity? Because what I believe and perceive is that there is a difference between a multipolar world and a multipolar world order. They are two different things. And why do I say this?

Because multiple powers can still interact. So only a new distribution of wealth or resources will not solve the problem unless we develop some sort of workable mechanism. By calling it a multipolar world, we raise the next question: how is it going to work? How will it make the world fairer and more just? This is my first point.

The second one, as mentioned in your title, is coopetition. It’s extremely interesting because there are two sides to this concept, or two layers. Of course, one is cooperation, and the other is competition. Competition is not going anywhere. It will still be there, but that doesn’t mean cooperation will erode as well, because states are still interdependent in terms of technology and economic weight. So they are more or less interdependent on each other.

But this also brings another layer of questions: what if this cooperation itself, or interdependence itself, becomes a source of rivalry? So how are we going to manage that? In one of my recent articles, I explained US–China relations as more of a multi-vector, managed sort of competition, and that is what is actually happening. States are trying to manage it so that they can prevent it from turning into fragmentation or rivalry.

So this is another question, a probing question: what if interdependence itself becomes a mechanism for rivalry?

The third point, which I see as very important and which is very close to my own interests, is agency. What about the agency of the Global South, middle powers, and developing states? I see three perspectives here: middle powers have access in a multipolar world order; middle powers have relevace; and middle powers have [inaudible].

Access is needed, of course, because it enhances their strategic leverage, and states want to have a better share and engage with others. But do they really have the capacity and capability to be autonomous? Do they have this kind of manoeuvrability so that they can decide their own course freely?

The best example is what I call, in one of my articles, a constrained bridge state or a swing state. Pakistan has good relations with multiple actors, but it does not have the capacity or capability to manoeuvre freely, even in a multipolar world. So how much share can developing states have, what kind of agency can they exercise, and how can this be worked out?

Before I take any more time, the last point you mentioned is about China’s role in reaching out to the world. And that’s where, personally, this becomes very interesting to me because I’m at the intersection of geopolitics, being a student and practitioner of international relations.

International media has remained very relevant in marrative-making. I think this is very important because empowerment and influence without meaning are not useful.

So in today’s world, how do we interpret and how do we communicate? This is also extremely important. And since China now wants to have better relationships with the wider region and the wider world, I think legitimacy and communication are extremely important.

And in the end, I think I would conclude with this: perhaps the most important question raised by China and the Next Global Order is not simply how many poles emerge, but what possibilities for meaningful action exist around those poles.

Thank you.

Mabel Lu Miao

Very interesting comments. And you proposed some questions, but your ideas were also included in your questions. Thank you very much.

Next, we would like to invite Zoon Ahmed Khan. Thank you.

Zoon Ahmed Khan, Special Commentator for CGTN; Researcher, Belt and Road Institute, Tsinghua University

Thank you so much. Firstly, congratulations to Henry on the book, and to CCG. I’ve been in Beijing for 11 years. I came in 2014 with the question: what would Chinese leadership look like? You know, how could it be different from the kind of leadership or hegemony that we had been experiencing? And especially for West Asia, for certain parts of the world, the manifestation of that hegemony was quite harsh.

So anyway, what I felt back in 2014 was that there was a lack of understanding of how China sees the world; what are Chinese solutions to the problems that we face? And increasingly, over these 11 years, we’ve seen that a lot of that gap in understanding China’s perspective — how China approaches different issues, including conflicts, and the global initiatives that have been announced — has been addressed. That creates a window of opportunity for the world to understand what new leadership can look like.

But I’m going to be very quick. I’m going to answer two questions that I feel everyone can sort of relate to.

I was on a panel recently where the host asked me how China’s approach to development or addressing poverty differs from that of the West. And I said, I don’t think there is a targeted approach right now, domestically, in certain very developed countries to address poverty and tackle challenges.

And that’s the first question that we are looking at when we talk about an international order, because an international order is not just about the status quo. We talk about a bipolar order, a unipolar world order and, increasingly, a multipolar world order. But when we talk about the international legal order, we are essentially talking about the UN system, which has deliverables.

And then China is a country with increasing functional capacity to address those issues, such as the SDGs and, with the announcement of the IOM as well, possible mediation. These are real issues and challenges that the international order is mandated to address. And now China is increasingly playing a proactive role in bridging that gap between aspiration and reality.

So I feel this book also goes into the nitty-gritty, into the details of the different aspects of challenges that the world is essentially facing, whether it’s finance, whether it’s peace, whether it’s development or whether it’s poverty. What is a Chinese perspective on addressing those challenges? And I think that’s essentially what the world is looking for.

I know that Denis Simon was the first person to mention that it’s an optimistic book. My own view is that aspiration is the key to guiding a changing, and inevitably changing, global order in a direction that we want. And the Global South, the global majority, the world at large, has been aspirational.

And the second point I’ll mention is that, not long ago, a very respected scholar from Europe said, you know, the SCO is imagined. And I said, well, everything, every organisation, every such grouping, is first of all imagined, and then you work towards building the institutions, the understanding, the dialogue and the capability to create some kind of synergy.

And I think that is what the growing Global South and its growing weight in decision-making are also about. When Africa was mentioned, one of the reasons that Africa today is dynamic is because the African Union has built this continental-scale identity that every African country is working towards. And we need more of that.

So aspiration is what we really need to know what direction we’re going in. Nobody in a developing country, no government sitting in the Global South, ever says that we want to walk out of the international order. They say we want it strengthened. We want to be better represented. We want to be part of the solutions to the problems that we face. And what we really want is a UN system, a UN-centred international legal order where no country can go to war with absolute impunity. Venezuela was mentioned. These are the issues that we want to tackle.

So I think, I mean, I’ve gone through the book. I will read it in much more detail as well. This is the kind of voice that the world needs. There has been a big gap between what China is creating versus what people know about it. The issue of Orientalism was also mentioned, and I think, increasingly.

The last point I’ll mention is that we often try to compare this changing world order with some moment in history, but there is no comparison because today there is a true democratisation, so to speak, where countries in different parts of the world are speaking with each other.

Anyone sitting in Uganda or Chile or Peru can download this book and read what a Chinese perspective is like. So China’s growing global role is also not just about convincing the status quo powers that I am capable. It’s about showcasing its capabilities within the international order and delivering actual results to developing countries to prove that I am a leader that is following a direction that most of us have been wanting to move towards.

So we’re in a very different moment in history. And I think the contributions you’re making are very valuable in increasing synergy.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Zoon, for your great comments. Next, we would like to invite Michael Fabiyi, who is a PhD candidate at Tsinghua University. Please.

Oluwasegun Michael Fabiyi, PhD Candidate, Tsinghua University

Thank you so much. First and foremost, I want to say a very big congratulations to Dr Henry Wang on this wonderful publication.

I’ve not been able to read everything, of course, but I was very much struck by your conversation with Graham Allison, especially about escaping the Thucydides Trap, in terms of China and the US.

And I’m very impressed by what everyone has said concerning developing countries. And as someone coming from Africa, of course, having lived in Africa almost all my life, I can attest to some of these things. First of all, what the West was doing in Africa, and now what China is doing in Africa.

But I’m always very curious about something that you have said, and that President Xi has said, which is about not leaving anyone behind. And I’m always very curious about what China is going to be doing, even as the next global order emerges, to ensure that it is not leaving some of our developing brothers and sisters behind.

And of course, I will say that not just this particular book, but even your previous publications, are usually very wonderful, very brilliant. And I’m always very curious about what you think China should do in terms of not leaving anyone behind.

Of course, once again, congratulations.

Mabel Lu Miao

So maybe I would like to invite Emily from Springer Nature to say a few words.

Emily Zhang, Senior Editor for Business, Economics, and Political Science, Springer Nature

Thank you, Mabel. I’m so glad to be here on behalf of the publisher to offer some comments on this newly launched and very timely book authored by Henry. And we have had a very long period of cooperation with CCG, including Shirley, Henry, and Mabel. Thanks so much.

And I would like to share some of my comments on this book after reading some chapters of it.

I’d like to address two themes of the book. One is, I think, the arrival of a multipolar world. I think whether one agrees with every argument of the author or not, the fact is that a multipolar world is coming. And yes, I think the voice of a Chinese scholar is very important on this timely topic.

And the second theme is the power of dialogue. I think the book is also most valuable from that point of view. As a publisher, we want to build a bridge for authors and readers to share their comments on this very important and timely topic.

So that’s all. And yes, we look forward to another success for this book and the forthcoming titles in this series.

Thank you so much.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you, Emily. I appreciate all the cooperation between CCG and Springer Nature. We have had productive results. I look forward to this book having more influence on global governance.

And I know there are some journalists here as well, from CNN. Simone? If you have a question, the floor is open.

Simone McCarthy, Senior China Reporter, CNN International

Thank you so much. Such an interesting talk, and I look forward to reading the book.

You know, today, one of the big items in the news is conversation, especially among US tech companies, about AI and whether or not there should be more guardrails and a slowing down of AI development due to major AI risks or even a potential existential threat.

And I think it’s an interesting example when we have this conversation about multilateralism, but then there’s also the reality that the US and China are the two countries which are the most advanced in the technologies. And so how the two navigate putting those guardrails in place and working together on those kinds of global regulations, will be very important, despite the fact that we’ve also seen Chinese leader Xi Jinping repeatedly speaking about the need for global AI governance.

And so I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about how the bilateral relationship between these two countries fits into that broader picture of AI global governance. How do we sort of think about those two things working together, or are they entirely separate?

And then perhaps, of course, I’d be very curious, Dr Wng, to hear your view on the extent to which the two countries, especially in the coming days as we see President Xi travelling to the United States. Will they be able to reach some sort of agreement on these guardrails? Thank you so much.

Henry Huiyao Wang

So first of all, I would like to thank all the distinguished panellists and roundtable participants, and also Springer Nature, for attending this afternoon’s new book launch.

I think there have been a lot of questions raised in the process, but I’m also very grateful for all the positive comments and encouragement that we’ve had from this roundtable.

And of course, the book talks about China and the next global order. Actually, the next global order is still taking shape. I don’t mean that it’s already there, but it’s in the process of taking shape. So that’s one point.

And the other point, I mean, our friend asked about the multipolar world and the multipolar order. I think, you know, it’s all interdependent. It’s all intertwined.

We currently see a lot of multipolarity at the regional level. You know, for example, particularly in the economic area, we have RCEP and CPTPP, which are also driven by the middle powers. And we also see the European Union and ASEAN, and the SCO and BRICS. So there’s a variety of international, regional and geopolitical organisations taking shape.

But in that process, I agree that we actually need a UN-based, global consensus. As I discuss in my book, how about we do more with the G20, which is more inclusive. You’ve got ten Global South countries and ten Global North countries, representing 85 per cent of global GDP. So how could we use that to reform the UN, including the UN Security Council? I have a long article in the book about that. So I think those are interesting points.

Regarding our friend from CNN, I think you raised a very good question. Exactly. You know, AI has become so dangerous and so alarming. I’m also pleased to see three CEOs from the United States, from three of the largest AI companies, come out and say, “Okay, guys, let’s slow down. Let’s not really rush to accelerate the speed of AI development.”

So I think it’s extremely important for human beings to be very careful not to be overtaken by AI or swallowed by AI. Otherwise, we could basically end up wiping ourselves out with our own product.

So, as for how to do that, I see this upcoming visit by President Xi to the United States to meet President Trump as very important. And I know that there’s a lot of discussion, and great importance has been attached to AI.

I remember, in May, when President Trump visited China, he brought the Fox News crew, which did an on-site interview with President Trump in Beijing. But then the Fox crew actually came to my office, to this office. We did quite a lot of interviews. They just wanted to know about AI. They wanted to talk about AI. We gave our assessment.

So what I think is important is that both leaders realise the importance of AI. I’m sure AI will be talked about during the upcoming visit.

And actually, I even have a proposal, which is that we should really treat AI as a potential weapon of mass destruction. And we should have limits on that. So let’s say, how about we agree not to weaponise AI between China and the US?

Or maybe even further, let’s say we’re not going to be the first to use AI weapons, just as China has proposed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Can the US say, “Okay, we’re not going to be the first to use AI weapons”?

So something like that, I think, can be discussed. I think AI is probably a more urgent, more important global governance issue.

We have Pax Silica, which the US has launched, and China has launched the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation. But then the problem is that the US is very exclusive. The US is saying, “Look, you can’t join this World AI Organisation launched by China.” Whereas China hasn’t said that members cannot join the US organisation. So I think there’s a question of openness here. We need to have a unified organisation.

I really hope that during this high-level visit between China and the US, President Xi is going to bring some business leaders there. So why not have Chinese AI company leaders and US AI company leaders hold industry talks? You know, let’s get the top ten AI companies from both China and the US to sit down and talk as well.

So I would think that if we have more dialogue like this and more exchanges like this, we will realise how important it is to recognise the dangers of AI. AI can bring benefits, but it can also bring dangers to us.

But I think what China is doing is important as well, because the US has a lot of top research on AI and how it can really disrupt the whole world, whereas China is researching AI and how to use it, how to apply it to practical daily life. Sixty per cent of users in China have already signed up to AI. There’s no big opposition in China to the positive benefits of AI.

So I think there’s quite a difference in mentality and acceptance of AI, and China has all that infrastructure, power and electricity for AI development.

So I think China and the US, if they combine their efforts, can create huge wealth for human beings around the world. And then they can really limit the dangers. So that’s why we pin such high hopes on the China–US summit this month.

So I really appreciate all of you giving us your time today. I think we’re probably going to stop here. I really thank all of you for coming. But I think this book is just starting to reach readers. You can download it. It’s free and very accessible. So I hope that we can have more discussions in the days to come.

So in the meantime, let’s have a break now and have more exchanges among our colleagues, have some coffee and have some exchanges.

Thank you very much.

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CGTN, China’s English-language national broadcaster, has since released the full program on both its official website and YouTube channel.

Moderated by CGTN Radio host Tu Yun, the discussion featured

• Gonzalo Talavera, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Peru in China;

• Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG;

• Bert Hofman, Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Economy at the Asia Society (online);

• Paul Samson, President of the Centre for International Governance Innovation and former Canada Deputy for Finance at APEC (online);

• and Ravi Velloor, Associate Editor and Senior Columnist at The Straits Times (online).

Antonio Basilio, Director of the APEC Business Advisory Council International Secretariat, also delivered a video message.

The program came as China’s 2026 APEC host year entered its final stretch, ahead of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen in November. The discussion centered on this year’s theme, “Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together,” and its three priorities: openness, innovation and cooperation.

This transcript is based on the video recording and has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Tu Yun, Host, CGTN Radio

Different economies, different perspectives. Can APEC still find common ground to prosper together? Welcome to the 2026 APEC China Year Media Chats. I’m Tu Yun with CGTN Radio. It’s a great pleasure to have you with us for this special dialogue, jointly hosted by CGTN and the Center for China and Globalization.

As China hosts APEC this year, today’s discussion will explore China’s vision and priorities, review the outcomes of the meetings held so far, and look ahead to the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting to be held in Shenzhen. We’ve brought together officials and experts from different economies and backgrounds to share their perspectives on the opportunities and challenges facing the Asia-Pacific.

Joining me to preview this year’s APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting to be held in China’s southern tech hub of Shenzhen are Gonzalo Talavera, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Peru in China; Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalization; Bert Hofman, Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Economy, Asia Society; Paul Samson, President, Centre for International Governance Innovation, and former Canada Deputy for Finance at APEC; and Ravi Velloor, Associate Editor and Senior Columnist at The Straits Times, Singapore.

It’s a great pleasure to have you all on the show, gentlemen. In the audience, we also have teachers and students from Renmin University of China, the University of International Business and Economics, and Capital Normal University. Welcome to you all.

Well, before we begin our roundtable, we are very pleased to have a special video message from Antonio Basilio, Director of the APEC Business Advisory Council International Secretariat.

Antonio I. Basilio, Director, APEC Business Advisory Council International Secretariat

Good morning. I would like to thank the Center for China and Globalization and CGTN for organizing this important and timely event. China’s chairmanship of APEC draws to a close when APEC leaders meet in November in Shenzhen for their annual summit. China’s chairmanship comes at a period when the region is facing slower economic growth, rising protectionism and fragmentation, supply chain disruptions, and energy security challenges.

At the same time, we are experiencing very rapid technological change. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other frontier technologies are transforming not only the way we produce, trade, and do business, but all facets of our lives. The energy transition to a low-carbon economy is also creating both new opportunities and new challenges for our economies. This year, China has had the responsibility of leading the APEC region in responding to the challenge of continuing to sustain growth and prosperity in this increasingly uncertain environment.

From the business perspective, which ABAC, the organization I represent, brings, this greater policy uncertainty is making it more difficult for businesses to plan, invest, and grow. Under its chairmanship, China has focused APEC’s attention on, one, recommitting to openness and predictability, which is the foundation of our region’s economic success; two, pursuing practical initiatives to support this openness, including enhancing connectivity and facilitating trade; three, utilizing digitalization and AI to enhance productivity by encouraging its responsible deployment and making it accessible to all. Other areas like food security, healthcare, and other areas where greater cooperation can strengthen growth and resilience are also on China’s agenda.

The APEC Business Advisory Council, or ABAC, was created by APEC leaders to provide the business perspective on the major economic issues facing the region. Our role is really quite practical. We look at what is happening on the ground. What is preventing companies from trading and investing? What is making supply chains more difficult or more costly? What can improve productivity and competitiveness? And where can governments and businesses work together to make a real difference?

Our 2026 report to APEC economic leaders brings together ABAC’s recommendations on how we believe the region should respond. The report is accessible on our website, and I encourage your audience to take a look. Thank you again for giving me this opportunity to say a few words, and I look forward to the discussion to follow.

Tu Yun

Well, first, shall we have a brief introduction from each of our panelists? And please keep it to no more than two minutes. Shall we begin with Gonzalo?

Gonzalo Talavera, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Peru in China

Good morning. Thank you very much for inviting us to participate in this event. My name is Gonzalo Talavera. I am the Deputy Head of Mission of the Embassy of Peru in Beijing. I have worked for more than 20 years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peru as a diplomat, but only in two countries, in the U.S. and in China. Unfortunately, I have never been in charge of APEC issues, but my boss has, and he has given me his notes. So I will try to follow them as well as I can, so we can have a constructive dialogue today.

Tu Yun

Thank you. Henry.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President, Center for China and Globalization

Yes, thank you. So it’s really great to work with CGTN on this timely, very important subject, and really great to see old friends on the screen and also the Deputy Ambassador here as well. And thank CGTN for organizing this as well.

So I think it’s so important that we’ve got different perspectives. We’ve got perspectives from the Asia-Pacific, from Canada, from Singapore, from Asia, from Europe, and also Latin America. So I think it’s all Asia-Pacific-related, and I’m sure this year, when we have all the leaders, probably the most attended meeting compared with previous years, we’re going to generate a lot of outcomes. So let’s really discuss it, and hopefully we can make some contributions.

Tu Yun

Sure. It’s not just different economies; it’s also different perspectives or backgrounds, right? Then let’s turn to Bert with Asia Society.

Bert Hofman, Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Economy, Asia Society

I’m Bert Hofman. I’m right now a senior fellow at the Asia Society and also a senior fellow at the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute. I used to be the director of that institute, and before that, I spent 27 years at the World Bank. My last job was Country Director for China. My current research is on China and the world, on global integration and the tensions of geopolitics, and the effects on trade and investment flows.

Tu Yun

Should we go to Paul with CIGI?

Paul Samson, President, Centre for International Governance Innovation, and former Canada Deputy for Finance at APEC

Yes. Hello. Thank you very much for the invitation. Paul Samson, President of the Canadian independent think tank Centre for International Governance Innovation. I had the honor to be a member of the APEC table for almost five years as Canada’s finance deputy, and I was also a co-chair of one of the G20 working groups on the global economy for five years. So there’s an interesting comparison and contrast as to how these different groups work and how they can move things forward.

Tu Yun

Thank you. And last but not least, Ravi, please.

Ravi Velloor, Associate Editor and Senior Columnist, The Straits Times

Morning, everybody, and thank you for having me on this program. And thank you to Dr. Wang, an old friend, for inviting me. I write for The Straits Times. I’m a senior columnist, and I focus on the Asian transition, regional diplomacy, macroeconomics, and geopolitics. I’m also a podcaster, and my program is called Asian Insider. Last month we did a podcast that proved to be immensely popular. You might want to see it.

Very happy to be here. I speak from the viewpoint of a nation that is critically dependent on keeping trade channels open. Singapore is probably the world’s most trade-dependent economy, and with APEC especially, I think almost 80 percent of our trade goes to APEC. So the region is very important to us, and I’m very happy to be here. Thank you very much.

Tu Yun

Let me begin with the theme of China’s APEC year, “Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together,” with three priorities: openness, innovation, and cooperation. So Gonzalo, Peru actually hosted APEC two years ago, right? And you are now serving here in Beijing as China hosts APEC. So that gives you a rather unique vantage point. How has the APEC agenda changed from your perspective since the Peru year, and what does an Asia-Pacific community mean to you?

Gonzalo Talavera

I think that we have to take into consideration three areas here. First of all, we have to recognize that every time an economy hosts the APEC meeting, it has the advantage of choosing or proposing the things that that meeting will be focused on.

In the case of Peru, we chose “Empower. Include. Grow.” And that was in 2024. In 2025, Korea hosted the APEC meeting, and they chose their own topics, and they developed and centered on AI and demographics. And this year, as you have said, China has chosen the topics that the APEC meeting will focus on. That’s the first issue: the agenda for the APEC meeting in that year is entrusted to the host economy.

What has changed is the environment. The environment of 2024 is very different from the environment of 2025 onward, so there are more challenges for the economies that are hosting the APEC meeting since 2025. What has not changed is the destination, because so far there have been some advances. All economies are betting on facilitating trade, facilitating exchanges among the APEC economies.

What we understand by a shared community—that’s what you said—for us is to be able to be treated as equals in all economies, meaning that a small or medium-sized company in Peru can sell its products to Japanese consumers, Singaporean consumers, Canadian consumers, American consumers, Chinese consumers. And we have to work so that, in the future, we will be able to facilitate these trade flows between all our economies.

Tu Yun

Indeed, inclusiveness is very important, right, all the time, I think. Thanks, Gonzalo. Let me bring the rest of the panel into the discussion. Henry, you specialize in China’s engagement with the world and global governance, so what does an Asia-Pacific community realistically mean to you?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Great question. And what I think is that, particularly for the last 10 years, the world has really been in turmoil. Particularly, we’ve seen and witnessed protectionism, trade wars and sanctions, and all the measures taken in the international trade arena and economic arena. I think the Asia-Pacific APEC summit remains one of the most relevant and highly valuable platforms, and particularly I place very high hopes on this year because President Trump is going to come, and probably Putin is also going to come, so we will see, and of course all the 21 leaders of Asia-Pacific economies.

How can we really build an Asia-Pacific community to prosper together, as the theme reflects, under the keywords of openness, innovation and cooperation? So I think the theme maybe still reflects what everybody has been hoping for for many decades. But hopefully this time, let’s put something real on the ground. I know there are several ministerial meetings that have already happened, but also it will be held in Shenzhen, which 40-some years ago was just a village, a fishing village. Now it’s a cosmopolitan city of 20 million, and that demonstrates how we can prosper together.

And particularly, I think the spirit of working together, of leaders having dialogue together, and a lot of preparation work this year under the APEC theme is really productive. Hopefully, we can also have some joint consensus in order to really reflect the urgent crises we’re having. There are many issues. There’s climate. There’s AI. There’s global imbalance. There’s debt. There are many trade frictions. So hopefully this can generate some more positive sentiment and more positive policy directions.

I don’t expect everybody will agree on everything at the same level, but at least show some kind of spirit of cooperation. That’s exactly what we need to bring back. And I think APEC is also very comprehensively representative and represents 60 percent of the global economy. Particularly, the U.S. and China are in it, and hopefully this is going to be very relevant with ASEAN, with Latin America, with many other countries in the Pacific.

So I hope this is going to send a huge signal. I mean, we cannot go back to the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. But that was a vision that we had many years ago. But at least we can come together, and hopefully we’re going to send a message to the world: okay, we are still talking. We are still tackling all those tough issues. We may be different, but let’s really get together.

Tu Yun

Indeed, we look forward to some substantive progress this time, and we’ll come to this free trade agreement later on in the show. But to Bert, you have extensive experience with China and the broader Asia-Pacific economy. So your interpretation of an Asia-Pacific community?

Bert Hofman

Well, look, it’s a very strong community. Aside from the share in global GDP, also in trade, almost half of global trade takes place in the Asia-Pacific. That hasn’t changed, despite all the noise and all the geopolitics. It is still a very strong community, and two-thirds of trade within the Asia-Pacific takes place within the Asia-Pacific economies, and one-third is outside those economies. So that’s a very strong community.

At the same time, there are, of course, forces that drive some of the economies apart. The geopolitics of it is very clear, but it’s also an opportunity. Look, I mean, there are very few organizations where China and the U.S. are coming together and talking with other countries—not just with themselves, but with other countries—about the issues that face global trade. So that community can hopefully entice some countries to continue to be part of that.

Tu Yun

And Henry just mentioned there might be some trilateral meeting among those three heads of major economic powers later.

Bert Hofman

Right. So, I mean, if you get a number of people together, it’s always good to have the bilaterals. That’s really where it happens. Or trilaterals—that’s really where it happens. And creating an opportunity in such a summit, where indeed both the leader of the United States and the leader of China attend, is going to be an opportunity.

Tu Yun

Indeed. And Paul, given your experience in the Canadian government, APEC, and G20, what’s your answer?

Paul Samson

Yeah, I would say that I’m an optimist, but I’m also a realist, right? And so when I look around at what’s happening, you know, a huge part of the economy, a huge part of trade, and also one of the most dynamic economic areas on the globe, maybe the most dynamic. So it’s certainly a place to look at.

At the same time, the headwinds are going to remain, right? We’re kind of in a world where industrial policy is full-on in many countries. Tariffs are going to linger. We’re still going to be facing export controls, security considerations and things, so those will be out there relating to supply chains. But I think the kind of thing that APEC can do, on the optimistic side, will be to continue to show how trade facilitation works. Standards can be shared.

I think the treatment of data is going to be very important. Digital interoperability is something where I think APEC can demonstrate some leadership that could spill over into other parts of the world as kind of a good example. So I’m optimistic about APEC, but I’m also realistic about those headwinds that are out there that I think are going to remain.

Tu Yun

I think optimism is very useful now. And to Ravi, you’ve spent decades reporting on and analyzing Asian geopolitics and international relations. In your view, what would an ideal Asia-Pacific community look like?

Ravi Velloor

Look, Tu, I’m in the happy position of being able to agree with almost everything that has been said by the people who spoke before me. So I really can only add to what they said and endorse what they’ve said so far.

We should not forget that we are in the happy situation where our region is still growing, and growing reasonably well, and we need to preserve that. And to me, a community is one which consistently works to improve its shared space and works on resolving issues before they become problems. So that is my vision of a strong community where open discussions take place.

And one of the best things about this meeting is that, as you mentioned, so many of these key people are going to be around. They’re going to be pulling each other aside, and any time when people meet at that level, there has to be good.

Now, that doesn’t mean that there are not real issues to address, and there are many. We need to talk about choke points. We need to talk about resilience in supply chains. We need to talk about climate, which is very important for the part of the world where I’m speaking from. Southeast Asia is in the vortex of what’s called the intertropical vortex, which means that we have very heavy floods and very dry summers. And so climate is important for us. Energy resilience, health—all these issues belong in APEC and should be discussed.

So I think we have a real opportunity to discuss some of these things, and especially because APEC is an intergovernmental organization, not a supranational one. I think there is room for frank discussions, and frank discussions surely have to be fruitful.

Tu Yun

Right. If, like you’ve all mentioned, an Asia-Pacific community to prosper together means it should be inclusive, it should include communication, or it’s all about being connected between different economies, then the first question is whether those economic connections, or economies, can remain open. So that’s why the “China Year” has placed openness at the top of its three priorities.

But tariffs, like you all mentioned, trade barriers and industrial policies, and supply chain realignments are reshaping the global trading landscape. So against this backdrop, Ravi, according to your observation, do you still believe APEC can serve as a force against increasing economic fragmentation?

Ravi Velloor

Well, I take heart from the fact that the United States—to borrow an expression used by a former Australian prime minister—you know, the U.S. has been so recalcitrant on so many of these issues, but it is still inside APEC, unlike the TPP, which the President withdrew from on his first day in office. He signed that away. I take heart from the fact that the United States is still within APEC, and that, to me, is a positive that I’d like to work on. It’s something that probably is a gentle force that works against the fragmentation that you ask me about.

And I do believe that initiatives like supply chain resilience, which Singapore is working on, and also paperless trade, which Singapore is working on—these things do act as counterforces against whatever fragmentation might be taking place around us. And always, I think managed interdependence is the answer to many of our problems.

But we also need to recognize that many of the Asian economies, particularly, are at different stages of economic growth. We have to be mindful of that. And China’s theme, as was mentioned, is to prosper together. I think later I might talk a little bit more about this, but there is real fear of deindustrialization taking place in some of the major economies in Southeast Asia, and we need to ensure that some of these economies do not get left behind as openness and trade proceed. So I think I’ll stop at that point and come in later if you need me to.

Tu Yun

Sure. So you do believe that APEC can counter increasing economic fragmentation?

Ravi Velloor

Well, I think there are enough positive forces at work to stay the negative forces at work as well.

Tu Yun

Sure. And to Henry then, from China’s perspective, what concrete measures could China promote through APEC to advance openness at a time of rising trade protectionism?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes, good question. Actually, I just got back from Xiamen. I attended the 26th China International Fair for Investment and Trade. It was huge. This year they had a much larger scale.

China still pursues this openness in practice, welcoming all the foreign investment, many ministers. And yes, the China International Fair for Trade in Services in Beijing opens again. We are going to have one session tomorrow there. So you can see China does that. And of course in November we’re going to have the China International Import Expo. So I think they put this openness into practice.

What I think China can do, probably at this APEC summit, is first, we can of course emphasize all those principles: openness, prosperity, cooperation, development. Those are still the key words because these days we hear less about those keywords.

Second, I think we need to build up some consensus. So basically, build up trust. I think what we’re lacking is trust. So the meetings we have, leaders having dialogues—that’s a good way to build up trust. And then we should probably reduce the rhetoric on trade wars, sanctions and measures, and, “If you do not do this, I’m going to do that.” Let’s use dialogue. So I think, build up some rapport and a friendly atmosphere.

And thirdly, which is important, let’s propose some concrete measures, like China has already done with over 70 countries coming to China visa-free now, almost one way or the other. Fifty-three African countries, including others, about 60 or 70 of them, come to China tariff-free. We could do more on that. We could open visa-free access for the U.S. and many other countries.

And thirdly, let’s welcome Chinese investment, because we see there are a lot of complaints about China overcapacity, subsidies and things like that. But why not welcome Chinese investment? Because if we hang on to those sanction banners all the time, and then we hear the bad stories all the time, there’s no Chinese investment there. The Peruvian Deputy Ambassador was just telling me that Peru has become a major destination for Chinese investment because we have good relations. Brazil is the same. I just came back from Brazil. And also, I think ASEAN has become the largest trading partner of China for the last six or seven years now.

And then, of course, we need to really strengthen our cooperation with Europe, with America, with the Middle East, with all the other countries too. So I think in this Asia-Pacific, we probably cannot reach complete consensus, but let’s re-emphasize open and free trade, cooperation, and then propose some concrete measures. And of course, it’s also a good time for China to hear from all the leaders about their comments, suggestions, recommendations, or even some differences on what’s going on.

But by inviting them all to come to Shenzhen, they’re going to see a vast miracle in 21st-century modern history. Forty years ago, it was just a village. This is probably one of the largest cities. It’s become the Silicon Valley of China. It demonstrates how one Five-Year Plan after another Five-Year Plan, how working together with openness and attracting foreign investment can produce miracles. So that experience can also be shared among Asia-Pacific countries. So I think many things can be done, but most important is to build up trust. Seeing is believing.

Tu Yun

Gonzalo, what’s your evaluation of what China has done? Like Henry just mentioned, there are some countries saying that China is not doing enough. From your experience here over the past two years staying here in China, what’s your evaluation?

Gonzalo Talavera

We are working very closely with China, but you have to know that Peru has the opposite model of the Chinese economy. China has very strong state-owned companies. We have almost zero. We have a very private economy. Probably 95 or 96 percent of our economy is private.

So when we work with China, we work with the understanding that we want to bring investment from China to my country, to develop my country and to improve the quality of life of our population, under one principle, and that principle is the principle of non-discrimination. We don’t even discriminate between foreign and national investment, so much so that we don’t have statistics about foreign investment. Every time we receive investment, we don’t care which flag it has, as long as it invests and respects Peruvian law. And that’s how we work with China. We try to invite them, to convince them that they have very good opportunities in Peru, and we do that with the U.S., with European countries, with Asian countries, with everybody.

Tu Yun

Have you found Peruvian products here in China? Are we open enough?

Gonzalo Talavera

Yes. Fortunately, in the last two years we have been able to open a couple of new products, but we have been exporting grapes for maybe 15 years. There are a lot of blueberries coming here and a lot of copper. And one thing that we are working on with China is that we want to diversify our trade, because so far it is almost focused on one product, which is copper.

And if we want to make a stronger relationship, that relationship should not be based only on one product, but on many other ones. And we try to convince GACC, the Chinese authority responsible for phytosanitary matters, to let more Peruvian products come to China. And that’s a little hard. I have to say, it takes years to open the market for one Peruvian product, but we are working very hard in that sense.

Tu Yun

Right. I believe many of us here have been consumers of Peruvian grapes or blueberries. And to Bert, how much room is there for APEC to preserve an open trading system when some major economies are increasingly putting economic security ahead of economic efficiency?

Bert Hofman

Well, look, economic security is a fact of life, and both the United States, as well as Europe, as well as China, pay a lot of attention to that, and that complicates trade. But at the moment, there’s not enough understanding of what it actually means. And if national security is one thing, it could mean everything.

So setting some understanding around that—what is acceptable behavior in light of national security concerns, and what is not—would already be tremendously helpful. The WTO has a rule on that, but it is so comprehensive that, in practice, it doesn’t mean that much. So working on that is important.

Second, there are clearly different phases in different countries. If you want, the United States is now stepping back from a number of responsibilities that it has performed in the world for a very long time. They no longer play that leadership role, neither in trade, nor investment, nor in other parts. And China could step up. Henry already talked about a number of things that China could do unilaterally. That is good for China, but also good for others.

One thing that China could do more of to help all the other APEC economies is stimulate domestic demand. It’s a clear domestic priority. China is very strong in investment, very strong in exports, but not very strong in domestic demand. That would help everybody export more to China, and that would therefore help the Asia-Pacific community.

Tu Yun

Actually, I think the Chinese government is doing everything it can to promote domestic consumption, right? That’s what we all know. Then, to Paul. You have argued that Canada and other countries will need to step up in responding to changes in global trade. So what does that mean in practice: more regional agreements, a stronger commitment to multilateral rules, or something else?

Paul Samson

Yeah, I think Canada is a particularly good example right now because we’re an open trading economy with a high percentage of exports going to the United States, and that regime has been shaken up, right? But what I’m about to say, I think, applies to many other countries as well, and that is that there are several tracks to this.

The first one is to diversify trade concretely beyond the opportunities that exist on paper through existing arrangements. In our case, we have agreements with many, many countries, but they have not actually been realized to the degree that they probably should. So, in our case, we’ve set a target to diversify a significant part of our exports to new markets, and that would include Europe, but a lot of it is the Asia-Pacific.

I think the second thing that applies to Canada, and I think it applies to other countries as well, is to ensure that the infrastructure, in a broad sense, is up to par with demands. Getting what you’ve got in terms of products to markets—and often, in the case of APEC, that’s on the Pacific Ocean—you want that ability to maximize things through ports, transportation corridors, trains and highways. All those links really matter. And in Canada’s case, the more infrastructure we have to get products out through the West Coast, Pacific Ocean, the more options we have, right? Because a lot of our infrastructure is north-south, and that can’t get products to APEC countries as easily. And many countries are facing the same thing.

And then the final thing that I would say that would apply to Canada and a number of other countries is a little bit of that middle-powers discussion, where when the smaller economies have good ideas, they can still demonstrate best practices. They can build little mini-coalitions on issues that they want to move forward. I think areas of digital trade are showing some promise there. I think artificial intelligence needs help, and it’s not necessarily going to come from China or the United States on their own. Maybe they need some encouragement to get these kinds of regimes clear—interoperability, data. I think energy will be another one, and then issues like the reform of the World Trade Organization. I think small, or smaller, open economies need to get more active on that front to maintain the value of those organizations.

Tu Yun

Indeed. Talking about infrastructure construction and AI, I believe China can do something there if Canada allows us to do so. Then, one possible answer to maintaining openness in the region is a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, or FTAAP, mentioned earlier by Henry. It has been on the APEC agenda for two decades, and this year China has proposed a standalone outcome on FTAAP as part of the APEC 2026 deliverables. Henry, what could realistically constitute a meaningful FTAAP breakthrough in Shenzhen?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Well, I think absolutely those are crucial issues, and we need to really continue to make a breakthrough on that. I think China calls for that, and China is willing to do that. For example, we have upgraded our free trade agreement with ASEAN, and recently we did that with Switzerland. And I really hope that we revive this comprehensive investment treaty with Europe.

But specifically for the Asia-Pacific, even though the FTAAP, the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, was proposed, as you said, 20 years ago, we still see some progress. We have RCEP, the largest free trade agreement in the world, concluded a few years ago. We have the CPTPP, which is now really in the hands of middle powers. And I think I really agree with what Paul just said. Middle powers can play a role. It’s no longer black and white. It’s no longer China versus the West or the West versus the rest. It’s really picking on merit.

So if the CPTPP can really uphold free trade and higher standards of trade above the WTO—a mini-WTO—then let’s talk. I mean, China expressed interest in joining that, and the UK has already joined that, and the European Union is interested. So we could talk about many things, but I do think, one step at a time, that we could continue to push for FTAAP. But also, with smaller steps, pursue bilateral and trilateral free trade agreements.

But there’s also more than trade now. There’s climate. There’s artificial intelligence. There’s digital. There are many, many areas. So I’m really pleased to see a lot of ministerial meetings happening now, and then I really hope that we can create a new climate, a new trust, a new narrative, and really, with all those 21 leaders of the Asia-Pacific staying together, that we are going ahead with all those valuable agendas that we’ve cherished for so long. It’s just that these recent few years have really distorted things, and then we’ve also gotten into different regional wars. So energy is important. How can China play a role in solving this Middle East crisis? How can China play some role in solving this European-Ukraine crisis? So I think many things can be done.

Tu Yun

Do we need anything physical or visible or tangible—something like that—a formal roadmap or anything else?

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think they already had the roadmap before, but of course FTAAP would be a long-term objective. But what I think is this: if the Asia-Pacific can get a handle on AI, which is really rapidly developing and out of control, and then also on energy caused by the Middle East, the Iranian war there, and with the U.S.—I think, how do we deal with new energy?

We talk about climate. We see what happened in Nepal and Xizang just recently, for example. So what we need to do is basically how we can promote this new technology, new green power, new globalization of green. Those things are really concrete. But I do think we can re-emphasize open trade, newly emphasize AI cooperation—not weaponize AI—and emphasize the digital divide between the Global South and the Global North.

And of course, I think I would have a bold proposal: can we somehow merge RCEP and the CPTPP? I mean, can we intertwine them? Have a big cooperation among those two largest groups, and have some new policy for that.

Tu Yun

All right. And Gonzalo, from Peru’s perspective, what could leaders in Shenzhen add that ministers have not already said in this regard?

Gonzalo Talavera

Sometimes when we have a crisis in an international forum, we have to just stop. Let me use an analogy. We have to stop the horses to check if the wagons are still connected, because sometimes the horses go away and we lose the wagons. I think this is an opportunity to look backwards and see where the wagons are.

And what Peru did in 2024 was that we annexed the Ichma Declaration to the 2024 Declaration in Lima, setting the basic themes and areas where all the economies agree. And I think that the leaders this time, if they cannot advance 100 percent toward their objective, could try to make a roadmap to fulfill all those deliverables that we have agreed on over the last 10 years, 15 years, because there is a lot of work to do.

One example is trade facilitation, validation of certificates. There are many areas where we have already agreed—even to discuss, even to disagree. We have to standardize our language, and we can advance in that sense. So what the leaders can do is stop negotiating, maybe, and start implementing what has already been agreed on.

Tu Yun

I think they’ve talked about customs clearance, to upgrade or streamline the process, right?

Gonzalo Talavera

For example. Or the new topics that were agreed on just last year about the use of AI in trade facilitation. For that, for example, the challenge is not technical. The challenge is a regulatory challenge. It’s a legal challenge. We have to adapt national laws to those tools that AI is developing, and in our own languages, because a small or medium-sized company in Peru will never be able to use them if they cannot understand them.

Tu Yun

Right. I think that’s what Paul just mentioned: interoperability. So Paul, Canada is part of the free trade pact USMCA with the United States and Mexico, as well as other regional trade arrangements. From your experience, how difficult would it be to build an agreement that can accommodate such a diverse group of economies, and what would make meaningful progress politically possible?

Paul Samson

Yeah, I think in some ways, if you were able to prove the experiment backwards, the CPTPP grew out of a bit of an APEC vision and kind of dynamism in the region, because of course most of the members are APEC members as well, right? And so that, as Henry said, is a nucleus to grow from.

I think it’s hard to imagine some kind of comprehensive formal trade agreement encompassing all APEC economies right now. But I could imagine quite a bit of progress on the kinds of issues that were just mentioned—ones that are around updating and modernizing customs to be fully digital, electronic documentation that is compatible. Because the smallest thing that is different kind of means these systems don’t operate smoothly. So there’s a lot that can be done there in facilitating.

I think standards are very important as well. They often sound kind of boring and in the background, but the degree to which they are compatible and meshed makes a big difference. And APEC has been doing that.

And I think, as was mentioned earlier, trust is quite high within APEC. When you look at the different tables and conversations around the world in different settings, I’ve been to many of those, and I’ve always felt that APEC had one of the best feelings of that trust and kind of building it together, which is the theme for this year. So I’m optimistic about some of those small things, but I don’t think we’ll quite get to some kind of broader comprehensive agreement in the short term.

Tu Yun

Right. But what about in the long run?

Paul Samson

Well, the long run depends on how long you mean. But I don’t—I mean, that’s too far out to project right now.

Tu Yun

Sure. And to Ravi, what’s your observation here?

Ravi Velloor

Okay. Can I just go back to the comment that Bert made about the importance that China stimulate domestic demand? I think he really had it spot on, because the more China stimulates domestic demand and gives the rest of the world an opportunity to sell into it, the resistance that we are seeing build around the world to Chinese manufactured goods coming out into the world will ease.

And, you know, for us in Singapore, trade is also a means for global peace. I mean, really, when people are interdependent, the chances of conflict come down. But let me just say this: China has got so good at manufacturing. I’m not in the camp of people who say that the Chinese are mercantilistic exporters or anything like that. I just believe that you’re very good at what you’re doing, and that you’re so efficient, your supply chains are so smooth, and it’s very difficult to compete against that.

It’s going to get worse when we enter the field of services. That’s going to be the next wave, and the third will be when AI-embedded products come out. And I see China going to be very dominant in all that. So if you want to remove the resistance that’s bound to happen, even in places like Southeast Asia, which, in my mind, is the region most favorably inclined towards China—we have no residual issues. We don’t carry half the suspicions against China that the rest of the world seems to have.

So in our common interest, I think, A, you can help grow economies here because if you feed domestic demand in these countries, that helps your exports. Secondly, if you can stimulate domestic demand there, it gives us an opportunity to trade into you. So that’s the point I wanted to make, taking up what Bert said.

To what Henry said and what Gonzalo said, there is a saying in parts of Asia. Grandmothers tell their grandchildren that before you stretch out both your legs, make sure you’re sitting down, because if you don’t, you could just fall. So it’s important to do these things incrementally. And in this current situation that we are in in the world, it is the time to lie low and build incrementally and quietly. We don’t want to do things or announce things that are so big that it catches the attention of the White House, and then everything stops.

So what is realistic? If we can move on digital trade, paperless trade, basic rules on AI, as Henry said, align the various FTAs, the RCEP and APEC and all that, and bring some of that together, I would think that, for me, that would be more important than any dreams of an FTAAP dramatic announcement, which I just simply don’t see happening in today’s climate.

Tu Yun

Yeah. What Ravi just mentioned actually brings me to the question for Bert. Paul just mentioned he is not so optimistic in the short term, but could APEC’s relatively informal and non-binding nature actually be an advantage here? Because economies do not have to agree on everything, right, before they can begin cooperating on practical economic issues.

Bert Hofman

That’s very true. I mean, I’m with the other speakers that we can’t expect a big free trade announcement from APEC at this particular point in time. I define the short term as until November 2029, i.e. the next elections in the United States. Beyond that, a lot will be possible again.

If you look at the experience under President Biden, he turned again to internationalism. He turned again to international cooperation—not as before, because the world has changed—but that we can expect. So if, in the meantime, we can make smaller progress, and we are below the radar screen, or as part of a modular free trade agreement of the future, the areas that were mentioned—AI, customs, standards, and more specifically standards in, say, agriculture, even more narrowly in electronics, wherever you want to put that—those will help in eventually building something that could be considered a free trade agreement.

The competing vision, of course, is to say, well, APEC is a discussion club and will make some practical progress and innovate some at the margin, but the bigger agreements will be in RCEP or CPTPP. That’s a decision that hasn’t been made yet, but that could come out in a couple of years as being a more practical route towards further opening up, which is the goal of most countries around the world at the table. Thanks.

Tu Yun

Right. And whenever we get confused or things get too abstract, we can always refer to some concrete examples, right? One example, I think, is Peru’s Chancay Port, for how openness can help strengthen regional connectivity in the Asia-Pacific. It has emerged, if you will, as an important new link between Latin America and Asia.

If I remember correctly, its total container throughput in the first half of this year recorded an increase of over 70 percent. So under these circumstances, Gonzalo, what does the Chancay experience tell us about the potential for stronger Asia-Pacific connectivity? And do you think this kind of cooperative model can be promoted or expanded elsewhere in the region?

Gonzalo Talavera

That will depend on the legal framework each country, each economy, has. For example, Chancay Port is a very good example to explain how Peru works. Chancay Port is not the product of a government-to-government agreement. It has never been. It was the idea of two entrepreneurs who used to be navy officers in Peru, who discovered a perfect place for a deep-water port.

And they spent 12 years of their lives going to Europe, to the U.S., to many countries, presenting their project. And for 12 years, nobody listened to them, until, at one meeting in Davos, they reached a manager from COSCO Shipping. They made contact, and they were invited to Hong Kong to present the project. So these two entrepreneurs presented the project to a company in Hong Kong, and they asked for a Peruvian counterpart. And that Peruvian counterpart was a mining company called Volcan.

So COSCO put 60 percent of the capital, and Volcan put 40 percent of the capital, and it was a private endeavor that developed Chancay Port. That is very important for us. It had an effect of 1 percent of GDP growth last year. And more than that, it has reduced the shipping time from Peru, from South America, to Shanghai, to Asia, from 35 or 38 days to 23 or 25 days. If you calculate the cost savings of that, it’s very, very big, and that’s a reality.

The other thing is that we are betting that Chancay will become a regional hub, and it is already transforming into a regional hub, because we are receiving cargo from Ecuador, from Colombia, Chile, and even Brazil. What we are trying to convince the Chinese part is that they will let us come, for example, from Chancay to Shanghai, use a phytosanitary certificate from the Peruvian authority, and allow us to re-export that product to other economies of the region—to Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, Korea. And we are working with the customs authorities in Shanghai on that.

And that will benefit China, and that will benefit Peru, because Chancay in Peru will consolidate as a regional hub, and China will provide logistics services for cargo that will not just come to China but to the other economies of the region.

Tu Yun

That’s what we say: prosper together, right?

Gonzalo Talavera

It’s a very good example of what the Chinese call a win-win situation.

Tu Yun

Right. And then Henry, what would it take to turn individual connectivity projects like Chancay Port into a broader regional network, rather than leaving them as isolated infrastructure projects?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yeah, what the Deputy Ambassador just told us was really a very vivid story. It’s the first time for me to hear that. I thought it was some kind of state project, but it was actually a private initiative, and for 12 years nobody was interested, and China started to do something. So that’s a good example.

I think that kind of story will gradually make China become more connected and then promote prosperity for different regions. So I think now China is not only doing that in Peru, but also in Indonesia. ASEAN is now super-connected. They’re building railways in Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand. Laos is already there. So that’s a good example.

And then I think something can be done on green development. How can we really help the world fight climate change with the most cost-effective, most available products? Find a way to do that in a friendly way. I agree with our panel colleagues that China should stimulate domestic consumption. I mean, that’s because I think we went through COVID, real estate has been flat and coming down, and maybe people felt, okay, we need some more cash savings for the future. But again, China built the largest social security network, the largest education system, the largest Medicare system. Let’s improve on that. So we should spend more money on those things, and then people probably will have more confidence to consume.

And the other thing I would really like to see is tourism. We should have more tourists going to Peru, going to Europe, going to different countries. So visa-free access is really good, and I really call for other countries to give China free access to travel, because right now, even when I travel, I have to apply for visas for many places, and it takes a long time. That’s a big process. And of course Canada is such a beautiful country. We love to go. I hope the visa process can also be simplified.

And more than that, I would think China is using this kind of open attitude, trying quietly to promote globalization, but also peace. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang has made 40 calls to different foreign ministers on the Iranian conflict in the region. So I do think that the U.S. and China, with the four summits, kind of high-level meetings this year—never had before—with President Trump and President Xi, could really send a lot of positive signals about doing things together.

But I do agree with our panelists, and I also propose this too: let the APEC summit model the CPTPP. Because it’s already Asia-Pacific-related, it was looked after by middle powers. But let’s use those standards, upgrade all the standards, and then maybe have overlap between RCEP and the CPTPP and increase RCEP as well. And then eventually, can we merge CPTPP and RCEP?

Instead of FTAAP, let’s say the convergence of RCEP and CPTPP. That’s a pathway for the future, and that probably will strengthen relations among the economies. While the U.S. is not in the CPTPP, there won’t be too much interference. Let middle powers and China find more practical cooperation through these two largest free trade agreements in the world.

Tu Yun

Sure. And talking about challenges, I believe, back to the Chancay point, we all see that it didn’t come easily. It’s not without challenges, especially over the past few months, if I can say that. So if regional partners want to copy that, or learn from Chancay’s experience, what kind of challenges do you think other players or partners should focus on, or meet, or tackle? What’s your experience for us?

Gonzalo Talavera

From the Peruvian perspective, we have more or less clarified the situation. We want to keep our legal framework stable.

So foreign investors will have a lot of confidence investing in Peru. I cannot recommend how to do it in other countries, because they have different legal systems, they have different financial challenges. But I had the chance to follow more or less what happened with Chancay Port since I was working in Hong Kong, because I had to legalize some documents for that financing.

Actually, it went quite smoothly because the Chinese are among the best builders on the planet. So to build that port with high technology, I am sure that they must have been quite stressed. But all the dates, all the deadlines were fulfilled on time, even though President Xi Jinping went in November 2024 to Peru to participate in the APEC meeting, and we took advantage of that to make a state visit, and President Xi and President Dina Boluarte at that time inaugurated the port in November.

I don’t dare to make recommendations, because each country has its own realities.

Tu Yun

That’s true. Well, trade and physical connectivity are only part of the story, and increasingly the next border could be digital. Data crosses borders instantly, while regulations struggle to keep pace. And yes, AI offers huge opportunities for productivity and inclusion, but it can also fuel technological rivalry.

So that brings us to the China Year’s second major priority: innovation. APEC’s digital and AI discussions this year have highlighted cross-border data flows, interoperability, open-source approaches, and responsible governance. So Paul, from a global governance perspective, I think you’ve already touched upon this a little bit, but why are these issues becoming so important, and what kind of common ground does APEC realistically need to find?

Paul Samson

Yeah, I think that now what we traditionally call trade infrastructure is actually becoming digital infrastructure in many ways, as the backbone of much of the interactions we’re seeing, right? So digital is becoming inherent, and AI is dramatically accelerating that change.

You don’t have to look very far into the news to see the latest AI models, coming mostly out of the United States and China, moving the needle quite rapidly on the importance of AI. A number of significant reports have come out just in the last few weeks on the likely impact on productivity and economic growth, which all countries are trying to move on because of debt-level pressures and things. It’s just becoming so central to the planning of all countries that we can’t not embrace it.

And I think APEC is well positioned to make some of the connections that we were talking about earlier. If we used to, in the past, talk about ports and containers and tariffs and things like that, we do have to get into these questions of models and computer infrastructure, digital identities, electronic payments. We haven’t mentioned electronic payments so far in this conversation. That is moving very, very rapidly, right?

And we’re moving into a world where there will be several different forms of electronic payments, some of which are being led out of China. Of course, you’ve got the SWIFT system. One of the critical things is going to be, again, interoperability between those systems. I think we’re going to have a hybrid model, but it doesn’t mean it can’t function well if there are these bridges and smoothing elements to it.

I think the question of open source—I want to say a word on that. It’s a huge issue, and it’s a fascinating one that comes up pretty much every time with new technologies. But this time it’s even more fundamental with AI because of all the layers involved in the models, and the transparency question becomes paramount.

Now, there’s a lot of confusion around what open source means, because open-weight and open-source all have different meanings. You can have something that is fairly open in terms of the model—it can be downloaded and replicated and things—but it may still not be open in terms of how the training was done, what the sources of data are.

So I think this is going to be a huge debate. I think there’s going to be pressure to move more towards open source, but because of the national security elements, there are a lot of pressures to keep some things non-open-source. But I think this would be a great conversation for APEC to have and to push the importance of that issue.

So, huge scope here. I think everyone has an interest in more cooperation on AI, whether it’s for safety risks or just facilitation. There’s competitiveness, of course, but there’s a lot of low-hanging fruit that APEC could lead on, I would say.

Tu Yun

Right. I think everybody knows how much benefit AI could bring to this region, but there could also be some confusion about which model you should choose, right? Especially when it comes to this question of rivalry between the two biggest AI powers.

So there comes the question: how can Asia-Pacific economies avoid being forced to choose between competing technological ecosystems, especially when it comes to smaller or middle economies like Peru? Gonzalo?

Gonzalo Talavera

The cheapest one that solves the problem.

Because we are not a rich country, and we don’t have security threats outside our borders. Our security problems are inside our borders, and to fight those threats, we need AI. We need some tools that we do not have.

But with those tools, we don’t want to create any dependency, because the moment you create a dependency, you are going to miss opportunities and probably spend more resources than you could with an open-source model or an open-weight model. We want to be able to choose at any time in the next few years. It’s just a matter of resources.

Tu Yun

Then what about another economy, Singapore? Ravi?

Ravi Velloor

With your permission, will you allow me to digress a little bit and go back to the point that Gonzalo made about ports? If I have your permission, I’ll just take a couple of minutes. The reason I want to do that is I want to make a point that connectivity landmarks are also going to be part of geopolitical tussles.

You only have to read Pete Hegseth’s speech at last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, and his words on the Panama Canal, to know and understand how much these huge connectivity projects are coming under the radar of geopolitics. And in this context, I want to mention the Arctic, which is shaping up to be, potentially, maybe in 15 years or 20 years—which is not really that long in the history of civilization—a major transit route for goods from Asia or the Pacific into Europe.

There are three significant Arctic states attending this year’s APEC, and they are Canada, the United States and Russia. China has declared itself to be a near-Arctic state. Everybody there has a stake in it. The Arctic is turning out to be a hotbed of geopolitical tussles and wrestling. You can see that taking shape. Huge military movements are taking place. People are moving forces into the region.

And I go back to what I said about a community. I think this is an opportunity for the leaders to discuss that region and to make sure that it stays open for everybody to use and to benefit from. So that’s the point I wanted to make.

To come back to this thing about navigating between rival technological poles, if you want to call it that, we in Singapore feel that pressure all the time, and so far we’ve survived. And I know many companies, big insurers, banks, that use technologies from both sides. I don’t think we’re in a position to exclusively go with either American technologies or Chinese technologies when it comes to data storage, when it comes to other issues.

So everyone’s trying things out. They’re feeling their way through this. And that’s the only way to survive, is just not to take sides in this, and have a foot in either camp, if you want to call it a camp. There’s no other way to do this.

Tu Yun

Say that again?

Ravi Velloor

I said there is no other way but to have good relations and good ties, good technological contacts, with both sides. I mean, it’s too early to pick sides, and I don’t think, even at any point, it’s worth taking sides at all, because that really works against this region’s interests.

Tu Yun

It’s too early, but it might be—

Ravi Velloor

No, no, no, no. I meant to say, even if it’s [inaudible]. But I really do not believe that taking sides is the way out of this. I mean, you have to have knowledge, you have to have experience, and you have to have an understanding of the technologies that both sides offer, and take the best, but keep hedging on both sides equally. Maybe a little bit one way or the other, but the hedging is important.

Tu Yun

Sure. I wanted to push you further. I think that’s the attitude shared by a lot of small and medium-sized economies in this region, and—

Ravi Velloor

Long may it stay that way.

Tu Yun

And to Bert, the APEC AI agenda also emphasizes making AI benefits accessible to all. What would be the first practical indicator that this ambition is actually working?

Bert Hofman

Well, look, I think we’re only finding out how much AI is being used, and we have surveys from around the world. It’s growing very rapidly. Adoption is very rapid. So in that sense, there is a lot of access. And there are basically two models.

One is the Chinese model with open weights, and you can use a lot—especially in applications, you can use the base models from China. And then you have the U.S. model, where you pay for basically a subscription, and you can build your own models on that without actually having access to the weights in the model.

I believe that has some room to play, and I don’t think we need to regulate that or choose that at some point. What we need to avoid is making things exclusive. And there I have my concerns, and maybe APEC could be a forum in which those concerns can be expressed, because the superpowers in AI could force countries not to use particular models in their supply chains. And that would be very difficult.

But it has been done before, and I can only mention Huawei in telecoms, where basically Huawei was excluded from a number of countries because of pressures from a national security point of view. The second part—and that’s a concern for everybody, but it’s really business for only a few countries—is national security concerns. We’re talking about very sophisticated systems with national security risks, and I think everybody has an interest in that being managed.

And that is more important, if you want, than the supply chain issues that we have been talking about now—the national security issues. And that, I think, a summit between China and the U.S. will do more about than an APEC summit.

Tu Yun

Indeed. And that brings us to an important test of all the bigger ideas. It’s relatively easy to talk about AI, digitalization, and innovation at the level of governments and large technology companies. The harder question is whether an ordinary small business can actually feel the benefits, right? That’s also where shared prosperity becomes more than a slogan.

Following the September 4 APEC SME ministerial meeting in Guangzhou, the agenda now includes not only the proposed AI Empowerment Center for SMEs, but also an APEC SME Cooperation Zone in Shenzhen. So Bert, what is the outlook for these initiatives? And more importantly, what would it take to make them work in practice rather than remain ideas in a plan?

Bert Hofman

Well, thanks. And this is really an area where you can learn from China. Having a special zone for SME adaptation to all these new technologies is fantastic. China has shown that, in the end, you need to be on the ground. You need to see, in practice, what the issues are that particular enterprises face and how governments or other parties can help. That’s simply a way to find out.

You can’t think of it all, especially not in a very fast-moving area such as AI, digital and others. You can’t regulate everything ex ante. You can’t design everything ex ante. You need to have that practical experience. So a special zone to actually find out is a fantastic idea.

Tu Yun

Right. I think we also learned this idea of establishing special zones from Singapore, right, Ravi? What would you use as the test—more SME exports, higher productivity, or better access to finance?

Ravi Velloor

Look, long before the TSMCs and the Hynixes came to global attention, East Asia’s economic success was built on the energy and enterprise of its small and medium enterprises. Now, as we go forward in this new world of automation and AI, I see employment turning out to be a national security issue for many countries.

And you already see that manifesting in Southeast Asia and India. We don’t know the real situation in China, frankly; I’m not very familiar with that. But if you want to keep employment going, small and medium enterprises are going to be very valuable in that enterprise.

And anything that helps SMEs—I was talking to the head of AI for Accenture, a Chinese-American lady, just last week, and she was describing to me the ways in which AI can help small and medium companies scale up, improve their sales, improve their marketing. And if China can really do good work in this and share that knowledge with the rest of the region, I think it’ll go a long way toward what the Chinese goal is about shared prosperity for APEC. That’s what I have to say. Thank you.

Tu Yun

Right. Thanks for your faith in China. And then there comes the question for a middle power, Paul. Canada is neither one of APEC’s two largest economies nor a peripheral player in the region, and you’ve also worked directly with APEC and the G20. So can middle powers such as Canada play a bigger role in keeping regional economic cooperation functioning when relations among the largest powers become increasingly difficult?

Paul Samson

Yes, I think they can. Let me make a bridge with two points that relate to the conversation we’ve just had about digital and AI. The first one that we haven’t mentioned, which I think is very important, is that countries want to maintain some kind of sovereign capacity over core issues, whether they’re national security information or health data and information.

You wouldn’t store your paper files in another country, right? On your health data, you’re not going to store them in the cloud with a kind of system that you don’t completely trust. You’re not going to feed them into AI models that are completely controlled elsewhere. So there’s going to be a sovereign element. I think countries are going to insist on that. Middle powers will insist on it. I think other countries are going to be concerned that they’re going to be shut out from that, especially poor countries that have less capacity. That’s point one.

And then point two that we haven’t mentioned is cybersecurity. I think right now, because of the power of AI systems, we’ve seen those escaped training models in the United States that actually autonomously created a cyberattack event, right? So there’s going to be a common interest between countries to have rules around cyber protection, because we’re all vulnerable, right? So I think that’s a good APEC conversation, even though some elements of cybersecurity that are part of national security conversations wouldn’t be on the table. But I just wanted to set up with those two points.

So what can middle powers do? I think we’ve touched on the issues already a little bit. The first one is there are issue-specific coalitions where they come together to show either a vision of something that makes sense and is demonstrated through best practices, or the best standards that could catch on. The larger powers say, hey, this is the right thing to do. It starts to create momentum. So middle powers can do that.

They can also sometimes broker an issue. There have been several references in this conversation to the need for the U.S. and China to work out issues bilaterally. I completely agree, but they can still be helped along a little bit with ideas and facilitation and things. Sometimes with ideas from the outside, and sometimes it’s almost easier if it’s an idea from the outside than just the direct bilateral conversation. So I think they even have a role there.

I think the middle powers do have an interest in a lot of the institutions that keep systems open, and that will be the case. Just like you think of open shipping lanes, the ability to get your product onto the other side of the world. If you have interoperability for data and AI systems, and you’re an SME, that’s going to help you have a global market for your unique product, right? So it’s going to play out in a similar way. So I think middle powers will have an interest in these kinds of open systems, and that will include interoperability systems.

Tu Yun

Sure. That’s where the spirit of collaboration or cooperation can play an essential role, right? So we’ve talked about what APEC wants to achieve: openness, connectivity, innovation, and more inclusive growth. But there is still a question underneath all of these: can the APEC mechanism itself still deliver in an environment that’s becoming more fragmented? I’d like to ask this to you all. I think Paul, you just mentioned you are optimistic, so shall we begin with you?

Paul Samson

Sure. I mean, if you like, let’s compare and contrast the World Trade Organization, which is right now frozen in many ways. The ministerials can’t make progress on the core issues. It’s a consensus-based organization, but it has very tight rules and procedures.

APEC is very nimble, and so there’s much more scope for experimentation. APEC’s always been very good at that: let’s pilot this, let’s pilot that. I think there is a level of trust within the majority of APEC countries that allows pilots to flourish. So to me, there’s a good, less risky approach for countries to experiment via APEC than through some of these other formal mechanisms.

Now, I’m not giving up on the World Trade Organization. I think that’s important. But for the moment, it’s not going anywhere, right? It’s going very slowly. So in that sense, I do think APEC has a good model for the times. It doesn’t mean we’re going to get everything we want, but it is the right kind of forum, I think, for the current times.

Tu Yun

Sure. And Bert, do you have any different opinion?

Bert Hofman

No. I agree with Paul that you can have lots of progress even if only parts of APEC agree, and you can take steps forward. I mean, just recently, another informal grouping, the G20—they didn’t agree on everything, but they agreed on a lot of things. So some points in the chairman’s concluding statements were controversial, but most of them were actually agreed.

So you can get agreement even if you don’t agree on everything. APEC, because it’s not formal, doesn’t need to have consensus on everything. It’s a way to push agreements in particular areas. Thanks.

Paul Samson

And just a point on that, to contrast APEC and the G20. One difference is that APEC does have a small secretariat that helps follow up on things and kind of push initiatives through, whereas the G20 rotates each year to a different presidency, and it’s a little bit harder to build between the years. So APEC has an advantage of being able to link between years a little bit more easily.

Tu Yun

That’s an acute observation.

Ravi Velloor

We are privileged to be the host nation for the APEC Secretariat, as you know. It operates out of Singapore. All I have to say on this point is that there used to be a time when APEC would feed into the WTO. But as we all know, the WTO is more or less strangulated, paralyzed, whatever you want to call it, at this point in time.

So I think, more than supranational organizations, an intergovernmental organization like APEC—where people meet, where people can discuss, where people are not committed or bound—is really the way to go in this environment. We are all feeling our way, and sometimes even these summit meetings are the best solution to a lot of things. So I really don’t have more to say than that.

Tu Yun

Okay. Henry?

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. No, I think this is an excellent discussion. What I think APEC, as our colleagues just mentioned, can achieve most urgently is AI. As we know, we are already divided into two camps now. We just had Pax Silica, in which the U.S. has some 20-some countries, and China has launched this World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization in Shanghai lately, with 29 countries in that.

But the U.S. is telling many countries not to join the Chinese organization. For example, Kazakhstan is in both camps, but then they were told not to do that. So I think that is not really a great approach.

What I think now is that China’s AI has an open system, and it has vast applications. They have hundreds of thousands, even millions, of robots and humanoids and applications. Seeing that China is second to no one now, that can generate practical AI serving small and medium enterprises, and that’s probably something that can be said at the APEC summit.

And also, I think there need to be boundaries on how to regulate AI. And I think the U.S. and China have to have a dialogue. I mean, that’s the key subject coming up at the summit between President Trump and President Xi, actually just next month. So I think that’s something we could really strive for, for AI.

But finally, I would like to say that we should really still pursue openness, liberalization and trade. And now APEC countries have the two largest free trade agreements in the world: RCEP and CPTPP. Why don’t we start to see what the differences are? Can we intertwine with each other? Can we invite each other to join each other? And then can we really make a difference?

Because I know, as you said, colleagues, the WTO is marginalized or paralyzed sometimes. I’m actually going to the WTO Public Forum next week. I’m invited to speak on four panels there. But what I found is, yeah, we have a good example of regional multilateralism booming. RCEP and CPTPP can find a way, and that could be an interesting topic for APEC to discuss: how to really raise the two largest free trade agreements in the world. And then that can push the WTO and all the other free trade. So that’s the bedrock of the prosperity, cooperation and resilience that we have.

Tu Yun

Right. I think Henry couldn’t wait and jumped to the next question, so let’s just deal with it. And everybody here, bear with us. There are still two more questions to go before you can raise questions. So each of you, name one concrete deliverable you’d like to see come out of Shenzhen. Gonzalo?

Gonzalo Talavera

For us, it is to have a permanent body that will deal with mining.

Tu Yun

Mining?

Gonzalo Talavera

Yes. Because what we know is that 70 percent of all mining production is done among the APEC economies. Three-quarters of all mining investment in the world is done by APEC economies. So it could be good to have a mining body that will follow up on all the agreements that we could make in that sector.

Tu Yun

Right, right. It’s mining. And Ravi?

Ravi Velloor

What I’d really like to see coming out of Shenzhen is—I don’t want to call it an agreement—a statement agreed on by everybody present that commits themselves to a rules-based trading order. If we can get that statement out, I think it’s more important than anything, any other things that might be announced there. Just a commitment to a rules-based trade order. Thank you.

Tu Yun

Okay. Let’s combine the last two into one. Paul?

Paul Samson

Yeah. Well, if you’re looking for a bigger outcome, I would come back to the word that I’ve said a number of times, and that would be a digital and AI interoperability framework recognizing that there’s a lot of diversity within APEC. And in a way it’s a microcosm—you’ve got a bit of almost everything, right? The point that was made about Peru being 100 percent, or close to 100 percent, private sector, not—you know.

So what does that look like concretely? A framework for APEC to work on over the next few years, to make some progress now in Shenzhen, but to talk about trusted data flows, electronic trade documents, the whole kind of system that’s going to be needed for digital trade and AI.

I think that could be combined into some visionary framework. And then get into some of these issues about the role of open-source AI, and start to get things on the table. I don’t think they’re going to be quickly resolved, but I think setting the menu would be a good outcome.

Tu Yun

Right. And last but not least, Bert, please.

Bert Hofman

So I like the framework that Paul just mentioned. But on very specific outcomes, I think that we could have specific outcomes in standards in very specific areas—call it agriculture, call it mining, call it other consumer goods—where an agreement would simply make progress. It won’t be very big, but it will be very concrete and useful for the participants. Thanks.

Tu Yun

Now I’d like to open the floor to questions from our audience. So maybe three to four questions. If any of you have a question, please raise your hand, name the guest you want to ask, and tell us where you’re from.

Q

[Speaking in Chinese]

Thank you very much, professors. I’m sorry, but my English isn’t very fluent. May I speak in Chinese?

I’m Natsuki Shiraiwa from Japan, and I’m studying at Capital Normal University. I have a question today. APEC has long promoted free and open trade, but countries are also placing increasing emphasis on economic security and supply chain stability. It seems to me that these two objectives can sometimes be in tension with each other. How does APEC hope to strike a balance between free trade and economic security?

Henry Huiyao Wang

No, I think absolutely—we, the world, have been functioning for the last 80 years. I mean, the supply chains and all those logistics are great. We talk a lot about shipping and all those transport links and infrastructure. So that’s still going to be the bedrock of the global functioning system.

But on security, I do agree with our previous panelists: there was over-securitization, right? Everything becomes a security issue. That’s probably the problem.

That’s why I really emphasize trust. We need to really build up trust. What is security? Violating prosperity, violating cooperation, violating the goodwill among all of us for the last 80 years—that’s the biggest security threat.

So I think we have to go back to the basics and really restore our confidence and our trust. And we’re all human beings. We now have to work together for Mars, for the Moon, for climate, and for AI. Now a new species is coming up. So I think we need to really find a way to work together.

APEC could provide a good opportunity. And particularly, I see President Trump, President Xi and Putin probably coming together. Let them sort out the wars in Europe together with the European countries, and then let’s make some peace. And also for the Middle East.

Tu Yun

Yeah, but some viable or concrete solutions—anything to make the first step? Or does any other guest from the panel want to answer her question? I think Japan is also facing a similar dilemma, right? Maybe Paul?

Paul Samson

Well, I would just say that I agree with what Henry Wang just said, that you can separate the discussions around supply chains, economic growth and prosperity from national security, partially. Of course, there’s always some linkage, right? But you can certainly separate them in terms of there being an interest for countries to move forward on both of those agendas.

I think that, in the conversation around national security, there are a lot of shared and common interests as well that are emerging around the new technologies. So it’s not all rivalry and competition. I think there are some common interests there too.

So we need to tone down the current temperature a little bit, right, to focus on the elements of cooperation, which I think actually exist on both the growth agenda and the national security agenda. But I think we can separate out the growth one for the APEC conversation.

Bert Hofman

So to add, look, there are mechanisms that can actually handle some of these security issues. The Wassenaar Arrangement is one of them. So you basically agree on a list of goods that are dual-use, and those can be discussed. So those are restricted, but others are not.

So having clarity on what is not restricted is going to be very important. Expanding that type of discussion to issues such as digital, data and AI is, in my view, a natural extension. It’s hard to do, but having clarity on what is and what is not a national security risk, and agreement on that, is the first step.

Tu Yun

Right. Hopefully those government officials can have that vision. Thank you, Bert. Any other questions? Yes, please.

Q

So basically, my question is: how do you see the organization, all of you, in the future, like in 10 years or 20 years? And can we have an opportunity to invite Kazakhstan to join this good party, to make business and make visas a little bit easier to get? Basically, these two questions.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I think there’s a tendency now to look at the economic agenda in every organization. Now we have BRICS countries, we have the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

And of course, I would think we can expand. I hope that we can invite Central Asian countries or other African and European leaders to sit in or to be observers, so that whichever organization is most effective, I think it should be open and welcome all the others to participate.

Tu Yun

Right. It’s kind of like a poll. Gonzalo?

Gonzalo Talavera

I would like to ask one of our colleagues who knows more than I do, but maybe you can join as an observer. Maybe Bert or Paul knows if that category exists in APEC.

Tu Yun

All right. Paul?

Paul Samson

What I would say is that it may not be necessary to formally join an organization per se, but the vehicles that the organization is kind of incubating or creating, like the CPTPP, that’s maybe where the action is going to be, right? And that’s where you want an expanding circle of members and partners, whether it’s formally part of APEC or not.

I mean, I think the way that the OECD dealt with this issue was to have observers. In many cases, observers were part of different working groups and things, so as not to get stuck on who’s a formal member and who isn’t, and then just link it to the real issues.

Tu Yun

That’s a feasible way. We can have a third question, if you have any.

Q

Hello, guys. My name is Ding Ding, and I’m the President of the SDGs Innovation Academy. And thanks for hosting today’s conversation and discussion. I think it’s very meaningful.

And my question is actually about the U.S.-China relationship. So we know that the U.S. and China are both APEC members, and I just want to ask our guests and panelists: if the U.S. and China cannot cooperate on the core issues, what can the other 19 economies actually achieve besides hosting meetings in Shenzhen?

And also, middle powers like Singapore, Canada, Australia and Korea often say they want to bridge the U.S.-China divide, but has any of them actually succeeded? Or is “bridging” just a polite way of saying “avoiding choices”? So I want to hear your opinions. Thanks.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I could give it a first shot. But I do think U.S.-China relations are very important. I mean, Trump said this is G2, but anyway, I think it’s a very important relationship.

But I do think the frequency of President Xi and President Trump’s meetings—four times in 2026—is a great step forward. And also, in the first term of Trump, it was strategic rivalry. In the second term, now we call it strategic stability. So that sends a lot of good signals around the world.

I do think middle powers and all the other 19 members of APEC can really make a lot of difference, can have a lot of impact on this bilateral relationship, in that we don’t take sides, but we really look at the merits.

So whoever has the good merits, good things, let’s follow it. Let’s support it. If the U.S. has something right, let’s support the U.S. If China has something right, support China.

So I think then the U.S. and China will feel, okay, if we’re losing popularity in the world, then we have to make corrections. So if global democracy is working, then I think this is going to inject good vitality into our multilateral system like APEC.

Tu Yun

Thank you. And before we wrap up our panel discussion today, let me thank all our guests again: Ravi Velloor, Associate Editor and Senior Columnist at The Straits Times, Singapore; Paul Samson, President of the Centre for International Governance Innovation; Bert Hofman, Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Economy at Asia Society; Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization; and last but not least, Gonzalo Talavera, Minister and Deputy Head of Mission at the Embassy of Peru in China.

There are still many questions we haven’t been able to explore today. But by November, when APEC leaders gather in Shenzhen, we should have a much clearer picture of whether the region can turn openness, innovation and cooperation from aspirations into concrete results.

Till then, take care. I’m Tu Yun, saying thank you for being with us.

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Liu is one of the best-known photojournalists of his generation. He was Time magazine’s first photographer posted to Beijing after China began reform and opening up, and later worked for the Associated Press in Beijing, Los Angeles, New Delhi, Seoul, and Moscow. In 1992, he shared the Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography with the AP team in Moscow for their coverage of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

His latest project took him some 270,000 kilometres across five continents, 21 countries, and 54 regions over three years. The resulting book, Old Road, New Connections, follows the connections taking shape along and beyond the ancient Silk Road, looking at how Chinese infrastructure, companies, technology, and people are encountering very different societies around the world. The Chinese edition was published by CITIC Press, while the English edition is published by ACC Art Books.

The luncheon opened with remarks by Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG, followed by a presentation from Liu and a dialogue with Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG. Liu reflected on more than half a century behind the camera, from China’s transformation and the collapse of the Soviet Union to his recent travels documenting Belt and Road projects. Their conversation also explored how China and the outside world report on one another, the importance of being physically present as a journalist, and the role of people-to-people and cultural connections alongside infrastructure and trade.

The session concluded with a live Q&A. Questions came from Antonio Villafranca, Vice President for Research at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI); Hodan Osman Abdi, Ambassador of Somalia to China; Hong Hai, Founder of TimeDoc; and Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG.

The following transcript is based on a recording of the event and has been lightly edited for clarity. It has not been reviewed by any of the speakers.

Mabel Lu Miao, Founder & Secretary General, CCG

Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon. Thank you all for joining us for today’s CCG VIP Luncheon. The CCG VIP Luncheon is a flagship high-level international exchange platform established by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG). It serves as a key bridge connecting global political, business, and academic communities to promote pragmatic cooperation between China and the world.

Today’s luncheon is also a special edition of the CCG Global Dialogue, our flagship platform that brings together policymakers, scholars, and business leaders around the world to discuss the most pressing global challenges. As a forum for open exchange, the dialogue fosters cross-cultural understanding and pragmatic solutions on issues ranging from governance and sustainable development to economic cooperation and international security.

Today’s theme is Old Road, New Connections. Over the course of three years, Pulitzer Prize-winning photographer and photojournalist Mr. Liu Heung Shing travelled some 270,000 kilometres across five continents, visiting 21 countries and 54 regions. Amazing. The result is his new book, Old Road, New Connections, a work of long-form photojournalism that traces the new connections taking shape along and beyond the ancient Silk Road.

Today, CCG hosts a VIP Luncheon featuring Mr. Liu for a conversation on the making of the book, whose English edition is published by ACC Art Books and Chinese edition by CITIC Press. The luncheon will feature a visual presentation by Mr. Liu, including selected photographs from his journey and a 12-minute film edited by well-known Chinese filmmaker Jia Zhangke, followed by a dialogue with CCG President Henry Huiyao Wang and a live Q&A with guests.

Before we start, please let me take a moment to acknowledge some of our special guests and VIPs who are here. We have invited representatives from the diplomatic community, government authorities, academic institutions, international organisations, corporations and the media.

We have invited several ambassadors to China: His Excellency Robert Lee, Ambassador of Fiji to China. Welcome. Her Excellency Hodan Osman Abdi, Ambassador of Somalia to China. Welcome, Your Excellency. And Mr. Ma Jianchun, President of the China Society for WTO Studies and former Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce. Welcome. We also invited Huang Haifeng, Senior Fellow of CCG and Co-Dean of the China Institute for Responsible Management Education and Sustainable Development. We invited Huang Junxiong, Director of the Regional Agreement Service Division, Beijing Investment Promotion Service Center. Welcome. And Mr. Song Yaoming, former Minister-Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs at the Chinese Embassy in Japan and former Commercial Counsellor of the Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce. Welcome. Mr. Sun Yongfu, former Director-General of the Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce. Welcome. He is also a CCG Senior Non-Resident Fellow. And we invited Mr. Wang Haiwen, Dean of the School of Economics, Beijing International Studies University. Welcome.

We have a special guest today. He is Vice President of a well-known Italian think tank, ISPI. He is Mr. Antonio Villafranca. Welcome, Antonio. We have invited representatives from different multinational companies, including Ms. Liu Chang from an American company and many other well-known companies. We also invited media reporters from People’s Daily, CGTN, The Christian Science Monitor, and TimeDoc.

Before my introduction, we would like to show a film to all of you. I think the film is very unique. It is not open to the public, but you guys can have a look.

[Film screening]

This film was edited by a well-known director, Jia Zhangke. But the most important thing is that the content features Mr. Liu Heung Shing, who is a well-known photojournalist.

Very touching. A very touching story, and a lot of vivid pictures, a lot of vivid faces and individuals. That is very important. So maybe let me introduce Mr. Liu Heung Shing after this fantastic video.

Mr. Liu Heung Shing is one of the best-known Chinese photojournalists of his generation. Over more than five decades, he has photographed some of the most important changes in China and the world. He was Time magazine’s first photographer posted in Beijing after China began its reform and opening up, and later worked for the Associated Press in Beijing, Los Angeles, New Delhi, Seoul and Moscow. In 1992, he and his AP colleagues in Moscow received the Pulitzer Prize for their coverage of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Many of us first came to know Mr. Liu through his photographs of China in the late 1970s and 1980s. He was there at a time when the country was changing very quickly, and his photographs captured both the big events and what was happening in everyday life.

His new book, Old Road, New Connections — you can see it on the table — brings that same eye to his travels across a much broader part of the world. Between 2023 and 2025, he travelled some 270,000 kilometres across five continents, visiting 21 countries and 54 regions. The Chinese edition came out with CITIC Press in July this year. The English edition, Old Road, New Connections: China Builds a Different World, is being published by ACC Art Books. We have copies here today, so you can take a look.

This is also a particularly interesting conversation for us at CCG. We have long been involved in bringing people from China and around the world together through policy dialogues, international exchanges, and people-to-people engagement. Mr. Liu’s work speaks directly to many of the same questions about how people, societies and cultures understand and connect with one another.

So let’s move to the next part of our luncheon today. It is a dialogue between Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of CCG, and Mr. Liu Heung Shing. Before our dialogue, we can invite Mr. Liu onto the stage to deliver his introduction and speech. Welcome, Mr. Liu.

Liu Heung Shing, Photographer & Photojournalist

Good afternoon. Thanks for being here. Since the project started three or four years ago, I have had many, many questions, and one of those asked most often is: Why do you do this?

To answer that question, I have to bring everyone back to what I see as China 1.0, China 2.0, and what I think, when this BRI project is more or less completed — there is still a long time to go — could arguably be China’s 3.0.

When I came back from Hong Kong, where I was born, to China to receive my primary education, that was in the mid-1950s. The vivid impression that education left with me was that every day I entered the schoolyard, there was a billboard, maybe about three times the length of this billboard, which said, “China must catch up with Great Britain and surpass the United States.” I also saw, at that time, the ongoing Great Leap Forward, and I saw the effects of the Great Leap Forward on the neighbours who moved into our family’s courtyard, which had been a dowry from my grandparents to my mother and father. So I saw these faces from malnutrition — blown faces and legs and arms and so on and so forth.

There was a time when my parents brought me back to Hong Kong, and I received a British education until I left for the United States in 1969 to study in the U.S. But before then, I also had the unique experience of visiting China before I left for the U.S. In 1968, I actually saw the Cultural Revolution with my own eyes. And as a photographer, as a future photographer, I watched with great curiosity the relationship between people in China, especially people who came back from overseas. They were met with scrutinising eyes from schoolmates and friends.

So after my graduation, I went to Europe. I photographed Spain in the first years after Franco. I photographed the election participated in by the Portuguese Communist Party. And when I went back to Paris, I saw all the Parisian newspapers with front-page pictures, entire-page pictures, of Chairman Mao. I knew then what had happened. Time magazine and the German magazine Stern sent me back to China. At that time, I don’t know how many of you realise that, to buy train and plane tickets in China, you had to go through China Travel Service. So I obviously missed the million-strong crowd commemorating the death of Chairman Mao.

Instead, I stayed in Guangzhou for 10 days on the banks of the Pearl River. I watched with my eyes and I studied very carefully the people’s new body language, which was a comprehensive, general relaxation from the Cultural Revolution. I also remember people’s walking steps were gentler, slower. They dropped their tense shoulders. Their facial muscles were more relaxed. So I felt China would change, but how it would change, I had no answers.

So I went back to New York, and I pitched to the president of Time Inc. When he asked me what I wanted to do, I said, “I want to go to China.” So I was here from 1977-78 as a resident foreign correspondent in Beijing for over five years. At that time, I watched the unfolding of a national debate which had the title “Seek Truth from Facts.” In Chinese, it says, “实践是检验真理的唯一标准.” It’s amazing in China: when Deng Xiaoping launched reform with these emphatic messages for the people of China, suddenly you see things moving.

By the end of my visit, and subsequently when I returned to China after multiple assignments in the U.S., in New Delhi covering the entire South Asia region, in South Korea and, finally, in the Soviet Union — and it collapsed before my lenses — during this period, obviously, I saw the steady success of the economic reform to what China today is, arguably, the world’s largest manufacturing powerhouse.

So when you see with your own eyes, and you go through all these years here of China’s economic reform to what China is like today, for me, at least, I take what China says very seriously. So when the Chinese leadership announced the Belt and Road, I said to myself, “Uh-huh. This will be the first time China is reaching out to 146 countries around the world.” And I said to myself, “This is big, but this is difficult to do.” After many years of thinking about it, I said I really should do this, because the result of this may arguably become the largest man-made project in the world of the 21st century.

So I proceeded to do this, and I encountered two challenges. In order to tell this story, I felt I had to go to the five continents. Without capturing this vast mass of the globe, you cannot understand how comprehensive this project is, how China can build projects in different countries that are in different stages of development, with different cultures, different languages, different races and different religions, and so on and so forth. Because I feel, if I don’t reach out to do this, it is very hard to get the in-depth feeling, because you have to watch with your eyes, and you have to listen to people, and you have to then decide what would be included in your camera and the lenses.

So what I saw after this travel, after this book was wrapped up, basically, I could point to three compelling competitive advantages that China brought to this project. As I stayed in these container-converted sleeping quarters in the oil field and shared breakfast and so on with Chinese managers and engineers, I realised that all these 146 countries are sovereign nations. So China — unlike many voices of criticism saying this could be a post-colonial period, or this could be a debt trap for many nations — I realised that all the sovereign nations have to invite China to participate in various projects. China has to submit a bid like everybody else.

And if you go through the bidding process, you realise one aspect of Chinese competitiveness is the cost of management. I have been an expatriate all my life. When you realise that Chinese engineers and managers who are sent abroad today do live in very comfortable housing — I watched it with my own eyes in Rio de Janeiro, on the beautiful beaches. I photographed the Chinese playing Sunday volleyball on the beach. Afterwards, I walked back with them to where they lived. They lived in just beautiful condominiums with a beachfront view. And I asked, “How many of you live here?” He said, “Oh, 214 units belong to our State Grid Corporation. We live here.” As opposed to what I am familiar with in all my travels: most foreign corporations, when they send their representatives abroad, may require staying in a villa; they have to have the chef; they have to have the driver; they have to have the children attending international school, et cetera, et cetera. So you could easily imagine, when China sends 100 engineers and technicians overseas to this project, their management cost is considerably less, but equally good and competitive.

The second aspect is what China brings to the table in terms of raw materials. After a long time getting to know some Wenzhou businessmen, I finally went to Zhejiang and went to Wenzhou. I met with the Ruili Auto Parts Company and the chairman, Mr. Zhang Xiaoping, who started his business with 15 people and today has 50,000 staff. He pointed out to me these gigantic brakes. I was told that if you build a high-speed train and you don’t have these brakes in every single compartment, on both sides of the compartment, when you brake the high-speed train at 350 kilometres an hour, the backside of the train will simply flip over. And he said, “Well, our brakes are as good as any, but our cost is about 40 to 50 percent of the Italian, German and French.”

So when China brings, you know, 2,888 pieces of equipment to Algeria to build another 583-kilometre railway under 50 degrees Celsius and completes a project like that, China also brings with it these compelling advantages of good, high-quality equipment and raw materials and so on at a very, very competitive price.

And the third aspect is that, in terms of financing, you all know Chinese financing is as competitive as anyone.

And the fourth observation I have known all along, in my whole life, in all my travels to different countries, developed and developing countries, is this peerless pragmatism of Chinese people and how hard Chinese people work. So if you add the last quality to the previous three, you have a situation — and you may find the answers to why the Chinese nowadays, even though they have learned many, many lessons in the Belt and Road projects, have also brought something to the table: their projects are usually within budget and always on time. And these overseas countries, and the elites who manage the Chinese projects that I talked to, more or less understand that if they don’t do this, they will be falling behind in their development.

So without going further, I would rather prefer that Henry and I answer many of your questions, because each one of you will have a different question, and I look forward to our chit-chat.

Mabel Lu Miao

Thank you very much for the great words from Mr. Liu Heung Shing. We were really touched by the film, also by the pictures and your speech. Later, we would like to move to the dialogue part between Henry Wang and Mr. Liu Heung Shing.

Henry Wang is the President and Founder of the Center for China and Globalization. Actually, we have conducted the CCG Global Dialogue Series for several years. We have had dialogues between Henry and different distinguished guests, like Joseph Nye, Graham Allison, a lot of distinguished thinkers around the world, and of course including think tankers, policymakers and former statesmen.

But this time, we would like to invite Mr. Liu, who is an artist and also a journalist. I also think he is a great thinker. Beyond those visual things, there are many thoughts and insightful perspectives. So I think we would like to invite our colleagues to set up the chairs, and we would like to move to the dialogue part. Let’s welcome both of you, Henry Wang and Mr. Liu.

Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder & President, CCG

Great. So Mabel and I were really fascinated by your introduction of this new undertaking you have, and it is very, very impressive. At the Center for China and Globalization, CCG, we have conducted many dialogues. And of course, we usually talk with political leaders, think tankers and, as Mabel mentioned, also business leaders. But this is actually the first time we have talked to a journalist leader and a great pioneer in photography, particularly in China.

So first, I would like to ask you. I know you are a Pulitzer Prize winner, right, many years ago. So based on your five decades of travelling to quite a number of countries — just on this trip, you have already been to 20-some countries, right? — what are the most important transformations, say, in the last half-century that you have witnessed that strike you the most? I heard you just mention you were in Europe, you witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and then of course you saw the rise of China, and then you saw how the world is shaping. Now we are in a more intertwined but also intensified world.

So what is your impression of this changing world, and how can we address that, particularly through the media, through artists, through photographs and through people-to-people exchanges, which I think is the broader theme of your latest landmark project? So maybe you can give us a little bit more about how you evolved and, in the last 50 or 60 years, your experience. You touched on some of that, but we would like to hear more about that.

Liu Heung Shing

Thank you. I think I would make one or two comments from my perspective. At 26, I began my career with a mainstream U.S. media company. I spent about 30 years as a day-to-day journalist, but also had over 10 years of experience in management roles with Time Warner and also with News Corp. With both of these companies — one, as you know, being an American centre-left corporation, and one a centre-right corporation, which today are more or less in fierce competition for the public’s attention — I learned that media do play a very significant role in shaping our perceptions.

And I learned how politics and economics, in fact, are joined at the hip. One influences the other. Because I have also witnessed that the conversations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China have gone through this sweep of the pendulum, from the heyday of Richard Nixon’s visit to what it is today. I believe, and I hope, media from both countries will get to learn from each other better.

I was just with a colleague last night after an event, and we shared notes. And I realised that since the late 1990s, somehow the people in our newsrooms, editorial rooms, who make decisions about sending foreign correspondents to distant countries — and in this case particularly China — somehow the senior editors in the late 1990s, towards the second half of the 1990s, believed that China was an economic story. And therefore we sent many, many journalists to China who could read spreadsheets and understand what corporate reports said.

Versus the time when I first arrived in 1978: I was one of eight American journalists who landed in Beijing. In those days, three out of the eight people, my colleagues, had studied China. They studied the language. They were all students of John King Fairbank at Harvard. So, if anything, they brought their curiosity to China, and they brought the necessary language skills and understanding of Chinese history. And that changed when the people arriving on the ground became so focused on the economy. Gradually, the story swung and became the competition between the two economies, and therefore the narrative also shifted.

And of course, the people in Congress also played a role, because they sensed increasing economic competition. So the conversation is skewed towards the side that is, in effect, what we all see today. So I think it will take considerable time going forward. What China can do and what the U.S. can do is to reopen their minds about China. I am not asking everybody to change their lenses, but today the discussion and the topic can so easily become misguided when you don’t have that curiosity, when you look at China with a straitjacket view. I think the level of understanding just plummets.

I think the reverse side is also important. One of my American colleagues once made a comment. He said, “I notice all the Chinese journalists arriving in Washington. They seem more interested in attending discussions in the think tanks.” He said, “I rarely see a Chinese journalist going to follow a local election, understand local elections, understand American politics, campaign contributions, et cetera, et cetera.” Which is also a necessary pair of lenses to scrutinise what makes America tick. So I think I’m hopeful. I’m hopeful. I’m very hopeful that this period will also move on.

Henry Huiyao Wang

That’s great. Actually, President Xi is visiting the United States now, and I think we are going to talk about the issues of trade. You talk about investment, AI, people-to-people exchanges, particularly also, I think, journalistic exchanges that you mentioned. I think absolutely we need to expand exchanges, and then have more journalists come and report on both sides. So I am really for that.

As a matter of fact, when I look at your presentation, I think the Center for China and Globalization is also doing similar things. We have been going to different countries. In the last five years, we have also travelled to 50 countries, actually, for all the think tank meetings, global conferences and so on. What I think is that this narrative from China probably needs to be reshaped somehow. And your work, certainly from a journalist’s unique perspective, has really given new, fresh thinking.

For example, when I look at your presentation, it reminds me that when I was growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, my father actually went to Africa to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway. At that time, I remember seeing my father off at the airport.

Liu Heung Shing

And 68 Chinese died.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. So that was really a moment when China was just starting. But it is amazing. You talked about Jakarta to Bandung, cutting 10 hours to 40-some minutes. So with that kind of infrastructure and hardware connectivity, I think China is making a lot of progress.

So what do you think about the software now? I think we probably also need to connect with the world on the software — on people-to-people exchanges, students, tourism, and also journalists, culture, artists and all the other areas. So in that aspect, you travelled to these 20-some countries in the last few years. What do you see that we can still improve to enhance mutual understanding?

Of course, this “old road, new connections” has a new meaning, a new connectivity. But how can we revive the Silk Road spirit to make the connectivity? We have a friend from Italy here, right? I mean, we have Marco Polo. Seven hundred years ago, he travelled to China. You are probably a new photographer version of Marco Polo in contemporary times. And I also know we have many companies here doing business in those Silk Road countries. For example, we have this AI company, you know, Kai-Fu Lee’s company, actually doing projects in Kazakhstan, and so many things like that. So what do you think? How can we go further after your three-year journey on this very interesting, fascinating project?

Liu Heung Shing

Well, my travel over more than three years actually has brought me back to what I learned on day one. I didn’t go to study journalism, but from day one at the Associated Press, we had what is called the AP Stylebook, which is the Bible for American journalists and newspapermen. And in fact, if you ask American journalism teachers, Journalism 101 emphasises being there. And being there has a magic that removes all sorts of stereotypes.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Seeing is believing, basically.

Liu Heung Shing

Well, not only seeing, but also listening. And I believe Chinese journalism, Chinese newspaper people, also understand this. But there are nuances. The practices are different. Even, for what I know, Chinese journalists, before going anywhere, have a lot of discussion: what to cover, how to cover, what to cover, and so on and so forth.

It is not unusual in Chinese newsrooms, because I heard this when I visited these state-owned enterprises. They would relate to me that before the Chinese journalists arrived at these projects, they would have very detailed discussions about what they would like to film, what they would like to cover. So in many ways, the decision is made in Beijing.

And when I had to deal with all the state-owned enterprises, which I think is an awesome challenge — I emphasise how challenging it is because, in the state-owned corporations, the people I deal with, and it turns out we become good friends through this work together — invariably, all the Chinese state-owned enterprise people would say, “Mr. Liu, put down what you would like to photograph, what you would like to see, et cetera, et cetera.” Which is what they told me they do when Chinese journalists arrive in these distant countries.

And I was often stuck, because I said to them, “I can’t tell you what I would like to photograph, because if I haven’t been there, I haven’t seen your operation, what would I know about what I want to photograph?” You see, these differences actually speak louder than words. We almost feel like we understand the practice of journalism from different places. For me, it is very, very important to be in the room and see these people and see the interaction. And I decide where I want to be, what I would like to photograph.

So for me, I spent an awful lot of time convincing people. For example, when I asked the people who built this amazing high-speed train from Jakarta to Bandung, I said, “I want to see one more thing. I want my readers to see what it is like in the driver’s compartment.” And suddenly, the conversation paused. And it went on for three more months before they came back to me.

They said, “Oh, Mr. Liu, I realised that when we handed the high-speed train project to the Indonesians, they came back to us and said, ‘By the way, don’t leave yet. Why don’t you help us operate this system, including the ticketing?’” And ticketing turned out to be immensely complex. Same thing in Saudi Arabia: the Chinese light rail train taking over three million pilgrims to Mecca every year. Again, the Saudis asked the Chinese, “Why don’t you manage it?” Because, you know, it is ticketing, the computer, the information, and so on and so forth.

So in Indonesia today, you could just put your ID in there, punch a few things, and out comes the ticket, which sounds much simpler than it actually is. So this gentleman came back to me. He said, “Well, the Indonesians decided to ask us to actually operate it for some time, and because we are operating it, we can think about bringing you into the compartment.” So it goes around and around in circles.

But finally, I’m glad that I asked to be in the compartment because, when I was in the compartment, I realised two drivers from Tianjin, Mr. Zhang and Mr. Wen, who belong to the Beijing Railway Bureau, were sent to Indonesia to operate this train. But behind the two drivers, I saw five or six Indonesian interns watching and listening and learning. That is why my job of being there is so important, because then you see all the nuances. It is not a spreadsheet: this project is worth X billion dollars. You realise the complexity.

And ironically, after I travelled back and forth in 40-some minutes — what would normally have taken 10 hours before — going from Jakarta back to my hotel, it was the old traffic, right? It took two and a half hours to go from the train station just to the hotel. When this 10-hour journey is now reduced to 46 minutes, you can really appreciate why they need China to build this high-speed train. And now they have built the high-speed train, the Indonesians came back to China and said, “Why don’t you build more?”

So this vivid seeing and listening to the people who were involved in this project are essential components of any reporting. And if you watch now, if The New York Times decides to report on China by having a bureau in Seoul, in South Korea, that’s what we have become. And how would these issues be addressed? I hope President Xi will find the answer.

Henry Huiyao Wang

I hope so. Yes. No, I think it is fascinating, because the case you illustrated shows that not only the hardware, but the software as well. And also, on your trips to different projects, you find where the interface is, how to really find the angle, and then all the views. So it has been fascinating not only to see your pictures, but maybe the stories behind those photos will also be very, very interesting. That is what I am thinking.

I was particularly impressed with one of the cases you mentioned, the BYD factory in Uzbekistan. It is very modern. And I saw this green — you know, the world needs green technology and green products. But how can we invest more in different countries, create jobs and make all those local contributions? So that is probably a good story as well, because there is a lot of talk about China just selling, but actually China is building a lot of factories around the world. So that is really also interesting.

Liu Heung Shing

Well, speaking about Uzbekistan, the BYD plant — a month ago, there was a story reprinting a New Yorker article in the Reference News 参考消息, and the writer said he went to Xiaomi and understood that Xiaomi, you know, this fantastic car that looks like a Porsche, can be produced every 76 seconds. So I had a chance to meet the leaders of BYD, and she said, “Oh, for us, it’s not 76 seconds; it’s 48 seconds.”

So, I mean, these things — the nuances in reporting — sometimes come full circle. How you read and what you read extends to a larger narrative, and how people understand the challenge we face.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay. So maybe I just have one more question, and then we will open it up for the audience to raise questions and have a dialogue. Finally, I would like to ask you: you have such a lifetime of experience reporting the world between East and West. As a photographer, or maybe as a journalist, what do you think are the three key qualities that you must possess to be a good journalist, a good photographer? What are the three key success factors, or the key qualities that you must have? I would say you work very hard. That must be one of those. But what about those things you can think of?

Liu Heung Shing

I think the result of all and the finest education is to groom students to be curious.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Curiosity. Okay, that’s number one.

Liu Heung Shing

Because curiosity gives you the mental energy to step forward. And I think the second important thing for journalists is that you need an incomparable kind of structure of knowledge. Because at the end of the day, journalism is a trade, it is a practice. If you don’t have a good body of general knowledge, you will very quickly find yourself in a pigeonhole.

Henry Huiyao Wang

That’s interesting. So knowledge — knowledge is power, right? Absolutely. Good. Okay, so of course working hard, too. Any question from our audience here? Okay, we have Antonio.

Antonio Villafranca, Vice President for Research, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)

Mr. Liu, it is really a pleasure to meet you. I mean, in this room, there are many people who have been so lucky in their lives, including myself, to go around the world and see many countries. But probably we have done it as diplomats, as experts, as scholars, with different eyes compared with you. So my question to you is about the way you perceive Europe. Since I’m from Italy, from Europe, the way you see Europe — what makes Europe different, in your view and through your eyes, compared with the United States or China? Thank you.

Liu Heung Shing

I mean, whenever I’m in Europe, I continue to be in awe of the civilisation Europeans have built in all aspects. And for me, I want to mention tiny, tiny little details. Whenever I travel in France and Italy and so on, I often go and visit many, many churches, because churches represent something very definitive about Europe. And in the churches, I kind of practise my trade, because these magnificent churches are always very dimly lit, with very little light.

So I learned to practise my craft because I wanted to close my lens down to f/11, f/16, when the actual light should be f/1.4 at 1/15 of a second or 1/8 of a second to get the pictures. So I often practised this. I would turn my lens down and take a slow shutter speed of 1/4 of a second or 1/8 of a second. The result of that is that I found it important for my work that I could hold my camera very steady.

And that resulted in the pictures when Gorbachev — practically, I was the only photographer in the room when he decided, in a live broadcast in the Soviet Union, that he wanted to resign. I decided my only chance for the picture was when he put down the paper, his resignation speech, because at that time history hadn’t ended yet; it was towards ending. So I decided that I must show that the paper was still moving. It had not landed on his desk yet in the Kremlin.

So I decided to do 1/30 of a second, and I was the only one in the room. I thought, my God, you know, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union would happen right after this, because Yeltsin had tried to push Gorbachev out. And if he resigned, then Yeltsin was the president-elect of the Russian Federation. So I said to myself, if I do 1/30 of a second, Gorbachev could be blurred and out of focus, and I would be the sinner of the world to miss this one.

But I decided to go ahead anyway because I didn’t want to use a flash. A flash makes the lighting in pictures very hard, and it is not nice. I wanted to catch the ambience inside the Kremlin. So when I came out of the Kremlin, back into Red Square, I saw the Soviet flag come down and the Russian flag go up. And back in my darkroom, when I came out and Gorbachev was sharp, and the next day all the editors saw the paper was still moving — it was a highlight in life.

I think when you look at Europe, Europe essentially dominated the world for 500 years. And that frame of reference — of Europe and the world and the rest of the world — is not that easy to adjust. And in order for Europe today, I think, to drastically step up and rekindle growth, certain things need to adapt. Because when you were at the pinnacle of power, you saw things in a certain way.

And you all know — I know everyone in this room knows — in the last few decades, as I mentioned in the film, the Asian century is descending upon us, if it is not already here. In order to have this mutual growth, mutual accommodation — for example, decision-making in Europe compared with decision-making in Asia is very, very different. I think in the late 1950s and early 1960s, European countries built up this superior social welfare system, which has now also come back and extracted a very, very high price vis-à-vis growth. And no European politician can survive trying to modify this system, which is very, very costly.

So we are in an age going through this dramatic transformation, and with this knowledge and information, with AI and so on. So how Europe will respond and react, I think, remains a big challenge. And I think people in Asia, whose first preference for travel may be to go and admire this great civilisation of Europe, at the same time may not be fully aware of what Europe has to shoulder in order to move forward in the globe. I think that is quite important.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Yes. I think Antonio’s question was quite relevant. Actually, both Europe and Asia are long civilisations, right? Two of the longest civilisations in the world. And furthermore, I really admire the early Europeans and the curiosity that we mentioned before. Like Marco Polo. I went to Venice to see the legacy of his voyage to China 700 years ago, and his legacy is still cherished today. And then the old Silk Road he took.

So I think that kind of cooperation, exploration and deepening of cooperation and connectivity is something we still value between Asia and Europe. Okay, maybe we have another question. Yes, Ambassador from Somalia.

Hodan Osman Abdi, Ambassador of Somalia to China

Thank you very much. I would like to thank the organisers for the invitation. It is an honour to meet you and admire your work. In the video that we first saw at the beginning, the first part of it gave me the sense that you were on a mission to kind of obliterate some stereotypes that were out there around the world regarding China, China’s efforts, China’s presence in the world and the Belt and Road Initiative.

However, when it came to your visit to Africa, something that you said really struck me — the fact that you actually wrote a will and you felt that there was danger in this journey. This kind of reaffirmed stereotypes out there around the world about general life in Africa, how dangerous it is, or how perilous that could be.

Now, as a photojournalist, as a Pulitzer Prize winner, I understand that you value what your words, what your impressions, would communicate to the rest of the world. But how do you balance your own prejudice or your own misconceptions against what you are trying to communicate to the rest of the world?

Liu Heung Shing

Thank you for your question. It is a very good question. I want to add a small nuance to the film. That comment in the film wasn’t an attempt to deepen a certain understanding of Africa. Rather, I think Congo, for me, is a unique case in all of Africa. For example, my first stop was Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and I saw people from Africa going and coming and so on. That remark was very, very specific to me personally.

I mentioned my age. I said I have covered six wars. In Afghanistan, I had people pointing guns at me. And read the news — my colleague from The Wall Street Journal was beheaded in that conflict. So that note, I was trying to show that I wanted to add more caution to this trip. Travelling there in 2025-26, you have to take five vaccinations, and it takes eight weeks to get all those shots. And to arrive there at my age, I had to be prepared.

I was trying to convey why I wanted to do this trip, why the trip would be interesting, and why the trip was important for me. Because I have been following China for a long time. I feel that, for my work on China, doing this reportage was an extension of my work. That is why I made so much effort to go and be there. So I hope, with this little bit more information, you can take that quote with a grain of salt.

It wasn’t about trying to paint Africa as a sort of ubiquitous place of challenge and difficulty, and so on and so forth. It is rather a reflection that I have covered so many stories that I was mindful to remind myself to be a little bit cautious.

Hong Hai, Founder, TimeDoc

Professor Liu, thanks for sharing. The video is really touching, and your book is very powerful. Thanks. I have a question. Another very famous photographer, Henri Cartier-Bresson, always talked about the decisive moment. I want to know: what does the decisive moment mean to you, and how do you know when the moment has arrived? Thank you.

Liu Heung Shing

Thanks for the question. I think Mr. Bresson gave a rare interview. He hardly spoke to journalists or was interviewed. In the 1970s, there was a piece in The New York Times. It was an interview, and I very much agree with how he defined the decisive moment. He said, when you are in the situation, when you are in front of things, your thought and your heart and the moment you press the shutter are completely in sync. That, for him, was the decisive moment.

But notice how he placed the order in the decisive moment. He said first is your thought. And for me, photographers have to go through considerable effort to familiarise themselves with a lot of information. For us, I think there is a considerable misunderstanding of what photographers do — or at least what a very good and thoughtful photographer would do. They go through a lot, a lot of preparation.

Earlier, I mentioned to Henry, I think for a journalist, as for photographers, the structure of knowledge and information is almost paramount. Besides that, you are interested, you are curious about something. So you could be in a situation in front of a group of people. You could choose — especially today, with memory cards, you could take 800 pictures. So you are no longer restricted by only a roll of film with 36 exposures.

Be that as it may, with 36 frames — and I usually used even fewer than 36 exposures. I usually let a lot of film go to waste because I took pictures not as much as most people did. Because I think observation is more important. Watching the interaction between people is more important. Watching a person’s expression — he or she, how they react — because don’t forget, every time you point the camera at someone, someone is also watching you.

So that we can establish this minimum trust. And with that trust, a lot of things go through very subtle changes. And still, you must wait. And when it happens, you also have to be very fast. So photography is one of those exercises. But I do agree that what you bring in your head to the situation, how you understand the situation, is very, very important.

I have seen photographers arrive somewhere and immediately start pointing the camera at somebody. Every photographer, of course, works differently. But I agree about how much thinking and preparation you need to go through before you go into any story.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay. I think the decisive moment for the photographer, of course, is when you push the button. There are a lot of decisive moments, but really, it accumulates all that knowledge and experience you have. So maybe a final question. Zichen, do you want to raise one?

Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General, CCG

My name is Zichen Wang. I work here at CCG. I used to be a journalist for 11 years for China’s state news agency before coming to CCG. So your name — you are a towering figure in the profession. It is truly a privilege to be in the same room with you and listen to you.

Having spent your career in U.S. mainstream institutional media, and being an inspiration for many in the profession, I’m sure you’ve also heard a lot of criticism and pessimism about the industry. For example, maybe in the 1980s, the availability of cameras was very limited. But now cameras are widely available, and everyone has a smartphone and can take photos with that.

There was a time when the Associated Press and, maybe in China, Xinhua News Agency — when this institutional media, legacy media, had a dominating effect on society. But now people listen to podcasts. They listen to Tucker Carlson. And the power of institutional media has, I mean, indisputably, also been reduced.

So I’m sure there are people, there are naysayers, who say that at this age — and also we are in the age of AI, where just by a few prompts you can create very beautiful videos, and no one is able to tell the truth from the false — with everything, I’m sure there are naysayers who say the era of photojournalism is long over. That’s past, and we have to adapt to a new reality.

I just want to learn from you, as a veteran of the industry, as an inspiration for latecomers: how do you respond? And what would be your guidance for people who still have some belief, have some devotion to the profession? Thank you.

Liu Heung Shing

Well, I can honestly say my profession — at least my previous profession — has undergone dramatic, and I really mean dramatic, changes. When I first arrived in Beijing, I don’t know if you have ever heard, at that time we called photographs that you see in the newspaper “radio photos,” right?

Radio photo means that when I processed my film, I made a print, I added a caption, I would go from Qijiayuan diplomatic quarters, get into the car with my prints, drive to the Xidan PTT office, hand the print to the receptionist, and she would put the print on the transmitter. And then it would start scanning the picture by scanning the picture into sound. Then the sound would be broadcast, like a radio broadcast, to AP Tokyo.

So my colleague would take that signal and download the signal, and then transfer that signal of sound back into the image. And then that image would be sent through the undersea cables at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, transmitted from Tokyo to New York. And the same pictures would go through an Atlantic Ocean cable and go to Europe. And today, in less than a second, you can send the photographs.

And so, a few years ago, I saw the figure, and I stopped paying attention to it. I mean, mankind now — even a few years ago, five or six years ago, the survey was that we took over four trillion images a year. So we are in this kind of general hyper-explosion of information, both in words and text as well as pictures.

But I don’t think we — I mean, on the one hand, social media has done ravaging damage to traditional media and the way stories are communicated. But I personally find — at least, I could be wrong, but it is my faith — that we continue to need to tell our stories to our children, to our parents, and storytelling will never stop.

And today we are inundated. I’m not a fan of Donald Trump. I mean, he keeps saying, telling every reporter in the White House that they are producing fake news. But we all know there is a considerable amount of false information out there. So if we do not redouble our scrutiny of the information that we receive through AI, which is already here, I think we will be challenged like never, ever before.

So I don’t think children will stop telling their stories to their parents, and mothers will stop telling stories to their daughters. I hope they will still tell true stories to each other. So the challenge is on us. It’s not for me to give you a general comment or observation that tomorrow we are all going to jump off the cliff. So I’m still hopeful.

Henry Huiyao Wang

Okay, okay. Regarding that point, I think that basically, for the future, absolutely, the tradition is still there, even though everyone can do photography. But then professionalism, and also curiosity, perseverance, persistence — all that matters as well. And also, the time you live in. So we are embracing the change.

But absolutely, I think the uniqueness, the speciality, and also the institutional and authoritative voice are probably still going to be really important as time goes on. So we are going to conclude our VIP Luncheon today. I’m very glad that Mr. Liu has shared his half-a-century of experience, and the last several years of his new voyage to 20-some countries.

But you see, I mean, it strikes me that when you came to China in the 1970s and 1980s, when you look at the old pictures you have of the old China just before opening up, and then you see what China is now, and then China is embracing the world by reaching out, by connecting projects, by connecting people. It is an enormous change, and that is probably the biggest thing in the 21st century.

So how can we tell that story, right, but also make it resonate in the world? It is really a very important art and skill. And I think you have done tremendously effective and good work in terms of putting this new picture of China in front of the world, and then, being a veteran Western journalist, looking at China with fresh eyes, from a fresh angle. I think that helps.

And you are not satisfied with that, of course. We still have a lot of room to improve. Now you become an elephant, right? You have to handle relations with other countries — how to really make hardware, but also software, people-to-people, heart-to-heart, and arts, academics, journalists, photography, and all those things. In addition to the economic progress we have made, I think we still have a lot of soft progress that needs to be made. And that is probably why your contribution is one of the very valuable ones that we are having today.

So again, thank Mr. Liu for sharing his great experience. And also thank our ambassadors, our ministers and counsellors, our foreign guests, industrial companies, our journalists and all the specialists. And of course, I noticed Mr. Liu’s wife is here. Also, congratulations on this new project. So we will conclude our VIP Luncheon. But let’s have a photo together. Thank you all very much.

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In the book, Blair offers an analysis of China’s economic governance model and its transformation over recent decades. Beginning with a comparative history of the Chinese and U.S. economies from 1979 to 2025, he analyzes the distinct historical phases of China’s transformation and stresses that the details of a nation’s financial system determine whether a sustainable fundamental transformation is possible.

Challenging conventional theories, he attributes China’s achievements to its ability to combine a government-planned financial system that promotes capital investment in infrastructure and industry, highly competitive markets in almost all sectors of the economy, and Confucian/socialist social capital. Using these systems, China created a benevolent cycle of high investment, fierce competition, and rapidly rising real wages.

Looking into future, he argues that China is now in the midst of a further transition to a new growth model based on industrial upgrading and concludes that China’s unique blend of state facilitation, social capital, strong competition and adaptive reforms offers a viable model for balancing technological progress with broad-based prosperity.

The book launch will be followed by a seminar bringing together David Blair and senior scholars and experts to discuss China’s economic transformation, the factors behind its development, and the drivers of future growth.

Speakers will include Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG; David Blair, Vice President of CCG and author of How Nations Succeed: The China Case Study; Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG; Wang Zhi, Professor and founding director of the Global Value Chain Research Institute at the University of International Business and Economics; and other invited experts.

When: 15:00–16:00, Tuesday, October 13, 2026 (Beijing Time)
Where: CCG Headquarters, 12 B10, West Wing, Hanwei Building, No. 7 Guanghua Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing
Language: English

No RSVP required — just drop by.

Agenda

15:00 – 15:05 Welcoming Remark

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-General of CCG

15:05 – 15:10 Opening Address

Emily Zhang, Senior Editor for Business, Economics, and Political Science, Springer Nature

15:10 – 15:25 Book Launch

David Blair, Vice President of CCG; author of How Nations Succeed: The China Case Study

15:25-16:00 Seminar

Henry Huiyao Wang, President of CCG; former Counsellor of China State Council

David Blair, Vice President of CCG; Former Chairman of the economics department at the Eisenhower School of National Defense University in Washington, DC; author of How Nations Succeed: The China Case Study

Evans Davidgeraint，Director of the Science Popularization Experiment Center of Beijing University of Chemical Technology

Mabel Lu Miao, Co-founder and Secretary-general of CCG

Wang Zhi, Professor and founding director of the Global Value Chain Research Institute of the University of International Business and Economics

Yan Sen, Senior diplomat, former Project Director of the China Investment Promotion Office at UNIDO

Q&A

About the Author

David Blair is an economist specializing in macroeconomics, monetary policy and entrepreneurship. He has also held numerous positions related to foreign policy. He retired in 2016 as professor of economics and finance from the Eisenhower School of National Defense University in Washington, where he also served as chairman of the economics department. Previously, he was a senior columnist at China Daily.

He holds a PhD in economics from UCLA and was a MacArthur Foundation Avoiding Nuclear War Fellow at Harvard University. He has led projects and consulted in Italy, Tajikistan, India, Bulgaria and Ethiopia.

About “China and Globalization” Book Series

CCG and Springer Nature are currently publishing sixteen books under “China and Globalization” book series which covers global governance, diplomacy and international relations, and economy and commerce. In this series, Chief-editors Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang and Dr. Mabel Lu Miao hope to provide a representative and in-depth look into China that has so far been lacking in the English-speaking world. This series boasts of over three hundred contributors internationally, including Graham Allison, Kishore Mahbubani, Joseph Nye and Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps, to name just a few.

This series is designed to present a wide range of global views on issues related to China and Globalization, opportunities and challenges of China’s rise in the world and China’s roles in global governance, global economy, global development and global security. It outlines China’s international relations with major global powers and the rest of the world, and it contains recommendations and proposals for the future of sustainable development, prospects for China’s further capital and market liberalization, and China’s globalizing trajectories as experienced by the world. As the first of its kind to publish the works of over two hundred contributors internationally, this book series seeks to create a balanced global perspective by gathering the views of highly influential global opinion leaders, former statesmen, ambassadors, well-known academics and think tank experts, multinational CEOs and foreign chambers of commerce from China and around the world.

The chief-editors of this series are Dr. Henry Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), and Dr. Mabel Lu Miao, Co-Founder and Secretary-General of CCG.

About CCG

The Center for China and Globalization (CCG) is a leading international non-governmental think tank in China. Founded in 2008, it was the first Chinese think tank to obtain special consultative status with the United Nations, as well as the first Chinese social think tank to rank among the world’s top 100. It has been ranked as the top social think tank in China on numerous authoritative domestic and international think tank rankings.

CCG also offers a nation-wide post-doctoral research program, the only non-governmental think tank certified to do so by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security. CCG is a member of the Belt and Road Think Tank Alliance, a founding member of the US Research Think Tank Alliance established by the Ministry of Finance, and serves as the secretariat for the “Global Youth Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)” initiative. In 2021, the “Global Youth Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)” project, initiated by CCG, received a reply letter from President Xi Jinping.

Headquartered in Beijing, CCG maintains multiple branches and overseas representatives both domestically and internationally, and boasts a seasoned team of full-time think tank researchers and professionals. Adhering to the professional principles of “internationalization, influence, and constructiveness,” CCG upholds the philosophy of “Global Vision for China, Chinese Wisdom for the World” It is dedicated to in-depth research in areas such as globalization, global governance, international relations, international trade and investment, international talent and corporate globalization, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese diaspora, and think tank development.

About Springer Nature

With a portfolio of over 2,700 journals and over 220,000 books, Springer is a global leader in academic and scientific publishing. We empower authors to share impactful research, enable readers to access trusted content, and collaborate with institutions and communities to advance knowledge worldwide. Whether you’re publishing cutting-edge science or foundational texts, Springer provides the reach, credibility, and support to help your work make a lasting difference.

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Speaking during the plenary session of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on October 1, Wang, also former Counselor to China’s State Council, had this Q&A with Putin

Henry Huiyao Wang

（Mr. ) President. My name is Huiyao Wang, Founder and President of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

You mentioned that you’re going to APEC, and we actually saw you had a very successful summit last year with President Trump, and you had a very successful summit with President Xi this year. Of course, President Xi just came back from United States, also had a very successful summit. So I’m wondering, when you are at the APEC, this possible trilateral summit. So, what do you expect China can play some more role, for example, in promoting the peace, making peace, or peacekeeping, or guarantor, whatever, so that can really facilitate this summit to be successful? Thank you.

Putin

I have no doubt that the summit will be successful.

As for the role of China, well, first and foremost, Chinese philosophy and its political thought has never had an issue of applying pressure or solving issues through military force. Well, it’s not part of Chinese philosophy. China always tries to do that through peaceful means, and we see that in the Chinese policy led by President Xi.

Could China play a role right now? Yes, of course. That is based on its increasing economic and military potential as well, on its strive to expand its zone of free cooperation. The initiative by President Xi, One Belt One Road, is aimed at precisely that. Together with China, we’re developing this initiative as well, as well as the Russian initiative, and we’re coupling them together. For example, the Russian initiative on Eurasian cooperation. We’re working together, and that brings positive results.

As for the trilateral meeting during the APEC summit, it is possible. I guess I have said that it will largely depend on China as host of the APEC summit, but yet again, it’s always useful to me to to clear up the positions of each other and so on. But most importantly, we need to find the agenda, the issues that could be part of that trilateral summit. We need to identify the topics for the discussion. Largely, that would depend on the hosts of the event, and hence President Xi.

It was a particularly timely question. Xi had just returned from his September 23–25 visit to the United States and summit with Trump, while Putin is expected to attend the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen on November 18–19. The Kremlin had already floated the possibility of the three leaders meeting there, but no trilateral summit has been formally announced. Reuters reported in September that Russian officials had discussed the possibility while stressing that the substance and agenda would first have to be worked out.

Interfax separately reported the remarks, quoting Putin as saying that Russia was in favor of the idea in principle and that a potential meeting at APEC would depend “largely on China, as the host of the event.” It also carried his response that China “can” play a role in promoting peace.

The exchange quickly travelled beyond the room.

Reuters reported “Putin says he’s ready to meet Xi and Trump if agenda is worked out,” based on the answer elicited in the Valdai Q&A. The wire service subsequently included the same point in its broader report on Putin’s remarks that day, writing that the Russian president was ready for a trilateral meeting with Xi and Trump if an appropriate agenda could first be agreed. Neither Reuters report identified Wang as the questioner.

The line was subsequently highlighted by Sky News, which told readers that Putin “said he was ready for a trilateral meeting with Donald Trump and Xi Jinping,” and appeared in reporting carried by outlets including SBS News in Australia.

That media pickup gives the exchange significance beyond the fact that a Chinese scholar had the opportunity to address the Russian president. Wang’s question connected three issues that are likely to converge at APEC: the Xi-Trump relationship after their latest summit, Putin’s possible interaction with both leaders, and the unresolved question of whether Beijing might assume a more active role in diplomacy surrounding the war in Ukraine.

Henry Huiyao Wang has advocated versions of that idea well before the Valdai exchange. In March 2022, Wang wrote It’s Time to Offer Russia an Offramp. China Can Help With That. in The New York Times. He has repeatedly argued that China’s relations with Russia, Ukraine, the United States and Europe give Beijing unusual room to contribute to a negotiated settlement. In earlier writings and public discussions, including in Foreign Policy, he proposed widening the diplomatic table beyond Moscow, Kyiv and Washington.

His appearance at Valdai also reflects his unusually extensive participation in international policy debates for the head of a Chinese nongovernmental think tank.

He also appeared as a panelist in Responsibility: Individual or Universal? Eighth Session of the Valdai Discussion Club’s 23rd Annual Meeting.

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China’s industrial strengths must also benefit its trading partners

By shifting towards domestic consumption and exporting industrial know-how, Beijing can give global partners a genuine stake in its growth

The European Commission is pressing China for progress by next month to address the widening EU-China trade imbalance, and raising the possibility of new protectionist trade policy. The deadline raises a question: how should China and its trading partners address perceived economic imbalances while sharing the benefits of Chinese industrial competitiveness?

China’s merchandise trade surplus approached US$1.2 trillion last year even as other exporting economies press for controls. “Overcapacity” is accepted as the blanket explanation for China’s industrial success, with government support leading to a production glut.

But this framing obscures more than it clarifies. China’s success is multifaceted, given the vast scale of its ecosystem, intense domestic competition and dense supplier networks. An effective response must distinguish between genuine imbalances and the productive advantages that offer opportunities for cooperation.

China’s car industry showcases the strength of its competitive edge. The International Energy Agency found that while making an electric car costs 30 per cent less in China than in advanced economies, only about one-third of that difference is due to batteries. Furthermore, the gap for conventional vehicles is similar.

China’s advantage is embedded in its manufacturing system rather than being the product of government subsidies.

Research by Rhodium Group makes the point clearly. It estimates that Chinese carmaker BYD enjoys a cost advantage of about US$4,700 per vehicle over Tesla’s Chinese operations. Direct grants account for only around US$292; the bulk of the advantage is due to vertical integration and lower research, administrative and supplier costs.

While industrial policy helped develop China’s industrial ecosystem, subsidies and government support do not explain the resulting cost structure.

China’s experience in textile production offers a precedent. Even as wages rose and some production moved to Vietnam, Bangladesh and elsewhere, China retained a major presence – over 30 per cent of global textile exports – because of its supplier clusters, infrastructure, skills and capacity to upgrade production.

That does not mean China should stay the course indefinitely. Chinese policymakers have been discussing consumption-led rebalancing for two decades, and policy commitment has become more explicit. The 2025 consumption action plan addressed wages, pensions, healthcare, childcare, paid leave and benefits for migrant and flexible workers. The government subsequently adopted China’s first five-year plan devoted specifically to consumption, targeting retail sales of about 60 trillion yuan (US$8.96 trillion) by 2030.

We’ve seen incremental results. While household consumption still only accounts for around 40 per cent of the gross domestic product, Beijing is moving in the right direction. Last year, per capita, disposable income rose by 5 per cent and consumption expenditure by 4.4 per cent.

Still, there is quite a bit of work to be done. China’s household savings rate reached an estimated 32.4 per cent in the first quarter of this year, compared with a pre-pandemic average of 29.6 per cent.

The government is already directing more fiscal resources towards pensions, healthcare, unemployment insurance, childcare and portable benefits for migrant workers as part of the domestic transformation. Greater household security and wealth would reduce precautionary savings and support sustained consumption. Similarly, boosting an openness to foreign goods and services could translate into a stronger demand for imports.

Addressing the sensitive topic of exchange-rate flexibility could support this adjustment; any resulting yuan appreciation would further increase Chinese households’ purchasing power abroad.

But any adjustment must also occur internationally. I previously wrote about the trend of Chinese companies moving from producing “in China for the world” towards producing “in the world, for the world”. The competitive edge of Chinese enterprise can help support overseas industry through the same system of joint ventures, technology and local-supplier development programmes that took China into global markets.

Chinese process knowledge combined with employment and industrial capacity in Europe and other markets would create meaningful local value, rather than the limited gains of merely assembling imported kits, which is what would happen if the doors to cooperation on win-win trade and investment were closed.

China’s trading partners should reserve permanent protection for genuinely strategic vulnerabilities. Where import surges cause demonstrable injury, temporary and reviewable safeguards may provide time for industrial adjustment. Subsidy transparency, common environmental and safety standards, stronger competition rules and negotiated market-opening commitments would address distortions more precisely than an open-ended campaign against “overcapacity”.

China is more than open to the idea – it has removed tariffs on imports from 53 African countries. Cooperation requires a rebuilding of trust. China should stick to strengthening domestic demand and encouraging overseas investment. Its trading partners should also widen the opportunities for cooperation.

Restrictions on stopping China buying advanced chipmaking machines from Dutch tech giant ASML are looking like a positively archaic holdover. Governments should instead be working towards easing their technology and investment restrictions, using clearly defined security concerns and verifiable safeguards to guide those decisions. Such openings would create opportunities for businesses on both sides.

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Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on BBC World Service’s Business Daily, 25 Sep 2026

Henry Huiyao Wang joined Business Daily for its post-summit episode, Taking stock: Trump and Xi face the trade test. The 17-minute programme examined what came next for trade, tariffs and AI after the White House meeting, whether bilateral tensions were easing, and the implications for technology, business and global trade. Wang appeared alongside AI researcher and author Stephanie Hare.

Henry Huiyao Wang appeared in BBC World Service, 26 Sep 2026

Henry Huiyao Wang’s quote in The Atlantic, 15 May 2026

From Beijing’s perspective, Trump is simply bowing to the global shift in power. “It’s the reality of the world that China is rising, and the U.S. has to accept that,” Wang Huiyao, the president of the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think tank, told me. “We have to coexist, compromise, accommodate each other. That’s what Trump is doing.”

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance in Nikkei, 26 Sep 2026

Henry Huiyao Wang was featured by Nikkei following the Xi–Trump summit.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on LBC, 26 Sep 2026

Henry Huiyao Wang’s quote in TRT World, 23 Sep 2026

"I see the visit as an anchor — a real bedrock — for further US-China relations," Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and director of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization and a former Counselor to China’s State Council, told TRT World.

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Henry Wang said the leaders' diplomacy provides a "guiding compass" for the relationship, while Chinese geopolitical analyst Gao Jian said Beijing wants to consolidate the "constructive strategic stability relationship" agreed in May through more predictable communication and mechanisms to manage differences.

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Henry Wang said this proposed mechanism for tariff-free imports from each side could provide a starting point. "$30 billion tariff-free imports for each side would be a good start," he said, suggesting it could eventually expand.

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Henry Wang puts it more bluntly: "We do not need an AI arms race; we need global AI governance."

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"China is the biggest guarantor, supporter and stabiliser that Trump can have," CCG’s Henry Wang said, pointing to Beijing's relationships with Iran and Gulf states.

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Henry Wang said Beijing could welcome Trump's earlier statements opposing Taiwan independence and expressing reluctance to station US forces thousands of miles from the US.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s quote in TRT World, 21 Sep 2026

"We do not need an AI arms race; we need global AI governance," Henry Huiyao Wang, founder and director of the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and a former Counselor to China’s State Council, told TRT World, describing AI as one of the most important issues likely to feature in the evolving US-China relationship.

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For CCG’s Henry Wang, the answer lies in separating competition from the management of risks created by the technology itself.

The United States and China, he said, have different strengths. The US remains strong in advanced AI models, modelling and computing, while China has a vast application market, extensive data-centre capacity and large-scale deployment potential.

Rather than attempting to eliminate that competition, Wang believes the two countries could work towards an international framework governing AI.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on Doha Debates, 22 Sep 2026

Wang joined Isabel Hilton, Renata Ávila and Arnaud Bertrand for the season premiere of the Doha Debates Podcast, Will China or the West lead the world into the future? The 131-minute discussion examined China’s rise, the future of the Western-led order, Taiwan, Ukraine, AI competition and whether major powers could find a sustainable form of coexistence. The programme page does not provide a transcript.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on WPIC’s The Negotiation, 25 Sep 2026

WPIC CEO Jacob Cooke interviewed Wang in a special 31-minute post-summit episode on the immediate implications of the meeting for China–U.S. relations and trade stability. The discussion devoted particular attention to AI: Wang set out his proposal for a global no-first-use principle covering AI-enabled autonomous weapons, discussed risks associated with the U.S. AI investment boom, and considered what an effective U.S.–China AI-governance framework might look like.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on Hong Kong’s Now News, 25 Sep 2026

Now News interviewed Wang about Trump’s unusually high-profile reception for Xi and what it suggested about Washington’s evolving approach to Beijing.

“他都意識到中國必須跟美國合作。”

Wang pointed to Trump personally receiving Xi at Joint Base Andrews, the White House welcoming ceremony and the state dinner as signs that Washington increasingly recognised the need to work with China amid a changing strategic balance.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s interview with Italy’s La Stampa, 24 Sep 2026

In a substantial interview with La Stampa, Wang discussed trade, investment, Taiwan, Iran and the broader strategic significance of Xi’s Washington visit.

“Già il fatto che Xi Jinping e Donald Trump si parlino per la seconda volta in pochi mesi è un successo.”

He argued that a second leaders’ meeting within four months was itself significant, particularly given the two countries’ rivalry. Wang also cited Trump’s personal airport welcome for Xi as a signal of unusually high-level treatment and said there was momentum for further trade and investment liberalisation.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s interview with Sweden’s Sveriges Radio, 24 Sep 2026

Wang spoke to Ekot, the news service of Sweden’s national public broadcaster Sveriges Radio, about Taiwan and what Beijing might seek from Trump during the Washington summit.

“Efter att Donald Trump var i Peking i våras sa han att han inte vill skicka soldater till Taiwan.”

The report said Wang believed Beijing saw an opportunity during Trump’s term to seek greater U.S. restraint over Taiwan, including on a paused U.S. arms package.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s interview with Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, 24 Sep 2026

In an extensive interview, Wang argued that deep economic interdependence left substantial room for pragmatic China–U.S. cooperation on tariffs, investment, high-tech trade and people-to-people exchanges.

“中美之間競爭客觀存在，但競爭並非只有對抗一條路徑。”

He argued that tariff and trade confrontation would hurt companies on both sides, advocated greater two-way investment and high-tech trade, and suggested that China could explore short-term visa-free entry for U.S. citizens as part of rebuilding people-to-people ties.

Henry Huiyao Wang on China–U.S. AI cooperation in Wen Wei Po, 24 Sep 2026

A separate article from the same interview focused on artificial intelligence and the danger of an emerging AI arms race.

“中美必須攜起手來，完善全球AI治理、管控技術風險、推動AI良性商業化發展。”

Wang contrasted U.S. strengths in frontier technological development with China’s strengths in commercial deployment and industrial applications. He proposed that the two countries explore understandings on the non-weaponisation of AI and on avoiding first use of AI in confrontation.

Henry Huiyao Wang on major-power coexistence in Wen Wei Po, 24 Sep 2026

Another Wen Wei Po article focused on the strategic relationship and Wang’s argument that the two countries should search for a more sustainable framework for coexistence.

“美國應當嘗試同中國達成戰略諒解，共同探索大國共處新路徑。”

Wang said China and the United States, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, could strengthen coordination on conflicts including Ukraine, Iran and Gaza, while recognising that the two powers would continue to have substantial differences.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s appearance on Italy’s Chora Media’s Black Box, 24 Sep 2026

Italian journalist Silvia Berzoni interviewed Wang for the 16-minute Black Box – La scatola nera della finanza episode Il summit Trump-Xi visto da Pechino. The programme examined the Washington meeting from Beijing’s perspective, with trade, rare earths, international conflicts and especially artificial intelligence among the principal topics. No transcript is provided on the episode page.

Henry Huiyao Wang’s interview with Italy’s Krisis, 16 Sep 2026

In a lengthy pre-visit interview, Wang discussed the structural nature of China–U.S. competition, the approaching U.S. midterm elections, Xi’s Washington visit, the changing international order, Ukraine and the Middle East, economic interdependence and AI governance.

“A prescindere dal verdetto elettorale, penso che esista una questione strutturale.”

Wang argued that deep economic interdependence made complete decoupling increasingly unrealistic and that the two powers would need to find some form of coexistence even as structural competition persisted.

Henry Huiyao Wang on The Heat by CGTN on 26, Sep 2026

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Zichen Wang, Deputy Secretary-General of CCG, in BBC, The Washington Post, Associated Press (twice), The Times (of London), and Channel News Asia

Zichen Wang’s appearance on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, Sep 2026

Zichen Wang appeared on BBC Radio 4’s flagship Today programme at its legendary 8.10 am interview slot during Xi Jinping’s U.S. visit to discuss the summit and China–U.S. relations.

Zichen Wang’s quote in The Washington Post, 25 Sep 2026

“In the public policy discussion, virtually all categories of AI risk are present. My impression is that political and social-stability risks receive greater attention than existential risk in the Silicon Valley sense,” said Zichen Wang, deputy secretary general of the Center for China and Globalization, a thinktank based in Beijing, referring to recent debates in the U.S. about whether AI could threaten humanity.

“But technical loss of control is definitely on the radar” in China, said Wang, who writes the Pekingnology newsletter.

Zichen Wang’s quote in Associated Press, 26 Sep 2026

Although the summit did not resolve the countries’ fundamental differences, analysts said the incremental progress was noteworthy.

“Personal diplomacy between the two leaders is important, but the emphasis on working-level engagement, military-to-military dialogue and crisis-management mechanisms suggests an effort to make that stability more durable and institutionalized,” said Wang Zichen, deputy secretary-general of the Beijing-based Center for China and Globalization.

Zichen Wang’s quote in Associated Press, 26 Sep 2026

Wang Zichen, deputy secretary-general of the Beijing-based think tank Center for China and Globalization, said there has never been “a convention” requiring the Chinese president to attend the U.N. General Assembly. Xi’s predecessors, including Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, attended major U.N. meetings only selectively, and Xi himself last addressed the body virtually during the pandemic in 2021.

Last year, Premier Li Qiang represented China. Senior diplomat Wang Yi has also spoken several time in recent years in various capacities; he was accompanying Xi this year on the Washington trip. And Han spoke in 2023.

“Both the premier and the vice president are sufficiently senior representatives that I would be cautious about interpreting the choice between them as a diplomatic signal in itself,” Wang Zichen said.

He added that China portrays the U.N. as an important global institution, so “it would be difficult to argue from the level of representation alone that China is becoming less interested in the U.N.”

Zichen Wang’s quote in The Times (of London), Sep 2026

“There is greater confidence in Beijing than there was a few years ago,” said Wang Zichen, from the Beijing think tank the Centre for China and Globalisation. “There is a sense that China has weathered considerable pressure from Washington, and that the United States has its own constraints and vulnerabilities.”

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“I have not seen any discussion suggesting that this is somehow the moment when global leadership passes from the United States to China,” Wang, the analyst, said. “Beijing still sees the United States as extraordinarily powerful, and the overriding objective at the moment is stability, not triumph.”

Zichen Wang’s quote on Channel News Asia, 25 Sep 2026

“Personal diplomacy between the two leaders is important but the emphasis on working-level contacts, military dialogue and crisis-management mechanisms also suggests an effort to make that stability more durable and institutionalised,” said Wang Zichen, deputy secretary-general at the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think-tank.

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Xi has called for more regular contact between government departments and the two militaries, as well as stronger crisis communication and continued dialogue on artificial intelligence.

He also said that the US and China should cooperate with sincerity and share a responsibility to ensure AI remains under human control and serves the well-being of people.

AI was a particularly revealing example, said Wang.

“Beijing does not want the AI relationship to be framed solely around containment, security or preventing worst-case scenarios, but also around what the two countries can constructively achieve together,” he said.

Zichen Wang’s quote on CNA, 23 Sep 2026

“I think from Beijing’s perspective, this visit is not about restoring the kind of relationship China and the US had in, for example, 2015,” said Zichen Wang, deputy secretary-general of the non-government think tank Centre for China and Globalization.

“That era is over. The more realistic objective is to consolidate a framework of strategic stability,” said Wang, who is also the founder of the newsletter Pekingnology.

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Dear Guest,

Greetings!

China’s first administrative regulation dedicated to outbound investment, the State Council Regulation on Outbound Investment, took effect on 1 July 2026. Against the changing landscape of China–US, China–Europe and Global South economic and trade cooperation, there is an urgent need to bring together relevant government departments, trade and economic experts, and representatives of globally active companies. The conference will provide a forum for interpreting the new rules, gathering business perspectives, facilitating cooperation and supporting responsible overseas investment.

Drawing on the international reach of a world-leading think tank and years of research on globalization, the 2026 China Outbound Investment Forum will connect international and domestic stakeholders, convene leaders from government, business and academia, and create a high-level platform through which Chinese companies can access global opportunities and expand international cooperation.

The 2026 China Outbound Investment Forum is hosted by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), with the China Association of International Trade (CAIT), the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies (CWTO), and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as co-organizers.

It will be held in Beijing CBD on 17 October 2026. We cordially invite you to attend the conference and join a closed-door exchange dinner with former senior officials of the Ministry of Commerce, ambassadors to China, representatives of international organizations and entrepreneurs leading international expansion.

Building on CCG’s extensive international network and twelve consecutive editions of the China Outbound Investment Forum, the conference will convene entrepreneurs and representatives of globalizing companies, leaders of international organizations and business associations, established companies, and experts in artificial intelligence and green development. The programme includes an opening ceremony, keynote addresses, a special session featuring prominent globalizing entrepreneurs, six industry and regional forums, and two high-level closed-door events. Participants will dine with diplomats from more than 60 countries, including ambassadors from 30 countries. In the presence of ambassadors and conference guests, three authoritative recommendation lists will also be announced: Chinese Globalizing Enterprises, Service Companies Supporting Chinese Global Expansion, and Emerging Young Business Leaders in Global Expansion.

We sincerely hope you will be able to join us. Our team will be pleased to assist with all arrangements.

With highest regards,

Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

September 2026

Contact: Liu Jun +86 157 1287 1680

Email: liujun@ccg.org.cn

Provisional Overall Programme 2026 China Enterprise Globalization Conference

Host:

Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Co-organizers:

China Association of International Trade; China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Date:

Saturday, October 17 2026

Venue:

Beijing CBD, China

Programme:

09:00–10:30 Opening Ceremony: Globalization Policy Signals and Major Trends

Moderator:

Mabel Lu Miao — Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Executive Director-General, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); Founder, Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)

Welcome Remarks:

Henry Huiyao Wang — President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Opening Keynote Speakers:

Chen Deming — Former Minister of Commerce of China

Chen Jian — Former Vice Minister of Commerce of China; Distinguished Expert, CPPCC National Committee Talent Pool for Consultative Governance

Erik Solheim — Co-chair, Europe-Asia Center; Former Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations

10:30–10:40 Launch of the UNCTAD World Investment Report

Presenter:

Li Nan — Senior Director, Division on Investment and Enterprise, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

10:40–10:50 Networking Tea Break

10:50–12:30 Keynote Addresses: Strategies for Chinese Enterprise Globalization

Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Henry Cai — Chairman and Founding Partner, AGIC Capital

Cao Dewang — Honorary Chairman for Life, Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co., Ltd.

Fu Chengyu — Former Chairman, Sinopec Group

Kai-Fu Lee — Chairman and CEO, Sinovation Ventures; Founder and CEO, 01.AI

James Liang — Co-founder and Executive Chairman, Trip.com Group

Liu Hanyuan — Chairman of the Board, Tongwei Group

Zhang Chuanwei — Chairman, Mingyang Smart Energy

Zhang Yichen — Chairman and CEO, CITIC Capital Holdings Limited

12:30–13:30 Business Buffet Lunch and Open Networking

13:30–14:45 Forum 1 (Auditorium 1): Artificial Intelligence, Digital Economy and Cross-Border E-commerce

Moderator:

Tang Min — Vice President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Featured Address:

Xue Lan — Dean, Institute for AI International Governance, Tsinghua University

Invited Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Ji Xinhua — Founder and CEO, UCloud Technology Co., Ltd.

Lyu Yixiong — Founder and Chairman, Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd.

Shi Peng — Global Chief Operating Officer, Mixue Group

Megan Wang — Managing Director, China, Project Management Institute (PMI)

Zhang Jingyang — Founder and CEO, Moore Elite

Zhou Hao — Founder and CEO, QuantGroup

Zheng Rujing — Founder and CEO, Spes (Haomai Technology)

Zou Xiaowu — Founder and Chairman, Eclicktech

14:45–15:00 Networking Tea Break and Room Transition

15:00–16:15 Forum 2 (Auditorium 1): New Energy and Green Globalization

Invited Speakers (alphabetical by surname):

Liu De — Co-founder, Executive Director and Senior Vice President, Xiaomi Group; Chief of Group Leadership Development

Ni Jun — Chief Manufacturing Officer and Co-president of Engineering, Manufacturing and R&D, Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL)

Zhang Hui — Vice President, Europe, NIO Holding Co., Ltd.; Chair, Automotive Working Group, China Chamber of Commerce to the EU

16:15–16:30 Networking Tea Break and Room Transition

16:30–17:45 Forum 3 (Auditorium 1): Enterprise Globalization and Project Management

Jointly organized by CCG and the Project Management Institute (PMI), this specialist forum focuses on full-lifecycle management of cross-border projects undertaken by Chinese companies. Drawing on PMI’s globally recognized body of knowledge, standards, certifications and industry practice, it addresses common challenges such as difficult cross-border delivery, weak risk controls and inefficient cross-cultural collaboration. The forum will combine standards, case analysis and targeted connections to produce replicable methods and strengthen systematic project governance, delivery quality and commercial value.

13:30–14:45 Forum 4 (Auditorium 2): Cross-Border Investment and Financing

Jointly organized by CCG and investment and financing institutions, this forum examines how cross-border capital can support industrial globalization. It will focus on evolving financing needs, efficient cross-border capital allocation, and two-way collaboration between industry and investors. By connecting policy guidance, fund-of-funds leverage and industrial implementation, it will bring together globalizing companies, industrial capital, financial institutions and professional advisers to support safe, compliant and high-quality international expansion.

15:00–16:15 Forum 5 (Auditorium 2): Career Development for Chinese Overseas Students and Returnees

This forum focuses on cross-border talent ecosystems and the talent strategies of globalizing companies. Drawing on professional networks in overseas-student career development, cross-border mobility planning and full-lifecycle talent services, it connects overseas-educated talent, Chinese companies operating internationally and specialist service providers. The integrated platform will offer career guidance, employer matching and cross-border support, expanding global career opportunities while supplying companies with high-quality international talent.

16:30–17:45 Forum 6 (Auditorium 2): Young Business Leaders Growth Forum

This forum is designed to cultivate the next generation of business leaders and strengthen the talent pipeline for enterprise globalization. It connects young entrepreneurs, returnee professionals, industry mentors and international platforms through growth support, practical opportunities and global perspective-building. The goal is to help emerging leaders identify global opportunities, strengthen international management capabilities and contribute a sustained new generation of business talent.

13:30–14:45 Forum 7 (Auditorium 3): China–Europe Cooperation Forum

A high-level dialogue on deeper China–Europe economic and trade cooperation and sustainable development. Drawing on extensive networks across European government, business and academia, the forum will focus on green transition, the digital economy, two-way investment and industrial-chain coordination. It will connect policy dialogue, business matching and practical co-creation to foster durable cooperation among companies, industry organizations and professional institutions.

15:00–16:15 Forum 8 (Auditorium 3): Central Asia and Neighbouring Regions Cooperation Forum

This regional forum focuses on economic cooperation with Central Asia and the South Caucasus and on investment opportunities around the Caspian economic corridor. It will examine trade facilitation, industrial investment, logistics connectivity and investment facilitation, providing official channels and practical support for Chinese companies entering Central Asian and South Caucasus markets and advancing mutually beneficial regional supply-chain integration.

16:30–17:45 Forum 9 (Auditorium 3): Middle East and North Africa Regional Cooperation Forum

Jointly organized by CCG and embassies of Middle Eastern and North African countries in China, this official regional forum focuses on deeper cooperation and opportunities in Gulf and North African markets. It will align economic-transformation strategies in the region with the capabilities of Chinese companies, covering two-way investment, industrial capacity, trade upgrading and infrastructure cooperation. Official policy interpretation, project matching and implementation support will help companies develop these markets and advance mutually beneficial economic and trade relations.

18:00–19:00 Networking Reception

Venue: Foyer outside the Main Conference Hall

Open to all conference participants, the reception connects the afternoon forums with the evening’s closed-door dinner. It will bring together government, business and academic representatives, leaders of globalizing companies, international organizations and diplomats. Partners may use the setting for brand presentation and business meetings, reaching the full conference audience and beginning targeted engagement with senior dinner guests.

19:00–21:00 Exchange Dinner for Globalizing Entrepreneurs and Diplomats in China

Venue: Private dinner venue (by invitation only; closed-door event)

The highest-level closed-door event of the conference, this invitation-only dinner will convene ambassadors and commercial counsellors, former senior trade and economic officials, leaders of major globalizing companies, and representatives of international and industry organizations. Centred on high-level dialogue, authoritative announcements and targeted connections, it will provide a trusted setting for policy communication, international resource matching and lasting cooperation.

Core Programme:

1. High-level government–business dialogue: ministry experts will address policy and practice in Chinese enterprise globalization; leading entrepreneurs will discuss global AI trends and new opportunities; and ambassadors will offer remarks on government–business coordination, two-way opening and industrial cooperation.

2. In the presence of relevant Ministry of Commerce leaders, ambassadors and dinner guests, three authoritative recommendation lists will be announced: Chinese Globalizing Enterprises, Service Companies Supporting Chinese Global Expansion, and Emerging Young Business Leaders in Global Expansion.

3. Themed table discussions: guests will be grouped by regional market and industry to match cooperation needs and connect resources. A cultural performance by Guo Shize will be presented during the dinner.

To register, please scan the QR code below.

Or use the registration link:

For further enquiries, please contact:

Tel: +86-10-65611038-8009

Appendix: Full List of Conference Guests

I. Former Ministry of Commerce Officials (alphabetical by surname)

Chen Deming — Former Minister of Commerce of China

Chen Jian — Former Vice Minister of Commerce of China; Distinguished Expert, CPPCC National Committee Talent Pool for Consultative Governance

II. Ambassadors to China (alphabetical by country)

H.E. Marcelo Suárez Salvia — Ambassador of Argentina to China

H.E. Hussain Al Hammadi — Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to China

H.E. Wolf Dietrich Heim — Ambassador of Austria to China

H.E. Bruno Angelet — Ambassador of Belgium to China

H.E. Dario Mihelin — Ambassador of Croatia to China

H.E. Alberto Blanco Silva — Ambassador of Cuba to China

H.E. Koula Sophianou — Ambassador of Cyprus to China

H.E. Michael Starbæk Christensen — Ambassador of Denmark to China

H.E. Tefera Derbew Yimam — Ambassador of Ethiopia to China

H.E. Mikko Kinnunen — Ambassador of Finland to China

H.E. Bergdís Ellertsdóttir — Ambassador of Iceland to China

H.E. Evgenios Kalpyris — Ambassador of Greece to China

Péter Király — Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Hungary in China

H.E. Kenji Kanasugi — Ambassador of Japan to China

H.E. Hussam A. G. Al Husseini — Ambassador of Jordan to China

H.E. Abdelkader El Ansari — Ambassador of Morocco to China

H.E. Vebjørn Dysvik — Ambassador of Norway to China

H.E. Khalil Ur Rahman Hashmi — Ambassador of Pakistan to China

H.E. Manuel Carvalho — Ambassador of Portugal to China

H.E. Dan-Horia Maxim — Ambassador of Romania to China

H.E. James Kimonyo — Ambassador of Rwanda to China

H.E. Vaness Tsin Jie Li — Ambassador of Suriname to China

H.E. Per Augustsson — Ambassador of Sweden to China

III. Ministry of Commerce Experts (alphabetical by surname)

Chai Xiaolin — Former Director-General, Department of WTO Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Director, Trade in Services and Investment Division, World Trade Organization

Senior official, Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce

Gou Haodong — Former Deputy Representative, Mission of China to the African Union

Han Bing — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Economic and Commercial Counsellor of China in Croatia and Poland; Former Minister-Counsellor of China in Egypt and Zimbabwe

Huang Rengang — Former Minister-Counsellor, Permanent Mission of China to the WTO; Former Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of China in Australia

Huo Jianguo — Former President, Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce; Vice President, China Society for World Trade Organization Studies

Jiang Shan — Former Director-General, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister-Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Canada

Jin Xu — Former Commercial Counsellor of China in the United Kingdom; President, China Association of International Trade

Lei Fengyun — Former Science and Technology Counsellor, Embassy of China in Austria; Former Chief Representative, UK Office of the State Administration of Foreign Experts Affairs

Lu Kejian — Former Director-General and Deputy Director-General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Japan

Li Xiaobing — Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in India

Ma Jianchun — Former Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Ambassador of China to The Gambia

Ma She — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister-Counsellor for Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in France

Peng Gang — Former Director-General, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Commerce; Former Minister, Mission of China to the European Union

Song Yaoming — Former Minister for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of China in Japan

Sun Jie — Former Deputy Director-General, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation; Formerly served in economic and commercial offices of Chinese embassies overseas

Sun Yongfu — Former Director-General, Department of European Affairs, Ministry of Commerce

Tian Deyou — Former Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs; Former Minister-Counsellor, Economic and Commercial Office, Embassy of China in the United States

Wang Huiyao — President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Wang Kaiqian — Director, China International Electronic Commerce Center

Wang Qingyuan — Former Minister-Counsellor for Economic and Commercial Affairs at the Chinese embassies in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico

Yang Yi — Former Director-General, Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau, Ministry of Commerce

Zhu Hong — Former Minister, Embassy of China in the United States

IV. Entrepreneurs and Company Founders (alphabetical by surname)

Timo Blenk — Partner and CEO, Agora Strategy Group AG

Henry Cai — Chairman and Founding Partner, AGIC Capital

Cao Dewang — Fuyao Glass Industry Group Co., Ltd., Honorary Chairman for Life

Dai Anhui — Zhejiang Gaoshengtong Holding Co., Ltd., Chairman

Duo Xiaojing — Huangjing Global Business Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Fu Chengyu — Sinopec Group, Former Chairman

Gan Yuanshan — Boerfei Bioengineering Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Gao Min — Hanbo Group, Chairman

Gao Zhendong — Positec Group, Founder; Chairman

Hua Dongyi — Beijing Dadeson Science, Technology and Trade Services Group Co., Ltd., CEO

Hong Kai — Henling Technology, CEO

Ji Xinhua — UCloud Technology, Founder and CEO

Kai-Fu Lee — Sinovation Ventures, Chairman, 01.AI, Founder and CEO

Li Xiaopeng — DeWe Security Service Group (DWSS), Founder, Frontier Services Group, Executive Director

Liu Shuqi — Tongwei Co., Ltd., Chair and CEO

Liu Yonghao — New Hope Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Lyu Yixiong — Shanghai Chicmax Cosmetic Co., Ltd., Founder; Chairman

Ma Tiemin — Kaisheng Haofeng Agriculture Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Qiao Jian — Lenovo Group Limited, Vice President

Qiu Guangyu — Vice President, Meituan; Head of Keeta Overseas Business

Shi Peng — Mixue Group, Global Chief Operating Officer

Sun Piaoyang — Jiangsu Hengrui Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd., Chairman

Tang Xiuguo — Rotating Chairman, SANY Group

Wang Peng — Synear Food Co., Ltd., General Manager

Wang Xin — Founder, Global Honor Club (Li Jiamei)

Wu Jing — Returnees Today, Founder and CEO

Dr. Karim Alwadi — Beltway Group, Co-founder

Xu Fang — Galaxy Ventures, Founding Partner

Xu Gui — Shanghai Daoshen Huangu Technology Co., Ltd., Founder

Yang Rui — Dreame Technology (Suzhou) Co., Ltd., Founder

Yu Dechao — Innovent Biologics, Founder

Yu Lu — Urban Planning & Design Institute of Shenzhen Co., Ltd. (UPDIS), Party Secretary; Chairman

Zhang Chuanwei — Mingyang Group, Founder; Chairman

Zhang Jingyang — Moore Elite, Founder and CEO

Zhang Yichen — CITIC Capital Holdings Limited, Chairman and CEO

Zhao Yong — Fuhua Group, Chairman

Zheng Rujing — Spes (Haomai Technology), Founder and CEO

Zhou Yu — Huakai Yibai Technology Co., Ltd., Chairman

Zhu Weiqing — Shanghai Baotan New Energy and Environmental Technology Co., Ltd., Founder; Chairman and CEO

Zhu Zhaojiang — Shenzhen Transsion Holdings Co., Ltd., Chairman and General Manager

Zou Xiaowu — Eclicktech, Founder; Chairman

V. Counsellors and Other Diplomats in China (alphabetical by country)

Ahmed Benyahya — Counsellor, Embassy of Algeria in China

Mansour Al Kaabi — Head of the Economic Section, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Zuo Ende — Senior Economic Researcher, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Abdulla Alnoaimi — Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Mansour AlKaabi — Head of the Economic Section, Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in China

Natig Khalilov — Chief Adviser to the Trade Representative, Embassy of Azerbaijan in China

Jing Liu — Senior Investment Director, Australian Embassy in China

Mandefro Shiferaw — Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Ethiopia in China

Franz Roessler — Commercial Counsellor, Austrian Embassy in China

Kaiyrzhan — Counsellor, Embassy of Kazakhstan in China

Ernst Prosman — First Secretary, Economic Section, Embassy of the Netherlands in China

Lene Jie — Trade Commissioner, Embassy of Canada in China

Counsellor, Embassy of Cameroon in China

Sofia Ancheta — Economic Counsellor, Embassy of Cuba in China

Suzanne Wong — Head of Global Affairs, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Andrew Duff — Economic Officer, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Onejin Wu — Economic Officer, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Karalea Davis — Specialist, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Wang Xiaojuan — Specialist, Economic Section, Embassy of the United States in China

Gonzalo Talavera — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Peru in China

Radouane Chaouki — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Morocco in China

Cecilia Chirita — Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of Moldova in China

Nuno Lima Leite — Coordinating Director for China, AICEP Portugal Global; Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Portugal in China

Chandima Kiriwandala — Commercial Minister, Embassy of Sri Lanka in China

Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Saudi Arabia in China

Altay Ceylanoğlu — Counsellor, Embassy of Türkiye in China

Bai Jie — Commercial Secretary, Embassy of Uganda in China

Dimitrios Michas — Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in China

Sun Jinshu — Officer, Financial Section, Embassy of Hungary in China

Emanuele Aloisio — Financial Attaché, Embassy of Italy in China; Representative of the Bank of Italy in China

Rishikesh Swaminathan — First Secretary for Science and Technology, Embassy of India in China

Jörg Weberndörfer — Minister-Counsellor for Industry and SME Policy, Trade and Investment Section, Delegation of the European Union to China

Khaled Melad Rezek — Minister Plenipotentiary and Head of the Economic and Commercial Office, Embassy of Egypt in China

Daniel Necula — Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Romania in China

Kuno Gschwend — Chief Investment Officer and Deputy Head, Swiss Business Hub China, Embassy of Switzerland in China

VI. Representatives of International Organizations and Institutions (alphabetical by surname)

Johann Caspar Fuhrmann — Representative, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Li Nan — Senior Director, Division on Investment and Enterprise, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Tatiana Rosito — Representative, World Bank China Office

Luo Xiang — Representative, United Nations Global Leadership and ESG Development Center

Mabel Lu Miao — Co-founder and Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Executive Director-General, Alliance of Global Talent Organizations (AGTO); Founder, Global Young Leaders Dialogue (GYLD)

Marshall Mills — Representative, International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Muhammad Amersi — Representative, Amersi Foundation, United Kingdom

Mohamed Al Barwani — Founder and Chairman, MB LLC

Megan Wang — Managing Director, China, Project Management Institute (PMI); Executive Council Member, CCG

Elisa Hörhager — Chief Representative in China, Federation of German Industries (BDI)

VII. Experts, Scholars, and Leaders of Technology and Professional-Service Institutions (alphabetical by surname)

Cao Mizu — Vice President and Director, Yiwu Shuzhao Artificial Intelligence Innovation Center

Cheng Zongchao — Director, EMBA Programme, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB)

Gao Jian — Deputy Director and Research Fellow, Atmospheric Environment Institute, Chinese Research Academy of Environmental Sciences

He Shan — Samsung Global Research, Chief Research Fellow

Li Haitao — Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB), Dean

Li Wei — Professor of Economics and Associate Dean for Asia, Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business (CKGSB)

Liu Jun — Deputy Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Liu Hong — Deputy Director of Public Relations and Communications, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Lu Ruquan — CNPC Economics & Technology Research Institute, Dean

Tang Min — Vice President, Center for China and Globalization (CCG); Former Counsellor of the State Council

Wang Zichen — Deputy Secretary-General, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Dr. Karim Alwadi — Beltway Group, Co-founder

Xiang Siwei — Samsung Global Research, Chief Research Fellow

Yu Lu — Urban Planning & Design Institute of Shenzhen Co., Ltd. (UPDIS), Party Secretary; Chairman

Zhang Wei — Vice President and Senior Fellow, Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

Zhang Xiong — Executive Vice Dean, E-Pharma Globalization Institute

Zheng Jinlian — Center for China and Globalization (CCG), Deputy Director; Research Director

VIII. CCG Council Members (alphabetical by surname)

Guo Shize — Founder and President, Yingzhong Overseas Consulting; Executive Council Member, CCG

Jiang Guohua — Zicheng United Construction Group Co., Ltd., Chairman

Jiang Zhongyuan — Vice Chair, CCG Hong Kong Council

Jing Yuhong — Shanghai Zhongyou Information Services Co., Ltd., Executive Director

Ma Enduo — Amaes Food (Group) Co., Ltd., Chairman

Min Hao — Dongwu Shian IoT Technology (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd., Chairman

Tang Haoxuan — Fuaida International, Chairman

Wang Yi — LAIX Inc., Founder and CEO

Wang Xinghua — Chengdu Huafu Group, Chairman

Zhou Hao — QuantGroup, Founder and CEO

IX. Executives of Chinese and International Companies (alphabetical by surname)

Cai Qinghong — Merits & Tree Law Offices, Managing Partner

Chen Peng — ICBC Brussels Branch, Head of Legal and Public Relations

Chen Xiaohua — Deputy Party Secretary, Huaxing Haian Group

Cui Xiaojing — JA Solar Technology Co., Ltd., Representative

Guo Xu — RELX, Director of Government Affairs

Guo Weifang — Baker McKenzie, Director of Business Development, China

Huang Jinghui — China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure), Deputy General Manager

Huang Qijia — PwC China, Managing Partner, Consulting

Huang Ye — CIIC Group, Head of Overseas Development

Ji Lin — iFLYTEK Co., Ltd., Vice President

Jie Ling — Jianggen Capital, Director of Overseas Business

Li Xiaoxu — Hangzhou Tigermed Consulting Co., Ltd., Director of Strategic Affairs

Li Yifang — Hong Kong Xihui Holdings Group, Representative

Li Yao — KPMG Global China Practice, Partner

Liu Chang — Cargill China, Vice President of Government Affairs

Liu Shiliang — Former Managing Director of Investment Banking, China International Capital Corporation Limited (CICC)

Liu Shuqi — Tongwei Co., Ltd., Chair and CEO

Mei Lin — Amazon Global Selling, Head of Asia Pacific

Qiao Jian — Lenovo Group Limited, Vice President

Qiu Guangyu — Vice President, Meituan; Head of Keeta Overseas Business

Shi Peng — Mixue Group, Global Chief Operating Officer

Wang Peng — Synear Food Co., Ltd., General Manager

Wu Yanyan — BMW Group, Vice President

Xia Xin — Vice President, Sanofi China

Xiao Lijun — IDG Capital, Partner

Xu Chengzhi — Windey Energy Technology Group Co., Ltd., Global Chief Public Affairs Officer

Xu Fengwei — Zhenjiang Co., Ltd., General Manager

Zhang Hui — Vice President, Europe, NIO Holding Co., Ltd.; Chair, Automotive Working Group, China Chamber of Commerce to the EU

Zhu Hui — Partner, China, Boston Consulting Group (BCG)

Zhu Hailuan — Vice President, Danaher China

X. Local Government Officials and Leaders of Chinese and International Business Associations

Cheng Fabao — Director, Beijing Investment Promotion Bureau of Jing County, Xuancheng, Anhui

Rami Khalil — President, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia

Deng Zhiqiang — Shenzhen Longgang Cross-Border E-Commerce Association, President

Jin Jinghao — Deputy Director, JETRO Beijing Office

Liang Cuiqin — Overseas Vice President, Malaysia ASEAN Business Association

Lin Xinru — Shenzhen Cross-Border E-Commerce Enterprise Association, Secretary-General

Ren Xinglei — China Association for Small & Medium Commercial Enterprises, Vice President

Wang Xin — Shenzhen Cross-Border E-Commerce Association, President

Dong Xuecheng — China Entrepreneurs Innovation Forum, Secretary-General

XI. Participating Organizations

(1) Companies

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; Avatr Technology; Abbott China; Anker Innovations; Ernst & Young Hua Ming LLP; Aukey; 1EarthVillage; Baidu; Banyu Technology; Baker McKenzie; Bain & Company; KPMG China; BYD; Boston Consulting Group (BCG); Boston Scientific; CKGSB Alumni Association; Yangtze Optical Fibre and Cable; Chengxi Consulting; Dentons; Dahua Certified Public Accountants; Dalian Jiahe Technology; Dalian Xiangdu Property; Danaher; Dapresy Group; Dow Jones; Deppon Express; Deloitte China; DeHeng Law Offices; 4PX; DiDi; Philips Healthcare; FiberHome; Flybird International; SVOLT Energy; GE HealthCare; China Communications Group; China Development Bank; Gotion High-tech; State Grid Corporation of China; Hengtong Group; HongShan; Hony Capital; Huangjing Global Business Group; Huawei; Huawei Digital Power; Huairou Science City Administrative Committee; HP; IDG Capital; Geely Holding; ZEEKR; Jingneng Energy; BOE Technology Group; King & Wood Mallesons; Goldwind; Harvest Fund Management; JunHe LLP; Jiucheng Supply Chain; CBC Group; iFLYTEK; Cook Medical; Kuayue Express; LightInTheBox; Livzon Pharmaceutical Group; BDO China; Lenovo; Beijing Liangzi Business Consulting; Lunan Pharmaceutical Group; LONGi Green Energy; Roland Berger; London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG); Mindray; Medtronic; Embassy of the United States in China; Meituan; Mingyang Smart Energy; Merck China; Nizami Ganjavi International Center (NGIC); NETA Auto; CATL; nubia; OPPO; Palanda International Trade; Penggong Intelligence; PwC China; Qilu Pharmaceutical; Chery; 360 Group; Ruizhi Consulting; realme; SERES; Sailvan Times; Sanofi China; Thermo Fisher Scientific; SANY Group; Sinocare; Fosun Pharma; MicroPort; Shanghai Turing Intelligent Computing Quantum Technology; Shanghai Huijingchen Technology; Shanghai Daoshen Huangu Technology; Shanghai Ruili Biotechnology; Shanghai Yincai Network; SenseTime; Stryker; Shumaorong (Beijing) Technology; SF International; SF Express; Suzhou Sifang Intelligent Technology; StarTimes; Swiss Cultural and Arts Center; TCL; Tigermed; BY-HEALTH; Andon Health; Tianjin Zhongtian Data Technology; Baker Tilly China; Pan-China Certified Public Accountants; Trina Solar; Tianqi Lithium; Tongwei; vivo; Worldwide Logistics; Weiheng Law Firm; NetEase; NIO; Wuhan Burini Education Technology; Wuhan Xingqiao International Education Technology; SHEIN; Simcere; Innovent Biologics; ShineWing; Sunwoda; New Hope Group; Siemens Healthineers; XPeng; Xiaomi; HONOR; XCMG; Sungrow; Yipianhong E-commerce; EVE Energy; Yingke Law Firm; Yingke Yirong (Beijing) Information Technology; Envision Energy; Windey Energy; Yuntu Logistics; YSS Group; Zhejiang Gaoshengtong Holding; Merits & Tree Law Offices; IM Motors; CALB; Zhong Lun Law Firm; Zoomlion; CICC; CIMC Vehicles; CITIC Capital; CITIC Futures; China International Engineering Consulting Corporation; Sinosure; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; China General Nuclear Power Group; China National Offshore Oil Corporation; China Construction Bank; Export-Import Bank of China; China State Construction Engineering Corporation; China Railway Group; China Railway Construction Corporation; Energy China; China Three Gorges Corporation; Sino Biopharmaceutical; CRRC; Sinopharm; China Southern Power Grid; Bank of China; Beijing Yitan Jiujing Technology; Beijing Compliance Culture Development; Beijing Junya Xiangxin International Trade; Beijing Hehehui; Beijing Haoda International Cultural Exchange; Beijing Shubai Fangzhuang Hospital of Traditional Chinese Medicine; Beijing Ruiqi Business Consulting; Beijing Tenghua Jianbo Ducui Technology; Beijing Zhijie Consulting; Beijing Rongqing Technology; Beijing First Launch Business Center; Zishun Compliance; Zigong Haitian Culture; Dreame Technology; Zijin Mining, among others.

(2) Local Governments and Related Authorities

Beijing Investment Promotion Bureau of Jing County, Xuancheng, Anhui; Huairou Science City Administrative Committee; Investment Promotion Center, Department of Commerce of Jiangxi Province; Tangier Port Authority; Yangjiang Green Energy Industry Technology Innovation Service Center, among others.

(3) International Organizations

Finance Center for South-South Cooperation (FCSSC); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); World Bank; Asia Pacific International Arbitration Court, among others.

(4) Universities

University of Macau; University of Science and Technology Beijing; International Cooperation Research Center for Sustainable Industrial Park Development and Planning, Southeast University; SOAS University of London; RCEP Member States Research Center, Ningbo University of Finance & Economics; Nantong University; Center for Student Global Competence Development, Tsinghua University; Overseas China Data Research Institute, Soochow University; Suzhou University of Science and Technology; Tianjin Normal University; University of Northampton; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics, among others.

(5) Research Institutes and Think Tanks

Guoyan Economic Research Institute, Development Research Center of the State Council; Guoyan High-Tech (Xiamen) Digital Economy Research Institute; Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences; Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, Ministry of Commerce; Belt and Road Initiative Sri Lanka (BRISL); Samsung Global Research; Suzhou Innovation Ecosystem Research Institute; Xinhua China Enterprise Development Research Center; Yangze Huaan Think Tank; China Low-Altitude Economy Research Institute; China National Chemical Information Center; National Science Library, Chinese Academy of Sciences, among others.

(6) Chinese and International Business Associations

Australia China Business Council (Tasmania); Beijing Digital Economy Enterprise Globalization Base; GiC International Investment Promotion Association; Global Medical Aesthetics Innovation Conference; Global Intelligence Empowerment Center; Silk Road International Talent Alliance; CCPIT Lüliang Council, Shanxi; Green Trade Committee of the China Association for Statistics of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade; Asia Pacific Medical Technology Association; Zhongguancun Green Mine Industry Alliance; International Industrial Innovation Cooperation Committee of the China Society for World Trade Organization Studies; Foreign Trade Culture Committee of the China Enterprise Culture Improvement Association; Special Committee of the China Medical and Health Development Foundation; China International Talent Exchange Foundation; Commercial Sub-council, China Council for the Promotion of International Trade; China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation.

China Association of Trade in Services; China Association for Socio-Economic and Cultural Exchange; Anti-Aging Medicine and Proactive Health Branch of the China Food and Drug Safety Promotion Association; All-China Environment Federation; Beijing Association of Enterprises with Foreign Investment; China Association of International Trade; China Society for World Trade Organization Studies, among others.

(7) Chinese and International Media

People’s Daily; Xinhua News Agency; CCTV+; Dow Jones China strategic partnerships; D&S Media; The Straits Times; Global Times; Reuters; South China Morning Post; Entrepreneurs Daily; TRT World; Sina Finance; ABC, among others.

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Held under the theme “Powering the Future,” this year’s Public Forum focuses on the role of trade in services in economic development, job creation and the future of the global trading system. According to the WTO, more than 4,600 participants from business, governments, civil society, academia and international organizations are taking part, with 540 speakers appearing across a record 113 sessions.

September 15

On September 15, Wang joined a closed-door exchange in the WTO’s Green Room. WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala delivered opening remarks at the session.

Later that day, Wang attended a high-level session led by the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), titled “The tectonic plates of trade are moving: A new equilibrium?”

The session opened with remarks from PIIE President Adam S. Posen and was moderated by Bloomberg’s Brendan Murray. Speakers included Cecilia Malmström, Nonresident Senior Fellow at PIIE and former European Commissioner for Trade; Tatiana Prazeres, Brazil’s Foreign Trade Secretary; Vera Songwe of the Brookings Institution; and Joe W. Sullivan, Senior Director for Policy at the Office of the United States Trade Representative.

The discussion examined how the global trading system is being reshaped amid geopolitical tensions and economic fragmentation, and what role the WTO can play in supporting a more balanced and sustainable international trade order.

September 16

On September 16, Wang joined a special edition of PIIE’s Trade Winds series at the WTO Public Forum, “The state of play for global trade: Spotting trends and challenges.”

Hosted by Cecilia Malmström, the discussion featured Robert W. Staiger, Chief Economist of the WTO; Maria Martin-Prat, Ambassador of the European Union Permanent Mission to the WTO; and Nazak Nikakhtar, Partner at Wiley Rein and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis.

Staiger presented the WTO’s 2026 World Trade Report, “A Critical Juncture for the World Trading System,” followed by a discussion on the major forces shaping international trade, including tariffs, subsidies, export restrictions, industrial policy and geopolitical tensions, as well as the future role of the WTO.

September 17

On the morning of September 17, Miao attended “The New Map of Data and Future of Critical Minerals: Could Turkiye Become Eurasia’s Safe Harbour for Data Centre Investment?”

Organized by the Electrical and Electronics Exporters’ Association of Turkiye and the Istanbul Mineral Exporters’ Association, the session examined the rapid expansion of data-centre investment, associated energy and infrastructure needs, critical-mineral supply security, and Türkiye’s potential role in Eurasian digital infrastructure.

At noon, CCG convened its own session at the WTO Public Forum, titled “Unilateralism undermining the multilateral trading system.”

Moderated by Miao, the panel featured Wang; Maarten Smeets, Senior Fellow at the World Trade Institute and a member of the Steering Committee of the Trade and Investment Research Network; Elvire Fabry, Director of the Trade and Economic Security Programme at the Jacques Delors Institute; and Wenhua Ji, Professor at the University of International Business and Economics and Vice President of the WTO Law Research Society of the China Law Society.

The discussion considered the spillover effects of unilateral trade measures, risks of further fragmentation in the global trading system, the preservation of multilateral trade rules and possible pathways for WTO reform.

Later on September 17, Wang joined a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) panel, “Effect of Structural Economic Differences on Global Trade.”

Hosted by Angela Ellard of CSIS, the session will also feature Marion Jansen of the OECD, Ed Brzytwa of the Consumer Technology Association and Nazak Nikakhtar of Wiley Rein. The panel will examine how structural differences among major economies affect global trade and what those differences mean for the future of multilateral trade governance.

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CCG has participated in previous editions of the WTO Public Forum. At the 2019 edition, Henry Huiyao Wang publicly called for marine plastics pollution to become an area of WTO cooperation and urged China to help advance multilateral action on the issue. Also participating in that discussion was Zhang Xiangchen, then ambassador and permanent representative of China to the WTO.

The following year, China and Fiji launched the WTO’s Informal Dialogue on Plastics Pollution and Environmentally Sustainable Plastics Trade. The initiative has since expanded to 83 WTO co-sponsors, representing nearly 90 percent of global plastics trade.

On December 13, 2021, to mark the 20th anniversary of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Center for China and Globalization (CCG), together with the Network for International Trade and Investment System (NITIS) and the China Institute for WTO Studies (CIWTO) at the University of International Business and Economics, held a hybrid seminar titled “Twenty Years of China’s WTO Membership: From Integration to Interaction.”

Participants included then WTO Deputy Director-General Anabel Gonzalez; former Spanish Foreign Minister Arancha Gonzalez Laya; former WTO Deputy Directors-General Alan Wolff and Yi Xiaozhun; Zhang Yuejiao, former chair of the WTO Appellate Body; and Tu Xinquan, Dean of CIWTO.

At the 2024 Public Forum, CCG organized a session titled “Leveraging China’s Green Transition for Global Climate Mitigation: Perspectives, Opportunities and Challenges,” moderated by Wang and featuring former WTO Deputy Director-General Xiaozhun Yi, former Kenyan Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed, Elvire Fabry and PIIE President Adam S. Posen.

CCG in 2024 was greeted by Li Chenggang, then Chinese ambassador to the WTO, in Geneva.

The 2026 programme continues CCG’s engagement with international institutions and policy organizations on the future of the multilateral trading system and global economic governance.

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